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DUAL SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Elizabeth Defeis*
Developments in the area of human rights continue to figure prominently
in the evolving jurisprudence of the European Union. The Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms has assumed an increasingly important role
in the opinions of the Advocates General' and in decisions of the Court of First
Instance and most recently, it was cited by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
for the first time.2 In another development, the Court of First Instance has ruled
that UN Security Council resolutions trump fundamental human rights
guarantees. Finally, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
deferred to an opinion of the European Court of Justice concerning an
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms despite the fact that it might have decided the case differently.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, although not legally
binding, is advancing, albeit in some sense covertly through citations in the
opinions of the Advocates General and the courts of the European Union. In
addition, the Parliament and the Commission continue to cite the Charter as
inspiration for many of its actions.
When the EU was first established in 1957, its primary goal was the
attainment of economic integration.4 Although the Treaty of Rome contains a
social chapter that gives limited mention to human rights, its primary focus was
to improve working conditions on a harmonized basis throughout the European
community. It was not viewed as a guarantor of rights.
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author would like to thank her
research assistants Lisa M. Scorsolini, Class of 2007 and Kourtney J.A. Knop, Class of 2008. These remarks
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1. Case C-I 73/99, Broad., Entrn't, Cinematographic & Theatre Union (BECTU) v. Sec'y of State
for Trade & Indus., 2001 E.C.R. 1-4881 28 (opinion of Advocate General Tizzano).
2. See generally Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 2006
EUR-Lex (June 27, 2006).
3. Case 306/01, Yusufv. Council of the European Union, [2005] E.C.R. 3533, [2005] 3 C.M.L.R.
49 16 (Sept. 21, 2005).
4. Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Constitution for the European Union? A Transatlantic Perspective, 19
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 351,377 (2005). Indeed, its only substantive provision pertaining to human rights
was ex-Article 119, now Article 141, which guaranteed women equal pay for equal work. Id. at 378. Even
this provision, however, was included for economic rather than human rights reasons; since some states
already had such a guarantee (e.g., France), its inclusion was necessary so that those states would not be
placed at an economic disadvantage.
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As originally envisaged, human rights were to be protected by the
individual Member States through their national constitutions and laws, and
through the Strasbourg Process. However, when the ECJ announced the
doctrine of supremacy of community law over national legislation in 1964, the
doctrine was resisted by some states that had strong human rights provisions in
their national constitutions. In response, the ECJ as early as 1969, held that
fundamental rights were enshrined in the general principles of Community law.'
In the early 1970s the Court noted that the EU would be guided by
constitutional traditions of the Member States and by the provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.'
In recent years the ECJ has effectively incorporated the decisions of the
ECHR into its human rights jurisprudence. The Court now cites almost
routinely the case law of the Strasbourg Court. This is indeed striking since
citation by the ECJ to the case law of another court is unusual.7 However, the
Court has also ruled that the EU itself could not accede to the Convention.
In July of 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms was proclaimed at
the Nice Summit. However, even though the document has political force, it
is not legally binding on Member States. The Charter was included as Part II
of the ill-fated Constitution and its importance continues to grow together with
a movement to adopt the Charter as a separate document
The Charter not only explicitly reaffirms the rights set out in the European
Convention but covers a range of rights not included in the Convention such as
the right to good administration and social rights of workers.9 It is composed
of a preamble and chapters pertaining to Dignity, Freedom, Equality, Solidarity,
Citizens' Rights, and Justice and incorporates fifty paragraphs enumerating
extensive rights."°
5. Case C-29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
6. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 17 (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int; Defeis, supra note 4, at 371-72.
7. Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter on
Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Justice: The Impact of European Union accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights, in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 291,291-292 (IngolfPemice, Juliane Kokott, & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2006).
8. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 41.
9. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, arts. U-87, 11-101, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C
310) 47-50.
10. See generally Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 3 10)
1. These include a right to life (with the death penalty proscribed), a right to respect for one's physical and
mental integrity (including a right to life), a right to respect for one's physical and mental integrity (including
a ban on the sale of human body parts), a right to respect for private and family life, a right to the protection
of personal data, a right to marry, a right to conscientious objection, a right to join trade unions, a right to
have access to vocational and continuing training and the right to receive free compulsory education, a right
to engage in work, a right for children to express their views freely and to have those views taken into
consideration, rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence, a right of the disabled to benefit
from measures designed to ensure their dependence, a right of access to a free placement service for
employment, workers' rights to take collective action, and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental
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Although a few countries (including France, Germany, Denmark, and
Sweden) have accepted the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the document is not
without controversy.1 The U.K. ultimately accepted incorporation of the
Charter into the draft Constitution with the provision that it should apply to
"[m]ember States only when they are implementing Union law."' 2 Further, the
draft Constitution provided that the Charter is to be interpreted consistently
with constitutional provisions of Member States.13
The Charter has already played an important role in the European human
rights arena despite the uncertainty about its legal force. This influence can be
found in numerous opinions by Advocates General and judgments by the Court
of First Instance. In most cases the Charter of Fundamental Rights is cited
alongside the European Convention of Human Rights. Typically, citation to the
Charter is followed by the disclaimer that the "Charter's legal status is still
uncertain, but its importance should not be ignored."' 4
For example, in a case involving right of access to documents, Advocate
General Ldger stated that the Charter should not be regarded as "a mere list of
purely moral principles without any consequences."' 5 He noted that since the
rights in the Charter are drawn from values unanimously held by Member States
and consolidated by the Member States, they form the top level of protection
of community values. Further, the sources listed in the Charter's preamble
contain binding legal force, which allows the Community to benefit from values
that are so highly and commonly held. Lfger noted that the Charter was meant
to be an instrument for classifying fundamental rights and it is a "source of
guidance as to the true nature of the Community rules of positive law."' 6
The Court of First Instance similarly frequently cites the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. For example, in a case involving the presumption of
innocence the Court cited the Charter along with the ECHR for the principle
that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right. The Court stated, "it
is necessary to take account of the principle of the presumption of innocence
resulting in particular from Article 6(2) of the ECHR, and by Article 47 of the
leave.
11. Defeis, supra note 4, at 379.
12. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, supra note 8, art. 11-1 1.
13. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, supra note 8, art. 11-112. At the
Intergovernmental Conference following the publication of the draft Constitution, the U.K. succeeded in
having a new paragraph inserted in the text concerning the application of the Charter ofFundamental Rights.
It states that "[t]he explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States." A
special Declaration was added to the draft Constitution that includes texts of the explanations in full.
14. See, e.g. Case C- 173/99, Broad., Entm't, Cinematographic & Theatre Union (BECTU) v. Sec'y
of State for Trade & Indus., 2001 E.C.R. 1-4881 128 (opinion of Advocate General Tizzano).
15. Case C-353/99, Council ofthe European Union v. Heidi Hautala, 2001 EUR-Lex T 80 (July 10,
2001) (opinion of Advocate General LUger).
16. Id.
2007]
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that are protected in the
Community legal order."' 7 Thus, the Charter is placed in the same category as
other legally binding instruments as part of the Community legal order.'8
However, the Court also notes that the Charter does not have legally binding
force.
While the Charter is cited frequently in the Opinions of the Advocates
General and the Court of First Instance, until recently, the European Court of
Justice has avoided mentioning the Charter at all. However, in June 2006, in
European Parliament v. Council ofthe European Union the Court reversed this
trend in the case involving a Directive on family reunification that was
challenged by the Parliament. 9 As is customary with such directives, the
Directive cited the Charter in recognizing the right to family reunification and
no discrimination based on age.20 In an Opinion, Advocate General Kokott
writes, "[w]hile the Charter still does not produce binding legal effects
comparable to primary law, it does, as a material legal source, shed light on the
fundamental rights protected by Community legal order."'"
The European Court of Justice in its opinion noted that the Preamble of the
Directive refers to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.22 In
discussing the relevance of the Charter, the Court acknowledged that while the
Charter is not a legally binding instrument its importance was recognized by the
Community legislature by placing it in the Directive.23 Furthermore, the Court
noted that the "principle aim of the Charter ... is to reaffirm rights as they
result.. . from Constitutional traditions and international obligations common
to Member States, the Treaty on the European Union ... and the European
Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms."24
The Charter was solemnly proclaimed by the Parliament, the Council
and the Commission in Nice on December 7, 2000. While the
Charter is not a legally binding instrument, the Community legislature
did however, acknowledge its importance by stating, in the second
17. Case T-38/02, Groupe Danone v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
548 216 (Oct. 25, 2005).
18. Case C-353/99, Council ofthe European Union v. Heidi Hautala, 2001 EUR-Lex 82 (July 10,
2001) (opinion of Advocate General lger). In other instances involving issues of criminal procedure such
as the right to an effective remedy and protection from double jeopardy, the Charter is cited alongside of the
Convention.
19. See generally Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 2006
EUR-Lex (June 27, 2006).
20. Id. 32.
21. Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 2006 EUR-Lex (Setp.
8, 2005) (opinion of the Advocate General Kokott).
22. Id. 6.
23. Id. 108.
24. Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 2006 EUR-Lex 38
(June 27, 2006).
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recital in the preamble to the Directive, that the Directive observes the
principles recognized not only by Article 8 of the ECHR but also in
the Charter. Furthermore, the principal aim of the Charter, as is
apparent from its preamble, is to reaffirm rights as they result, in
particular, from the constitutional traditions and international
obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European
Union, the Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Charters
adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the
case-law of the Court ... and of the European Court of Human
Rights. 25
In its findings the Court discusses the relevant provisions of the Charter
pertaining to respect for private or family life.
While incorporation of the Charter has been widely noted and
enthusiastically received, it has also been subject to criticism. Just ten days
before the Court issued its opinion citing the ECJ, the well respected Advocate
General Sir Francis Jacobs discussed the Charter. He noted that the Charter has
no legal force and, that although several Advocates General and the Court of
First Instance had referred to the Charter as a non-binding authority on human
rights, it had not been relied on by the ECJ as a legal source. Although he
acknowledged that in many respects it was preferable that the EU has its own
human rights law appropriate to its own competence and nature, he criticized
the Charter as confusing and misleading.26
Despite the misgivings of Sir Francis Jacobs, it seems clear that the
Charter has taken on an increasingly important role in the human rights
jurisprudence of the European Union and that the movement for accession is
gaining momentum.2
Two cases involving Human Rights decided in this past year, one by the
ECJ and the other by the ECHR, will likely have a profound impact on human
rights and the EU.
In a stunning decision rendered by the Court of First Instance in September
2005 in Yusuf v. Council of the European Union and the Commission of the
European Communities, the Court affirmed the supremacy of Security Council
Resolutions over obligations under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and, indeed, over the treaty
obligations of Member States.28
25. Id.
26. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 293. Jacobs was critical also of the position that the EU should accede
to the European Convention. EU accession to the ECHR is intended is to fill a gap, by allowing an individual
to bring a case against the EU, as well as Member States. Thus, he suggests that extending the jurisdiction
of the ECJ is preferable to EU accession to the ECHR and notes that the ECJ should be given a wider role
to ensure respect for the rule of law in important areas that require effective judicial review.
27. See generally id.
28. Case 306/01, Yusufv. Council of the European Union, [2005] E.C.R. 3533, [2005] 3 C.M.L.R.
2007] Defeis
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The case involved Ahmed Ali Yusuf, a Swede of Arab origin, who had
been placed on a list of alleged terrorists by the U.N. Sanctions Committee.29
The Security Council Resolution required that all funds and other financial
resources controlled directly or indirectly by individuals associated with the
Taliban, Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network be frozen.3" It also
published a list of alleged terrorists.3 In order to implement the sanctions
regime, the European Council enacted regulations that in effect froze the assets
of Yusuf. Yusuf claimed that the sanctions were in violation of the Treaty of
Rome, which provides for disciplinary actions against states not single
individuals.32 He also claimed that his fundamental rights, including his right
to make use of his property, right to a fair hearing and right to an effective
judicial remedy were violated.3
The Court of First Instance held that the EC Treaty empowers the Council
to impose economic and financial sanctions on third countries, when a common
position adopted by the European Union under the common foreign and
security policy so provide.34 The Council had in the past taken restrictive
measures against persons who constructively governed a part of a country and
against persons or entities associated with them or provided financial support.35
Indeed this type of smart sanction is aimed at individuals and is designed to
reduce suffering of civilians and has been utilized by the Security Council since
the 1990s.36 It then ruled that the Council is competent also, under similar
conditions, to impose economic and financial sanctions such as the freezing of
funds on individuals, in connection with the fight against international
terrorism.37
The Court then turned to the interplay between rights guaranteed by the
European Convention and possible conflict with Security Council resolution.3"
The Court noted that under § 103 of the United Nations Charter, the obligations
of the Member States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United
Nations prevail over any other obligation, including the obligations under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and under the EC Treaty. The Court stated: "[f]rom the standpoint
49 7 (Sept. 21, 2005).
29. Id 197.
30. Id 10.
31. Id 9.
32. Id 110.
33. Case T-306/01, Yusufv. Council, [2005] E.C.R. 3533 190.
34. Id 131.
35. Id 114.
36. Id 113.
37. Id 119.
38. See generally Case 306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the European Union, [2005] E.C.R. 3533,
[2005] 3 C.M.L.R. 49 (Sept. 21, 2005).
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of international law, the obligations of the Member States of the United Nations
under the Charter of the United Nations clearly prevail over every other
obligation of domestic law or of international treaty law including, for those of
them that are members of the Council of Europe, their obligations under the
ECHR and, for those that are also members of the Community, their obligations
under the EC Treaty."39 This paramountcy extends to decisions of the Security
Council.
The Court further noted that although the European Union itself is not a
member of the United Nations, the Community is bound by the obligations
flowing from the Charter of the United Nations, in the same way as are its
Member States.40 First, the Community may not infringe the obligations
imposed on its Member States by virtue of the UN Charter or impede their
performance. 4 Second, the Community is required to adopt all the provisions
necessary to allow its Member States to fulfill those obligations.42
The Court observed that the Community regulations were enacted to put
into effect at the Community level decisions of the Security Council. 43 Any
review of the internal lawfulness of the regulation would therefore involve the
Court in examining, indirectly, the lawfulness of the decisions in question."
The Court stated, "[i]t must therefore be considered that the resolutions of the
Security Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court's
judicial review and that the Court has no authority to call in question, even
indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community law. On the contrary, the
Court is bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply that law in a manner
compatible with the obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the
United Nations. 45
Nevertheless, the Court did reserve for itself one area of review of Security
Council decisions. The Court would examine the contested regulation and,
indirectly, the Security Council resolutions in the light of the higher rules of
general international law falling within the scope ofjus cogens-a peremptory
norm of public international law from which neither the Member States nor the
bodies of the United Nations may derogate.46 It then considered claimed
violations of human rights including deprivation of property, right of personal
defense and right of effective judicial review in light of rules ofjus cogens and
found no violation ofjus cogens.47
39. Id 231.
40. Id 210.
41. Id J254.
42. Id.
43. Case T-306/01, Yusufv. Council, [2005] E.C.R. 3533 256.
44. IdJ 7.
45. Id 276.
46. Id 7.
47. Id 8.
2007] Defeis
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Several other cases involving the contested regulations were subsequently
decided by the Court of First Instance. The Court, using reasoning similar to
the Yusufcase upheld the Council regulations. Appeals to the European Court
of Justice are pending and it will be interesting to see whether the Court adopts
the reasoning or limits it.
The final Case to be discussed is a judgment not of the ECJ but of the
ECHR. The Case is Bosphorus v. Ireland which involved the impoundment of
an airplane pursuant to EC regulations that were enacted to implement the
Sanctions regime of the Security Council with respect to the former
Yugoslavia.4"
Previously, the Regulation had been challenged49 and through an Article
177 referral by Ireland to the ECJ, the ECJ determined that the Regulations
applied and that the impoundment did not violate fundamental human rights
including the right to quiet enjoyment of property as set forth in the
Convention.5"
When the impoundment was challenged in the ECHR as violating Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention, the ECHR very carefully surveyed the human rights
system for protection of human rights in the European Union and reviewed both
the opinion of the AG and the decision of the Court itself.5" It found that system
to be equivalent to the Convention system both substantively and
procedurally.52 By equivalent protection, the Court stated that it means
comparable rather than identical system of protection.53 The Court noted that
any requirement that the organizations system of protection be identical could
run counter to the interests of international cooperation 54 -an interest which it
described as a legitimate interest of considerable weight.55 Although not
identical to the Convention, the EU protections were comparable or equivalent
to the Convention system and the Court, in effect deferred to the decision of the
ECJ without further scrutiny.56
Clearly, human rights protection within the EU continues to evolve.
However, with a dual system for human rights protection, difficult questions
and challenges will remain both for the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights.
48. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 3-4 (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
49. Id. at 29.
50. Id. at 10-11.
51. See generally id.
52. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 30 (2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
53. Id. at44.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 43.
56. See generally id.
[Vol. 14:1
THE RIGHT TO RESIST THE GOVERNMENT:
TYRANNY, USURPATION, AND REGICIDE IN
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king of France" .. .................................... 37
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William Shakespeare explored in his plays the ideal of stability and
harmony between the governed and the governor. The reins of
government and personal royal ethics lay at the core of Shakes-
peare's concerns discussed in this article. These are the public and
private aspects of the issue that may have inspired Shakespeare to
dramatize conflicts over the reins of government. Shakespeare
centered several plays on the ruler's failure to do justice before his
people which often fueled a usurper's desire to seize the throne.
Incompetent, weak or tyrannical kings caused long-term discontent
and often provoked ambitious, junior members of the royal family
who dared to think that they could inspire, capture and keep the
loyalty of the people after seizing the throne from the not-very-
popular incumbent. Shakespeare's vision of good government con-
templated the king's broad consultation among thepeople, including
Parliament as well as the king's council, to serve the public interest
and the common good. Shakespeare's plays, together with wide-
spread European examination of the nature of monarchy during the
1590s, afterwards proved to be an important step in the development
of constitutional monarchy which was ultimately the achievement of
a later century. Neither examples of classic Aristotelian natural law
nor yet individualistic Lockean rights, these transitional works have
proved to be enduring examples andwarnings forpoliticians seeking
to leave their mark on history when constitutions provide leaders
with a set of norms for their behavior. Indeed, by the time John
Locke wrote, the ideas were in place for a new nation to use as a
blueprint the natural law insights refined and adapted to the needs
of the late seventeenth century. Both Locke and Shakespeare were as
important in the United States ofAmerica as they were in England
(Vol. 14:1
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I. INTRODUCTION
William Shakespeare (1564-1616) lived in turbulent times. In the guise
of examining what the Romans had done, political authority was being
challenged seriously from various points along the political spectrum, from
communal to individual demands and absolutist stances to the Diggers of the
mid- 17th century. The threats of violence were not far from the surface. Queen
Elizabeth (who ruled from 1558-1601) was growing older without an heir to
succeed her. Religious and political groups of English people were becoming
more divergent, including those who thought that churches should be
independent from government sponsorship, later known as Congregationalists.
Elizabeth's failure to declare a successor produced much intrigue at court,
mostly among the multitude of political adventurers and religious dissenters
who hoped to reshape the government in their own image. Shakespeare's plays
suggest that the character of the ruler is a determining factor which can ensure
stability or trigger unrest. In the search for greater political stability, history is
important for the lessons it discloses about royal behavior, actions and psycho-
logy. Shakespeare's contemporaries used their knowledge of the many events
and lessons of history to understand the mistakes of the past and their own time
better. Shakespeare presents various sides of the political debate through his
characters and the dramatic interaction between them. He did not advocate the
overthrow of the monarchy, as indeed he could not openly do under the
censorship laws of the time. Even Locke's espousal of revolution in the 1680s
was not publicly advanced but pursued very much in backroom political
meetings for the overthrow of James I, should that have become necessary.
Thus the plots of many of Shakespeare's plays revolve around royal
actions, omissions and mistakes in the affairs of state, thereby giving us greater
insight into the political and ethical norms of Elizabethan society. He paid
particular attention to the character and psychology of kings, the problems they
faced and how they ruled. Shakespeare noticed whether they were attentive to
or aloof from the concerns of their subjects and whether they shared the
common moral values of the people, including social justice. Royal incompet-
ence, weakness or tyrannical behavior had often caused long-term discontent
and hardship for the people. Unethical royal choices had continually lent hope
to the ambitions of new seekers of the crown who plotted to inspire, capture and
keep the loyalty of the people after seizing the throne from the not-very-popular
incumbent. In Shakespeare's dramatization of the histories of several rulers, we
will explore approaches to the legal and moral crises arising from the numerous
conflicts about change of leadership and sharing political power.
Shakespeare modeled different types of monarchy for the English people.
As succeeding generations became familiar with their own history and
government in part through watching the ethical struggles of such kings as
2007]
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Macbeth (THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, [hereinafter MACBETH]),' Richard II
(TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD II, [hereinafter RICHARD n]) 2 and the fourth and
fifth Henries (King Henry V [hereinafter HENRY V])3 portrayed on the stage,
they made their wishes plain that the monarchy be circumscribed with constitu-
tional safeguards. In that sense, Shakespeare's plays about kingship are rele-
vant to politicians and government today as we see our own leaders struggling
with the ethical challenges that face them. In these plays, Shakespeare created
a body of work that speaks out against poor rulers and their equally poor ethical
choices. The plays proved to be an important step in the development of
constitutional monarchy later achieved in England.
Shakespeare lived at a time when the problems of monarchy were
becoming more and more apparent. The classic conceptions of government,
drawn from the experience of the ancients and later reflected in the writings of
Plato and Aristotle, start with the small Greek city state in which the character
of the ruler was crucial to the quality of the government.4 Therefore, the
questions of virtue, the purpose of life and the best kind of life were centrally
practical concerns of political philosophy. In Aristotle's time and after, the
politicians were fundamental to the success of the regime in a way that modern
rulers of representative democracies with many institutional checks, balances
and administrative agencies are not. As Professor Francis Slade stated, in
ancient political society, "rule cannot be detached or separated from the kind
of people who exercise it."5 Shakespeare's plays show the difficulties from this
entanglement and make the audience wish to be able to decouple government
from such abject dependence on the ruler. More recent political theorists have
been able to conceive of government apart from its rulers. Professor Slade
notes that because of this conceptualization of rule, our founding fathers could
say "all human beings are created equal, no one by nature is [the] ruler of any
other human being."6
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 792
(1960) [hereinafter MACBETH]. Throughout this article, the quotations from Shakespeare's works are from the
one volume, widely available unabridged paperback edition of the "Cambridge Shakespeare" of 1864, revised
in 1911 but without the variant manuscript reading in the notes. THE UNABRIDGED WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
(William G. Clark & William A. Wright, eds. Courage Books 1989) (Originally published as the Globe Edition
under the title THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 1911). Many excellent editions with separate
volumes for each play exist and any classic notes cited from these editions are acknowledged.
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD 11 in I THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
278 (1960).
3. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, in I THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 414
(1960) [hereinafter HENRY V].
4. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS in 21 ARISTOTLE IN TWENTY-THREE VOLUMES 625 (G.P. Gould ed., H.
Rackam trans. Harvard University Press, 1990) (1932).
5. Telephone Interview with Francis Slade, Professor Emeritus, Saint Francis College (Feb. 6,
2006).
6. Id.
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Usurpation, regicide and treason were familiar concepts during the Middle
Ages, as well as to Shakespeare's audience. Shakespeare often warned against
tyranny in his portrayal of Kings Richard II and Henry IV. He previewed the
dangers the realm faced in attempting to overthrow tyranny. The plays serve
as a warning to make the point that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty but
more than that, they explored the nature of government at a very dangerous and
exciting time when people looked back to the order and stability Aristotle
posited for government but were also beginning to yearn for greater personal
fulfillment which a better-honed concept of government might give them.
Natural law, as Aristotle had envisioned it and Aquinas had interpreted it, no
longer proved a sufficient blueprint to allow for the variety of people who
wished to contribute to, and be accommodated in, the governing of the realm.
This article shows Shakespeare exploring in his plays the struggles to forge the
links between the old balance of powers and another view of the world,
between the natural law verities of Aristotle and what later became the
individualistic vision of the constitution for able entrepreneurs under a limited
government. The ethical choices of the individual rulers are therefore integral
to the structure of these plays politically as well as dramatically. Shakespeare's
plays contributed to our journey from the first to the second concept of
government and were thus politically important during the 18th century in both
England and the United States of America.
Surprisingly, despite all the interest in Shakespeare and the many books
and articles I have been able to cite in reaching my own conclusions, there is no
one received view about Shakespeare's attitude toward kingship. The founda-
tions of political theory and constitutional government were long available in
England, however, and provide background for some of the notions about
government explored in the plays. This article will show that Shakespeare's
plays fit between a classical Aristotelian notion of natural law integrating the
individual into a larger society and the later concept of individual rights in a
limited, liberal constitutional state.
A. A government unresponsive to the will of the people breeds its own
violence: "If you do sweat to put a tyrant down, You sleep in peace the
tyrant being slain "7
England has a long tradition of discussing tyrants and tyranny. As early
as the 12th century, John of Salisbury (c. 1115-80) was discussing in
Policriticus the slaying of tyrants, about which he drew "only one conclusion:
tyrants come to a miserable end. And he passes only one moral judgment on
7. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD Mll, in I THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
244, act 5, sc. 3, II. 255-56 (1960).
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this fact: they are really deserving [of] it."' 8 During the next century, the lawyer
and royal judge Henry de Bracton revised a legal treatise entitled De Legibus
et Consuetudinibus Angliae which discussed the role of the king in making and
upholding the law.9 In Book I of De Legibus, the law is treated with great
importance and the king whose office is simultaneously under the aegis of the
law and also above the law. This may have been due to the need to subject the
king to natural law (the moral principles for judging government) without
interfering in his control of positive, or man-made, law and his governance of
the realm.' Although the king was subject to the law, the process of the law
could not be brought against the king. As Kantorowicz summarizes the
position, the ruler "is bound to the Law that makes him king; but the Law that
made him king enhances also his royal power and bestows upon the ruler
extraordinary rights which in many respects placed the king, legally, above the
laws"--because the people transferred their power and authority to the king."
What pleased the prince had the force of law but to fashion a law, the prince
received counsel from the magnates.12 Already in the 13th century, the
emphasis was on fettering the king's discretion with the consultation of his
council. The composition ofthe king's council often times determined whether
the king was deemed a good or unsatisfactory ruler, as Shakespeare's plays
demonstrate. Further, in Bracton and in RICHARD II, the king may claim
"similitude with Jesus Christ in whose stead he governs on earth."13 If the king
were not law-abiding, he would be merely a tyrant and not a king.
In terms of political theory, Sir John Fortescue (c. 1395-1477), Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, described England in De Laudibus Legum Anglie
(1470) "as a 'dominion political and royal,' ruled by common law." 14 The
people of England intended their government to pursue the common good, and
8. Jan van Laarhaven, Thou Shalt not Slay a Tyrant! The So-Called Theory of John of Salisbury,
in THE WORLD OF JOHN OF SALISBURY 319, 328 (Michael Wilks ed., 1994).
9. 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 25 (G.E. Woodbine ed., S.E. Thome
trans. 1968-77). Bracton and his mentor Judge Ralph Pattishull were familiar with Roman law through the
writings ofAzo. Id. at 25. The treatise therefore set the discussion of English kingship and law in the context
of Roman law. See also Ewart Lewis, King Above Law? "QuodPrincipiPlacuit" inBracton, 39 SPECULUM
240 (1964).
10. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN POLITICAL MEDIEVAL
THEOLOGY 145 (1997). The king was above the law (rex supra legem) and the law was above the king (lex
supra regem). Id. at 149.
11. Id. at 150.
12. Id. at 152.
13. Id. at 156. Bracton's comparison of the king to Christ was based on the assumption that the
servant of the law could become the lord of the law and that "all royal prerogatives depended on the king's
acknowledgment of being bound to the Law which granted to him those very prerogatives." Id. at 157.
14. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND xv (Shelley Lockwood
ed., 1997). See also J.H. BURNS, LORDSHIP, KINGSHIP AND EMPIRE: THE IDEA OF MONARCHY 1400-1525
(1992).
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the king undertook to embody the country politically. A king had to do justice
through the laws; law is "the sacred bond of human society." 5 Fortescue saw
justice as the means to overcome tyranny because each person was to enjoy
what was due to him through natural and human laws. Justice is "the
touchstone for the legitimacy and proper functioning of political authority. ' 6
As had been accepted throughout the Middle Ages, kings, in accordance
with their coronation oath, had to observe the laws and customs of England.
The king could not change the laws without the people's consent, although
nothing other than public pressure and tradition ensured that the king did so.
Interestingly enough, for the circumstances in Shakespeare's play RICHARD II,
one theory of the cause of tyranny was the king's poverty, which made him seek
funds beyond what Parliament appropriated to accomplish what he thought had
to be done. 7 Politically, the king needed the wherewithal to reward his
followers in order to prevent rebellions. To Fortescue, recognition of the
existence of the public good served as the greatest protection against tyranny.
On a more practical level, the king's council similarly provided protection for
government. The composition of the council had changed between Bracton's
and Fortescue's time. The nobles continued to think that they should be the
natural councilors for the king, as they had been in Bracton's time. Fortescue
suggested instead that men of merit rather than birth alone could serve the
king's government better. In the tradition of natural law, they could channel the
king's discretion to shape good government in accordance with the intent of the
people.' 8 Richard Hooker (1553-1600) developed some of these ideas building
on Aquinas in the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593). The law of reason and
notions of consent and equality in Hooker's treatise were important themes
present in Shakespeare's time. Nearly a century later, John Locke (1632-1704)
drew on these themes from Hooker. By Locke's time, natural law principles of
limited government and duties and rights of both governed and governor
became more focused and pronounced in the theoretical language of political
science. Shakespeare's history plays had presented the factual evidence of how
and why greater numbers of groups within the commonwealth wanted to
express their views and participate in its government. Other aspects of Locke's
theories of government, such as the state of nature or a focus on individual
rights, cannot be anticipated in Shakespeare's plays, which reflect a hierarchical
society and an emphasis on the common good rather than on individual political
and economic rights. Whether Shakespeare drew on Hooker's book for his
15. FORTESCUE, supra note 14, at xxiii, 127-36.
16. Id. at xvii.
17. Id. at 92-93.
18. Id. at 114. On the transmission of this natural law tradition to later ages, see THE SELECTED
POLmCAL WRITING OF JOHN LOcKE 222 (2005) (citing RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL
POLITY, BOOK I (1593) (tracing Locke's use of Hooker)). Further references will be to the section number
of the Second Treatise of Government.
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plays or derived them from earlier presentations, there is little doubt that these
governmental values appear strongly in Shakespeare's plays and that these
plays later had an important role in developing a better governmental system in
the succeeding centuries.
B. The role of the usurpers: "[Wihen blood is their argument:
"[Ulsurpation is the exercise ofpower, which another hath a right to. "20
Shakespeare's plays on English kingship focus on moments of moral
choice in royal decision-making about the care of the kingdom. In the
soliloquies, Macbeth, for example, is portrayed in moments of self-examination
and doubt. His thought process is revealed as he gropes toward a decision.
Once the audience sees the characters in Shakespeare's plays interact, it can
draw conclusions about tyranny versus mercy, ambition versus justice and
courage versus bad character, as well as strong, weak, tyrannical or good
government, based on the type of ruler Shakespeare portrays in the play.
In the attempt to discern the common good in a hierarchical society, one
main problem to address is who speaks for the public interest. In troubled times
and troubled reigns, both the king and his usurper often ignored the common
good in favor of poor or overly selfish or ambitious decisions with dire and
often violent consequences. Both kings and those vying to usurp the throne
used political unrest to seize the political initiative and impose their own views
and interests on the realm. These kings and their usurpers had a range of
decisions to make about foreign relationships, taxation and domestic policies.
The realm of ethical kingship can be seen as the point of intersection of natural
law, that is, the over-arching moral perspective, and positive, that is, human,
law embodied in legislation. Royal legislation, was considered reason enough
to depose the king if the law were deemed fundamentally immoral and unfair.
The public judged the results of their rulers' choices after the decisions were
made but the ethical choices themselves came from the people with political
power to bring about change in England for good or ill. The decision makers
in Shakespeare's plays (often the ambitious, royal rebels committing treason to
obtain the throne for themselves) proved that their actions were every bit as
important as the kings' decisions. Tudor political theory held that the monarch
was divinely ordained. Indeed, the king had long been crowned in a ceremony
set forth in a coronation ordo, or service, with passages from the Bible selected
for Charlemagne's coronation. In addition, the monarch is anointed with holy
oil, as even the second Queen Elizabeth was in 1953. Only a minority of
passages in the Bible treated "the king as a provisional rather than absolute
19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRYV, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE supra
note 3, at 432, act 4, sc. 1, 1. 143.
20. LOCKE, supra note 18, § 199.
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authority" and absolute authority normally required "the subject's duty of
unqualified obedience.",21 The Bible attested to the legitimacy of kings. The
passage on legitimacy most frequently cited in Shakespeare's time came from
St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. "Let every soul be subject unto the higher
powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of
God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God:
and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation."22 Legitimacy accord-
ing to the Bible, however, did not by itself make a king powerful or effective.
As a form of government, monarchy had inherent drawbacks, not least how
to avoid a weak or bad ruler when his term of office was for life. This problem
recurred whenever the anointed king could not deliver the peace, security and
justice the people expected. If kings either exercised tyrannical powers or had
a weak government, debates about whether a tyrant could be removed from
office or whether the law instead required the tyrant's subjects to await his
natural death became very popular.23
Historians have long argued without possibility of resolution about
Shakespeare's views on whether a king could be deposed.24 Prudence
demanded that Shakespeare in his plays, though confident enough to use his
work to air notions of political reform, never cross the line to advocate
revolution even through his characters. In order to evade the censor and bring
his work before the public, Shakespeare had to be careful enough to draw
lessons on government without open criticism. How much harder for us than
the contemporaneous censor it is to discern Shakespeare's opinions on
Elizabethan political problems. Shakespeare showed in his plays the deposi-
tion, or removal, of rulers in different periods of Roman 25 and English history.
21. C.W.R.D. MOSELEY, SHAKESPEARE'S HISTORY PLAYS 55 (1988).
22. Romans 13:1-2 (King James). Garry Wills reminds us that Shakespeare quoted the Bishop's
Version of the Bible. GARRY WILLS, WITCHES and JESUITS: SHAKESPEARE'S MACBETH 95 (1995). See also
RICHMOND NOBLE, SHAKESPEARE'S BIBLICAL KNOWLEDGE 69-75 (1970).
23. See also J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
24. History proved attractive not only because those reading history could learn what others had
done in analogous circumstances but also because the existence of censorship made it easier to discuss current
political problems using as code language what had happened in earlier times. See M.M. REESE, THE CEASE
OF MAJESTY: A STUDY OF SHAKESPEARE'S HISTORY PLAYS 12-14 (1961), cited in PHYLLIS RACKIN, STAGES
OF HISTORY: SHAKESPEARE'S ENGLISH CHRONICLES 11 (1990).
25. THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR (c. 1600) deals with the assassination of the most popular
politician in Rome, because he appears too king-like for the republic he wishes to lead. See generally
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE 571 (1960). In THE RAPE OF LUCRECE, published in 1594, Shakespeare shows the expulsion
of the Roman royal family from their seat of power in 510 B.C. after committing many bad deeds. See
generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE RAPE OF LUCRECE, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE 106 (1960). This expulsion ushered in the Roman republic which survived almost 500 years
with a weak central executive, checked by a term of office of only one year and balanced by the Senate.
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During the 1590s, Shakespeare was studying several different historical
attempts to kill tyrants or bad rulers. Earlier Elizabeth had had her own
legitimacy problems when her father, Henry VIII, had Parliament declare his
daughters illegitimate after his son was born in order to prevent them from
succeeding to the throne but now one of her major problems was her failure to
provide for her own succession. The law attempted to protect the monarch
from revolts by providing dire penalties for treason.
The disobedience and rebellion against the king shown in Shakespeare's
play RICHARD II were therefore treated as treason. In brief, poets and
politically active nobles alike considered Richard's taxes and wars unfair. As
will appear in Section II, when Richard confiscated his cousin Henry's lands on
the death of his father, Richard lost his political initiative and was deemed a
tyrant in some powerful circles. It is appropriate to assess Richard's ethical
choices, described above, in terms of the natural law theory of human acts.
This approach had not yet been replaced in Shakespeare's time. A natural law
analysis pinpoints Richard's shortcomings at that point of intersection between
natural law and positive law, in short in his ethical choices about the governing
of the realm. The teleological theory of ethics makes the idea of the good
paramount.26 Human acts derive their moral quality from their relation to the
final end of human beings. Thus in regard to moral law, reason sees that some
acts are necessary for the attainment of the good of man. The final end of
humans is activity and reason has an important function in moral conduct by
enabling humans to act deliberately in view of a consciously apprehended end.
In natural law philosophy, deliberate choice is crucial according to the SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE. Every act of free choice is elicited by the will and is materially
or substantially an interior act of the will brought forth under the command or
judgment of reason for a particular end. Human acts are therefore moral acts.
Moral life is founded on the will's movement toward the good. Virtues are
good operative habits. Moral virtues incline sensitive appetite to act in
accordance with right reason. Human desire naturally wants to achieve the end
or purpose. Firm or good will wants to fashion the means to the end. Election,
or choice of will, tries to get to the end and decision or judgment follows.
In his portrayals of Kings Richard II and Henry IV, Shakespeare warned
his audience against the tyranny of an oppressive ruler and previewed the many
dangers the realm faced in attempting to overthrow a weak or tyrannical ruler,
including the large problem of a troubled succession. The king's individual
decision-making about government, together with the constitutional and
During the Middle Ages, the fear of tyranny and dictatorship from the experience of the early Roman kings
and then during the Roman Empire was so great that Italian City States left their political executives too weak
to provide necessary protection, as Shakespeare knew from his Italian sources. See generally PAUL A.
CANTOR, SHAKESPEARE'S ROME: REPUBLIC AND EMPIRE (1976).
26. See ROBERT S. WHITE, NATURAL LAW IN ENGLISH RENAISSANCE LITERATURE (1996).
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political considerations of sharing the powers of government, form the core of
Shakespeare's concerns discussed in this article. The private and public aspects
of government inspired Shakespeare to dramatize conflicts over the reins of
government and the desire to seize the throne: how can we approach the ideal
of stability and harmony between the governed and the governor?
Shakespeare's plays show that good government encompassed the consultation
of the king's council and Parliament because it would serve the public interest
and the common good.
We do not know whether Shakespeare believed that a ruling monarch
could be deposed by right. We do know, however, that Elizabethans in general
feared that the deposition of a monarch would lead to disastrous consequences
for the realm, including civil war. While Shakespeare's plays presented
reformist views through different characters, they also equally reflected his
audience's trepidation about the practical realities of revolution in the
trepidation other characters in the plays expressed about the social horrors that
followed in the wake of revolution. Elizabethans presumed that ethical ruler-
ship and truthful behavior might prevent political and social unrest and that
having weak or tyrannical rulership could plunge England into a political crisis.
This fear of chaos perhaps translated into a simple distinction between a good
king and a bad king rather than calling into question the viability of monarchy
itself as a form of government.
Shakespeare's JULIUS CAESAR became very popular once England set out
on the road to becoming a constitutional monarchy at the end of the 18th
century while the English were figuring out the nature of the new monarchy.
The office of king was preserved but the monarch's powers were shared with
a broader spectrum of the people. In popular opinion, Shakespeare was deemed
to have sided with Brutus against Caesar. Then public-minded activists thought
that every school child and member of Parliament had to read the play to learn
about good government. The play JULIUS CAESAR was familiar to Americans
as part of the intellectual furniture of their lives in the years before and during
the War of Independence as Americans thought about what a republic means.
Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle (c. 1625-73), a woman of letters,
praised the play during the Restoration.27
II. THE DOWNSIDES OF USURPATION: MACBETH, JULIUS CAESAR AND
RICHARD Ill: "[O]uR DUTIES ARE TO YOUR THRONE AND STATE CHILDREN
AND SERVANTS"
28
In MACBETH, it appears likely that Macbeth, an excellent warrior and
general, who has served the Scottish King Duncan loyally, will be elected king
27. Letter 123 from Margaret Cavendish, in CCXI SOCIABLE LETTERS 129 (1997).
28. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 1, at 795, act 1, sc. 4,11. 24-25 (Macbeth speaking to King Duncan).
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himself one day. He betrays his promise by growing impatient to reign
immediately. Macbeth breached his duties of loyalty to King Duncan because
of his desire to displace the king and assume his throne. MACBETH shows the
need for a king with the legitimate right to rule. Shakespeare wrote MACBETH
after the Scottish King James's accession to the English throne in 1603 upon
the death of Queen Elizabeth who had no children. Indeed, Shakespeare
reflected the contemporaneous supposition that the line of King James VI of
Scotland descended from Banquo after Malcolm Canmore's line ran out. Later
historical research proved that genealogy to be inaccurate. The supposed
succession, however, may have sparked some of Shakespeare's interest in
Macbeth. The subject matter of the play is kingship but focuses on Macbeth's
ambition to become king.
In actuality, Macbeth lived in a Scotland invaded during the great
movement of the Scandinavian peoples. Selection of a king among the male
members of the royal family depended on whether there was a vacancy and on
the ability of the candidate to protect the country from invasions and during
wartime. The major quality sought in a candidate for the Scottish kingship at
this time was military capability and judgment.29 Often times during that very
unsafe age, battle demonstrated the would-be leader's capability and worth. So
it was with the historical Macbeth, a skilled war leader, who started a kind of
civil war against King Duncan. Both Macbeth and Duncan were grandsons of
the previous king, Malcolm n who had come to the throne by murdering his
cousin, King Kenneth III, the grandfather of Lady Macbeth. After Duncan's
death in the battle, Macbeth reigned some fifteen years until the English general
Siward's winning battle in 1054 at Dunsinane and Macbeth's final defeat in
1057. Duncan's son Prince Malcolm Canmore, after having returned from exile
in England with Siward's army at his side, became king. In the play MACBETH,
Shakespeare used the real life murder of a tenth-century king while he was a
house guest as the murder of Duncan in order to portray Macbeth's usurpation
more dramatically and graphically. Shakespeare further telescoped Macbeth's
reign into one evening, thereby leaving the impression that the people rose up
quickly to throw off Macbeth's illegal rule.
29. Shakespeare referred to Scotland as an elective monarchy. THE OXFORD SHAKESPEARE, THE
TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, act 2, sc. 4 n.30 (Nicholas Brooks, ed. 1990). See also Elizabeth Neilsen, Macbeth:
The Nemesis of the Post-Shakespearean Actor, 16 SHAKESPEARE Q. 193, 195 (1965) (discussing the elective
alternating between branches of the royal family explains the repeated murders within the Scottish royal
family by members of the opposite branch attempting to forestall their cousins from ascending the throne).
As Locke later remarked, without a clear method of appointing a ruler, anarchy follows. See LOCKE, supra
note 18, § 198.
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A. No political way out for the usurper: "Macbeth shall sleep no more!"30
Shakespeare's departure from the historical facts about the death of King
Duncan in battle underlines the playwright's desire to focus on illegal
succession to office through usurpation as the central issue in MACBETH.
Macbeth, the Shakespearean character, comes to a point of crisis when he
considers killing the king.3 The murder of King Duncan is accompanied by the
killing of Duncan's drunken guards who had no information that Macbeth had
murdered Duncan. The sense of violation of natural law, which presumably the
audience feels from watching the play, increases as the play unfolds with more
murders in store.
Shakespeare depicts the image of bad government in Macbeth's decision
to commit additional murders to retain the throne he obtained by murdering
King Duncan. This chain of murders starts with the Witches' prediction that
the descendants of Macbeth's friend Banquo will come to rule Scotland.
Macbeth therefore hires two assassins to eliminate Banquo. (He later adds a
third assassin).32 Banquo's ghost then appears to Macbeth at dinner, disturbing
the banquet and scattering the attending nobles who do not perceive the ghost
but who clearly see Macbeth's horror.3 Although Macbeth did not achieve
happiness as king, he continued to kill in order to protect his position as king
of Scotland.
Shakespeare dramatizes the horror of having a king like Macbeth who
seizes the throne through regicide, by showing the audience more examples of
Macbeth's evil rule. Macbeth's next act is to have the wife and children of
Macduff murdered, when he finds out that Macduff opposed him. When
Macduff escapes to England to join Prince Malcolm, Macbeth orders the
destruction of Macduff's property and the murders of Lady Macduff and their
children.34 Like the story of King Herod, who slew all the male children under
two years old because a future ruler was predicted to be among them,
Macbeth's murder of Macduff's children shows how tyrannical his rule is;
30. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
supra note 1, at 799, act 2, sc. 2, 1. 43.
31. In order to put Macbeth's moral choices into bold relief for his audience, Shakespeare
reinvented the historical Macbeth and turned him into a caricature of raw ambition. Shakespeare carefully
explored both Macbeth's conscience and reasoning process to help the audience realize that Macbeth does
have a choice. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 1, at act 1, sc. 2, II. 7-16, 25-28. See act I, sc. 7, II. 1-28 for the entire speech.
Paul Cantor contrasts the certainty in Brutus's soliloquy, "It must be by his death," in act 2, scene 1,
line 10 of Julius Caesar with the "perplexing moral dilemma" gripping Macbeth in his soliloquy, "If it were
done when 'tis done." CANTOR, supra note 25, at 113-114.
32. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 1, at 803, act 3, sc. 3.
33. Id. act 3, sc. 4.
34. Id. act 4, sc. 2.
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Macbeth will kill even innocents to achieve his ambition and protect his ill-
gotten crown.
The dramatization of the murder of Macduff's children brings the audience
to feel the depth of harm Macbeth's course of action causes the realm. Robert
S. White states that "the principle of moralizing from empathetic suffering is
enormously important to the moral patterning of Shakespearian tragedy. The
basis of these effects is natural law presupposed as being within the consciousness
of members of the audience, an in-built desire to follow virtue and 'murmur at
vice.'35 The focus of MACBETH is the violence to innocent lives, both public and
private, which comes to the realm because of their king's illegitimate ascent to the
throne. Shakespeare's decisive departure from historical facts in MACBETH from
allows Shakespeare to portray in bold relief the horror of usurpation and regicide.
Macbeth's illegitimate ascent to the throne freed Shakespeare to delineate in
audacious detail the potentials for monarchical abuse. Only under the cover of the
despicable actions of an unlawful king could Shakespeare approach a presentation
of revolution through the arrival of Siward's army from England with the motive
of restoring the arguably legitimate line of King Duncan. To echo Hamlet,
something is literally rotten in the state (Scotland or Denmark) when the ruler
achieves his position through crime and cunning.
B. "The king-becoming graces" of the true ruler test his adherents: "What
I am truly, is thine and my poor country's to command"36
How does Shakespeare create a contrast from Macbeth's murderous rule
with images of good government? While Macbeth is killing, the English king
is literally healing his subjects. Shakespeare praises Macbeth's English
contemporary, King Edward the Confessor (1042-65) in act 4, scene 3, lines
140-159, for curing the physical ills of his people (such as the skin disease
scrofula).37 The contrast in the ethical actions of Edward and Macbeth could
not be starker. At every step, Macbeth put his own interest before the interests
of his people. Macbeth's repeated murders to retain and secure the usurped
throne outline the disparity in bold relief. The murders of Lady Macduff and
her children symbolize how far Macbeth has removed himself from his
community and the law. He is willing to endanger his people and the realm to
further his own ambition and retain the crown he usurped. First committing the
treason of usurping Duncan's throne and regicide, Macbeth then stooped to the
35. WHITE, supra note 26, at 86.
36. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 1, at 810, act 4, sc. 3, 11. 131-32.
37. BERTE WILKINSON, HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION PAMPHLET, THE CORONATION IN HISTORY 9-10
(1953). See also MARC BLOCH, THE ROYAL TOUCH: SACRED MONARCHY AND SCROFULA IN ENGLAND AND
FRANCE (1973) (discussing tuberculosis lymphadenitis, or the king's evil).
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murder of little children. The son of the slain King Duncan, Prince Malcolm
Canmore, in testing Macduff, listed the qualities, or graces, becoming to a king
as a synthesis of mercy, justice and courage.3" Those are the qualities of
Edward the Confessor. Malcolm in both the play and in life lived at the court
of Edward who ruled a country which arguably enjoyed a settled, hereditary
monarchy.39
The fact that Duncan wanted to be a king like Edward the Confessor rather
than retain the arguably still elective kingship of Scotland may bear some
analogy to the situation in JULIUS CAESAR. Duncan was ahead of his people in
moving too quickly from a fluid elective kingship to a more settled, hereditary
kingship.4 Duncan attempted to make the kingship of Scotland hereditary
when he was too weak militarily to bring this about or even to hold onto the
throne. Duncan lacked political judgment. He over-reached to make the king-
ship exclusively dynastic rather than shared among the wider royal family.
Duncan gambled with his own life for a hereditary monarchy. The Scottish
election for life without any necessary hereditary component helped the nobles
of the kingdom blow off steam. They otherwise might have engaged in more
assassinations if outlets for their own ambitions had been blocked by hereditary
kingship.41 In other plays, Shakespeare dramatized legal and moral crises
arising from conflicts about change of leadership and sharing political power.
For example, Shakespeare depicted the assassination of Julius Caesar, who was
murdered for the same reason as Duncan, attempting to make the government
hereditary.
Macbeth also paid for his ambition with his own life in the battle after
Duncan's son Prince Malcolm Canmore returned to Scotland with his uncle
Siward's army. The English army represents the Scottish people's will to
ensure that the legitimate heir is placed on the throne. By the time of Richard
II's deposition in 1399, the English people had assumed a more direct role in
how the country was to be ruled. From his play, it is clear that Shakespeare was
keenly aware of this development and used its example to engage in a dialogue
with his fellow Englishmen about the nature of good government and the level
of participation in government by the various orders of English society.
38. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 1, at 809, act 4, sc. 3, I1. 93-94.
39. In the wake of Edward's death, William the Conqueror tested that stability. THE HOUGHTON
MIFFLIN DICTIONARY OF BIOGRAPHY William the Conqueror 1615 (2003).
40. The weaknesses of King Duncan are treated in GRAHAM BRADSHAW, SHAKESPEARE'S
SKEPTICISM 244-49 (1987). See also MICHAEL MANNHEIM, THE WEAK KING DILEMMA (1973).
41. Paul Cantor, Macbeth and the Gospelling of Scotland, in SHAKESPEARE AS A POLITICAL
THINKER 315, 319 (2000).
2007]
24 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
III. MONARCHY IS WEAK: RICHARD II's LEGITIMATE SUCCESSION TO THE
THRONE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO GOVERN WELL. ("NOT ALL THE WATER IN
THE ROUGH RUDE SEA CAN WASH THE BALM OFF FROM AN ANOINTED
KING")
42
According to medieval political and religious thought, even deposition
from the throne cannot change the mark imposed on the king during his anoint-
ment at the coronation ceremony. The king is legitimate in two ways, by proper
accession to the throne and by doing justice to his people. Unlike Macbeth,
Richard's ascent to the throne was unquestionably legitimate but he failed to do
justice to his cousin Henry Bolingbroke. Richard refused to allow Bolingbroke
to take possession of his lands upon the death of his father. Thus provoked,
Bolingbroke committed his own wrongs by deposing Richard, usurping his
throne and causing Richard's murder, which led to instability for England
during Bolingbroke's coming reign as Henry 1V.
The plots and conflicts in Shakespeare's English history plays from THE
TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD II through THE LIFE OF KING HENRY V, all follow
from Bolingbroke's usurpation of King Richard 11's throne.43 Unlike Macbeth,
Bolingbroke's usurpation did not end on the battlefield and his dynasty
continued on the throne until Henry VI was deposed. Richard was the last of
the Plantagenet dynasty, directly descended from William the Duke of
Normandy who invaded and conquered England in 1066. Richard's most
important royal feature is his undoubted legitimacy as ruler. King Richard II
(1377-99) ascended to the throne of England in 1377, as a ten year-old when
King Edward III, his grandfather, died. (His father, the Prince of Wales, was
already dead.) Richard began his reign as "a weak rather than a wicked human
being, prone to irresponsibility rather than malevolence," necessarily dependent
on guardians and councilors, never fully escaping their net of intrigue and
control." "A chronically weak king was as much of a threat as a tyrant because
he would lack that constant and perpetual will to justice which was the sworn
duty of his office. 45
42. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD 11, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
supra note 2, at 292, act 3, sc. 2, I1. 54-55.
43. "The central issue for Bolingbroke's rule, and one to which every play in the rest of the second
tetralogy will return, is the threat to the realm when the king is not legally titled." Donna B. Hamilton, The
State of Law in Richard!1, 34 SHAKESPEARE Q. 5, 15 (1983).
44. Harry Levin, Sitting upon the Ground (Richard II, IV, i), reprinted in SHAKESPEARE'S
UNIVERSE: RENAISSANCE IDEAS AND CONVENTIONS 3, 3-4 (1996). An example of the later political use of
the protectorate of the realm during the minority of the king is the argument made during the 1590s that the
royal person and the royal function are separable. MARIE AXTON, THE QUEEN'S Two BODIES 98 (1977).
45. FORTESCUE, supra note 14, at xvii. The minor heir as ruler is not a problem we face in our
republican, as opposed to monarchical, form of government today since by law our president must be at least
35 years old.
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In practical terms, ethical leadership for the common good often involves
decisions about the finances of the country, its wars, and other aspects of inter-
national relations. The people in Shakespeare's time wanted to have a plain-
speaking monarch whose word could be trusted. Commitment to public law and
order was the major test of a just king. Relying on councilors whom the other
members of the royal family and their noble retainers disapproved indicated
unethical kingship, as we see in the play RICHARD I. Richard's perceived failure
to communicate well and be honest had contributed to the loss of political
harmony during his reign. Richard was certainly not the ethical, trustworthy
leader the English had envisioned. In a nutshell, "a king who flouted the law lost
all title to rule." The choice of wise councilors was the essence of domestic
royal government. Beginning with Henry IV, usurpers could claim to be
"saviours of society. 4 7 By the end of Elizabeth I's reign, several anti-royal
members of the "squierarchy" as well as the nobility, lawyers and politicians in
Parliament had worked to secure their own influence and power in government
and limit the power of the monarch.41 Shakespeare reflected these anti-
monarchical views in RICHARD II during the first half of the play. On balance,
Shakespeare's "general tone [toward Richard] is really hostile."' 9
Bolingbroke, who usurped Richard II's throne, was the son of the Duke of
Lancaster, John of Gaunt, in turn the third son of King Edward 111, the
grandfather of King Richard. Despite his great faults, Gaunt remained loyal to
his nephew, King Richard II, during the later part of the reign. The duke of
Gloucester was the youngest surviving son of Edward III. Thus, Gloucester was
the uncle of King Richard and Bolingbroke. Unlike Gaunt, Gloucester and
Bolingbroke had already opposed Richard II in 1388 and impeached the royal
favorites in Parliament. After these royal favorites were eliminated, relative
peace in a hostile atmosphere prevailed in England until 1397 (in part because
Bolingbroke was frequently abroad). Whatever Gloucester did, and this
remains unclear, he was arrested and died in custody in 1398, before his trial
46. Gerald L. Harriss, Introduction: The Exemplar of Kingship, in HENRY V: THE PRACTICE OF
KINGSHIP 11 (1985).
47. ANTHONY STEEL, RICHARD 1 2 (Bradford & Dickens 1962). For a different view, see NIGEL
E. SAUL, RICHARD 11, 1-5, 465-67 (1997). Saul acknowledges "the anti-Ricardian tone of Acts I and U."
Id. at4.
48. Id
49. Id. "Thus only the last three years of the reign, the most difficult to defend of all, figure in the
play, and Richard is depicted as a weak-kneed tyrant, alternately unmanned by misfortune and drunk with
success; [Shakespeare's] unpleasantness in the early stages is not atoned for by the pathos of the later scenes."
Id. at 3, In RICHARD 11, Shakespeare's approach to the inviolate nature of private real property was almost
that of C.B. Macpherson's assessment of Locke's position on property in §§ 25-51 of the Second Treatise.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT xv-xvi (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980). Rebellion, which
is sometimes attributed to a tyrannical king, introduces force without authority, that is "a state of war." See
id § 149, §§ 226-227 (on the right to rebel).
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was completed. Bolingbroke apparently accused Thomas Mowbray, later the
duke of Norfolk, of killing the Duke of Gloucester during his pre-trial deten-
tion. Both Bolingbroke and Mowbray were exiled when the king could not
figure out what to do with them, even after establishing a parliamentary com-
mission designed to deal with the quarrel between Bolingbroke and Mowbray.
Despite Gloucester's real life nastiness, his ghost appears in Shakespeare's play
to suggest that Richard was culpable in his uncle's murder. Our sympathy for
Richard is thereby lessened when Richard is deposed from his throne and
murdered later in the play.
A. Legitimacy does not prevent tyranny: "The commons hath he pill'd with
grievous taxes, And quite lost their hearts 50
Meanwhile King Richard moved Parliament to appropriate money for him,
through such taxes as the customs on wool and leather. Richard spent at least
some of the money on extravagant living and was always short of money even
before the expedition to Ireland.5 When John of Gaunt died, Richard had the
commission (which was previously established to deal with the quarrel between
Gaunt's son Bolingbroke and Mowbray) remain involved in Bolingbroke's
affairs, including his claim of John of Gaunt's estate. The commission pre-
vented the application for his inheritance, thus leaving the land free for the king
to take in order to finance his coming war with Ireland. Richard's expediency
and the illegality of the commission's action alarmed all landowners in
England. This short-sighted maneuver brought Bolingbroke back to England
with an army to claim his inheritance. Soon Bolingbroke wanted more than his
inheritance. In act 3, scene 2, line 47, Richard pronounced Bolingbroke a
"traitor." After he heard of the execution of his favorites, rather than take
actions to fight Bolingbroke, Richard gave up.52 The king foresaw what would
take place next, and thereupon let his followers go rather than face certain death
from the usurper Bolingbroke. 3
50. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 287, act 2, sc. 1, 11. 246-48.
51. The English started wars of subjugation in Ireland during the reign of Henry 11 (1154-1189).
They were still heavily engaged in these very expensive and destructive wars during the reign of Elizabeth
(and beyond). The significance of Richard's taxes to finance the Irish expedition was not lost on Elizabeth,
the censors or those plotting to revolt against her because by analogy this was ammunition for their argument
that her government was tyrannical, illegal and corrupt. 'WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD H, in The
Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare 39-40 (Peter Ure ed., Methuen & Co. 1966).
52. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD IL in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 293, act 3, sc. 2, 11. 144-77.
53. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD 1i, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 293, act 3, sc. 2,1. 217. The poet Samuel Daniel, Shakespeare's contemporary, emphasized
the wrongdoing in deposing a king, rather than the character issues personal to Richard and Bolingbroke
because he believed that the later civil war grew out of this illegal act. ROBERT ORNSTEIN, A KINGDOM FOR
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By the time of Richard's reign, "the concept of the communitas regni [the
commons of England] [had] developed greatly."54  Royal alliances with
interests in Parliament did circumscribe the powers of the king and force
coalition-building. Shakespeare is at some pains to comment on the ethics of
this situation because he invented a living, adult queen for Richard who rejected
royal coalition building. Shakespeare thereby indicated not only the king's
exclusionary views of political choice but also the growing isolation of the
king. In general, while the English king was not yet the constitutional monarch
we know today with little political power, the voice of the commons had grown
much stronger. As in Bracton's time, the king could only rule in accordance
with the law after consulting with his subjects.
Shakespeare juxtaposes the royal family's exclusionary view of government
with the claim of the commons of England to have more of a voice in governance.
The fictional character of the Queen (Richard II was in fact a widower, engaged
to an underage foreign princess) emphasizes the importance to Shakespeare of
presenting the different views about which groups might have a voice in
governing England, if only to satisfy the demands of censorship by including the
royal position. This scene in the garden may also demonstrate Shakespeare's
recognition of the later growth of the role of the commons in government in the
two centuries following Richard's reign. Since Richard performed the duties of
government irresponsibly, is pruning what should now be done to Richard?
"Richard's failure in stewardship to God and the law presages his expulsion from
the sea-walled garden that is John of Gaunt's other Eden."5
In accordance with natural law and Shakespeare's portrayal of Richard U's
style of governing, Richard has failed in his ethical obligations to run England
A STAGE: THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SHAKESPEARE'S HISTORY PLAYS 119 n. 18 (1972). Drayton exemplifies the
traditional, hierarchical approach. Shakespeare's concentration on the king's ethical choices is at a transi-
tional point between the traditional approach and Locke's later emphasis of constitutional limitations on the
monarch.
54. FORTESCUE, supra note 14, at xx. The "addition of a fourth clause to the coronation oath,
binding the king to keep the laws which he and the people 'will have chosen' provides evidence for this
development of government as public interest. Id The garden in act 3, scene 4 allegorically represents the
powers of government in an analogy to the tasks of gardeners in an idealized garden, suggesting that the
government should be grown with the same care. MOSELEY, supra note 21, at 106. The Gardener and his
two assistants speak about having to weed the ground, prune the overgrowth and support the plants which
need a stake, or trellis, to uphold them. Id. See also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, in I THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 294, at act 3, sc. 3, 1. 61-66 (1960). (Using the language of
growing living plants in a garden, Shakespeare sets forth in ideal terms the duties of ethical kingship.)
Norbrook points out the role of the commons in contributing to the overall health of the social order in the
great garden of England: "the gardeners insist on the predominance of public over private interest, and on the
need for active intervention to remedy abuses even at the cost of violence." David Norbrook, 'A Liberal
Tongue': Language and Rebellion in Richard II, in SHAKESPEARE'S UNIVERSE: RENAISSANCE IDEAS AND
CONVENTIONS 37, 47 (1996), (citing act 3, sc. 4, 11. 32-36).
55. Hamilton, supra note 43, at 14.
2007]
28 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
well. This accounts for Shakespeare's hostility in the first two acts and his
sympathy for Richard in the events leading up to the regicide because by then
Richard was no longer making moral decisions about the care of the community.
Instead, Bolingbroke made the bad moral choices which led to Richard's illegal
and untimely end which also accounts for Shakespeare's cool reception toward
Henry IV who began his reign a usurper already suspected of a role in regicide.
The king's pleasure which could be embodied in positive law exempted him from
the strictures of the law. But he did not escape the consequences to himself and
the realm if his decisions failed to approach the morally acceptable threshold of
natural law.
Shakespeare conveys the personal anguish of Richard the king, who can be
analyzed as occupying a middle position between a God and the courtly fool. But
in Richard's case, the divine promise of the coronation did not work, due to
Richard's personal failure. Kantorowicz's interpretation illuminates, not the
king's role in the nation, but Richard's degradation from his position as the
Lord's anointed king of England, ending as an ordinary man.56 When the king is
deemed not to be an acceptable ruler, do his subjects have a right to revolt?
Shakespeare could not write directly about Elizabeth's government because of the
government censors who approved plays for publication or production. This right
to revolt, assumed by the people holding political power, sparks an interest in the
deposition of the king.
In addition to bringing his own strength to his rule (so that powerful lords
did not tyrannize ordinary subjects), a king had to keep the domestic peace and
prevent attacks from outside his borders. But Richard's assumption of Gaunt's
lands precluded domestic peace and brought armies to England under
Bolingbroke's command. All of this can in some sense be blamed on the bad
council Richard had in the form of the commission dealing with Mowbray and
Bolingbroke's quarrel.
B. The usurper's rule may not bring good government back: [This
unthankful king, ... this ingrate and canker'd Bolingbroke. . . "[T]his vile
politician ....
Bolingbroke states in act 4, scene 1, 11. 113, "In God's name, I'll ascend the
royal throne."" The bishop of Carlisle is horrified and prophesies in 11. 136-148
56. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 10, at 24, 35 n. 19. See also Margaret L. Ranald, The Degradation
of Richard II." An Inquiry into the Ritual Backgrounds, 7 ENG. LIT. REN. 188, 191-94 (1977). Norbrook,
supra note 55, places Kantorowicz's work in the context of the scholarship of his own day. Id. at 38, 49
nn.3-4.
57. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, at 361, act 1, sc. 3,11. 136-37, 241.
58. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
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that "if you crown" Henry, "The blood of English shall manure the ground / And
future ages groan for this foul act; / Peace shall go to sleep with Turks and
infidels, /And in this seat of peace tumultuous wars / Shall kin with kin and kind
with kind confound; / ... Prevent it, resist it, let it not be so." 59 Did Thomas
Jefferson make a similar point about tyrants and rebels in his letter of November
12, 1787, when he wrote "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time
with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is it's [sic] natural manure."
Bolingbroke's later difficult times were frequently attributed to his usurpation of
the throne. To some of the nobles who supported him when he returned to
England with an army, Bolingbroke appeared ungrateful, and his reign was
plagued by repeated attempts to revolt against him.
In Shakespeare's play, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD IX,61 the royal rebel,
Bolingbroke, soon to become King Henry IV, halted the damage from Richard 11's
rule only by treasonously deposing the legitimate king himself. In act 5, scene 6,
Bolingbroke is said to be a plant fertilized by the blood of Richard 11.62 He was
thus guilty of shedding the king's blood and the murder of Richard's supporters.
The dukes who sided with Bolingbroke tried to justify their rebellion as proper in
order to cloak their actions with some semblance of legitimacy but legitimacy
alone had not satisfied them.
In MACBETH, the major defect is that the usurper is not the legitimate king;
when the right ruler (King Duncan's son Malcolm Canmore) is restored, the play
ends.63 The concept of royal legitimacy does not, however, explain RICHARD II
supra note 2, at 297, act 4, sc. 1, 1. 113.
59. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 136-48.
60. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787) in 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 7 AUGUST 1787 TO 31 MARCH 1788, at 356 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
Tudor homilies on good order and obedience to magistrates and against disobedience and rebellion "linked
order in the state with divine orderings of the universe and the laws of nature." JAMES 1. CALDERWOOD,
METADRAMA IN SHAKESPEARE'S HENRIAD: RICHARD I TO HENRY V 20-21 n.6 (1970). The homily against
rebellion was issued as a "propagandistic response to the Northern Rebellion of 1569." Id. at 21.
61. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD l, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 278. The play dates from the mid-I 590s and was published in 1597. A performance of
another play, Sir John Heyward's Life and Reign of Henry IV, published in 1599, was probably paid for by
Sir Charles Percy, a member of Essex's circle, to be given the evening before Essex's revolt (Feb. 7, 1601)
in an effort to drum up popular support. Heyward's work dealt with the deposition of Richard H and Henry
Bolingbroke's part in the deposition. See Mervyn James, A t a Crossroads of the Political Culture: The Essex
Revolt, 1601, in SOCIETY, POLrICS AND CULTURE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 416 (1986), cited
in THE ARDEN EDITION OF THE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: RICHARD H, I xi (Peter Ure ed., 1966).
See also MURIEL C. BRADBROOK, SHAKESPEARE: THE POET IN HIS WORLD 103 (1978) (citing G.V.P.
AKRIGG, SHAKESPEARE AND THE EARL OF SOUTHAMPTON 262-63 (1968)).
62. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 305, act 5, sc. 6.
63. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 1, at 815, act 5, sc. 8.
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completely because the play also compares the political virtues and defects of
both the anointed King Richard II and the usurper Henry Bolingbroke. The
efficiency of Henry or the legitimacy of Richard is the reality of the choice the
royal dukes and other powerful political actors have to make.' Bolingbroke's
more effective, if more unpleasant, rule follows Richard's mistakes but
Bolingbroke as Henry IV proved no more than barely acceptable to the English
people. In contrast with the character of Macbeth, the usurper Henry Bolingbroke
presents a more nuanced picture with his harsh efficiency. As king, Bolingbroke
was not much better than Richard at building a wide basis of support, and
continued to suffer the prospect of rebellions throughout his reign.
One difference in tone from MACBETH occurs because Henry IV, unlike
Macbeth, was succeeded by his son and grandson. These and other events in the
history of English government provided the background for later theories about
government. Locke's Second Treatise recognized that both the governed and the
governor have duties and rights, including the justifiable resistance to the
governor's commands when they should not be followed. In our terms, the notion
of consent and withdrawal of consent embedded in Lockean thought underlies the
resistance to tyrants in Shakespeare's plays. Although we can see revealed in his
work some of the raw ingredients Locke would later use, Shakespeare never went
so far as Locke in locating a large measure of political power particularly in the
wealthy middle class. Nor were patrons and audience ready to balance the
constitution in favor of the growing entrepreneurial interests who later invoked
individual economic rights so successfully to their own advantage. Shakespeare's
close study of the history of English government shows the tradeoffs between
some concerns involved in good government such as efficiency and legitimacy.
Once these principles were absorbed into the fabric of the constitution, later
royalists could openly look back at King Charles I, a victim of regicide in 1649,
as a martyr.
Neither Richard II nor Henry IV was satisfactory as a ruler in the eyes of
their contemporaries, unlike Henry V who soon after proved to be popular with
his people weary of bad government. For Shakespeare's time, Richard's reign
was too recent to be romanticized. Many people dissatisfied with the inherent
flaws of pure monarchy were notably not sentimental about usurpation and even
regicide.65 This dissatisfaction existed not only in 1399 but also during the 1590s
and also continued after Shakespeare's death first at the regicide of King Charles
64. W.B. Yeats presumed that Shakespeare as a poet preferred Richard to the efficient Henry V.
W.B. YEATS, At Strafford on Avon, in IDEAS OF GOOD AND EviL. 154-64 (1903), reprinted in Levin, supra
note 44, at 138.
65. To much later ages, Richard 1I symbolized by the beauty of the Wilton Diptych (painted c.
1396-98), represented the values and legitimacy of government during the Middle Ages. Eleanor Scheifele,
Richard 1land the VisualArts, in RICHARD II: THE ART OF KINSHIP 255,259 (Anthony Goodman & James
L. Gillespie eds., 1999).
[Vol. 14:1
McCauliff
I and then during the repudiation of the monarchy itself in the 1640s and 50s
under the Protectorate.'
C. Monarchy is afragile form of government: "Tell thou the lamentable tale
of me and send the hearers weeping to their beds .... "67
In the play, King Richard H's legitimacy allowed him to make a showing of
paternal concern for the land of England, comparing himself to the sun, despite
his mis-steps. Richard, however, forfeited moral credibility through his alleged
complicity in Gloucester's death, financial credibility through his extravagant
spending and legal credibility by his seizure of Bolingbroke's estates without due
process. Richard upset the natural order of English society and suffered
Bolingbroke's usurpation of his throne.
One great defect of medieval monarchy (only solved much later by
constitutional monarchy) was the dependence on the personal rule of the king.
Whether the king was unusually capable or less than satisfactory, his personal
qualities were not transmissible to a succeeding heir since the institutions of the
court could not channel the energies of ministers or the king himself to meet the
administrative needs of the government. In the cases of both Richard II and
Henry IV, their political insights were episodic and not always translated into
effective action which satisfied the nobles and commons. The pathos evoked by
watching Richard come to terms with his deposition is emotionally wrenching
because it encompasses the personal tragedy of one man as well the disruption to
the kingdom from contesting nobles and unsettled government.68 Because in this
scene we witness Bolingbroke's treason in deposing Richard, "the violation of his
office" is very raw: "its manner of doing so is slow, gruelling and merciless; this
time the authorities must have caught the smell of gunpowder. The unthinkable
is happening before our eyes, and Richard ensures that the audience (on stage and
off) knows it is unthinkable."69 This dangerous drama and discourse attracted the
attention of the censors and the disapproval of the Queen (and no doubt also
moved audiences)."
66. The Epilogue warns of achievements being undone, those of Henry V and possibly those of
Shakespeare's own time. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 444, Epilogue.
67. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD 11, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 300, act 5, sc. 1, 11. 44-45.
68. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD IL in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 298, act 4, sc. 1, 11. 155-215.
69. ALEXANDER LEGGATr, SHAKESPEARE'S POLITICAL DRAMA: THE HISTORY PLAYS AND THE
ROMAN PLAYS 67 (1988). Therefore, the censors cut the deposition scene. Id.
70. Queen Elizabeth, in an interview with the antiquarian William Lambarde, said in August, 1601,
"I am Richard U." See JAMES, supra note 61, at 419, (citing UI JOHN NICHOLS, THE PROGRESSES AND PUBLIC
PROCESSIONS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 552-53 (1823)). James explains that the members of the Earl of Essex's
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Bolingbroke started his reign having violated as many moral, ethical and
legal principles as Richard had done by the end of his reign.7 MACBETH
emphasizes the all-consuming desire for the crown and shows in the course of an
evening that neither king nor country can be happy when a ruler is a usurper. On
the other hand, does the play RICHARD II suggest that despite Bolingbroke's
illegal seizure of power in England, the kingdom is better off in his hands and that
Richard is so at fault for ruling poorly and unjustly that he must be overthrown
for the good of the country? Shakespeare's English history plays together with
Ulysses' degree speech in TROILUS AND CRESSIDA72 reflect the widespread
English fear that various horrible consequences such as civil war follow the
deposition of a king, much like the description in MACBETH. "Underlying
Shakespeare's preoccupation with civil strife was a deeper concern for the social
order. In the Elizabethans' world view civil discord imperiled the very existence
of society. This was essentially the medieval view of the world."73 Nevertheless,
Shakespeare also shows Bolingbroke (now King Henry IV) grasping the reins of
government into his efficient hands.74 It will take longer for the injustice to
Richard II to be put right than Macbeth's seizure of the Scottish throne did in the
play MACBETH.
In fact, Shakespeare deemed Richard "worthily depos'd" for his part in the
death of his uncle the Duke of Gloucester.7" Bolingbroke is similarly situated in
an ambiguous moral position. The new king has righted one wrong (the
deprivation of his inherited landed estates) by committing an even greater
injustice, the treason of deposing an unquestionably legitimate ruler. Richard had
more than a personal property right in his inheritance of the throne from his
grandfather Edward II. As the Lord's anointed king, Richard had the public right
and duty to rule England.
circle saw the Queen as Richard and planned to depose her if their revolt had succeeded. Id.
71. "Like Richard in the opening scene, Henry in the closing scene must pretend to judge a
henchman for a crime in which he is complicit.... Like Richard he has shed a kinsman's blood' like Richard
he fears rebellious subjects; and like Richard he banishes the follower who was his hangman." ORNSTEIN,
supra note 53, at 124.
72. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE at 696, act 1, sc. 3,11. 109-10 (1960).
73. SAUL, supra note 47, at 2-3. For comment on the degree speech of Ulysses, see E.M.W.
TILLYARD, THE ELIZABETHAN WORLD PICTURE 9-10, 88-89 (1943).
74. It has been suggested that since wily Ulysses lies, his degree speech in Troilus should not be
taken at face value, much as we discount the truisms of Polonius. Martin Dzelzainis, Shakespeare and
Political Thought, in A COMPANION TO SHAKESPEARE 100, 113 (David Scott Kastan ed., 1999).
75. Patrick Martin & John Finnis, Caesar, Succession, andthe Chastisement of Rulers, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1045, 1073 (2003) (quoting act 4, sc. 1, 1. 223). RICHARD 1H is more complicated than earlier
Shakespearean tragedies because of its focus on Richard's fall as "deserved and at the same time terrible and
wasteful, an ambiguity which permitted [Shakespeare] to develop the person of Richard so that he grows to
be 'every inch a king' ... when he is one no longer." MOSELEY, supra note 21, at 85.
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In general, the Middle Ages were criticized by immediately subsequent
generations who wished to emphasize the contributions of their own times.76
Conceivably Shakespeare appreciated the willingness of medieval aristocrats to
revolt against kings who provided less than good government. 7' The facts
reflected in this play make it difficult to judge simply according to the law that it
is wrong to depose a king rather than waiting for his natural death, hence posing
an ethical dilemma. The choice was not really clear between Richard and
Bolingbroke, who was shown in a later play, unable to sleep and like Macbeth,
conscious of his guilt.78 Nevertheless, Bolingbroke forced the issue, making the
decision to insert himself into the kingship with mixed results. Faced with the
reality of Bolingbroke's actions, England had a new king.79 Any nostalgia for the
legitimacy of the Plantagenets came much later in English history when the
country had a constitutional monarchy which possessed little possibility for
creating anew the earlier governmental difficulties. At the time Shakespeare
wrote RICHARD II, the immediate political problem was the succession to the
English throne upon the demise of Queen Elizabeth who had no children of her
own and who was growing old in the 1590s. Those members of the audience who
had seen many of Shakespeare's plays had by now become used to seeing many
of their doubts about monarchy explored on stage before their very eyes. A
veteran playgoer might expect to find many weaknesses even in the reign of the
strongest king. Attendance at HENRY V reveals not simply the sufferings of war
during a glorious reign but the weakness of kingship itself when a thirty-five year
old king is carried away by trench fever, leaving England without a leader.
IV. HENRY V: BEFORE [THE CITY GATES OF] HARFLEUR: "CRY 'GOD FOR
HARRY, ENGLAND, AND SAINT GEORGE! "',
8 0
When Queen Elizabeth was growing ever weaker, Shakespeare wrote about
the vital, strong warrior King Henry V. THE LIFE OF KING HENRY V was written
76. Norbrook, supra note 54, at 37. Nostalgia for the lost social unity of the middle ages only
developed on a wide scale in the 18th century. Id. at 49 n.2. See also OLIVIA F. ROBINSON, T.D. FERGUS &
W.M. GORDON, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 169-86 (3d ed. Butterworths 2000) for the claim to
independence from scholastic thought by Renaissance lawyers and thinkers. Some exceptions existed to this
general disregard for the achievement of the middle ages, especially in the continued appreciation for the
artistic legacy of the middle ages. ORNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 102-03.
77. Norbrook, supra note 54, at 45-46, 51 n.27. Shakespeare popularized, if not invented, the
English history play in the 1590s. ORNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 319-27. Beyond that, English people had
an interest "in recovering the past and shaping the present by its models." RACKIN, supra note 24, at 3.
78. In WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF HENRY THE FOURTH, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, at 397, act 3, sc. 1, 11. 4-8, 26, 30-31, King Henry
complained that the cares he faced as king prevented him from sleeping.
79. ORNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 123-24.
80. Act 3, sc. 1, 1. 34.
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in 1599, two centuries after Henry became Prince of Wales at the age of 12 when
his father Henry Bolingbroke usurped Richard l's throne to become Henry IV.
It is the only Shakespearean history play centered on foreign policy issues and the
offensive war Henry V waged in France to claim a title to the French throne. No
one waged a civil war against Henry V. Only one dynastic and one religious plot
were fomented during his reign. Domestically people were for him, despite the
protests of poets.8 Many of the English people were very willing to accept war
which frequently seemed to find approval in the populace, perhaps because it
provided jobs and opportunities for advancement and created patriotic pride as
well as a sense of wanting to defend against a common enemy.
By the time he was an adult, Henry was very well trained in politics,
administration and warfare. Late in 1411, however, King Henry IV disagreed
with Prince Henry over French policy and removed the prince and his supporters
from the king's council. Prince Henry was later said to have engaged in illegal
adventures with his madcap friends during this time. After his father's death,
Henry ascended the throne in March 1413, at the age of twenty-five, reigned nine
and one-half years, and died in August, 1422,just before his thirty-fifth birthday,
cutting short his conquest of France. This play shows, as much as RICHARD II,
the inherent weaknesses in the monarchical form of government. Here an
apparently strong king cannot assure the continuation of good government and
leaves his kingdom unprotected upon his sudden death. This mortality allows the
audience to question the king's governance, including his decision to go to war
with France in the first place. Here reform appears as an apparently opposite
approach to that in MACBETH. In HENRY V, the affirmation of the King's power
itself illustrates the need for reform. Substituting Henry V's strength and
legitimacy for the corruption of Macbeth, Shakespeare led his audience to the
perception of danger and societal vulnerability created by an unrestrained, albeit
very popular, monarch.
A. Should Henry V be adjudged a tyrant? "We are no tyrant but a Christian
king"82 ("the state ofwar.. .[is] a state of enmity, malice, violence and
mutual destruction ')3
Despite the French ambassadors' fears about Henry's claims to France, the
play HENRY V opens by establishing Henry as a model of conventional Christian
81. The poets Gower, Hoccleve and Lydgate not only treated war as a scandal when waged between
Christians, but also wrote against war as a waste of lives and property. Thomas Hoccleve (who lived from
1367 to 1426) listed the ever present purpose of war as only "to win worldly wealth." Harriss, supra note 46,
at 21. As Gerald Harriss emphasizes, Hoccleve set forth "the sufferings of non-combatants and the
destruction of their property .. " Id.
82. Act 1, sc. 2, 1. 241 (quoting King Henry V to the French ambassadors).
83. Locke, supra note 18, §19.
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kingship." Henry Chichele, the Archbishop of Canterbury, praises Henry for
seeking the church's approval to invade France. The archbishop suggested that
King Charles VI of France himself may have inherited the throne of France
through the female line, thus negating their denial of Henry's claim to the French
throne through the female line. 5
Henry observed all the requirements of the culture of his day, the early 15th
century. According to the same criteria of natural law for human actions set up
in the discussion of King Richard's shortcomings, Henry for most of the actions
he took in the play comported with the requirements of consulting with the proper
interested groups and communities. Before going to war with France he carefully
sought and obtained the cooperation of the Archbishop of Canterbury in setting
forth his claim as just, thereby indirectly using the auspices of the church to state
that his war to realize his claim to the French throne was alsojust. Henry kept the
other royals further down the line to succession to the throne and their noble
entourages engaged in the war with France and free from plots, rebellions and
schemes to control the government at home. Albeit in disguise, the king even
consulted with the common soldiers on the evening before battle, refusing to take
on guilt for any lives that might be lost in the next day's battle. In this sense,
Henry has made his ethical choices in accordance with the expectation of his
community. He was quite unlike the character Macbeth but neither was he a saint
like Edward the Confessor. Not only did he insist on a war questionable in the
first place but he gave the order to kill the French hostages before the battle of
84. Henry V is shown as having an understanding of "what a king is and what a commonwealth
should be" when he announces on his first appearance as king that he now accepts the Lord Chief Justice as
his "father." Hamilton, supra note 43, at 17.
85. As long ago as the time of Charlemagne who conquered Meissen, an area of Germany between
the Saale and Elbe rivers, the French were said to distrust a king who claimed the throne through the female
line. The Salic law prohibited succession through the female line and got its name from the River Saale.
Archbishop Chichele described the ideal commonwealth in abstract terms as a beehive of activity. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 417-
18, act 1, sc. 2, 11. 183-204. Henry claimed the French throne through his great-great grandmother, Isabella,
the daughter of Philip IV, the king of France, and wife of King Edward I of England. Henry's substantive
argument for the French throne was that he sought to restore rights which the French wrongfully denied him.
Substantively, the French responded that Henry did not have a right to the French throne at all. In modem
terminology, Henry's claim was self-interested or even an illegal war of aggression. See generally WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (1960).
Henry did not wait to declare war until it was a last resort but willingly embraced war. Henry's
ambassador Exeter told Charles VI to divest himself of his crown and kingdom as borrowed glories. Charles
asked the consequences of refusing Henry's demands. Despite Henry's earlier claim to be no tyrant but a
Christian king, Exeter answered with the dire consequences of"bloody constraint," WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 414, act 2, sc. 4, 1.
97. Charles offered his daughter, a dowry and several dukedoms. Henry rejected them as petty attempts to
buy him off with unprofitable dukedoms. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, in 1 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (1960).
2007]
36 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
Agincourt started. In an England dissatisfied with Richard H1 and only marginally
happier with Henry IV, the young and energetic Henry V did not have to compete
against a high ethical standard to satisfy the English people.
Henry V shared the vision and objectives of the Englishmen of his day and
proved a popular and successful king. Was he also deemed ethical? Henry V was
a busy administrator. Contemporaries considered Henry a seeker after justice, a
defender of the church, and the commander-in-chief. Henry V was a war leader
in a literal, soldierly sense. He led Englishmen in battle in France and defeated
the enemy, as Kings Edward I and Edward III had done in their wars. Despite
poetic dissent on the justice of the war with France, Henry V, in providing his
subjects with order, efficient administration and military glory, met the English
people's "deepest yearnings and won their abiding loyalty."86
B. The spoils of Henry's war: "If Duke of Burgundy, you would the peace ...
you must buy that peace .... "7
Indeed, the war with France was the single most important event of Henry
V's reign. Although negotiations would not have brought Henry the French
throne, they would have resulted in increased territory, marriage to Princess
Katherine, the daughter of the French King Charles VI, and a large dowry.
"Under Henry V, legalism in negotiations, in propaganda, and in the councils of
state, always self-serving and often hypocritical, reached its climax."88 In the
play, Henry threatened the French town of Harfleur with destruction if it failed
to surrender.89 "Harry's ability to turn his consciousness of the horror of war into
a weapon of coercion is fascinating."9 The great English victory at Agincourt
which showcased the superiority of the English long-bow over French knights
was celebrated by contemporary 15th-century poets, though today we remember
Agincourt more because of the famous line, "we few, we happy few, we band of
brothers" in Shakespeare's play.91
86. Harriss, supra note 46, at 35.
87. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 3, at 441, act 5, sc. 2, II. 68-70.
88. THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAwS 17 (1993). See also LOCKE,
supra note 18, § 20 on the state of war.
89. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 3 at 426, act 3, sc. 3.
90. ORNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 190. See Locke, supra note 18, §20 on the state of war. "But
when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on
both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal
for the past injury, and to prevent future harm ... ." Id.
91. For Henry's whole speech, see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in TE COMPLETE
WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 434-35, act 4, sc. 3, 1. 24-66.
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Some, perhaps many, Frenchmen at the time viewed Henry as a conqueror
and usurper of the French throne. With bloody constraint, Henry V sold peace at
the high price of war. In act 5, scene 2, 11. 24-67, 9 Philip, the young Duke of
Burgundy, and cousin of King Charles VI, gives a powerful speech which makes
the case for peace, even today. In Burgundy's speech, Shakespeare continues in
HENRY V the garden images he used in RICHARD II. Burgundy asked why
"naked, poor and mangled Peace / Dear nurse of arts, plenties and joyful births /
Should not in this best garden of the world / Our fertile France put up her lovely
visage?"93 Just as the unpruned vineyards of France are dying or growing wild in
the wake of the war, so the children do not go to school and "grow like
savages-as soldiers will / That nothing do but meditate on blood.... ." King
Henry answers, "you must buy that peace" by accepting the demands set forth in
the Treaty of Troyes.95
C. Reassessment of Henry V's reign: "Cheerly to sea; the signs of war
advance: No king of England, if not king of France "96
In Shakespeare's plays, Henry IV had a difficult relationship with his son
and worried about whether the prince of Wales was ready to be king. Henry IV
had to face the prince's refusal to acknowledge his father's worries about his
position as king ("uneasy lies the head that wears a crown") or even his illegal
accession to the throne. The prince only confronted these issues after his father's
death when he himself became King Henry V and waged a war of conquest in
France.97 Henry V's motto, "no king of England, if not king of France," reflects
the notion that until Henry V became king of France by conquest he was not legi-
timately king of England.98 Even this reality Henry wished to avoid by dressing
up his invasion of France with a hereditary claim to the French throne and then
in the treaty of Troyes by describing himself as the heir to the king of France.
What did Shakespeare show the audience about Henry V, a king who was
the son of a usurper? Henry V seemed bent on perpetuating acts of usurpation in
his own reign by seeking to take the weaker French king's crown. Henry V
wanted to provide the French with the efficient government they did not have and
arguably did not want from Henry. More likely Henry was fulfilling his own
92. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OFWILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 3, at 441, act 5, sc. 2, 11. 24-67.
93. Id. act 5, sc. 2, 11. 34-37
94. Id. act 5, sc.2, 11. 38-60.
95. Id. act 5, sc.2, 11. 70.
96. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 3, at 422, act 2, sc. 2, 11. 192-93.
97. See CALDERWOOD, supra note 60, at 152, 156.
98. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 3, at 422, act 2, sc. 2, I. 193.
2007]
38 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
imperial ambition to wear more than one crown with the support of the English
people. Indeed only the war in France gave ambitious English nobles enough
scope for their energies and deflected them from revolting against Henry.
For Shakespeare, Henry may be as efficient and ethical a ruler as the English
could expect. He did everything conventionally expected of him and in turn was
rewarded with the support of the majority of the English people." Some
Englishmen yearned for more than what Henry could have provided. But the
people's quest for certainty and reassurances of peace and stability from their
rulers can never be fulfilled because life and death have a way of intruding on the
certain plans and ambitions of kings. Those who think that Henry should never
have embarked on the glorious but ultimately futile war which caused the deaths
of so many people are frustrated by his wishing to spend English money to
conquer first France and then they feared (if he had lived) the rest of the world.I" °
Much of the time, these sentiments about the king's ambition are only a
significant minority position. We can see from the number of times a good leader
has gone from ruling justly and in the interests of the people to exploring his own
imperial ambitions that the opposition is often too weak to restrain the ambitious
king's whims. Given the course of human history, Henry is the expected king
with the expected support of the people.
Shakespeare's play is at best ambivalent toward kings, especially Henry V,
a warrior king who played by the rules for kings and brought his people glory in
battle. His war distracted both people abroad from attempting to attack his
country and people at home from rebelling while a war was being waged abroad.
The pain of war was felt deeply by the conquered French. Beyond the baggage
boys the pain of war was not reflected very much among the English people
whose patriots and profiteers were well satisfied. The English common soldiers,
however, saw the dismembered, dead and injured bodies on the battlefields. The
night before the battle of Agincourt, the fictional, common soldier Williams
questioned the justice of the war in a conversation with the king disguised as
Harry le Roy.' On the eve of battle, war was still uncertainly justified in the
minds of at least some of the soldiers. Williams hoped that the suffering and
death would at least be for a just cause. "Behind the glory of the figure and reign
of Henry V, Shakespeare lets us see the shadows. And they will not go away. All
99. Cf RACKIN, supra note 24, at 72, (citing WYLIE SYPHER, THE ETHic OF TIME: STRUCTURES OF
EXPERIENCE IN SHAKESPEARE 28 (1976)).
100. Christopher Allmand's assessment of Henry V's kingship is quite favorable, despite his
recognition that Henry's war in France was a "serious error ofjudgment" because Henry failed to take into
account French nationalism. CHRISTOPHER T. ALLMAND, HENRY V 441 (1997).
101. For a discussion of this passage see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 432, act 4, sc. 1, 1. 143. See also RACKiN, supra note
21, at 243-44, 246.
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flesh is grass, the grass withereth, and the flower thereof fadeth away. Here is no
abiding city, and there will never be peace on earth, for man is fallen."' 2
Henry's death in the spring of 1422 trying to subjugate the rest of France
brought to an abrupt end his attempts to rule both England and France. The
character called the Chorus intervenes at important points in this play with
information for the audience and at least to some extent conveys Shakespeare's
viewpoint. "' Shakespeare's Chorus assessed Henry's short-lived attempts to rule
France differently from the way Henry and his subjects saw the war in France.
To Elizabethan England, Henry V was a great king. Shakespeare could not have
changed that opinion, even if he had wished to do so," or his play would never
have found an audience.
But Shakespeare managed to introduce a fair amount of doubt relating to
Henry's legacy. Henry's glory is alloyed with suffering, sorrow and the horrors
of war. The question is whether Henry V was a hypocritical adventurer, coldly
indifferent to the human costs of war and able therefore to satisfy his own
personal and dynastic ambitions while he appeared as the warrior king against
England's ancient enemy France? Or did Henry remain that heroic leader of the
band of brothers at the battle of Agincourt? Does Shakespeare in his play, THE
LIFE OF KING HENRY V, set forth all the facts on both sides of the story so that the
playgoer can make of the action what he wishes and judge it according to his own
moral playbook? 0 5 Ms. Axton can only conclude that playing out political theory
through character is inherently ambiguous."6
To resolve some of these ambiguities we must listen closely to the Epilogue.
The play did not end at Agincourt but the Chorus pointed out the futility of the
war for England. Ultimately England lost all the French territory after Henry V's
death before he could consolidate his French lands. That later English loss of
French territory coupled with the huge French war casualties and great destruction
of the countryside woefully arrayed in Burgundy's plea for peace demonstrate
Shakespeare's reservations about the government, even of the heroic king who
plays by the rules. Perhaps Shakespeare had a "fundamentally tragic view of
kingship."' 0
7
102. MOSELEY, supra note 21, at 168.
103. "[T]he Chorus is there to give a sense of perspective, to establish the figure against the ground.
The Chorus is simultaneously an actor in the play and a privileged voice outside it...." Lawrence Danson,
Henry V: King, Chorus, and Critics, 34 SHAKESPEARE Q. 27, 29 (1983).
104. Id at36. See also MOSELEY, supra note 21, at 98 n.1O. "Henry has been convinced his war
is just, and we ought to accept that the audience would have agreed, whatever our own feelings." Id at 156.
105. AXTON, supra note 44, at 109 (discussing Shakespeare's play KING JOHN and its sources).
Marie Axton's complex and fascinating assessment of the history plays emphasizes Shakespeare's nuanced
portrayals of English kings and their times. Id. For example, some of Shakespeare's sources may have been
arguing for a nativist (protestant) succession in England upon the death of the Queen when Shakespeare may
have been making the different point that the crown does not define England or the king. Id
106. Id. at 114.
107. Id. at 107.
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Shakespeare's play HENRY V shows us that we cannot trust human beings
to learn the lessons of the frustrations and disappointments flowing from even a
victorious war. As one generation learns that our time on earth is so finite that
causing the deaths of others in aggressive wars is simply destructive, another
generation grows up to take their elders' place and make the same sorts of
mistakes in new circumstances. Even as one generation's wars and ambitions
end, life, nevertheless, gives rise to the self-same ambitions in the next generation.
The Epilogue tells us that human ambition may have no limits but that God who
calls us in death may stop the follies of mortals, one generation at a time.
V. CONCLUSION: "[F]OR WITHIN THE HOLLOW CROWN/ THAT ROUNDS THE
MORTAL TEMPLES OF A KING/ KEEPS DEATH HIS COURT"' 10 8
These experiences and reflections on English political history in
Shakespeare's plays and other works prepared the way for later seventeenth-
century writers to emphasize wider participation in government. The notion that
the king makes positive law, which should conform to community standards
represented by natural law, allowed the king to stand above the law. The king's
role as lawmaker did not, however, absolve him from meeting the moral dictates
of natural law. In this way, the king was subject to the law in important instances
because the validity of his ethical behavior and law-making standards was
assessed according to these over-arching moral principles. Henry V, popular
warrior king, did not approach the standards of the saintly Edward the Confessor
but he only had to meet average requirements to succeed in satisfying the legal
and ethical norms of his community. In that way, Henry could be seen to be
doing justice before the people of his kingdom. Henry V escaped all these
troubles of unstable government because he was a master coalition-builder.
Shakespeare's Chorus, however, highlighted one of the major flaws in Henry V's
government: kingship was still essentially built on the individual human person
of the king. By dying too soon, Henry V doomed his son to endure a variation on
the themes of Richard 11's reign. 109
In the middle of the 1590s, Shakespeare appeared unsympathetic to Richard
II, a weak king distracted by Ireland and dominated by favorites who could not
see his over-mighty subjects' dissatisfaction until they raised armies to depose
him. Shakespeare emphasized royal unwillingness to recognize the people's right
to participate in growing the garden of England. Shakespeare's view of Henry IV
who usurped Richard's throne and who is responsible for the murder of King
Richard is, as history showed, that we can manage to live with Henry, despite
what he did to ascend the throne, although there are consequences which all must
108. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD 1H, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
supra note 2, at 293, act 3, sc. 2, II. 160-62.
109. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, in I THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE (1960) the author refers to Henry V throughout the conclusion.
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suffer, as HENRY IV, parts I and II dramatize. Neither Richard II nor Henry IV
could be said to have satisfied the people's need to see the king doing justice in
the interest of England. RiCHARD U marked the end of the middle ages with all
its ritual and splendid magnificence for the legitimate king. By then, it had
become painfully obvious that legitimacy alone did not ensure good government.
As the legitimate heir of the Plantagenets directly descended from William the
Conqueror, Richard II was unfortunately thrust into the kingship at the age often,
without the chance to grow up, see the government in operation and form his own
opinions about governing. Is it any wonder that the trappings of legitimacy
became Richard's trap and that he saw the ceremonies of kingship and govern-
ment as the only reality of his rule? His dependence on a few advisors made him
spend too much of England's resources on them. At the same time, Richard's
reliance on his intimate advisers also short-circuited the coalition-building process
of government leaving Richard isolated and without a wide-enough base of
support to remain king. Richard's isolation permitted Bolingbroke's usurpation
of Richard's throne to proceed without any effective opposition.
In MACBETH, electing a king did not prove sufficient to ensure good
government without the people's help.110 At the end of the play, the people had
to share the power at the moment of the next election when the army came to
restore the rightful ruler. In that early medieval conception of the problem of
government, legitimacy in government was the central consideration. The people
ratified that concern in joining the battle to install the new king, thus representing
the major form of the people's sharing in the operation of the government in
MACBETH. Before the end of the play, Macbeth, with few events from his reign
portrayed in the play, is defeated by a foreign army which restores order to
Scotland. Malcolm, the son of the slain King Duncan, becomes the "rightful
ruler" of a Scotland now ready for a hereditary kingship. The tragedy of the
character Macbeth in Shakespeare's play is that he started out justified as a heroic
warrior but because he was not named to succeed King Duncan as his reward for
serving Scotland, he made ethical choices seriously beyond the pale and
proceeded to behave unjustly. He had to be hunted down for his crimes and
removed from power for consistently placing himself above the law and totally
failing to do justice. At the beginning of the reign of King James I, Shakespeare's
MACBETH showed the people taking decisive action in removing a tyrant from
office. The strong inheritance of a natural law tradition of government
bequeathed through the ages to Hooker and Shakespeare alike is balanced
between the Aristotelian state which was thought to exist for the sake of the good
and later Lockean principles of good government through wider participation of
the commons together with the right to resist a tyrant. Shakespeare did not reach
110. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE (1960) the author refers to Macbeth throughout the conclusion.
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extreme individualist rights positions in his plays which advocated greater sharing
of governmental power and responsibility.
Like the Bible, Shakespeare's works contain principles to support varying
and even contradictory conclusions about what Shakespeare may personally have
thought or felt about rulers and indeed monarchy itself. In the attempt to
determine Shakespeare's views about usurpation, regicide and kingship, we may
be deflected from the very important insights to be gained by thinking about the
plays themselves. Through Shakespeare's plays, we begin to notice the good and
bad qualities and policies of average unpopular rulers (Henry IV), deposed rulers
(Richard I) and above average rulers (Henry V) in English history as we watch
the actions they took to rule the country and see the moral decisions they made,
good or bad. The ruler's failure to do justice for the people brought tangible
harms to the realm. The costs of righting the government took a large toll on the
people because there was no smooth constitutional method of dealing with
consistently unethical governmental decisions short of civil war or usurpation of
the throne. The king's failure to do justice was not only a personal ethical lapse
but also a crisis of government for the realm itself. Therefore it excites the
interest of audiences today.
In his works, Shakespeare demonstrates a keen awareness of the harms to the
realm caused by bad rulers, as well as of the risks society had to face from
deposing rulers. He clearly articulates how and even why usurpation and regicide
come about. Shakespeare recognized how great a temptation tyranny can be to
rulers who disregard the boundaries of law. He therefore wrote about tyrants,
ancient and modem, in a staggering array of rulers from Julius Caesar to Henry
VIH, to acquaint us with the dangers of tyrannical government and illegitimate
rule and of attempting to throw offtyranny.1 Shakespeare came from an age still
steeped in the observance of "degree priority and place," as his character Ulysses
put it, and guided by the Aristotelian ethics connecting law, politics and morality
in a concept of government for the common good before Locke's loosening of the
hierarchical bonds to refocus on the individual. As such, his works have much to
say to both those who wanted to keep order and hold chaos at bay and to those
saw opportunities for greater participation of merchant groups and others in
parliament in governing the realm.
Looking forward and looking back at a final pageant of Shakespeare's kings,
we see that time of transition with parliament and sovereign in a tense balance.
Concerns about legitimacy affect the king's ethical behavior in the day-to-day
administration of his government at home as well as in international affairs.
Whether the king had a right to wear the crown or whether he was a usurper often
determined his ability to do justice before his people, as Shakespeare shows us.
The ethics of treason, usurpation and regicide casts a pall over monarchy. So
many kingships began either in reaction to the tyranny or weakness of the old king
I 11. Laarhaven, supra note 8, at 333.
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or in the new king's usurpation of the throne for himself. Tyranny, arising from
the king's temptation to use his position of power as the head of state for his own
personal interest and gain, figures very prominently in Shakespeare's works.
From these works, we can conclude that Shakespeare was desirous of seeing
governmental power shared more equitably to include a broader range of people
in government and that he also explored whether the form government took
(republic or monarchy)" 12 helped to spread governmental power equitably and
more broadly. Some of the same principles were later enshrined in Locke's
Second Treatise, which advocates a constitutional structure of governmental
accountability, although many of the individualist implications of Locke's consent
theory cannot be overlaid onto Shakespeare's works without disfiguring, or even
destroying, them."3 It is important to emphasize that Shakespeare did not reach
the position of being an advocate. Shakespeare's plays never went so far as
Locke who sought to obtain political power for his interest group even by
revolution, if necessary. Shakespeare carefully used illustrations of human
weakness in his characters to demonstrate the need for reform but he always
stopped well short of advocating revolution.
That England was subjected to the vicissitudes of an unstable monarchy
surely accounts for some of Shakespeare's ambivalence toward Henry V. It is
apparent that monarchy, as Shakespeare surveyed it, did not work. Part of the
difficulty is in the nature of monarchy itself: government was too personal and
dependent on one man alone to provide continuity for a nation. Additional
difficulties arose from the poor judgments and choices of the individual kings.
The death of the old queen and dawning of the new reign of James I marked the
end of all those public musings about government and the nature of tyranny so
popular toward the end of Queen Elizabeth's reign. After his psychological study
of the desire to seize the throne in MACBETH, Shakespeare expended little more
energy on kingship. By 1603, Shakespeare's plays no longer tolerated usurpers
or the idea that they may have brought some good and useful change to the
country, along with their murderous ways. In the mid-1 590s, succession to the
throne was a large concern for England because the aged and childless Elizabeth
had designated no heir. Then Shakespeare had been willing to portray
Bolingbroke, the usurper, as a protector of property rights by recovering his lands
which the king had denied him, especially for the great lands owners in England
112. In Shakespeare's RAPE OF LuCRECE, the Roman monarchy was already an ineffective form of
government, and the people drove out the king when his son raped Lucrece around 510 B.C. See generally
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE RAPE OF LUCRECE, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra
note 25. In JULIUS CAESAR, Brutus was willing to die to keep the Roman Republic alive and to kill Caesar
to prevent him from killing the Roman Republic. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR,
in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, supra note 25. At the time of Caesar's assassination
in 44 B.C., however, the Roman Republic was no longer strong enough to remain alive and Octavian,
Caesar's grand nephew and adopted heir, became princeps. Id.
113. See generally THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITING OF JOHN LOCKE (2005).
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during his reign.1 4 Shakespeare was also willing to show Caesar's murder in the
Senate for threatening the continued existence of the once glorious Roman
republic. In 1606, still early in James I's reign, however, the new king was given
a chance to establish his own relationship with the English people. Shakespeare's
plays together with the widespread analysis of the nature of monarchy during the
1590s ultimately proved to be an important step in the development of
constitutional monarchy which was achieved in later centuries. By the time
Locke wrote after the English Civil War and the Restoration, which extended to
the theaters, audiences' knowledge of Shakespeare's history plays figured in the
general heritage of the people. They provided some of the background and
expertise about how government should be structured. The strong inheritance of
a natural law tradition in government bequeathed through the ages allows these
plays in the course of their dramatic action to present principles of good
government, showing participation of lords and commons together with a
reservation of the right to rebel, thus setting forth a conception of constitutional
government some three quarters of a century before Locke wrote but
Shakespeare's constitution was not so oriented toward the later Lockean
individual economic rights. In Shakespeare's plays, the common good of society
plays a greater role.
As Louise Halper wrote in her discussion of MEASURE FOR MEASURE,
Shakespeare "supports neither monarchical principle nor absolutism, but writes
... a brief for a more communal and collective discourse than that offered by the
developing legal rhetoric of the rule of law protecting the rights of the individual
market participant."'1 5 Some followers of the late Professor Leo Strauss
emphasized in their readings of primary texts that the obvious meaning and
interpretation overlays a deeper, secret meaning available to the cognoscenti who
peer more closely into the meaning of the texts over a long period of study. In
terms of Shakespeare's plays, Harold Goddard contrasted the surface meaning of
HENRY V with the "subversive" ironic interpretation." 6 In presenting this
personal reading of Shakespeare's views of resistance to governmental tyranny,
I hope I have set forth a position for discussion of limits on government power
both relevant to us and faithful to the history of Shakespeare's time, though
stretching forward to Locke. While there is no "plain meaning" and we are faced
with more indeterminacy than might at first be apparent, core values about good
government emerge from Shakespeare's plays.
114. See Patrick Collinson, The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I, in ELIZABETHAN
ESSAYS 31-57 (1994).
115. Louise Halper, Measure for Measure: "Law, Prerogative, Subversion," 13 CARDOZO STUD.
L. &LIT. 221, 252 (2001).
116. HAROLD GODDARD, 1 THE MEANING OF SHAKESPEARE 215-68 (1951), quoted in Richard Levin,
Hazlitt on Henry V, and the Appropriation of Shakespeare, 35 SHAKESPEARE Q. 134, 134 (1984).
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INTRODUCTION
In waging the "war on terror," the United States (U.S.) has detained
numerous individuals for many years and claims the right to detain them for
their whole lives on the ground that they are dangerous. But the basis for this
claim of dangerousness is often flimsy hearsay testimony or similarly unreliable
evidence. Those who care about justice as well as security want to be sure that
those who are detained for long periods of time have either had a fair trial and
been convicted of a serious crime or, if they are being preventively detained,
then it is only because of reliable evidence-regularly reviewed-showing that
their release would pose an unacceptable risk to security. The following is a
constitutional argument for striking ajust balance between liberty and security,
one that is superior to the one struck by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) that currently determine whether captured individuals can be detained
as "enemy combatants."
The Bush administration has argued that there are no constitutional limits
on when it can detain nonresident aliens in the interest of security in the "war
on terror." This argument is based on a widespread misreading of Johnson v.
Eisentrager,' according to which the Supreme Court has "emphatically"
rejected the claim that nonresident aliens benefit from constitutional protections
of their liberty.2 We expose this misreading and argue that all persons detained
by the United States in the "war on terror" have rights under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. In particular, the fundamental protection the Fifth Amendment provides
for liberty-guaranteeing that it cannot be deprived without due process of
law-applies to all detainees, not only to citizens and resident aliens but also
to aliens captured and held by the United States outside the territory of the
United States.3
Furthermore, we contend that the law of war, as a part of international law,
provides substantive norms for distinguishing between different kinds of
detainees and determining the content of their due process rights.4 These
1. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
2. The claim that the rejection was "emphatic" was made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
3. A direct implication of this thesis is that CIA detentions ofaliens for interrogation purposes are
also covered by constitutional law, contrary to the view implicit in President Bush's Executive Order,
Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and
Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Exec. OrderNo. 13,440,72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July
20, 2007).
4. This position was recently taken in AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 2007), but
only with respect to resident aliens, as the court, we think wrongly, took the position that only resident aliens
benefit from constitutional rights.
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substantive norms show that CSRTs are inadequate in two fundamental regards.
First, they misapply to civilians concepts that are relevant to combatants,
including the idea of detention until "the cessation of active hostilities."
Second, they use standards for detention that strike the wrong balance between
claims of liberty and of security, allowing people to be detained on the basis of
flimsy evidence that does not reliably show that they are too dangerous to be
released.
These two claims are separate. The Court could decide that nonresident
aliens benefit from constitutional rights and decide not to look to international
law for guidance on the content of those rights. But were the Court to decide
that the law of war is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation, it would not
only be in error, but it would abandon the longstanding and deep connection
between constitutional law and international law.
Lastly, there is the question of how these rights could be vindicated. A
detainee may be able to press his claim for due process by invoking his
statutorily granted right to appeal the determination that he is an enemy
combatant. But if not, he must maintain the right of habeas corpus to contest
his unconstitutional detention. The Military Commissions Act of 2006' (MCA)
strips federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by detainees
in the "war on terror." The U.S. Constitution does not, however, allow the
stripping of habeas jurisdiction when that jurisdiction is necessary to protect
constitutional rights. The most recent court ruling on this point, Boumediene
v. Bush,6 gets this wrong by holding that nonresident alien detainees have no
constitutional rights. They not only have such rights, but if they cannot raise
these rights on appeal, then the right to habeas is guaranteed to them as a
subsidiary procedural right.
We develop our argument in six parts. In Parts I and II we give an
introductory overview of the U.S. practice of detentions in the "war on terror,"
and the Supreme Court's discussion of the practice in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.7 In
Part HI we critically discuss Hamdi's misapplication of the law of war and
provide the legal parameters of a detention policy consistent with the law of
war. In Part IV we argue for the extraterritorial applicability to nonresident
aliens of the core constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. In Part V we elucidate the link between constitutional norms
and international law. Finally, we argue that these rights can be enforced by
U.S. courts in Part VI.
5. 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
6. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
7. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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I. BACKGROUND ON DETENTION IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
The latest reports indicate that the United States now holds approximately
375 detainees from the "war on terror" in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba,'
approximately 620 in Afghanistan,9 and over 18, 000 in Iraq.'0 We focus on the
detainees in GuantAnamo, as there is little publicly available information on
those held elsewhere.l" We adopt this focus for illustrative purposes only, and
not as an indication that the rights of detainees are or should be fundamentally
different depending on where they are held.
Of the 375 or so detainees still in Guantdnamo, approximately eighty have
been determined to be eligible for release or transfer and will presumably be
released or transferred as the United States proceeds with negotiations with
other countries that would receive them.12 Since 2002, approximately 390
detainees have been released to other countries; 111 were released in 2006
alone. 3 This record of releasing detainees lends some support to the
Department of Defense's claim that "[t]he United States does not desire to hold
detainees for any longer than necessary."' 4
Nonetheless, there is still ground for concern. Even if the United States
releases all eighty detainees who have been determined eligible for release, it
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Detainee Transfer Announced (June 19,2007), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD= 11030 (last visited Sept. 11, 2007).
9. See Ben Fox, Ex-Guantdnamo Prisoner, Once Among Youngest Held, Back in US. Custody,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 18,2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/19/news/CB-GEN-
Guantanamo-Juvenile.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
10. See Walter Pincus, US. Holds 18,000 Detainees in Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2007, at A24
("The average stay in these detention centers is about a year, but about 8,000 of the detainees have been jailed
longer, including 1,300 who have been in custody for two years, said a statement provided by Capt. Phillip
J. Valenti, spokesman for Task Force 134, the U.S. Military Police group handling detainee operations.").
11. But see id.; Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet, Jailed 2 Years, Iraqi Tells of Abuse by
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at 1.1 (describing cases of an Iraqi detainee held in Iraq for over two
years, during which time he was questioned only once, and subjected to harsh, degrading treatment many
times); Omar ex rel. Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d. I (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the process given a United
States citizen detained in Iraq in a way that seems very much like a CSRT hearing).
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note 8; see also Sara Wood, Administrative
Tribunals to Begin for High- Value Guantanamo Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Mar. 6, 2007,
available at http:/www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2007/03/sec-070306-a fps01 .htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2007).
13. Wood, supra note 12. The countries to which prisoners have been released include "Albania,
Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Sudan,
Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Yemen." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note
8.
14. Wood, supra note 12.
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will still be holding approximately three hundred detainees in Guantdnamo, not
to mention the others held in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most likely elsewhere-
including those held by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Even assuming
that some others will be found eligible for release, hundreds (or thousands,
counting those held outside Guantinamo) could well be held in preventive
detention "for the duration of hostilities," which in the context of a "war on
terror" could be generations. Indeed, even if Guantdnamo is closed down, many
detainees would still be kept in long term preventive detention (presumably
now on U.S. soil), 5 and their constitutional rights would still be an issue.
It is true that every detainee in Guantdnamo has been found to be an
"enemy combatant" by a CSRT.'6 By itself, however, this is not very
reassuring. These determinations are structured to err on the side of detaining
those who were not "enemy combatants." A detainee has access to a "personal
representative" who can review the government's evidence and share with him
the unclassified portions thereof, but he does not have access to legal help. 7
The government's evidence can include anything the CSRT deems relevant,
including hearsay.'" Lastly, and most tellingly, a detainee is determined to be
an "enemy combatant" if that conclusion is supported by a "preponderance of
the evidence," and there is a rebuttable presumption that the U.S. government's
evidence is "genuine and accurate."' 9 In other words, if a detainee cannot rebut
the government's evidence, the government's evidence is taken to be sufficient.
In practice, the presumption that the U.S. government's evidence is
genuine and accurate may be very hard for a detainee to rebut effectively,
15. See Thorn Shanker& David Johnson, Legislation CouldBe Path to Closing Guantdnamo, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A10.
16. The foundations for CSRTs were laid in the Detainee Treatment Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1006
(2005) [hereinafter DTA]. "Between July 2004 and March 2005, [the Department of Defense] conducted 558
CSRTs at GuantAnamo Bay. At the time, thirty-eight detainees were determined to no longer meet the
definition of enemy combatant, and 520 detainees were found to be enemy combatants." Wood, supra note
12. As of October 2005, at the latest, the U.S. Government claimed that all detainees in Guantinamo Bay
had had their status reviewed by a CSRT. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Situation of Detainees at
Guantdnamo Bay, 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.120_.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
We do not know what percentage of detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq have likewise had (similar) status
review hearings.
17. See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Sec'y of the Military Dep't 4 (July 14,
2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRT Procedures.pdf (last visited
Sept. 24, 2007).
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
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leaving many "innocent" detainees unable to make their case."° Furthermore,
the affidavit of Stephen Abraham, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army
Reserve who served on a CSRT board, indicates that the problems inherent in
the design of CSRTs are made worse by inept and biased implementation of the
procedures."
Coming on the heels of Hamdi, where the Supreme Court found that
Hamdi had been detained as an enemy combatant without any opportunity to
contest the evidence, CSRTs are a real improvement. However, even
supplemented by an annual review, CSRTs cannot suffice to provide the
process due nonresident aliens before being preventively detained for years or
even decades.2" And it is important to keep in mind that detainees in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly elsewhere, may get even less by way of
procedural protections. Moreover, CIA detainees seem to receive no process
at all.23
The inadequacies of the CSRTs--even if the procedures were flawlessly
executed-are really our focal concern. CSRTs operate as though the issue is
to determine whether the individuals who come in front of them are combatants
who may be preventively detained until the end of hostilities in an international
conflict. That is a mistaken framing of the issue. First, preventive detention
until the end of hostilities is premised on an international war. The "war on
terror" as a whole cannot be conceived of this way because it covers detentions
that occur where international war is ongoing and where it is not. Second,
treating all detainees as "combatants" confuses the relevant standards for
preventive detention of combatants and civilians. The process for preventively
detaining a civilian, when the context is not detention prior to trial, should
assess the evidence of his dangerousness so that his detention lasts no longer
than actually necessary to meet serious security needs. CSRTs do not weigh the
evidence with that question in view.
20. For illustration of this point, see Time Change-Examining Proposals to Limit Guantanamo
Detainees' Access to Habeas Corpus Review, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, (2006)
(statement of Thomas Sullivan, Partner, Jenner & Block), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfn?id=2416&wit id=5772 (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
21. See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at app., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 06-1196). Colonel Abraham declares that those charged with gathering
information for the CSRT boards seemed to be generally untrained and inexperienced in either legal or
intelligence matters; that the information available to them was incomplete; that access to information that
might have been exculpatory was denied him when he was officially tasked with finding it; and that CSRT
boards faced pressure from above not to find that someone was not an "enemy combatant." Id.
22. The Department of Defense reports that the detainees in Guanthinamo have had two annual
reviews, as of March 6, 2007. See Wood, supra note 12.
23. See Exec. Order No. 13,440, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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To see how these design problems arose, we turn now to an aspect of the
Hamdi decision that has so far received very little critical discussion-namely,
the way the Court seems to license indefinite and perhaps perpetual detention.
II. SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON DETENTION IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
The Court (by which we mean the plurality opinion) in Hamdi was
concerned with the possibility of perpetual detention. It addressed that concern
in three ways. First, it pointed out that one of the more objectionable reasons
for indefinite detention was not in play: "we agree that indefinite detention for
the purpose of interrogation is not authorized [by Congress in the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)].'24
Second, it embraced a competing justification for detention: "The purpose
of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of
battle and taking up arms once again. 25 Moreover, it framed its acceptance of
that purpose in terms of the internationally recognized norms of the law of war,
noting that "[i]t is a clearly established principle of the law of war that
detention may last no longer than active hostilities."26 Finding that "[a]ctive
combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in
Afghanistan, 27 and that the AUMFs grant of authority to the President to use
"necessary and appropriate force" included "the authority to detain [captured
individuals] for the duration of the relevant conflict,"2 it completed the
syllogism and concluded that the ongoing detentions of individuals caught
while fighting against the United States in Afghanistan are "part of the exercise
of necessary and appropriate force, and therefore are authorized by the
AUMF.' 29
Third, it offered future courts a potential escape hatch when it allowed that
its understanding "may unravel" if "the practical circumstances of a given
conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development
of the law of war."30 This difficult standard-being "entirely unlike" other
wars-was held not to apply at the present time. But it could allow arguments
24. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. Interestingly, this is in play with CIA detentions. It seems the only
reason President Bush believes he can order these is that they apply only to aliens, which he presumably
thinks benefit from no constitutional protections. As for why he thinks this is true of resident aliens, we
cannot hazard a guess.
25. Id. at 518.
26. Id. at 520-21.
27. Id. at 521.
28. Id.
29. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
30. Id
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to be made in the future that the "war on terror" has evolved in such a way that
future detentions should be viewed as more problematic than the ongoing
detention of captured combatants in a war that still involves active hostilities.3
It is important to be clear about the status of the Court's arguments here.
It might seem as if they were simply statutory arguments regarding what was
authorized by the AUMF. It is implausible, however, to suggest that the
Court's appeal to the law of war had no constitutional significance. When the
Court concluded that "[t]here is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own
citizens as an enemy combatant,"32 it surely was referring to constitutional as
well as statutory bars. Because the Constitution does not allow liberty to be
deprived except with due process of law-interpreted to involve both
procedural and substantive protections-the Court must have assumed that the
law of war is relevant to the constitutionally required due process. Indeed, if
we imagine that Congress had granted the President the right to hold captured
citizens both indefinitely and beyond the cessation of active hostilities, there
could be no doubt that the Court would have found this to be constitutionally
problematic. In other words, the citation to the law of war was not merely an
aid in statutory interpretation. If we are to make sense of the Court's opinion,
we have to see that citation as providing also a standard for constitutionally
acceptable detentions.33
Admittedly, the Hamdi Court's implicit reliance on constitutional rights
was deployed in a case involving a U.S. citizen. But our larger argument is that
the U.S. Constitution's protection against the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law applies to nonresident aliens as well as to resident aliens and
U.S. citizens. The process they are due may take into account the danger the
United States faces and the difficulties involved in collecting reliable evidence
of dangerousness, but it must also give due weight to their liberty interests.
We also acknowledge that it does not follow from the fact that the Court
looked to the law of war to justify preventive detentions in the "war on terror"
that it has to align constitutional law with the law of war. If the Court were to
accept our position that it misinterpreted the law of war, it could decide that the
law of war provides only a sufficient, not a necessary, basis for finding
preventive detentions in the "war on terror" to be constitutional. Nonetheless
31. It is also possible to interpret this third prong not as suggesting that the law of war might allow
too many to be detained for too long, but that it might not allow enough to be detained for as long as
necessary.
32. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
33. This is how the majority in Al-Marri reads Hamdi as well. In a footnote attached to a citation
to Hamdi it wrote that AI-Marri "is protected by the Due Process Clause and so cannot be seized and
indefinitely detained by the military unless he qualifies as an enemy combatant [under the law of war]." Al-
Marri, 487 F.3d at 181 n.10.
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we proceed on the assumption that the Court was deriving constitutional
authority from the law of war and that it would at least shift the burden onto the
administration to provide another justification for current detention practices
if it turns out that they are inconsistent with the law of war. In addition, we
argue in Part V that it would be proper, in developing a jurisprudence for due
process rights for nonresident aliens, for the Court to look to international law,
including the law of war.
Before moving on to a substantive criticism of the Hamdi decision, it is
important to be clear that the Court was indeed discussing the "war on terror"
generally, and not merely the limited part of it that was an international armed
conflict between the United States and the Taliban government of Afghanistan.
Given the fact that the evidence the Court offered of ongoing hostilities in the
"relevant conflict" was fighting in Afghanistan, and that it appealed to the law
of war to justify detentions, it might seem as though it was addressing only
detentions in traditional international armed conflicts.34 Were that the case, our
criticism of the decision would be misplaced.
But there are two reasons why it is hard to read the opinion that narrowly.
First, the Court's concern with the danger of "perpetual detention" cannot be
made sense of in the context of traditional international conflicts. Such
conflicts do not raise the specter of an "unconventional war" that could last "for
two generations," in which a detainee like Hamdi might be detained "for the
rest of his life."35 To raise that specter, the Court had to invoke not the war in
Afghanistan, but the larger "war on terror." Second, the Court was fundament-
ally concerned with the President's authorization under the AUMF, which was
broadly directed at "'nations, organizations, or persons' associated with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."36 In other words, the AUMF lumped
together combatants such as the Taliban soldiers and noncombatants-such as
members of al Qaeda-and the Court seemed to follow along, using the term
"enemy combatant" to cover both. Moreover, the CSRTs created in the wake
of Hamdi apply to both, without distinction.
In the end, it is not completely clear whether the Hamdi Court was
discussing the larger "war on terror" or only the war in Afghanistan. It is clear,
however, that in establishing CSRTs the Bush Administration reads Hamdi as
34. This is how the majority in AI-Marri reads Hamdi. Id. at 178-79.
35. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. Of course there was the 100 Year War between France and England,
but it is hard to imagine the war in Afghanistan itself lasting anything like that long. In fact, there is a sense
in which that international war is already over because the Karzai government is not fighting the United
States and the United States is no longer an occupying power. Now the United States is merely helping the
Karzai government fight an insurgency, an example of a non-international armed conflict.
36. Id. at 518.
2007]
54 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
relevant to the larger "war on terror." We discuss the opinion below as though
that were the correct reading. And on that reading-in treating this larger
"war" as though any putative terrorist detained in it would properly be
categorized as an "enemy combatant"-the Court departed substantially from
the law of war. We now turn to explaining why that is so.
III. CRITICIZING THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF DETAINEE RIGHTS
UNDER THE LAW OF WAR
37
The Court made two basic mistakes in invoking the law of war to justify
indefinite, possibly perpetual, preventive detention in the "war on terror." First,
it failed to see that the cessation of "active hostilities" does not fit the "war on
terror" as a whole. Second, it failed to see that the detainees captured in the
"war on terror" are usually not combatants, but are instead civilians. If we
correct these errors we see that legal detentions generally require more than
CSRT hearings. We also see that the law of war, as it now stands, can
reasonably be applied even given the new threats raised by terrorism.
A. Misapplication of the Norms of International Armed Conflict: The
Cessation ofActive Hostilities
The Court appealed to the cessation of "active hostilities" for setting a
limit to the length of detentions in the "war on terror." In so doing, the Court
relied on a part of the law of war that deals with international armed conflict.
However, the notion of the cessation of active hostilities does not fit the "war
on terror" as a whole, as the "war on terror" extends beyond any international
war that may form part of it.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto
provide the modern statements of the law of war with regard to the treatment
and justification of detention of those interned during war. In particular, the
Third and Fourth Convention (GC III and GC IV respectively), together with
the Additional Protocol I (AP I), provide the law governing the detention of
prisoners of war and other detainees.38
37. To speak with the Supreme Court, we use the phrase "law of war" where many authors would
instead use "laws of armed conflict."
38. These are, respectively, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC 1M]; Geneva Convention Relative to Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV];
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP 1]. The United States is a
signatory of these Geneva Conventions, but not the AP I. Nevertheless, the articles of the AP I that we rely
on, notably art. 75 on minimum guarantees, are generally regarded as customary international law. See
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The Supreme Court cited GC III, Article 118, for the proposition that
"detention may last no longer than active hostilities."39 This provision is only
triggered under Common Article 2, which provides that certain provisions of
law are applicable to "cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them"; and "cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance." ' Because the Geneva
Conventions are customary international law, the reference to high contracting
parties can be replaced with a reference to states. This shows that the reference
to "active hostilities" is limited to wars between states.
The Geneva Conventions also apply, in Common Article 3, to non-
international armed conflicts, such as wars between a state and groups such as
the Taliban after they were removed from power and became a rebel group.
But Common Article 3 provides minimum standards for humane treatment and
fair trial;4 it does not discuss when detentions are legally justified. It is only
in the law triggered by Common Article 2 that one finds provisions justifying
detention, and, as just noted, Common Article 2 refers to instances of
international armed conflict.
The Court was right to think that the conflict in Afghanistan counted as an
international armed conflict. The problem with the Court's analysis is that it
can be read as though the law of warjustified detention that could go on as long
as the "war on terror" lasts. Since much of the "war on terror" extends beyond
such international armed conflicts, however, the appeal to GC III cannot
possibly justify detentions until the end of the "war on terror." Indeed, since
appeal to the cessation of "active hostilities" was designed to fit the context of
a war between states, using it in another context strips it from its normative
foundation. Moreover, the notion of "active hostilities" loses its meaning if
taken from the context of a conflict between states and used instead to refer to
Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International
Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 419, 427
(1987) ("We support in particular the fundamental guarantees contained in article 75"); William H. Taft, The
Law ofArmed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003) ("While the
United States has major objections to parts of Additional Protocol I, it does regard the provisions of Article
75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.").
39. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
40. GC Il, supra note 38, art. 2; GC IV, supra note 38, art. 2, IN 1-2. This was also adopted by
reference in AP I, art. 1, 3 ("This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those
Conventions.").
41. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
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ongoing acts of terrorism and the United States's ongoing efforts to combat
them.42
It might be suggested that the "war on terror" presents a new set of
problems and that the old law has to be adapted to these new problems.
Perhaps-but extensions of the Geneva Conventions have to make sense and
appealing to the cessation of active hostilities is a categorical confusion. If
civilians who are members of certain terrorist groups are especially dangerous,
then it is the provisions dealing with the detention of civilians, not those dealing
with the return of combatants after an international armed conflict, that should
be re-examined.
We turn now to the second confusion: treating detainees in the "war on
terror" as if they were combatants.
B. Misapplication of the Norms of International Armed Conflict: Confusing
Civilians and Combatants
A second mistake in the Court's reasoning in Hamdi was to treat the
detainees in the "war on terror" as though they were combatants. There
presumably were some combatants captured in the wars against Afghanistan
and Iraq. Indeed, if the government's position on Hamdi is factually accurate,
he may well have been a combatant.43 But the opinion seems to be general, and
those captured in the "war on terror" during non-international armed conflicts,
such as the current fight against the Taliban, are not combatants. 44 Terrorists
42. We do not mean to imply that the law regarding when active hostilities have ceased, even in
the context of international armed conflict, is entirely clear. A good sense for the problem can be gained by
comparing the majority and the dissenting opinions in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
43. The government relied on a declaration by Michael Mobbs, according to which
Hamdi was 'affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons training'...
,remained with his Taliban unit following the attacks of September 11' . .. during the
time when Northern Alliance forces were 'engaged in battle with the Taliban,'
'Hamdi's Taliban unit surrendered' to those forces, after which he 'surrender[ed] his
Kalishnikov assault rifle' to them.
Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs at 3-4, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No.
2:02CV439). If the United States was in overall control over the Northern Alliance at this time, then the
conflict would have been international, and Hamdi would count as a combatant. Hamdi, however, claims
to have been a civilian in Afghanistan doing relief work. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511.
44. Note that the category of "combatants" exists only in international armed conflicts and not in
non-international armed conflicts. Thejustification for this becomes intuitively clear when one considers that
only combatants are immunized from prosecution for legal acts of war which would otherwise constitute a
crime. Others may be retrospectively granted amnesty in a non-international context, but that should not be
confused with an immunity. See Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict art. 6, 5, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP H].
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in general are civilians. The point here is not the one that Hamdi himself was
making-that he was a civilian, in no way engaged in hostilities, mistakenly
taken to be a combatant. The point is that even those who were engaged in
hostilities were mostly doing so as civilians. And the rules for detaining and
releasing civilians are not the same as those for detaining and releasing
combatants.
The definitions of civilians and combatants are laid out in AP I, which
codifies a negative definition of civilians as those who are not combatants. "A
civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons
referred to in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in
Article 43 of this Protocol., 45  There are a few things worth highlighting in
these provisions. First, with one exception, all combatants must be linked to a
Party, in other words, a signatory state. 46 Second, the reason for this require-
ment is that combatants are privileged to engage in hostilities; they may legally
kill and otherwise perform legal acts of war that civilians may not perform.47
Individuals can benefit from such a privilege if and only if they are properly
connected with a Party that confers the right to engage in hostilities on them.48
Third, the definitions are exhaustive. A civilian is anyone who is not a
combatant.49 Fourth, terrorists who operate through organizations such as
45. AP I, supra note 38, art. 50, 1.
46. The exception is GC Ill, article 4(A), paragraph 6, which endorses the concept of levie en
masse, a spontaneous rise of the people in self-defense against the invading army. GC I, supra note 38, art.
4(a), 6.
47. The right to engage in hostilities is explicitly mentioned at the end of AP I, article 43, paragraph
2. AP I, supra note 38, art. 43, 2. See also Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict
and the Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9 (2004) ("The underlying theory of the
combatant's privilege is that wars are conflicts between public entities, not between individuals. The
detention of combatants is not punishment, but rather, simply a way of putting combatants hors de combat
for the duration of the conflict. Privileged combatants cannot be prosecuted for engaging in violence when
that violence complies with the rules regarding conduct of combat."). DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 67 (1995) ("[O]n the basis of the ordinary meaning, a combatant
is a person who fights. As an international legal term, the combatant is a person who is authorized by
international law to fight in accordance with international law applicable in international armed conflict.").
48. See, e.g., KENNETH WATKIN, WARRIORS WITHOUT RIGHTS? COMBATANTS, UNPRIVILEGED
BELLIGERENTS, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGITIMACY 12 (2005) ("Combatancy is assessed in terms of
... its intimate and continuing link to legitimacy.").
49. The exhaustive nature of the distinction is generally accepted. See Knut D6rmann, The Legal
Situation of"Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants," 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45, 45-46 (2003); Oscar M.
Uhler et al., Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
51 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans.) (1958) ("There is no intermediate status;
nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law."); HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel
v. The Government of Israel [2006] 26, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.ilFilesENG/02/690/007/
a34/02007690.a34.HTM (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) ("That definition [of civilians] is 'negative' in nature.
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al Qaeda, or who operate on their own, are civilians. These organizations do
not have a link to Parties to the conflict. This last point bears repeating: the
terrorists who are the target detainees in the "war on terror" are generally
civilians under the governing law of war.
Despite the fact that the distinction between civilians and combatants is
reasonably clear in the law of war, the Supreme Court misapplied it. As was
noted above, the Supreme Court cited GC I, Article 118, for the proposition
that "detention may last no longer than active hostilities."5  What Article 118
actually says is that "[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities."'" The term "prisoners of war"
applies only to captured combatants and certain limited classes of civilians-
generally those who accompany armed forces that belong to a party in the
conflict, not those who strike out on their own.52 Thus, while the Supreme
Court may have been right to cite this clause for someone like Hamdi who-if
the government is factually correct-may have been a combatant, it was wrong
insofar as it cited it for preventive detentions generally. Those detained or
interned as civilians generally are not covered under that release or repatriation
clause.
The preventive detention of civilians in time of occupation-the condition
that applied in Afghanistan at the time of Hamdi-is covered most directly by
GC IV, Article 78: "[i]f the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for
imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected
persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to
internment."" What is noteworthy here is how high the barrier to detention is.
It defines the concept of 'civilian' as the opposite of 'combatant."); Id. at M 27-28 ("the state asked us to
recognize a third category of persons, that of unlawful combatants.... [A]s far as existing law goes, the data
before us is not sufficient to recognize this third category."). See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-
14-T, Judgment, 180 (Mar. 3, 2000) ("[civilians are persons] who are not, or no longer, members of the
armed forces.").
50. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
51. Naturally, "[p]risoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are
pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the
punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence." GC I1,
supra note 38, art. 119.
52. A general six-item list of types of people who can become prisoners of war if captured is given
in GC In, article 4(A). GC III, supra note 38, art. 4(A). Paragraphs 4-6 concern specific categories of
civilians who are due the protections of prisoners of war. Id. The one exception to the claim that citizens can
become prisoners of war only if they accompany armed forces of a party to a conflict concerns the concept
of levie en masse. See supra note 46. Whether these civilians should also be treated as combatants with
regard to release conditions is a question we do not address here.
53. GC IV, supra note 38, art. 78, 1. AP I, article 75, paragraph 3 reinforces this GC IV passage,
but adds nothing new with regard to when a detainee must be released: "Except in cases of arrest or detention
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Walen and Venzke
The emphasis on using preventive detention only rarely is sounded three times:
only when it is "necessary"; "for imperative reasons of security"; "at the most."
As the official commentary to this passage states, the point of the language used
was to ensure that "such measures can only be ordered for real and imperative
reasons of security; their exceptional character must be preserved."54 We will
see in section D at the end of this Part, that this approach to preventive deten-
tion as exceptional conflicts with the use of CSRTs as currently configured.
The other relevant Article of GC IV, Article 133, may seem to link the
detention of civilians with that of combatants. It reads: "[i]nternment shall
cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities." But it should be noted
that this does not imply that internment during hostilities is as unproblematic
for civilians as it is for prisoners of war and other detained combatants. This
article is based on the premise that "hostilities are the main cause for
internment";" accordingly when they cease, it can be generally presumed that
the need for preventive detention will cease as well. Rather than implying that
civilians can be detained as long as combatants, it provides simply another limit
to the detention of civilians. This is clear from GC IV Article 132, which states
that "[e]ach interned person shall be released... as soon as the reasons which
necessitated his internment no longer exist."
These provisions show that the Hamdi Court misapplied the law insofar
as it approved of holding "enemy combatants" until the cessation of "active
hostilities" on the grounds that this is in accordance with the law of war. Most
of these "enemy combatants" are not combatants at all. They are civilians and
their detention until the cessation of active hostilities is not straightforwardly
authorized by the law of war.
The U.S. government has tried to resist this conclusion by taking the
position that those civilians who engage in hostilities turn into a species of
combatant-unlawful enemy combatants.56 This can be seen, for example, in
for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon
as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist." AP I, supra note 38,
art. 75, 3. This provision of AP I serves as an ultimate safety net for persons who are not covered by the
relevant parts of GC IV because they do not qualify as "protected persons" as defined in GC TV, article 4.
54. Uhler, supra note 49, at 368. See also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21 -A, Judgment,
320 (Feb. 20, 2000) ("The judicial or administrative body reviewing the decision of a party to a conflict to
detain an individual must bear in mind that such measures of detention should only be taken if absolutely
necessary for reasons of security.... [T]he involuntary confinement of a civilian where the security of the
Detaining Power does not make this absolutely necessary will be unlawful.").
55. Uhler, supra note 49, at 515.
56. There are also scholars who adopt this line. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 28 (2004) ("A civilian may convert
himself into a combatant."). The assumption that an individual could individually gain combatant status
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the remarks of the Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, John B.
Bellinger: "it's very clear, and an accepted [sic] in international law, that
individuals who take up arms illegally ... are combatants because they are
fighting, but they are 'unlawful combatants' because they are doing it in an
illegal way."57 Plausible as his claim may sound in terms of lay English, it is,
as we have seen, simply and straightforwardly wrong as an account of inter-
national law."
Again, there may be reason to amend the law of war when it comes to the
detention of civilians. We return to examine that possibility in section E of this
Part. Our point now is that by treating civilians as combatants, the Court did
not respect the law of war as it now stands.
C. The Law of War and International Human Rights Law
So far we have been discussing only the limits on detention provided by
the law of war as it deals with international armed conflict. But that leaves
much of the "war on terror" ungoverned by international law. It might be
thought, then, that the right way to get guidance from international law on
detentions in the "war on terror," especially when it is waged outside of the
context of international armed conflict, is to look to international human rights
law. Perhaps surprisingly, this would not yield much guidance, as it turns out
that international law is more lax when it comes to preventive detention outside
the context of international armed conflict than in it. However, an argument
can still be made that the law of war for international armed conflict presents
a basic floor for legal detentions.
according to his actions is also implicit in Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It is TimeforIntermediate
Levels of Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 209 (2005).
57. John B. Bellinger HI, Digital Video Press Conference (Mar. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.usembassy.de/germany/bellingerdvc.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
58. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. The Hamdi Court cites Ex Parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 31 (1942), hoping thereby to show that the "capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants" is
legally well grounded. 542 U.S. at 518. But there is no reason to take Quirin as precedent for treating
civilians who unlawfully use force as combatants in the modem, legal sense of the word. See also Al-Marri,
487 F.3d at 186 ("[M]erely engaging in unlawful behavior does not make one an enemy combatant.... The
Quirin petitioners were first enemy combatants associating themselves with the military arm of the German
government with which the United States was at war.").
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When a state of international armed conflict does not exist, 59 the most
pertinent and universally applicable human rights law is the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).60 The relevant language for
our discussion from the ICCPR is found in Article 9:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law ....
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order
his release if the detention is not lawful.6'
While these clauses provide meaningful procedural protection, they do not
provide any substantive guidance on when a state can take a concern for
security to provide the basis for preventive detention. The prohibition on
arbitrary detention would not restrict the use of CSRTs to license preventive
detentions. Such detentions would certainly count as being in accordance with
a procedure established by law (the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and
the regulations promulgated pursuant to it, to be precise).62
Paragraph 4, which requires that there be some form of review by a court,
may provide some ground to criticize the use of CSRTs, but not a significant
one. The DTA provides for the right to appeal a CSRT finding that an
individual is an "enemy combatant," first to the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia, and from there to the U.S. Supreme Court.63 It could be argued
that the appeal right is too limited and that detainees also need to have a right
59. The only provision of the law of war that applies after wars and occupations end, but not
generally in peacetime as well as war is AP I, article 75, paragraph 6: "Persons who are arrested, detained
or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article until
their final release, repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict." AP I, supra note
38, art. 75, 6. Note also that only selected provisions of GC IV cover for the length of an occupation; others
end one year after "general close of military operations." GC IV, supra note 38, art. 6. Articles 78, 132 and
133, which we have discussed above, are among those that last only a year after the close of military
operations. AP , article 3(b) eliminates this one-year restriction, but the United States is not a signatory to
the AP I. AP I, supra note 38, art. 3(b).
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
61. Id. art. 9, 1, 4.
62. See supra notes 16-17.
63. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A).
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to habeas.' But unless there were some substantive legal problem with the
sorts of preventive detentions that the United States is now using in the "war on
terror," the procedural right to habeas would be of limited value. It might allow
certain factual inquiries that could not be raised on appeal. But the right to
habeas, by itself, would not provide a ground to challenge the legal framework
for preventive detentions. For that, more substantive standards are needed.
Nevertheless, it would be quite anomalous if the United States were to
conclude that it has greater legal liberty to put nonresident aliens in possibly
perpetual preventive detention if it captures them after a period of occupation
of another country ends than if it captures them during a period of occupation.6"
The solution to this anomaly is to be found in the link that should be made
between the law of war and U.S. constitutional law. Our argument in the next
two Parts will be that nonresident aliens benefit from the Constitution's
prohibition on deprivations of liberty without due process of law (again,
understood to have both substantive and procedural dimensions) (Part IV), and
that the law of war provides substantive guidance on how to interpret this
constitutional norm for the case of nonresident aliens (Part V). The standards
deployed in the Geneva Conventions provide an appropriate baseline for
balancing the United States' legitimate concern with security against the rights
of individuals to their liberty. The fact that international human rights law does
not provide a similar baseline does not give the United States license to change
the balance between its security interests and liberty interests of individuals.
It is not as if international human rights law provides competing norms for
balancing state security interests against individual liberty interests when
international armed conflicts are not ongoing. International human rights law
simply does not address in any substantial way the balance. Thus, the only
substantive guidance from international law comes from the law of war. If the
balance between security and liberty is appropriately struck in the Geneva
Conventions, then that is the proper constitutional balance for dealing with
nonresident aliens.
D. The Conflict Between U.S. Policy and the International Law Standard for
Balancing Security and Liberty
Even if the Supreme Court did not properly describe the law of war in
Hamdi, it might be argued that CSRTs strike-or would strike if staffed by well
64. This is the argument the Court decided to entertain when it granted certiorari, after initially
denying it in the Boumediene case. Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981.
65. The period of occupation would count as a period of international armed conflict.
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trained individuals who had access to the intelligence they need66-a legally
justifiable balance between the security interests of the United States and the
liberty interests of detainees. We argue here for the contrary position.
As noted above, GC IV provides that when a state "considers it necessary,
for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected
persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to
internment. 67  The balance struck here allows for only minimal use of
preventive detention, and only in exceptional cases. Nonetheless, it is a balance
that is called for and thus, security concerns can, if serious enough, justify
preventive detentions.68
The United States may claim that the CSRT procedure provides just this
sort of balance.69 Ongoing preventive detention is allowed only after a CSRT
has determined by a preponderance of the evidence that those detained are
"enemy combatants" in the functional sense of individuals who have taken up
arms against the United States and its allies.7" This is a determination based on
an individualized hearing. Moreover, a holding that a detainee is an "enemy
combatant" is reviewed on an annual basis.71
But there are at least three problems with the CSRT procedures. 72 First,
a preponderance of the evidence is a comparative notion; it does not imply that
the evidence is particularly strong. A preponderance of the evidence could be
66. See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 21.
67. GC IV, supra note 38, art. 78, 11.
68. If security can be preserved relatively well with less drastic measures than internment, then
those less drastic measures must be taken. For example, the practice of releasing detainees if they can come
up with a reliable "sponsor" within the community provides a way of protecting security while also promoting
liberty. The existence of this practice was pointed out to us by Charles Garraway. See also Bremer: Iraq
detainees to be freed(Jan. 7,2004), available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/O1/07/sprj.nirq.
bremer/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). In any event, the only legitimate factor counterbalancing the
deprivation of liberty is individual dangerousness constituting a security risk. Notably, this excludes
detention for the purpose of gathering information, which would be illegal in all circumstances. Cf Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 521.
69. This may only be true of detainees in Guantnamo, as the CSRT regulations we have been
discussing apply only there. The DTA does call for status review procedures to be developed for Afghanistan
and Iraq as well. DTA § 1005(a). But we are uncertain how much they resemble the procedures for
Guantinamo. Importantly, the DTA covers detainees only in Guantinamo, Afghanistan or Iraq. If the United
States holds detainees elsewhere, those detainees are not covered by the DTA.
70. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
71. See DTA § 1005(a)(I)(A). Interestingly, the DTA has different clauses covering detainees in
GuantAnamo, on the one hand, and in Afghanistan and Iraq, on the other. The procedure for annual review
is only to be found in the clause covering Guanthnamo. Compare § 1005(a)(1)(A) and § 1005(a)(1)(B).
72. For further discussion of how limited and problematic CSRTs are see Boumediene, 476 F.3d
at 1005-06 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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one piece of hearsay evidence from a dubious source, as compared to nothing
but the detainee's own denials on the other side. This problem is exacerbated
by the fact that CSRTs use a rebuttable presumption that the U.S. government's
evidence is "genuine and accurate."73
Second, though initial hearings are individualized, further review of
detention decisions are not, at least not in the relevant way, individualized. If
someone is found to be an "enemy combatant," he is subject to detention until
the cessation of "active hostilities," which in the war on terror would seem to
mean until the United States is no longer concerned about terrorist attacks.
Even with an annual review of his case, the presumption, once an individual is
declared an "enemy combatant," is that he can be held as long as the "war on
terror" goes on. The kind of individual consideration contemplated by the
Geneva Conventions, however, involves more than an annual review to see if
new facts have surfaced showing that his detention was a mistake.74 It requires
an individualized assessment of just how great a risk an individual poses, to
ensure that he is held no longer than necessary for "imperative reasons of
security."
Third, the definition of an "enemy combatant" is not only misleading, as
most detainees in the "war on terror" are civilians, but is also not particularly
tightly tied to a showing of dangerousness. The MCA defines an "unlawful
enemy combatant,"-a narrower category than the "enemy combatant" category
CSRTs use-in part, as "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or
its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)."75 Merely providing
"material support" for hostilities against the United States is an awfully
expansive term that may have nothing to do with being a supporter of terrorism.
It might be met, for example, by someone who, from time to time, cooks food
for members of terrorist organizations. Moreover, it is not clear what falls
under the label of forces "associated" with the Taliban and al Qaeda. Would
a member of Hamas, which has been declared a terrorist organization, count?
A huge percentage of the population of the Gaza strip could then be indefinitely
73. See Deputy Secretary of Defense, supra note 17.
74. Indeed, an annual review is insufficient. GC IV, article 43 provides that such revision shall take
place "periodically, and at least twice yearly." GC IV, supra note 38, art. 43. Also, in the context of
occupation, this decision must be reviewed periodically, "if possible every six months." Id. at 2.
75. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C § 948(a)(l)(A)(i)(emphasis added) [hereinafter MCA].
The CIA can detain for interrogation an even broader class of aliens, those who the Director of the CIA
determines "to be a member or part of or supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated organizations." See
Exec. Order No. 13,440, supra note 3 and accompanying text. Taken literally, the CIA could indefinitely
detain any alien who has done nothing more than express support for the Taliban.
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detained, even though many of them think of Hamas as a political party, not a
terrorist organization.76
To follow the norms of international law, then, the United States would
need to adopt different procedures that reflect a balance between security and
liberty that is more respectful of the claims of liberty. This does not mean that
the United States has to sacrifice its legitimate security interests. Measures
necessary to protect its security can legally be taken under international law.
However, it is a violation of international law to treat civilians like combatants
who can be detained until the "war on terror" is either "won" or abandoned.
E. Defense of the International Law Standard for Balancing Security and
Liberty
It might be argued, given the exigencies of the "war on terror," that the
United States is right to push for changes in the law of war. In particular, it
might be argued that the United States is right to push for a functional
definition, rather than a status definition, of combatants. According to the
functional definition, anyone who fights is a combatant. According to the status
definition, anyone who is entitled to fight is a combatant. The law of war uses
the status definition and we argue here that doing so strikes at least a defensible
balance between the security interests of the United States and the liberty
interests of detainees. The burden for changing the law of war, therefore, sits
squarely on those who seek to change it.
The premise underlying the United States' push to use the functional
definition is that members of groups like al Qaeda fight like combatants. They
present a danger more like that presented by combatants fighting for another
country than that presented by normal criminal activity (even organized
criminal activity). In addition, the problems of obtaining evidence sufficient to
convict them of criminal activity are so great that they need to be preventively
detained. They need to be detained, as combatants are detained, until the fight
against the organizations to which they belong is over.
These empirical claims are bolstered by a simple thought experiment.77
Suppose a combatant, fighting for a state with which the United States is at war,
and a civilian member of al Qaeda are captured side by side, both carrying
weapons, both having been shooting at U.S. troops. According to the law of
76. "[T]he mere fact that a person is a national of, or aligned with, an enemy party cannot be
considered as threatening the security of the opposing party where he is living and is not, therefore, a valid
reason for interning him or placing him in assigned residence." Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T,
Judgment, 577 (Nov. 16, 1998).
77. See Charles Garraway, "Combatants "-Substance or Semantics?" in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 317, 329-32 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
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war, the combatant can be detained until the cessation of hostilities with the
country for which he fights, but the civilian can be detained only as long as his
individual detention is necessary for imperative reasons of security. Moreover,
the combatant's detention does not have to be reviewed at all once he is
determined to be a combatant; by contrast, the civilian's status has to be
reviewed every six months.7" But surely it is absurd to treat the civilian, who
had no privilege to fight at all, so much better than the combatant. If he fights
like a combatant, he should be detained like one.
In response we point out that it is necessary to divide civilians who are
thought to function like combatants into two categories: those who are caught
red-handed and those who are not. Any civilian caught engaging in combat
would be caught engaging in a serious crime. He can presumably be convicted
and detained for as long as the relevant sentence allowed. Thus, he is actually
more subject to detention than a person with the status of combatant. On the
other hand, if a civilian is not caught red-handed, then there is likely to be some
doubt that he is a combatant and a danger that he will be detained without
cause. This danger of wrongly detaining someone who is not a combatant is
much less likely to be present with combatants who, in order to act lawfully,
must be wearing a distinctive insignia.79 Thus, the thought experiment does not
apply accurately to either category.
It might be objected that it is not always possible to prosecute those caught
red-handed. Capture in conditions of combat is a messy business and it is not
always possible for those who did the capturing to participate in a subsequent
trial. Indeed, sometimes the people who were eyewitnesses to a capture have
been killed in subsequent combat themselves. Moreover, whether or not they
are available for trial, they may have had little opportunity in the confusion of
real combat, to make extensive notes about who they captured and what they
were doing. If civilians had to be released as soon as it is no longer necessary
to detain them for imperative reasons of security, then the civilians who cannot
be tried because of a paucity of evidence might be released earlier than they
should be.
In response we point out that these are exactly the sorts of civilians who
can justifiably be preventively detained. We do not deny that many detainees
in the "war on terror" are committed to fighting the United States and to using
78. See GC IV, supra note 38, arts. 43 & 78, 2.
79. Any combatant not wearing distinctive insignia is guilty of a war crime. More significantly for
our point, we assume that it is very unlikely that anyone who is not a combatant would be wearing the
uniform or insignia of a combatant, especially as doing so would not only probably subject him to detention
until the cessation of hostilities, but also would mark him as a target for the enemy who, without knowing
better, is likely to shoot at the civilian in combatant's clothes.
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terrorist means in doing so. A category of preventive detention is justified for
those civilians for whom: a) there is insufficient evidence to obtain a
conviction for criminal actions, and yet b) there is good reason to believe that
they are terrorists, and c) no less restrictive treatment would serve the security
interests of the United States and its allies."0 Their cases may have to be
reviewed regularly, in contrast with what is due captured combatants. But they
can still be detained as long as there is good reason to believe that their ongoing
detention is imperative for security reasons, in other words, that they are still
a real threat. And regular review of their cases is a relatively small price to pay
to ensure that those who might have mistakenly been picked up as being
terrorists are released as soon as possible.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION TO NONRESIDENT ALIENS OF THE
CORE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT To BE DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
We now turn to the question of whether nonresident aliens can benefit
from the argument in Part MI as a matter of constitutional law.
A. Rasul v. Bush: ' A Headcount
When the Supreme Court most recently addressed the question whether
nonresident aliens have enforceable constitutional rights, 2 six of the nine
Justices took the position that they do. Five took that position in footnote
fifteen in the majority opinion of Rasul, and one, Justice Kennedy, took it in the
text of his concurring opinion. Even though one of the five who signed onto the
majority opinion, Justice O'Connor, has since retired, there should still be at
least five members of the Court who embrace the position that nonresident
aliens have constitutional rights.8 3
Starting then with footnote fifteen, it reads:
Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in
combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have
been held in Executive detention for more than two years in territory
80. Civilians can also be detained in the short run while looking for a country that would not violate
their human rights. See, e.g., Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198, 199 (D.D.C. 2005).
81. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
82. It is not redundant to describe constitutional rights as enforceable. For brevity, however, we
assume that all constitutional rights are enforceable.
83. We draw no inferences from the initial denial of certiorari in Boumediene, nor from the Court's
subsequent decision to grant certiorari.
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subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
United States, without access to counsel and without being charged
with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe 'custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'8 4
This text indicates that nonresident aliens could be subject to treatment by the
United States that would normally justify granting the writ of habeas: "custody
in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States. '5 By
itself, this does not imply that it is their constitutional rights that have been
violated-there are two other possibilities: violations of the law or treaties of
the United States. Yet the citation the Court offers for this claim does implicate
constitutional rights.
The supporting citation is Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,86 and the cases cited therein. Verdugo-Urquidez
held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
does not extend to nonresident aliens whose property outside the United States
is searched by U.S. authorities. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion rejected
the thought that the holding followed from the general proposition that
nonresident aliens have no constitutional rights. Instead, he framed the
question as "what constitutional standards apply when the Government acts, in
reference to an alien, within its sphere of foreign operations."87 In so framing
the question, he extended a point Justice Harlan had made concurring in Reid
v. Covert:88 It is "not that the Constitution 'does not apply' overseas, but that
there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all
circumstances in every foreign place."89 Justice Harlan's point concerned only
U.S. citizens; by citing it in this case, however, Kennedy was extending it to
aliens as well. Thus, the Rasul majority's citing this opinion makes it clear that
they agreed that constitutional rights could apply to nonresident aliens.
Justice Kennedy's own opinion in Rasul focused on the constitutional right
to habeas, as originally discussed in Eisentrager. The Court in Eisentrager
denied that twenty-one German detainees, who had been convicted of war
crimes by a military commission in China and who were later repatriated to
84. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
85. This phrase comes from the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2007). We say
"normally" because the MCA has stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over these detainees.
86. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259.
87. Id. at 277.
88. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
89. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (citing to Reid, 354 U.S. at 74) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original).
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Germany to serve their sentences in an American army base prison, had a right
to contest their detentions using habeas corpus. Nonetheless, it endorsed the
view that the constitutionally guaranteed right to habeas "is a subsidiary
procedural right that follows from possession of substantive constitutional
rights."9 Thus, to find that the detainees in Guantinamo had a constitutional
right to habeas, Justice Kennedy had to first find that they had constitutional
rights that might be violated by their custody in Guantdnamo. He found that
was the case both because "Guantinamo Bay is in every practical respect a
United States territory,"'" and because "the detainees at Guantinamo Bay are
being held indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceeding to
determine their status. 92 The important point, then, is that Kennedy, relying
on Eisentrager, came down again, consistently with his opinion in Verdugo-
Urquidez, in favor of nonresident aliens having constitutional rights that the
United States could violate.
It must be observed that both the majority and Justice Kennedy concurring
in Rasul expressed the view that nonresident aliens can benefit from
constitutional rights only when brought to U.S. territory, or at least territory that
is "subject to the long term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United
States."93 Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez was not in the
same way tied to United States controlled territory and that provides some
reason to think that the majority would extend constitutional rights to aliens
held by the United States outside territory controlled by the United States. But
just how the remaining members of the Rasul majority and Kennedy would
handle extending constitutional rights to nonresident aliens held by the United
States outside of territory controlled by the United States cannot be predicted
with great confidence.
B. The Case Law: An Open Question
We argue in this section that there is no settled case law on whether
nonresident aliens benefit from constitutional rights. In the next section, we
argue that because the Court confronts a choice between two different policies
the only honest approach to the choice is to examine the underlying reasons.
There are many voices in the debate that take the view that the law is
already clear: constitutional protections do not extend to nonresident aliens.
90. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781.
91. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487.
92. Id. at 487-88. In 2004, detainees did benefit from no legal process, as the CSRTs had not yet
been established. It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy would consider the process they provide adequate
to meet his concerns.
93. Id. at 484.
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For example, in Boumediene the majority declared: "[p]recedent in ... the
Supreme Court holds that the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens
without property or presence within the United States."" a There are two
Supreme Court cases that are primarily relied on for the view that nonresident
aliens have no constitutional rights. In reverse chronological order they are
Verdugo- Urquidez and Eisentrager. We address these in turn.
The majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, claimed that aliens outside the United States or territory controlled
by the United States do not benefit from any constitutional rights. The first
thing to note about this opinion is that it was not a majority opinionfor that
claim. Justice Kennedy was one of the five who signed on to the opinion, but
in his concurring opinion he stated: "I do not mean to imply, and the Court has
not decided, that persons in the position of the respondent have no
constitutional protection."95 He took this position in part because he thought
that the stronger claim in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, that aliens benefit from
no constitutional rights, was not "fundamental" to the opinion.96 In other
words, at most four Justices in Verdugo- Urquidez embraced the strong position
that aliens outside the United States benefit from no constitutional rights, and
if Justice Kennedy was right, they did so only in dicta.
How did Justice Rehnquist reach the stronger position? He spent some
time trying to show that the cases in which aliens were found to have constitu-
tional rights "establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when
they have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country."97  Moreover, by "substantial
connections" he meant connections deeper than mere presence in the country;
he meant something like lawfully and voluntarily establishing residence in the
country.98
94. 476 F.3d at 991. Disappointingly, even Judge Rogers, in dissent in Boumediene, bought the
majority line about what the precedent actually says. Id. at 1011 ("[The Supreme Court in Eisentrager held
that the Constitution does not afford rights to aliens in this context." Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770; accord
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269. Although in Rasul the Court cast doubt on the continuing vitality of
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-79, absent an explicit statement by the Court that it intended to overrule Eisentrager
's constitutional holding, that holding is binding on this court.). A proper reading of Eisentrager, as we
demonstrate, shows there is nothing to overrule.
95. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278.
96. Id. at 275.
97. Id. at 271.
98. Rehnquist commented that Verdugo-Urquidez's "lawful but involuntary" presence in the
country (he was brought into the United States by U.S. marshals after being delivered to the border by
Mexican police) "is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country." Id.
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This statement of what the case law shows is, however, inaccurate. As
Rehnquist himself showed in an earlier part of the discussion, analyzing the so
called "Insular Cases,"99 aliens outside the United States, but in territories
controlled by the United States, benefit from constitutional rights, even if only
from "fundamental" ones.'00 Moreover, as Justice Kennedy noted, a criminal
defendant taken to U.S. territory and tried there benefits from all the normal
constitutional trial rights, even though he has taken no voluntary steps to
develop a substantial connection with the United States. 0 '
Nevertheless, taken together, the cases Rehnquist reviewed establish that
aliens benefit from constitutional rights only insofar as they live in, or at least
are present in, territory controlled by the United States. They do not establish
that aliens outside territory controlled by the United States have constitutional
rights.
Rehnquist also examined the case that did the most to disconnect constitu-
tional protection from living in territory governed by the United States: Reid
v. Covert. He noted correctly that the plurality and concurring opinions in Reid
were all couched in terms of how the Constitution's Fifth Amendment due
process rights would cover U.S. citizens abroad.0 2 Connecting this with what
was shown about aliens, we see that no case law establishes that aliens living
outside territory controlled by the United States benefit from constitutional
rights.
Of course, failing to establish that something is the case is not the same as
establishing that something is not the case. The argument so far leaves it an
open question whether aliens outside of U.S. territory benefit from
constitutional rights. To plug that hole, Rehnquist appealed to Eisentrager and
claimed that Eisentrager's "rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendment was emphatic."' 3 This would be very significant, if true, for it is
the Fifth Amendment that guarantees that the federal government shall not
deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."° If
99. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial inapplicable
in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision
inapplicable in Philippines); Doff v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in
Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury trial
inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
100. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268.
101. Id. at 278. Indeed, 14 years prior to Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court had held that "[e]ven one
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [the] protection [of the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
102. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270.
103. See id. at 269.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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such protections do not apply, then it is unclear why any others should. But
Rehnquist's reading of Eisentrager is sloppy and exaggerated.I°5
The first thing to notice is that if this were the right reading of Eisentrager,
then Eisentrager would no longer be good law; it would have been overruled
six years later by Reid, which held, emphatically, that the Fifth Amendment's
protection of due process rights does apply extraterritorially. °6 Eisentrager
was not overruled by Reid because Eisentrager was concerned with the
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment to aliens, whereas Reid was
concerned with the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment to U.S.
citizens. Nonetheless, even adjusting Rehnquist's point so that it only applies
to aliens, the fact that Reid established that the Fifth Amendment does have
extraterritorial application six years after Eisentrager provides some reason to
question whether the holding in Eisentrager presupposed a view about the
territorial limits of the Constitution that is no longer good law."0 7
Second, the passage in Eisentrager that Rehnquist cited to support his
claim about what Eisentrager "emphatically" rejected does not refer specifi-
cally to the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, it
refers only to "[s]uch extraterritorial application of organic law."' 0 8 The actual
reference of that clause is "the companion civil rights Amendments" such as
"freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to
bear arms as in the Second, security against 'unreasonable' searches and
seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments."'0 9  In other words, the text is not even about the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process clause.
Third, not only did Rehnquist misdescribe the text he quotes, he was
simply mistaken that Eisentrager emphatically rejected the extraterritorial
application of the Fifth or other amendments. A fair reading of the majority
opinion in Eisentrager is that the Court actually left open the possibility that
nonresident aliens might benefit from some constitutional rights. It is crucial
to be clear about this, as Eisentrager is the lynchpin case for those who think
that there is settled precedent according to which the Constitution does not
105. It was also unnecessary. Rehnquist could have satisfied himself with a narrower argument about
Fourth Amendment rights. But he seems to have wanted to make a statement about the limits of
constitutional protections generally.
106. Reid, 354 U.S. at 2.
107. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guanitdnamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 61 (2004)
[hereinafter Neuman 1].
108. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784).
109. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
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apply to nonresident aliens." 0 But neither the explicit language of the case nor
the reasoning of the case supports this claim.
The explicit language of Eisentrager never says that nonresident aliens as
a category do not benefit from constitutional rights. It always frames the issue
more narrowly in terms like these: the "nonresident enemy alien, especially one
who has remained in the service of the enemy.""'1 As the Court put it in
concluding its discussion of the application of the Fifth Amendment to the
petitioners in that case: "[w]e hold that the Constitution does not confer a right
of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an
alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the
United States."' 2 Notice how different this holding is from Justice Rehnquist's
gloss. Admitting that nonresident aliens can be tried in times of war by military
commissions, and then punished if convicted, is a far cry from admitting that
nonresident aliens benefit from no Fifth Amendment protections at all.'
In addition, the argument in Eisentrager, with regard to nonresident aliens
having Fifth Amendment rights, implies nothing stronger. The argument pro-
ceeded in three steps. First, the Court noted that "American citizens con-
scripted into the military service are thereby stripped of their Fifth Amendment
rights and as members of the military establishment are subject to its discipline,
including military trials for offenses against aliens or Americans.""' 4 This is
relevant because the petitioners in this case were contesting their convictions
by military commissions. The Court reasoned that "[i]t would be a paradox
indeed if what the Amendment denied to Americans it guaranteed to
enemies."" 5 It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this argument that
the Court meant to say that nonresident aliens benefit from no Fifth
Amendment rights. Indeed, one of the cases the Court cites, Wade v. Hunter, 16
110. Even those writers who are fairly critical of the DTA and MCA, such as Richard Fallon and
Daniel Meltzer accept that Eisentrager should be interpreted to hold "that the Constitution did not compel
the extension of jurisdiction because the petitioners, given their limited contacts with the United States,
enjoyed no constitutional rights." Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029,2056 (2007).
111. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776 (emphasis added).
112. Id.at785.
113. Some argue that Eisentrager's ruling should be understood jurisdictionally: that federal courts
do not even have the jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from nonresident aliens because they lack
"standing." 339 U.S. at 777. But that cannot be the right way to read the case, as Justice Jackson goes on
to say that "the doors of our courts have not been summarily closed upon these prisoner" and proceeds to
assess their arguments on the merits. Id. at 780.
114. Id.at783.
115. Id.
116. 336U.S. 684(1949).
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actually holds that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause does apply
to conscripted American citizens. Thus, the only point the Court made in the
end was the comparative point that nonresident aliens could not have more Fifth
Amendment protections than conscripted U.S. citizens.
Second, the Court noted that resident aliens, in time of war, have relatively
thin Fifth Amendment rights, and again argued that it would be perverse to
extend greater coverage to nonresident aliens than to resident aliens." 7 But this
too is only a comparative point, and it is not as if resident aliens, even in time
of war, have no Fifth Amendment rights.
Third, the Court noted that it would be absurd to grant to "irreconcilable
enemy elements, guerrilla fighters and 'were-wolves"' living under a condition
of military occupation, all the rights granted U.S. citizens in the U.S, rights such
as the "freedoms of speech, press, and assembly" or the "right to bear arms."' 8
But this point, along with the two preceding points, is consistent with the view
taken a few years later by Justice Harlan "that the question of which specific
safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular
context overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due' a
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case.""' 9 Again, Harlan
said this in a discussion of what was due American citizens overseas, but the
arguments in Eisentrager are fully consistent with extending Harlan's point to
nonresident aliens.
In sum, Eisentrager no more "emphatically" rejected any and all
application of the Fifth Amendment to nonresident aliens than it "emphatically"
rejected the application of any and all Fifth Amendment protections to
conscripted American citizens. The only point the Eisentrager Court needed
to make to justify its holding was that the nonresident aliens in that case did not
suffer the violation of any Fifth Amendment rights by being tried and convicted
by a military commission. Any stronger inferences one might draw from the
Court's sometimes incautious language would be unwarranted in view of a
careful reading of the case. 20
Finally, one might appeal to the fact that the majority in Zadvydas v. Davis
took Verdugo-Urquidez to have held that the "Fifth Amendment's protections
do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries.'' But this was in
117. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
118. See Neuman I, supra note 107. This is the part of the Eisentrager argument that most
impressed the majority in Boumediene. See 476 F.3d at 991.
119. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75.
120. For a similar, though complementary, reading of Eisentrager, see Neuman I, supra note 107,
at 54-65. See also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 984 (2002).
121. 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
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dicta. Moreover, it was only a parenthetical reading of the holding of Verdugo-
Urquidez. In the text of Zadvydas itself, the Court said only that "[i]t is well
established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the
United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.' 2
This provides no ground for the claim that nonresident aliens can be
indefinitely detained without raising any constitutional concerns.
Thus, we see that there is no well established rule that nonresident aliens
do not benefit from any constitutional rights or protections. The flip side is true
as well, however. Justice Rehnquist was correct to note that Reid extended
constitutional rights beyond the territorial control of the United States only to
U.S. citizens. And the Insular cases extend (fundamental) constitutional rights
to aliens only in territories controlled by the United States. Thus, to resolve the
issue and to do so honestly, we must look to the underlying justifications for
adopting one policy or another.
C. Reasons to Recognize that Nonresident Aliens Benefit from
Constitutional Rights.
There has been a longstanding fight in U.S. jurisprudence between those
who take a "membership" position, who would extend constitutional protec-
tions only to U.S. citizens or those in U.S. territory, and those who take a
"mutuality of obligation" position,'23 according to which whenever the United
States exercises authority over people and expects them to respect its law, it
acquires an obligation to respect those people in return-an obligation that is
to be understood in terms of those people having constitutional rights against
the United States. 24 We argue here, following the lead set by Gerald Neuman,
that the only reasonable position is the mutuality of obligation position.2 5
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. In an earlier article, Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Unconstitutional Detention of Nonresident
Aliens: Revisiting the Supreme Court's Treatment ofthe Law of War in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 67 HEIDELBERG
J. INT'L L. 843, 870 (2007), we referred to this as the "responsibility position."
124. We draw this distinction from Gerald L. Neuman's work. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS
TO THE CONSTITUTION 116 (1996) [hereinafter NEUMAN 1]; Neuman 1, supra note 107.
125. Neuman also discusses two other positions: "universalism" and "global due process."
Universalism would require the United States to recognize constitutional rights the would fit a just world
order. As he points out, this is not what the actual U.S. Constitution was designed to do. NEUMAN II, supra
note 124, at 110. Global due process is the view that only core constitutional protections apply to nonresident
aliens, where the limit has something to do with "practicality." Neuman contrasts that with what he calls
mutuality, which asks which constitutional protections must be provided if a government is "to justify its
claim to obedience." Id. at 116. We follow Neuman in thinking that it is this last question which is
normatively fundamental.
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Indeed, it turns out that the only plausible version of the membership position
collapses into the mutuality position. 12 6
There are a number of important legal and moral ideas that underlie the
mutuality position. The most basic may be the moral idea that all persons
possess equal dignity; no one exists to serve others. Aliens cannot have duties
to respect U.S. law, unless the U.S. law has a duty to respect them.'27 As James
Madison put it in the context of aliens in the United States: "as they owe, on
one hand, a temporary obedience [to the laws], they are entitled, in return, to
their protection and advantage."' 28  Now what was once the temporary
obedience owed by aliens in the United States has been extended to a
permanent demand that aliens everywhere obey a range of U.S. laws. 129 The
United States claims the right to prosecute nonresident aliens for crimes that
affect the United States or its citizens.130  Thus, Madison's point must be
adapted to recognize that even nonresident aliens are entitled, in return, to the
Constitution's most basic protections.
In addition, the mutuality approach gives due weight to the idea that with
authority comes responsibility. This notion of responsibility is reflected in the
fundamental legal principle that the U.S. government is a creature of law.
Accordingly, it should never have a free hand to inflict whatever certain
members of the government, particularly the executive, may want to inflict
upon whomever they want to inflict it.'3' This is not to say that the government
126. Note, we do not mean to imply that there may not be other reasons for extending constitutional
rights to nonresident aliens. For example, the desire to obtain the good will of other nations could provide
a self-interested reason to extend constitutional protections broadly. Our main concern is to show that there
are principled reasons to do so, and that the arguments against the mutuality position do not succeed.
127. This Kantian conception of political equality and reciprocity could be challenged by
Hobbesians, who point out that according to Hobbes the people owe a duty to the sovereign, but the sovereign
owes no duties to the people. Without entering into a debate about Hobbesian political theory, it is enough
to point out that the Hobbesian view does not fit United States practice, in which the government has many
duties to the people.
128. James Madison, Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), in 4 DEBATES,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 556 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836), available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/
ratification/elliot/vol4/reportvirginia.html (cited in Neuman I, supra note 107, at 52).
129. See Neuman I, supra note 107, at 45 (stating that after World War II, "extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. law mushroomed.").
130. See NEUMAN I, supra note 124, at 108.
131. Consider Justice Kennedy's statement, concurring in Verdugo- Urquidez: "the Government may
act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic." 494 U.S.
at 277. See also Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 ("The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by
the Constitution."); Neuman I, supra note 107, at 44-45.
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has to treat nonresident aliens just as it would citizens. It is only to say that it
cannot view the treatment of nonresident aliens simply as a question of political
expedience, unbounded by concern for the value of liberty that lies at the heart
of the Constitution.
This principle that the government may not do whatever it wants with
nonresident aliens is itself legally well grounded in a number of ways. The
framers of the Constitution clearly took certain rights protected by the
Constitution to be natural rights possessed by all persons. '32 It is also reflected
in the civil war amendments, which ended slavery and the legacy of categories
of people subject to unchecked power. 3 3 Lastly, it is at the core of international
human rights law which not only binds governments in relation to their
constituencies, but in their actions towards all individuals under their
jurisdiction.'34
What, then, can be said in favor of the membership position? Its root
appeal lies in the social contract notion of a community that has come together
under a shared commitment to a particular legal system. So the question for the
membership position is whether there is a plausible conception of membership
in a legal community according to which constitutional protections would not
be offered to nonresident aliens who are nonetheless subject to U.S. power.
The answer is no.
One way to frame the membership position is to view the Constitution as
a compact between members of society. But as Justice Kennedy notes, "[t]he
force of the Constitution is not confined because it was brought into being by
certain persons who gave their immediate assent to its terms."'' 35 In other
words, the Constitution takes on a legal life of its own, and not only does it
govern some who did not assent to the compact but eventually, if it should last
long enough, it will govern a people none of whom were part of the originating
compact.
132. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2 (1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights...").
See also JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
290-93 (1996).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XII-XV.
134. See ICCPR, supra note 60, art. 2 1 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant"). Id. Despite the recent, implausible protestations of the United States, "territory"
and "jurisdiction" have to be read disjunctively. See, e.g., Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"?
Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil andPolitical Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L.
L. 739, 790-804 (2005).
135. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276.
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One might appeal to another level of membership and say that it is only
those who are duty bound by the Constitution who are also capable of
benefiting from its protections. This idea, however appealing it may be in the
abstract, does not make sense when one thinks about the workings of
constitutional law. With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, ending
slavery, all other constitutional rights are actually merely limitations on state
actors. The First Amendment's right to free speech, for example, is really just
a prohibition on making laws that abridge the freedom of speech. Likewise, the
Fifth Amendment's protection of liberty is really just a guarantee that the
government shall not remove it without due process of law. Thus, with regard
to all but one right, only government actors have a duty.'36 Yet it is the people
or persons in general who benefit from the various rights. Thus, this notion of
a membership community is also implausible.
One might broaden the conception of membership community yet again,
so that it comprises people who have a duty to obey the law that is ultimately
grounded in the Constitution. Perhaps only they are entitled to benefit from the
protections offered by the foundational legal principles of the law. But if the
condition that would allow one to benefit from constitutional rights is that one
is subject to prosecution by U.S. prosecutors for violations of U.S. laws, then
everyone in the world benefits from constitutional rights, as everyone in the
world is subject to prosecution by U.S. prosecutors enforcing laws that defend
the United States and its citizens.' 37
One might try to narrow, rather than broaden, the conception of member-
ship, so that it includes only citizens. Certainly citizens are paradigmatically
members of a society; the only ones with a full stake, including the right to have
a say, through their voting, in what the law will be. And if one defines the
community this way, one can then say that the country has chosen-perhaps as
a matter of magnanimity, or perhaps to avoid the unsightly spectacle of a two-
tiered system of justice within the "homeland"-to grant resident aliens
constitutional rights as well. Such a choice, one might then argue, was not
morally required, and a similar choice is likewise not required with regard to
nonresident aliens. If there are prudential reasons to allow the legislature and
executive more flexibility with regard to nonresident aliens, then they should
not be granted constitutional rights which would interfere with the pursuit of
those reasons.
136. Could it be argued that the one duty binding on all saves this position? If so, that it would mean
that only government officials benefited from constitutional rights prior to the adoption of the 13th
Amendment. Surely that position cannot be maintained.
137. See NEUMAN II, supra note 124, at 108.
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The proper response to this suggestion is to question whether it really was
morally unnecessary to grant resident aliens constitutional protections. Can it
really be maintained that they might come to the United States at their peril,
subject to arbitrary search and seizure, to prosecution without due process, and
to whatever punishment the state might choose to dispense? Such a position
has a certain consistency to it, but in contrast to Madison's position, that they
owe obedience to the law and are owed the protection of the law at the same
time, this position is, to use an antiquated word, barbaric. If this is the price of
maintaining the membership position, then the price is too high.
Moreover, the moral failure of this interpretation of the membership
position cannot be remedied by expanding membership to Rehnquist's concep-
tion of the relevant membership position, one that includes resident aliens who
have voluntarily and legally established substantial connections with the United
States. For one thing, this position would leave illegal immigrants and those
captured abroad and tried in the United States subject to the same abusive
treatment that we would not allow the government to inflict on aliens with a
"substantial connection" to the United States-a position that the Court has, as
noted above, rejected. More fundamentally, Rehnquist's position is still
without a solid moral foundation. The primary moral appeal of his position lies
in the image of citizens as hosts and of aliens who have made the relevant
substantial connection as invited guests. But it still fails to come to terms with
the extent to which, to stick to the domestic metaphor, one also has relations
with and makes demands on one's neighbors. It would indeed be especially
perverse to expect one's neighbors to respect one's own rights (as one
formulates them), and then not respect their basic rights in return.
In sum, we see that the membership position either reduces to the
mutuality position, or it assumes a morally barbaric form, one more fit for
members of the mafia than a moral community.
We can think of only one other argument for the position that limits
constitutional rights to those who are U.S. citizens or who are to be found in
territory generally governed by U.S. law, and that is one that appeals to the
notion of sovereignty.'38 The thought is that where the United States is
sovereign, as it is over its territories, its Constitution rules; but where the
United States is not sovereign some other country must be sovereign. Where
138. It seems likely that some thought along this line explains the almost fetishistic concern some
courts had with whether Cuba was technically still sovereign over Guantinamo, even despite the United
States having unchecked effective control. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-41
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (reading Eisentrager "to mean that the constitutional rights mentioned are not held by aliens
outside the sovereign territory of the United States.") (emphasis added); Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 992 ("The
text of the lease and decisions of circuit courts and the Supreme Court all make clear that Cuba-not the
United States-has sovereignty over Guantinamo Bay.") (emphasis added).
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another country is sovereign, its guarantees of rights are the only ones to which
people can look. The only exception would be for U.S. citizens who are
confronted by the exercise of U.S. power in another country. They, as members
of U.S. society, can demand that their government treat them with the respect
due U.S. citizens. But nonresident aliens must look to their own governments
or the governments where they reside for the protection of their rights.
In a world divided between sovereigns that take care of their own citizens
and visitors, this position might make sense. But in reality it makes no sense
at all. First, it presupposes that executive power and jurisdiction always
correspond with sovereign control over territory. That is not the case.
Guantinamo itself represents a living counter-example, as Cuba has sovereignty
but exercises neither executive powers nor jurisdiction over Guantdnamo.
Moreover, it would be a mistake to fixate on the special status of GuantAnamo
as a place where the United States can exercise control as long as it chooses.
The same problem arises, even if not indefinitely, whenever one country
invades and occupies another. In such periods there are people who live under
the power of a sovereign, but according to this picture, have no rights against
it. Rather, they live at the mercy of it. This puts the lie to the sanguine
unspoken premise of this view.
Second, even if the world were fully divided between sovereigns that took
care of their own people, the appeal of this model presupposes that all
sovereigns do a reasonable job of protecting their people. This, however, is
patently false. There are many countries that provide little to no protection for
anyone.'39 The position articulated here would allow the United States to
exploit the moral and legal degradation of regimes that show no respect for
human rights. The behavior of the United States should not be allowed to sink
to the lowest common denominator, especially not when the United States has
the economic and military clout to influence other states and cause them to sink
lower than they might independently be willing to go.
There is one more move that someone might make to deny that nonresident
aliens are due constitutional protections. It might be agreed that the
membership position is morally defensible only when interpreted to coincide
with the mutuality position, but at the same time, it might be asserted that this
kind of choice is one that has to be left to the people, speaking democratically.
139. Consider, for example, the many reports of the United States engaging in "rendition" to
countries that will torture people to get information. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Annals of Justice; Outsourcing
Torture; The Secret History ofAmerica's "Extraordinary Rendition "Program, THENEW YORKER, Feb. 14,
2005, at 106.
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It might be thought that it is up to the people, not unelected judges, to extend
the Constitution's protections to nonresident aliens.140
The problem with this argument is that it presupposes that the right
interpretation of the Constitution is one in which nonresident aliens are left
outside its protections. It might be tempting to think that because it has not yet
been concluded that they are inside its protections. But the truth is that it has
also not yet been decided that they are outside its protections. Lack of
established precedent is just that; it does not favor one choice over another.
It might be argued that those who voted to adopt the Bill of Rights in 1791
would not have expected the Fifth Amendment to provide protections to
nonresident aliens. But even if that were true, the reason is surely that those
who drafted and ratified the text would not have expected the United States to
have the power it now has. We simply cannot know how they would have
voted, or even what text they might have voted on, if the United States had been
the kind of power then that it is now.
In sum, it is up to the present Court-or if they duck it, some future
Court-to determine how to interpret the coverage of the Due Process Clause.
Our point is that the relevant moral reasons clearly point in the direction of
interpreting it through the principle of mutuality of obligation. 141
Again, we are not saying that the United States has to accord nonresident
aliens every constitutional right it accords residents (whether alien or citizen).
We agree with Justice Harlan, that "the question of which specific safeguards
of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context
overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due." 142 If application
of a particular protection would be "anomalous," then it cannot also be "due."
As noted by Justice Kennedy, concurring in Verdugo-Urquidez, certain rights
such as the Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches, would be
anomalous in foreign countries.143 Likewise, the worries expressed by Justice
Jackson, that the United States would be obliged to protect, for example, the
right to bear arms of those living in a country occupied by the U.S. military,
should not be a concern.1" The Constitution is not a suicide pact,'45 and such
140. This is the kind of position articulated by ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
59 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
141. For theoretical support for looking to morality to interpret constitutional text, see Ronald
Dworkin, Commentary to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115-27 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-15 (1996).
142. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75.
143. 494 U.S. at 278.
144. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
145. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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rights would not be "due." However, "[t]he time has long passed when 'no
quarter' was the rule on the battlefield."'46 Now enemies in battle are captured
if possible, and those who are captured are due certain protections under the
law of war. Likewise, they are due certain fundamental protections under the
U.S. Constitution. The most basic of these is that they not be deprived of their
liberty without due process of law.'47
V. THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS AND THE LAW OF WAR
There are two issues left to resolve. First, how should the Court
understand the Fifth Amendment due process rights of nonresident aliens?
Second, how can aliens bring due process challenges to their detentions? In
Part III we discussed what the law of war, as represented in the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocol I, has to say about the process due
civilians in the current "war on terror." In Part II we argued that the Court's
citation to the law of war in-Hamdi had constitutional significance. Now in this
Part we want to tie these loose ends together and argue that U.S. constitutional
law should properly take guidance from the law of war when devising norms
of due process for nonresident aliens. Then, in the next and final Part, we
address how nonresident aliens can bring their challenges in court.
A. Grounding a Link
International law has figured in U.S. law since its founding. The
Declaration of Independence was written to show "a decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind."'4 8 Article I, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution lists
among the enumerated powers of the Congress "[t]o define and punish...
Offenses against the Law of Nations."' 149 And as early as 1804, the Supreme
Court treated international law as a constraint on the interpretation of statutes
analogous to that provided by constitutional text: "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."'50 Our suggestion, then, is that when interpreting the
146. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920) (quoted by the
Court in Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518).
147. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,690 (2001) ("The Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause forbids the Government to 'depriv[e]' any 'person... of... liberty.., without due process of law.'
Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies
at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.").
148. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1.
149. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28.
150. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
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U.S. Constitution, it makes sense to look to international law norms for
guidance.
In opposition to this view, there has been, in recent years, a chorus of
complaints that U.S. law should not be interpreted with reference to
international legal standards. Leading this charge has been Justice Scalia. As
he once put it, "where there is not first a settled consensus among our own
people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution."'' His complaint seems to be that consulting the views of other
nations would somehow undermine the sovereignty of the United States or the
power of the U.S. people democratically to govern themselves. But the
complaint is overblown. No one is suggesting that the standards of
international law, much less the "views of other nations," should be binding
upon the Justices of the Supreme Court.'52 The suggestion is only that these
standards are relevant for the light they cast on how U.S. constitutional norms
should be interpreted.'53
As Harold Koh has argued, one of the ways in which foreign and inter-
national law has been invoked by the Supreme Court has been in interpreting
what he calls "community standards."' 54 These are norms such as avoiding
"cruel and unusual punishment"'5 or providing "due process of law" that
invoke standards that are shared by many nations. The United States has a long
tradition of consulting the practices of other countries and international conven-
tions and covenants when considering how to interpret these concepts. For
example, in carving out the limits of the death penalty the Court has looked
repeatedly to the practices of other countries and international conventions and
covenants that reject the death penalty for rape,'56 for juveniles,' and for the
mentally retarded.' So too has the Court looked to international legal opinion
in matters of "substantive due process" liberty rights. In Bowers v. Hardwick,
151. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. International law has no force in the United States if inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution,
as properly interpreted. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115 (1987).
153. To be fair to Scalia, his real concern is that Justices on the Supreme Court would use their own
judgment to settle issues where there is not a settle consensus, and where neither an original understanding
of the text nor U.S. history and tradition calls for a particular resolution. But then the influence of foreign
law is really a red herring. What really bothers him is the use of constitutional judgment. See SCALIA, supra
note 140, at 59. We disagree with his jeremiad against judicial judgment, but do not press the argument here.
154. Harold Hongju Koh, International: Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43,45 (2004).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
156. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1976).
157. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
158. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002).
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Chief Justice Burger concurred that the Constitution's protection of privacy did
not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy in part because
"[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject
to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization."' 59 And
when the Court overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, it took issue with
Burger's reading of the state of international law, noting that "[t]he sweeping
references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western civilization and to
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account of other
authorities pointing in an opposite direction.""16
The case for looking to international legal norms for guidance in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution is particularly strong when there is no
developed legal framework for interpreting a particular norm. In cases of first
impression, a court will normally look to the actions of other courts and to legal
authorities in general, for their "persuasive" authority. The goal in doing so is
not, of course, to abdicate their responsibility in formulating a legal decision.
As Koh says, judges do not look to international law in order to do "some kind
of global 'nose count.'"l. Rather, the point of looking to international law is
to discover reasoned guidance in a more or less uncertain area of law.
The case for looking to international legal norms for guidance in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution is even stronger when the United States is
taking actions in an international context. Indeed, in the context of the "war on
terror," the United States claims universal jurisdiction to prosecute nonresident
aliens for commission of international crimes. The MCA lists twenty-eight
crimes that, according to its own terms, have traditionally been tried by military
commissions. '62 The United States can claim the right to prosecute nonresident
aliens for those crimes, even when they are committed outside U.S. jurisdiction
and its citizens are not the victims of the crimes, only if these crimes are
international crimes. The international law framework that establishes
universal jurisdiction is the Geneva Conventions, which provide for universal
jurisdiction over grave breaches of the laws of war.'63 Thus, to prosecute
nonresident aliens under the MCA's appeal to universal jurisdiction, the United
States has committed itself to respecting the law of war as stated in the Geneva
Conventions.
159. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
160. 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
161. Koh, supra note 154, at 56.
162. Regarding the claim that these are crimes traditionally tried by military commissions, see 10
U.S.C. § 9 50p; regarding the list of 28 offenses, see 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(l)-(28). Whether this claim is true
or not is immaterial to our purposes here.
163. GC HI, supra note 38, arts. 129-30; GC IV, supra note 38, arts. 146-47.
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The development of due process rights for nonresident aliens is just such
a case of first impression in an international context. As noted in Part IV,
section B, there is no settled case law on the foundational question whether
nonresident aliens benefit from Fifth Amendment due process rights. If it is
agreed that they do, then the law must be developed to determine how they do.
Again quoting Justice Harlan, the question is: "what process is 'due' a
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case."'" Our
suggestion is that among the best sources for determining what process is due
is the law of war. Moreover, in claiming universal jurisdiction, the United
States commits itself to respecting the same.165
B. Defending Against Fairness Objections
There are at least two sorts of objections that could be raised to the
suggestion that the United States look to the law of war when searching for a
standard for the process due a nonresident alien before he is subject to long
term preventive detention; it would put the United States at an unreasonable
disadvantage in combating international terrorism and it would unfairly give
nonresident aliens advantages over resident aliens and citizens. We focus in
this section on the fairness objection, but we pause briefly to address the other.
We argued in Part III, section E that the balance struck in the law of war
allows the United States to do what it would need to do to protect itself from
terrorism, while also respecting the importance of liberty. We add here that if
it were truly imperative to strike a new balance in the war on terror, the reasons
for doing so would apply as well in the domestic case, or when dealing with
nonresident citizens, as when dealing with nonresident aliens.'66 Since there is
no significant push to rewrite constitutional protections domestically or for U. S.
citizens abroad, we infer that there is probably no good reason to embrace a
different balance when extending constitutional protections to nonresident
aliens.
Turning now to the fairness objection, one might argue for a fairness
principle, as articulated in Eisentrager, according to which it would be
constitutionally anomalous to have to offer nonresident aliens more protections
164. 354 U.S at 75 (Harlan J., concurring).
165. If due process rights for nonresident aliens were modeled on the rights contained in GC IV,
would that imply that the United States was now constitutionally bound to adhere to GC IV? No, if the
Congress and Executive wanted to withdraw from the treaty, they would be constitutionally free to do so.
The standard in GC IV is separable from the treaty itself. However, even if the United States were to
withdraw from the treaty, it would be in violation of customary international law were it to act contrary to its
provisions.
166. See, e.g., Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1365 (2007).
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than those offered U.S. citizens or resident aliens.167 There are reasons to doubt
the validity of this principle; since aliens lack the vote, they form a kind of
discrete and more or less insular population that may need extra protection from
political forces in the United States that would unjustly seek political benefit
at their expense. 6 Moreover, it is not unheard of for aliens to have advantages
that citizens lack. 169 But we put these concerns to the side in order to examine
the Eisentrager test both with regard to the treatment Eisentrager said was due
resident aliens and with regard to the issue of the suspension of habeas.
Justice Jackson noted in Eisentrager that resident aliens from an enemy
country can be detained for the duration of the war against that country.
"Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from Executive custody only to
ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and
so subject to the Alien Enemy Act."' 7 The process so described seems actually
thinner than that provided by a CSRT. If this is all that a resident alien civilian
is entitled to receive, then surely it is mistaken to think that nonresident alien
civilians are entitled to more.
There are at least two responses that can be made to this argument,
however. First, it is not clear that the Alien Enemy Act should still be
considered good law regarding resident aliens. It might be argued, in the wake
of Zadvydas-the 2001 case constitutionally limiting the use of preventive
detention on resident aliens who had been ordered removed by the Immigration
167. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
168. See Katyal, supra note 166, at 1373. Consider also that international law sets higher standards
for states in their relation with foreigners, as compared to nationals, when it comes to expropriation and
compensation This finds expression in the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, art. I, Mar. 20, 1952, Eur.T.S. 9, in relation to
which the European Court of Human Rights explained:
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform or
an economic restructuring, there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction
between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. To begin
with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they
will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor have
been consulted on its adoption.
Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 116 (1986). Similar reasoning has also
been used when assessing the protections offered to out-of-state residents, as compared to in-state residents,
by the Privileges and Immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See United Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
169. For example in European Community law we find the well established term of
"lnliinderdiskriminierung" (i.e., reverse discrimination). The French brewer could sell a product denoted
"beer" in Germany even if it does not meet the German "Reinheitsgebot" of 1516 which limits the ingredients
to malted barley, hops, yeast and water, because he or she benefits from fundamental freedoms of European
Community law. A German could not do so. See Case 178/84, Comm'n v. F.R.G., 1987 E.C.R. 1227.
170. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775.
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and Naturalization Service, and who were being held indefinitely (beyond the
ninety day removal period stated in the statute) because no other country would
take them-that resident aliens now have a constitutional right not to be
detained indefinitely; that the United States now must either deport them to
their home country or release them, perhaps under some program of supervised
release.' 7 ' In addition, the United States has signed the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which is federal law that occurs later in time than the Alien Enemy
Act, and is inconsistent with it. Indeed, the GC IV uses a standard for the
preventive detention of resident aliens much like the standard it uses for
nonresident aliens under occupation: "[t]he internment or placing in assigned
residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the
Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary."'72 This is more limiting than
the free hand granted the President under the Alien Enemy Act.
Second, it is possible to distinguish the security situation of the resident
alien from the nonresident alien. Nonresident aliens are not such an immediate
threat to the United States. They are already effectively deported, and thus the
same cause for detention is not present in their case.'73 A stronger presumption
against preventively detaining nonresident aliens should therefore pass the
Eisentrager test.
Turning now to the suspension of habeas, an argument can be made that
nonresident aliens should not benefit from enforceable constitutional rights in
places like Afghanistan and Iraq because conditions there are such that, were
those same conditions to apply in the United States, habeas would be
suspended, or at least subject to suspension. Habeas can be suspended "when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."' 74 If habeas
were suspended in the United States, even citizens could be denied the benefit
of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. By analogous reasoning, if
equally drastic conditions, amounting to a "Rebellion or Invasion," apply
outside the United States where the United States is nonetheless trying to
impose order and provide for the public safety, then Fifth Amendment rights
need not apply.
This is an important argument. We concede that if the security situation
in a region where the United States is operating is sufficiently insecure, then it
171. On supervised release as an option, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700.
172. GC IV, supra note 38, art. 42, 1 (emphasis added).
173. A similar point is marked in GC IV, which makes it harder to justify preventively detaining
nonresident aliens under occupation than resident aliens. "In occupied territories the internment of protected
persons should be even more exceptional than it is inside the territory of the Parties to the conflict; for in the
former case the question of nationality does not arise." Uhler, supra note 56, art. 78.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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would make sense for habeas rights to be suspended there. The insurrections,
with incursions from other countries, in Afghanistan and Iraq may seem to be
paradigm cases for such a suspension. But it is important to keep in mind that
the conditions for suspending habeas can and should be read to apply in a
limited manner.'75
There are not many historical examples to work with, but those that exist
show that habeas should be suspended only where, and only for as long as, it
is imperative to do so. Habeas has been suspended a total of four times in the
history of the United States. The first time was during the Civil War where
habeas seems to have been suspended broadly.'76 The next time it was
suspended, in 1871, President Grant suspended it for only ten counties of North
Carolina in his effort to combat the Ku Klux Klan. 177  Habeas was next
suspended by the Governor of the Philippines in 1905, in two provinces of the
Philippines, in order to combat organized bands that were terrorizing the
population. 7 8 Finally, it was suspended in what was then the territory of
Hawaii in 1941.179 In all but the first suspension, the range of the suspension
was limited to an area as small as or smaller than a state or territory. It was
limited to those regions where, and for those times when, the problem was
sufficiently intense to warrant suspension.
We would suggest that the same should apply in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Were the Court to recognize that nonresident aliens have constitutional rights,
and were Congress to decide that these rights might have to be suspended in
certain territories where the United States is engaged in trying to quell
insurrections, it would be appropriate for the executive to suspend habeas, but
only in those areas where the need for public safety requires its suspension, and
only for as long as the violence necessitated such a suspension.18 °
175. One might have also thought that if habeas is available for U.S. citizens in a region, it must be
available to all in a region. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia recently found that a U.S. citizen
in Iraq had the right to habeas. Omar ex rel. Omar, 479 F.3d. at 1. But it is not clear that habeas cannot be
allowed to some and denied to others. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal ofAliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961, 976-78 (1998).
176. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2006).
177. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 178 n. 190 (1980).
In fact, it was only suspended for at most nine counties at a time, as the suspension was lifted in Marion
County before being imposed on Union County. Id.
178. See Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 179 (1906).
179. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307 (1946).
180. The Fisher case provides a good model. The suspension of habeas was lifted in the two
provinces where it had been imposed in less than a year, once the Governor determined that the conditions
requiring the suspension no longer existed. 203 U.S. at 180-81.
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Importantly, the mere fact that U.S. troops patrol an area and that they may
from time to time engage in hostilities with civilians, does not by itself imply
that conditions are so lawless that habeas should, or even legally could, be
suspended. Thus, while this argument does provide a basis for limiting the
practical significance of extending due process rights to nonresident aliens, it
does not undermine the significance of such an extension all together. Rather,
it provides another safety valve for Congress and the Executive to address
emergency situations and thereby should ease any concerns about the security
implications of extending due process rights, modeled on those found in the
Geneva Conventions, to nonresident aliens.
In sum, it is perfectly appropriate and consistent with U.S. constitutional
law, both in text and in practice, to take guidance from international legal
authorities. It is particularly appropriate to use such authorities as a starting
point in cases of first impression and cases dealing with international affairs.
The question of how to extend the Fifth Amendment's protection against the
deprivation of liberty without due process to nonresident aliens, both civilians
and combatants, is just such a case of first impression arising in the context of
international affairs. The international law discussed in Part II1 above should
be a default position for U.S. constitutional law unless it can be shown that
adhering to these norms disables the United States from effectively fighting
international terrorism or is unfair to others whose constitutional rights can be
taken as fixed points. There is no reason to think these exceptions apply.
Therefore, the international legal norms discussed in Part III should be adopted
by the Supreme Court in place of the legally misguided holding in Hamdi, to
the effect that "enemy combatants" can be detained until the end of the "war on
terror."
VI. ACCESS TO COURT
A. Appeals and Habeas Rights
Though the public discussion of detainee access to the federal courts
during the "war on terror" has focused almost exclusively on the availability of
habeas corpus, there is another possible route into federal courts: appeal. The
DTA grants detainees a right to appeal determinations by CSRTs that they are
"enemy combatants" first to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and then to the Supreme Court. 8 ' This appeal right allows detainees to argue
that the Tribunals violated their constitutional rights.'82 There is no obvious
reason why the issues discussed here could not be raised on appeal.
181. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A).
182. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii).
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However, given the recent decision of the Supreme Court to review the
D.C. Circuit's decision to deny petitioners a right to habeas in Boumediene,8 3
this argument may be moot. The scope of review under the DTA is officially
limited to matters of law, with the single exception of whether the CSRTs
determination "was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by
the Secretary of Defense for [CSRTs]."184 This limitation may leave out factual
questions important for determining whether a detention is constitutionally
defensible.185 Unless the function of habeas is adequately provided for by
appeal rights, the MCA cannot constitutionally succeed in stripping away the
right to habeas.'86 In taking certiorari in Boumediene, the Court seems to be
expressing some sympathy with the position that the processes provided for in
the DTA are not an adequate substitute for habeas. 87
In sum, if we are right and nonresident aliens benefit from the Fifth
Amendment right not to be deprived of their liberty without due process of law,
and if the CSRTs do not provide due process of law, then these detainees
cannot be denied their day in court. Unless they can raise the issue of their
unconstitutional detention on appeal from their CSRT hearings-something that
no detainee has yet successfully done-they have a subsidiary right to
constitutional habeas to contest their unconstitutional detentions.188
B. Judicial Power to Remedy Unconstitutional Detention
Even granting that nonresident alien detainees have a constitutional right
not to be detained without due process of law, and that they have a subsidiary
right to petition for habeas corpus to vindicate that right if they cannot raise it
on appeal, it does not necessarily follow that the courts are in a position to do
anything for them. They must first establish that the facts support their claim
that they are indeed being denied due process. And then there must be an
acceptable remedy available to them. We conclude our discussion of alien
detention with a brief review of these issues, arguing that there is some role the
courts can play.
183. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981.
184. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i).
185. We discuss the factual determinations in the next section, VI(B).
186. "[T]he substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the
legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the Great Writ." Swain v. Pressley, 430
U.S. 372, 381 (1977). By contrast, one that is inadequate would constitute a suspension of the writ. Id.
187. At this point in time, no opinions have yet been issued discussing an appeal under the DTA.
It should be noted that the Boumediene court declined to convert the habeas petitions in that case into DTA
appeals. 476 F.3d at 994.
188. On this being a subsidiary right, see Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781.
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We start by reviewing what we suggest is the basic remedy. First, CSRTs
should be redesigned so that they distinguish civilians from combatants.
Having made that distinction, the remedy for each would be different. For
combatants the CSRTs could function as they do now, but it would be made
clear that the cessation of active hostilities is a reference to the international
armed conflict in which they were captured. Once such a war is over-as it
arguably is in both Afghanistan and Iraq-then combatants must either be tried
for crimes and sentenced accordingly, or repatriated. For civilians a richer
review of evidence of dangerousness would be required. They could be
preventively detained only as long as there is reliable evidence that their release
would provide a specific and significant threat to security.
With these suggested revisions on the table, we can ask how courts should
approach the task of adjudicating appeals or habeas petitions (because it may
be possible to raise many of the factual issues only through habeas, we focus
only on that). We start with a preliminary question: would not a right to
habeas disrupt military activities? As Justice Jackson said in Eisentrager, dis-
cussing the idea of granting habeas rights to the twenty-one German detainees:
It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to
submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert
his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal
defensive at home.18 9
Indeed, in the wake of Rasul, over 181 Guantdnamo detainees filed habeas
petitions in the D.C. District Courts.19 ° Are we not, then, proposing a course of
action that would invite disaster by opening up floodgates of disruptive
litigation?
A number of things need to be said to answer that question. We start by
pointing out the role that habeas would play in a properly running system. It is
an avenue for bringing issues before the courts that generally would have
systematic relevance. It would take only one habeas petitioner to establish the
structural reforms mentioned above. Assuming the Supreme Court agreed to
resolve the issue, either reaffirming or revising its holding in Hamdi regarding
indefinite detention, then there would be no need for future petitioners to raise
the same issue. Of course, no matter what the Court says, if the door to habeas
is open, some will try to abuse it. But once the law in this area is developed we
189. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779
190. See Hamdan, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 11. Boumediene, however, lists only fifty-six detainees as
having been involved in the appeal to that case. 476 F.3d at 984.
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can expect a flood of habeas litigation if and only if the United States does not
act in accordance with the law. 9'
Second, at least two of the presuppositions underlying what Justice
Jackson said in Eisentrager are not true. Jackson writes that "[t]he writ, since
it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during
active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and peace."'192 But the
constitutional writ is available only as a subsidiary procedural right to enforce
constitutional rights. Combatants have no constitutional right not to be held
during active hostilities, so they would have no standing to sue then. As for
civilians, if the hostilities in the area are sufficiently disruptive, habeas can be
suspended. If not, then allowing habeas rights should not be too disruptive of
military activities. In addition, Jackson writes as though the detainees might
have to be "transport[ed] across the seas for hearing." This is no longer true.
The Court in Rasul held that the prisoner who seeks habeas no longer has to be
in the jurisdiction of the court that will hear the petition. 93 The only person
who has to be in that court's jurisdiction is the custodian (or someone with
authority over the immediate custodian).'94
Third, in terms of the threat of disrupting the commanders in the field, it
is important to be realistic. Even currently, while the situation in Afghanistan
and Iraq is quite unstable, and U.S. soldiers are dying in action, the United
States is (mostly) not in active battle mode; it is in policing mode. Police can
and do take time off patrol to go to court. Moreover, the courts at issue would
not primarily be the federal court where a habeas petition would be heard.
Habeas litigation can almost always be handled by lawyers without the need for
witnesses. 9' The relevant courts where military witnesses might be called upon
to testify would be the military commissions that would try civilians and those
combatants accused of war crimes; CSRTs to determine the status of
combatants; and a reformed version of CSRTs for civilians-we suggest the
name: Individual Dangerousness Assessment Tribunals (IDATs).
We turn now to the question of how to assess the factual questions that a
court would have to resolve to handle a habeas petition. We start with
combatants, assuming that the question of distinguishing combatants from
civilians is normally unproblematic. How would a court be able to determine
191. See David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and The Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The
Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125, 143 (2005).
192. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
193. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
194. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478 (discussing the change in the law wrought by Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)).
195. SeeMartin, supranote 191,at 139.
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if there are indeed ongoing active hostilities? This is a classic case of a
question that is beyond the competency of a court-one that lies almost
exclusively in the competency of the Executive. The President, informed as he
is by military leaders in the field, will know much more about this than a court.
In addition, the Constitution gives the President, not the Courts, the role of
Commander in Chief of the armed forces'96 and general authority over foreign
affairs.
Nonetheless, the President is as bound by the Constitution as any other
officer of the state and he may not order the detention of combatants after active
hostilities have ended.'97 If a combatant petitioner, perhaps with the aid of
expert testimony, can make out the claim that active hostilities have ceased,
then the burden would shift to the government to offer evidence that this was
not the case. The court would then owe substantial deference to the executive's
judgment, but not absolute deference. Following the Court's definition of
substantial deference in Turner Broad Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), the job of
a court would be "to assure that in formulating its judgment, [the executive] has
drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence."' 98 This would not
put the courts in a position to second guess the executive's judgment about
whether there are ongoing hostilities. Nor, however, would it allow the
government to present a mere sham justification. Even giving substantial
deference, a clearly bogus claim that there are ongoing active hostilities, in the
relevant sense, could be rejected.' 99
Turning now to civilians, the factual question would be whether there is
good reason to believe they are sufficiently dangerous to be preventively
detained. Again, a court could only do so much. The issue would be essenti-
ally one of confirming that the relevant tribunal-the IDAT-was correct to
find that substantial evidence indicates that the individual was really involved
196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
197. It is true that the Court in Ludecke held that "[w]hether and when it would be open to this Court
to find that a war though merely formally kept alive had in fact ended, is a question too fraught with gravity
even to be adequately formulated when not compelled." 335 U.S. at 169. But compulsion may be in the
wings, so it is worth thinking about how to approach this question.
198. 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). Martin suggests an even stronger form of deference, requiring only
that the executive produce "some evidence." Martin, supra note 191, at 147. This is a fine point; our basic
point is the same as Martin's: to strike an acceptable balance between letting the executive and military do
its job and ensuring that it takes its job seriously. Id. at 150.
199. For a case showing the limits of substantial deference, see Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.
v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2004) rev'don other grounds, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127
S.Ct. 1610 (2007) (holding that even using substantial deference, Congress's finding of fact that there is no
need for a health exception to the prohibition on "partial birth abortions" should be rejected, because it "has
not drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.").
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in and committed to engaging in terrorism. Though habeas courts do
traditionally have the authority to resolve factual matters,20 ° they normally do
not re-examine the facts determined by another tribunal.2 ' The kinds of factual
claims that habeas courts typically look at concern procedural defects in a trial
that led to a conviction.20 2 Facts showing such defects would presumably be the
sorts of things one could raise on appeal from an IDAT, assuming the CSRT
appeal procedures still applied.20 3 Whether by appeal or by habeas, however,
it should be possible for a detainee to argue for his release if he can show that
the government has provided no substantive evidence that he is in fact
dangerous.
This brings us to the power of the courts to provide remedies. The issue
here is the separation ofpowers. As Justice Kennedy said, concurring in Rasul:
The decision in Eisentrager indicates that there is a realm of political
authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter.
The existence of this realm acknowledges the power of the President
as Commander in Chief, and the joint role of the President and the
Congress, in the conduct of military affairs.20"
Importantly, Kennedy was not saying that the judicial power may not enter into
the realm of military affairs at all. Rather, as he said, "[a] necessary corollary
of Eisentrager is that there are circumstances in which the courts maintain the
power and the responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even
where military affairs are implicated."2"5 What mattered for Kennedy was that
the courts show a proper respect for "military necessity." He reasoned that the
courts could grant habeas to petitioners in GuantAnamo because it was far
removed from any hostilities, and because:
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (2007) (on oral evidence, depositions and affidavits); 28 U.S.C. § 2247
(2007) (on documentary evidence).
201. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
202. An illustrative list of such defects is provided in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212
n. 12 (1952); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of trial); Mooneyv. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935) (knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecution); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (no
intelligent waiver of counsel in federal court); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (coerced plea of
guilty); United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 (1943) (no intelligent waiver ofjury trial in
federal court); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (denial of right to consult with counsel).
203. See DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i).
204. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
205. Id. (citing ExParte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,4 (1866)).
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Indefinite detention without trial or other proceeding... suggests a
weaker case of military necessity and much greater alignment with the
traditional function of habeas corpus .... Perhaps, where detainees
are taken from a zone of hostilities, detention without proceedings or
trial would be justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks; but
as the period of detention stretches from months to years, the case for
continued detention to meet military exigencies becomes weaker.2 6
In other words, we come to a balance of constitutional interests.2"7 On the one
hand is the interest of the Executive in controlling military matters, while on the
other hand are the interests of individuals in their liberty. Where the
Executive's need for control over military matters is strong, the courts can do
nothing for the individual. But where the executive's control over military
matters would not really be implicated, and where the individual's interest in
liberty is strong, the courts can do something for the individual.
If a court were convinced, having given the Executive the benefit of
substantial deference, that its claim that there are ongoing hostilities in the
relevant sense is a sham, then the court has already made the determination that
the Executive's control over military matters is not really implicated. Thus, in
such a case the court should not feel obliged to defer to the Executive's
authority over international affairs. It can order the release of detained
combatants. Likewise, if it is convinced, having given all due deference to the
government's evidence, that there is no real evidence that a civilian is a
terrorist, it could order him released.
This brings us to a last objection. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Hamdi,
observes the following about habeas:
The text of the 1679 [English] Habeas Corpus Act makes clear that
indefinite imprisonment on reasonable suspicion is not an available
option of treatment for those accused of aiding the enemy, absent a
suspension of the writ . . . [Section] 7 of the Act specifically
addressed those committed for high treason, and provided a remedy
if they were not indicted and tried by the second succeeding court
term. That remedy was not a bobtailed judicial inquiry into whether
there were reasonable grounds to believe the prisoner had taken up
arms against the King. Rather, if the prisoner was not indicted and
tried within the prescribed time, 'he shall be discharged from his
206. Id. at 488.
207. This kind of balancing is not alien to the Court in the context of the war on terror. Indeed, it
was embraced by the Court in section 3 of Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524-39 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976)).
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Imprisonment.' . . . The Act does not contain any exception for
wartime. That omission is conspicuous, since § 7 explicitly addresses
the offense of 'High Treason,' which often involved offenses of a
military nature. .. . Writings from the founding generation also
suggest that, without exception, the only constitutional alternatives are
to charge the crime or suspend the writ.2"'
The point Justice Scalia is making is that the process we have been defending
is inconsistent with the function of habeas. If we want to admit the necessity
of detaining certain individuals because of the threat they pose, even though
they have not been convicted of a crime, then we need to acknowledge that the
conditions for suspending habeas apply, or that these individuals are not
covered by habeas at all. Supposing that the conditions for suspending habeas
do not apply, that leaves us with the choice to insist that nonresident alien
civilians must be tried or released, despite the danger they may pose, or to
recognize that they are not covered by constitutional habeas (given the MCA,
they are already not covered by statutory habeas).
We reject this argument on the grounds that it presents a false dichotomy.
The better choice is to reject Scalia's originalism with regard to the function of
habeas. We endorse the view relied on in Eisentrager, that constitutional
habeas is a subsidiary procedural right for protecting constitutional rights, and
in particular the constitutional right not to be detained without due process of
law. This too reflects the core historical function of habeas: providing an
escape from detention for those who are detained without due process of law.
What has changed is not the core function of habeas, but the notion of due
process. Scalia embraces a rigid notion of the process that is due. We,
however, embrace a more flexible notion, one that takes due process to reflect
the appropriate balance between competing concerns. Given this notion, a
"bobtailed judicial inquiry" may be the best that can be offered a detainee. Yet
that option will do more to preserve the overall balance of constitutional rights
than Scalia's rigid position, which would either lead to dangerous terrorists
being released, or, more likely, unjustly deny constitutional protections to
nonresident aliens who live at the mercy of the U.S. government. Our argument
in Part IV, section C above convinces us that it is more important to protect this
extension of constitutional rights than to accept Scalia's crabbed originalism.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Bush administration is holding hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of
detainees for what seems likely to be a great length of time, presumably until
208. 542 U.S. at 564.
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the "war on terror" has been resolved. It categorizes these people as "enemy
combatants," thereby lumping together combatants whose lawful military acts
against the United States would be immunized by international law and
civilians whose hostile acts would have been illegal. And following the
Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdi, it has offered these detainees, at best (and
not when held by the CIA), only the inadequate legal process that is provided
in a CSRT hearing to determine whether they are indeed "enemy combatants."
We argue here that the Court should re-examine its holding in Hamdi.
That holding relied on a reading of international law, specifically the law of
war, and it got that law wrong. The law of war requires a distinction to be
made between combatants and civilians. That distinction is relevant to the
process each is due. Moreover, the process they are due is not merely an affair
of international law; they are due "due process" under the U.S. Constitution.
And the law of war dealing with international armed conflict is relevant as a
guide to the proper interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
Lastly, these rights can be enforced. They may be enforceable through the
appeal rights provided by the DTA. But if not, then they are enforceable
through habeas. The DTA and MCA have stripped nonresident aliens of their
statutory habeas rights but they cannot strip them of their constitutionally
guaranteed habeas rights. These are subsidiary procedural rights that ensure the
protection of their constitutional rights and in particular, their constitutional
right against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
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ABSTRACT
Targeted killings are a major, albeit controversial, policy in the modern
war against terror. Yet, since modern warfare is conducted at large among
civilian populations, the lives of troop soldiers, who are called to fight not
behind battle lines but inside unknown hostile environments, are highly at stake.
The present paper would like to present the position that subject to the principle
of proportionality and irrespective of the legal regime governing targeted
killings, extensive troop losses should also constitute, along with concern for
enemy civilian casualties, a legitimate reason for the endorsement of the
practice of targeted killings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2002 the Israeli Defence Forces entered Jenin, in the West Bank,
in the course of an operation to arrest Palestinian terrorists. A fierce battle
erupted. The soldiers had to pass along booby trapped buildings, while the
Palestinian fighters targeted them, hiding inside the civilian population.
* Intern in the Legal Department of the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, LL.M, Faculty of Law,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The writer would like to thank Dr. Yuval Shany for his useful
comments. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and in no way do they reflect
the positions of the Israeli legislative or executive bodies.
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According to the Report of the United Nations' Secretary General,' this battle
resulted in the death of about fifty-two Palestinians, half of them civilian
although it was argued that the number of the civilian casualties in the
particular incident was much lower.2 Moreover, twenty-three Israeli soldiers
also died, a heavy toll for the Israeli army.'
In December 2001, Yemeni Special Forces attempted to capture Al-Ahdal
and Al-Harethi, major operative members of Al Qaeda in the country. Tribal
forces in the village of Al-Hosun in Marib province, supporting Al-Ahdal,
opened fire against the Yemeni forces, killing eighteen Yemeni soldiers before
the terrorists managed to escape.4
In modern warfare, conducted at large among civilian populations, it is not
only the civilians' lives which are in constant danger, but also those of the troop
soldiers, who are called to fight not behind battle lines but inside unknown
hostile environments. Yet, these troop casualties would have been avoided had
the respective countries opted for operations by air against the specific targets.
Targeted killings are the most widely used, yet also highly disputed
expression of the aforementioned policy. The present article would like to
demonstrate that subject to the principle of proportionality and irrespective of
the legal regime governing targeted killings, the troops' right to life constitutes
a valid consideration for its endorsement. Targeted killings should be taken into
account in any military commander's planning of an operation.
As such, Part II will focus on the legality of targeted killings. Once
confirmed that the particular practice is not ab initio illegal, Part III will try to
demonstrate that both according to international humanitarian law and human
rights law, the lives of the soldiers should constitute a valid reason for resort to
the particular practice. Part IV will delve into international jurisprudence, in
an attempt to examine the limits of protection for the right to life. Part V will
examine the sensitive balance between the lives of soldiers and those of enemy
civilians, by focusing on the conditions under which the consideration of troop
losses could lead to the approval of a targeted killing and by proposing the
1. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General prepared pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution ES-10/1O, 43, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/186 (July 30,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/peace/jenin/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
2. See id. 57. According to the Israeli government the number of civilian casualties amounted
to fourteen deaths.
3. HCJ 3114/02 Barake v. Minister of Defense [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11. The statement of the Israeli
Supreme Court, adjudicating on allegations of a massacre, that "in Jenin there was a battle-a battle in which
many of our soldiers fell. The Army fought house to house and, in order to prevent civilian casualties [to the
greatest extent possible], did not bomb from the air. Twenty- three IDF soldiers lost their lives. Scores of
soldiers were wounded." Id.
4. Gregory Johnsen, Terrorists in Rehab: Yemen Uses the Pages of the Qur'an To Re-educate
its Jihadis, 17 WORLD MAGAZINE ONLINE 3, Summer 2004, http://www.worldviewmagazine.com/issues/
article.cfm?id=139&issue=34 (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
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principle of proportionality as a guiding standard. Finally, Part VI will try to
offer some conclusions.
II. THE PRACTICE OF TARGETED KILLINGS
While the modem way of warfare has changed, with an emphasis on the
war on terrorism, it is true that targeted killings are now one of the basic
features of this war.5 As such, it should cause no surprise that major countries,
like the United States and Israel, engaging in the fight against terrorism, have
resorted to the particular policy.
In November 2002, the United States killed A1-Harethi, an Al-Qaeda
member, in a targeted killing.6 Even before the September 11 th attacks, the
United States had considered the possibility of resorting to the particular
practice. Presidents Clinton and Bush had reportedly authorized not only the
arrest of Osama Bin Laden, but also his extermination, in case that was needed.7
In December 2002, the New York Times reported that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) is authorized to kill individuals, described as terrorist leaders, on
a list approved by the White House.8 As for Israel, it has repeatedly resorted
to the particular practice against the Palestinian terrorist groups. 9
Notwithstanding its basic feature in the war against terrorism, it is true that
nowadays the concept of targeted killings is also one of the most misunderstood
concepts, often labeled by Non-Governmental Organizations ° as well as some
United Nations' bodies" as extra judicial killings and assassinations. Yet, the
5. It is not by accident that the two states which have resorted to this option, the United States and
Israel, both face serious terrorist threats.
6. CNN, Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, Nov. 5,2005, http://archives.cnn.com/2002iWORLD/
meast/1 1/04/yemen.blast/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
7. Nathan Canestaro, American Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The
Practicability of Maintaining the Status Quo, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2003).
8. James Risen and David Johnston, CIA Expands Authority to Kill Qaeda Leaders, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2002, at A2.
9. The policy of targeted killing, as far as Israel is concerned, started with the killing of Hussein
Abayat. See Yael Stein, Position Paper: Israel's Assassination Policy: Extra-Judicial Executions, (Maya
Johnston trans., 2001), available at htpp://www.btselem.org/Download/200101_Extrajudicial Killings_
Eng.doc (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
10. See id.; Amnesty International, Israel andthe Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its Policy
of Assassinations, http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE1 50562003ENGLISH/$File/MDE1 505603.pdf
(last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
11. See U.N. Comm'n on H.R., Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the OccupiedArab
Territories, including Palestine, Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission, IN 53-64, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16,2001), available at http'//documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GOI/118/
72/pdf/G01 1 1872.pdfOpenElement (last visited Sept. 4, 2007); U.N. Comm'n on H.R., Report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation ofHuman Rights in the Palestinian
Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/30 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G2/160/00/PDF/G0216000.pdfOpenElement (last
visited Sept. 4, 2007).
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truth is that the differences between targeted killings and the other two concepts
are so great, that someone can easily distinguish between the three practices.
Extra judicial killings are basically punitive measures aimed against
regime dissenters or human rights defenders, who are killed for ideological
reasons without a fair trial during peacetime.12 Extra judicial killings violate
cardinal rights, such as the right to life and the right to a fair trial. 3 Even if the
hypothesis is made that their purpose is also defensive, still they are condemn-
able.
Although according to human rights conventions, such as Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, state agents have a right to forfeit a
person's life in the course of resort to the right of self defense, this possibility
is to be narrowly interpreted as an ultimum refugium once the arrest of a
particular suspect is not feasible, under the particular conditions enumerated in
the specific provisions of Article 2. Moreover, in cases where a deprivation of
life takes place by state agents, the state has a duty to investigate the matter. In
peacetime, there is no need or justification for individuals to be killed on
suspicion of membership in a group. 4 A person should be detained and entitled
to contest his/her detention in a meaningful way that involves due process of
law.'5 Under this specter, the fact that the Human Rights Committee has
repeatedly condemned the particular practice 6 should cause no surprise.
Targeted killings have often been labeled as "assassinations." Yet,
assassinations are understood to be the selected killing of an individual enemy
by treacherous means. 7 On the contrary, when a state is in an armed conflict, 8
targeted killings (given the turbulent background) are defensive measures-not
12. Antony Carillo-Suarez, Hors deLogique: Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian
Law as Applied to InternalArmed Conflict, 15 AM. U. IN'L L. REv. 1, 133 (1999).
13. AmyHowlett, Getting "Smart:" Crafting Economic Sanctions thatRespectAllHuman Rights,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1225 (2004).
14. Mary O'Connell, War Crimes Research Symposium: The Role of Justice in Building Peace:
To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 325, 330 (2003).
15. Gabor Rona, War, International Law and Sovereignty: Re-evaluating the Rules of the Game
in a New Century: Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5
CHI. J. INT'L L. 499, 502 (2005).
16. See H.R. Committee, Concluding Observations ofthe Human Rights Committee: Georgia, Part
IV 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75 (May 5, 1997); H.R. Committee, Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Brazil, 31 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.66 (July 24, 1996).
17. Benjamin Gorelick, The Israeli Response To Palestinian Breach of the Oslo Agreements, 9
NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 651, 669 (2003).
18. See Ralph Ruebner, Democracy, Judicial Review and the Rule ofLaw in the Age of Terrorism:
The Experience of Israel-A Comparative Perspective, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 493, 541 (2003);
Emmanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts By Attacking The Perpetrators or their Commanders as an Act
of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State's Duty To Protect its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
195, 224 (2001).
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treacherous means. 9 The laws of war recognize the non-culpable homicide of
members of an opposing force during armed conflict.2"
As such, targeted killings are seen as an integral part of warfare, to be
distinguished from assassination in peacetime, which is a form of terrorism.
This is a well entrenched principle of international law. Although the opinions
of Grotius, Vattel and Bynershoek condone an attack on an enemy leader with
the intent of killing him, provided it is not treacherous,2 their opinions are not
directly responsive to questions of targeting modern terrorists.22 Regardless,
they hold a special importance due to their demonstration that classical
international law always endorsed the possibility of killing leading enemies.
This being the case, it is appropriate to analyze targeted killings under the
broad category of international law relating to the conduct of war.23
Moreover, it is doubtful whether large scale operations to apprehend
terrorists, like those adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom in
Afghanistan or the Operation "Defensive Shield" of the Israeli army in 2002,
are morally preferable to targeted killings. The invasion of a civilian area and
the fighting that erupts lead to the death and injury of far more people, mostly
innocent, and bring misery and destruction to people who are minimally
involved in terror or military attacks.24
Under this spectrum, targeted killings can be justified under certain
conditions. 25 First, the state should be facing a security threat that it can not
incapacitate with other reasonable alternatives, like arresting the attacker.
Second, the principle of proportionality, dictating the minimum number, or
even the complete absence26 of civilian casualties, 27 should always be revered.
19. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter Terrorism: TargetedKillings Under International Law, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1076-77 (2002).
20. See Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law
Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing, 12 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 281,
309-10 (2005); O'Connell, supra note 14, at 328.
21. Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 134 MiL. L. REv. 123, 130
(1991).
22. Daniel Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency and
International Law, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 17 (2001).
23. Kendall, supra note 18, at 1073-74.
24. Daniel Statman, Targeted Killing, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 179, 187 (2004).
25. See David Ennis, Pre-emption, Assassination and the War on Terrorism, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV.
253, 255 (2005); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 171, 211 (2005).
26. Kretzmer, supra note 25, at 204.
27. See Amos Guiora, Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial": Targeted Killings as Active Self
Defence, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2004); William Wagner, As Justice and Prudence Dictate:
The Morality ofAmerica's War Against Terrorism-A Response to James V. Schall, S.J, 51 CATH. U. L.
REV. 35, 50 (2001); Amos Guiora, Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism: A Global Perspective,
7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 125, 145 (2005) [hereinafter Guiora fl]; Emmanuel Gross, Democracy in the War
Against Terrorism-The Israeli Experience, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2002).
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Opposite enemy civilian casualties as a parameter for the approval of an
aerial strike, the right to life of one's troops, as an expression of the principle
of military necessity, is juxtaposed. Thus, when a military commander is
almost certain that the sending of troops in a populated area in order to arrest
a terrorist would result in losses among his troops, aerial strikes pose as a
legitimate alternative, even at the expense of some enemy civilian casualties.
Although international humanitarian law and human rights law interact
differently in international and non-international conflicts, changing the
standards governing the legality of targeted killings,28 consideration of the lives
of the soldiers remains a legitimate factor in any decision concerning an aerial
operation.
Irrespective of the international or non-international character ofa conflict
and the application of international humanitarian or human rights law, troop
losses are always relevant, because in both fields of law, humanity and respect
for human dignity as well as the principle of proportionality are basic
elements.29 The conclusion is particularly important in the new war against
terrorism, where states are engaged in sui generis conflicts having elements of
both international and non-international conflicts.3"
III. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SOLDIERS' LIVES AS A LEGAL DUTY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. The principle of military necessity
Under international humanitarian law, while members of the armed forces
and civilians enjoy the same fundamental right to life, that right is limited by
military necessity. A primary goal of military necessity is the submission of the
enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least possible expenditure of
personnel and resources.3 Moreover, it is international humanitarian law that
acknowledges the possibility of civilians being killed or wounded as a result of
a military operation against a lawful target. Collateral damages are a well
28. For a complete analysis of the circumstances under which targeted killings would be permissible
in international and non-international armed conflicts, see Kretzmer, supra note 25, at 171-212.
29. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 245
(2000); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 183 (Dec. 10, 1998).
30. Kretzmer, supra note 25, at 175, 196. See also David Kretzmer, Agora: ICJAdvisory Opinion
on Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: The Advisory Opinion: The Light
Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 96 (2005) (discussing the difficulty
of establishing whether the conflict between Israel and the various Palestinian terrorist groups is an
international or a non- international one and the different opinions expressed).
31. William Fenrick, The Rule ofProportionalityandProtocollin Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL.
L. REV. 91, 93 (1982).
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known accepted phenomenon in the international humanitarian law frame-
work.3
2
According to military necessity, a belligerent can, subject to the laws of
war, apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of life. 33 Thus, a military
commander does not have to sacrifice members of his force in order to
exterminate the enemy, once he can achieve the same goal without any troop
losses. The fact that civilians could be also be killed or injured as a result of
the particular operation does not constitute an absolute factor forbidding the
conduct of the operation.
Once it is accepted that civilians can eventually die in the course of
hostilities, the important features that determine the legality of the operation
towards them are whether they were themselves directly targeted34 and whether
the number of civilian losses contravened the principle of proportionality.
Yet, although military necessity does broaden the protection awarded to
troops, it does not necessarily legally bind the army commander to preserve by
all means his soldiers' lives. Military necessity gives the discretion to the
military commander to beat the enemy while minimizing casualties in his
troops. Yet, military necessity does not legally guarantee the life of a soldier,
as his commander may decide for whatever reason to endanger the soldier's life
instead of opting for alternate measures.
As such, military necessity should be seen through the lens of another
basic principle of international humanitarian law-the principle of humanity.
B. The principle of humanity
The notion of humanity always constituted a pillar of the laws of war.35
International humanitarian law has been traditionally seen as a triumvirate
equation" under which military necessity is framed by the prohibition of
unnecessary suffering during the proportionate application of military force, 7
32. Id. at 94.
33. Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the
Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 93 (1994).
34. Edda Kristjansdottir, The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Under Current
International Law: The Arguments Behind the World Court's Advisory Opinion, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 291, 352 (1997-1998).
35. See Corfu Channel (U.K. of Gr. Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9); Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 79 (July 8).
36. Gabor Rona, Interesting Times For International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the
"War on Terror, " 27 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 55, 57 (2003).
37. Dale Stephens, Human Rights andArmed Conflict-The Advisory Opinion ofthe International
Court ofJustice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 17 (2001).
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in an effort to "humanize" a reality-like that of war-which is dominated by
cruelty and barbarity.
The Geneva Conventions, especially the fourth one, with the explicit
provisions for the protection of non combatants and the insistence on the
distinction between combatants and non combatants in the first place are a clear
indication of the borders that international humanitarian law came to put on the
conduct of hostilities and of the humanitarian face of international humanitarian
law.
The same humanistic borders were also settled regarding combatants.
Since the essence of war is the forfeit of combatants' lives, the humanitarian
aspect did not find expression in the non allowance of their killings, but to the
concern the particular branch of law showed regarding the way their deaths
should occur. Thus, the use of certain types of weaponry, causing unnecessary
suffering and superfluous injury, was forbidden.
Yet, it is important to note that the extent of this concern varied
significantly. In the case of civilians, it encompassed their right to life, while
in the case of combatants, the forfeit of their lives was deemed up to a point
acceptable-the laws of war coming to reassure only its dignified and more
painless character. Moreover, the laws of war traditionally protected persons
on the side of the enemy, but not persons from their own governments or
authorities.
According to the jus in bello, both the aggressor and the aggressed are
bound by the same standards38 and in the law of armed conflict all lives have
equal value.39 These particular conclusions juxtaposed to the jus ad bellum
which governs the legality or not of a military operation, stress the fact that
even combatants belonging to the side resorting to the illegal use of force
should be equally protected as combatants of the defending state.
Yet, the equal protection of combatants injus in bello was not meant to
equate their status to the protection and the preference awarded to civilians by
international law. On the contrary, one basic premise of international
humanitarian law has always been the distinction between combatants and
civilians. It is exactly this distinction that was weakened by the applicability
of human rights norms in the law of conflict. 40
It is true that traditionally, human rights laws were not seen as mainly
applying in situations of armed conflicts-namely in cases where two or more
armed groups are engaged in hostilities.4' The derogation clauses existing in
38. Rona, supra note 36, at 67.
39. Judith Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 412
(1993).
40. Francisco Forrest Martin, Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified
Use of Force Rule in the Law ofArmed Conflict, 64 SASK. L. REv. 347, 371 (2001).
41. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 328.
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international human rights instruments do suggest that application of their
provisions was indeed contemplated in times of war. Yet, their exceptional and
emergency character point to the fact that their drafters saw the application of
the instruments, under such circumstances, as the exception and not as the
standard rule. While human rights were deemed to apply during peacetime,
international humanitarian law had an exclusive role during times of war.
Nowadays, the aforementioned statement seems to be revised and human rights
are indeed seen as applicable in cases of armed conflict,4 2 without meaning that
there is a pretension that armed conflicts do not constitute a case where the
enforcement of human rights must take into account the existence of a
belligerent situation.
According to the prevailing view43 endorsed by the International Court of
Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons" human
rights laws do apply in armed conflicts, yet the specific circumstances should
also be taken into account. International humanitarian law is to be applied as
lex specialis each time human rights application is called for, as a branch of law
more suitable to the particular circumstances. Yet, this should not lead to the
conclusion that human rights are subordinate to international humanitarian law.
Rather, the two fields of law are in a continuous dialogue.
Thus, although international humanitarian law determines what an
"arbitrary" deprivation of life is in order for a violation of the right to life to be
declared, it is human rights law, which influences the proper application of
international humanitarian law in tilting the balance between military
considerations and humanitarian concerns in favour of the latter.45
The introduction of human rights law in the law of armed conflict should
not be deemed as a legal coup d'etat. It is none other than the first article of the
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions that constitutes the most
recent restatement of the Martens Clause-a clause deeply entrenched in
international humanitarian aw4 6-which stipulates that in cases not covered by
the Protocol or other international agreements both civilians and combatants
remain under the protection of the principles of international law derived, inter
alia, from those of humanity and from dictates of public conscience. 47 Thus, it
42. Roy Schondorf, Extra-State Conflicts: Is There A Need ForA New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U.
J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1, 60 (2004).
43. See Meron, supra note 29, at 239; Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 94 (1993).
44. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 35, at 25.
45. Orna Ben Naftaly & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, 37 Is. L. REV. 17, 57 (2003-2004).
46. Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (2000).
47. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
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is the Martens Clause and consequently international humanitarian law itself,
which allowed its penetration by human rights law.48
The application of human rights in the field of war had an effect in the
moral as well as in the legal field. Acts embedded in the essence of war, such
as the killing of an enemy combatant, ceased to be viewed from an international
humanitarian viewpoint and thus was condoned as lawful. Once stripped off
the mantle of legality, the act in question started to stand out as a starkly
unjustifiable and inexcusable killing of a human being.49
Gradually, it became understood that the only justified reason for killing
soldiers is that in a war, soldiers are not seen as individuals but as agents of
their states.5" Were they to be judged as individuals, most soldiers would be
morally exempt from being killed by the enemy. However,judged as agents of
a collective, soldiers lose their personal merits and are seen only as "the
enemy,"5' targeted just because they constitute impersonal units who con-
ceptualize an impersonal general threat posed to the whole group by the enemy.
Thus, human rights law came to shed light also on the status of comba-
tants; like civilians, soldiers began to be considered as human beings with the
same needs and feelings. From a moral point of view, the notion52 was
entrenched that soldiers should be seen as a separate distinguishable unit from
their state of citizenship, many times not even agreeing with their governmental
policies. As such, also they-and not only civilians-should be regarded as
human beings with a dignity and separate personality, not as simple units in the
disposal of an army commander.
The implications of the former conclusion affected an attitude towards the
combatants' lives, both in relation to enemy combatants as well as the political
and military administrations of the soldier's own country. Regarding the
former, it was realized that although in life threatening cases the killing of an
enemy soldier would not only be morally defensible but also utterly necessary,
there are also circumstances where this would not be the case.
The shooting of an enemy combatant who poses no immediate security
threat for the other side's bodily integrity or life at the moment of his repose
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol IU) art. 1(2), Dec. 7, 1978, 16 I.L.M
1442.
48. Francisco Forrest Martin, The Unified Use ofForce Rule Revisited: The Penetration ofthe Law
of Armed Conflict by International Human Rights Law, 65 SASK. L. REv. 405, 405 (2002).
49. YORAM DINSTEIN, AGRESSION AND SELF DEFENSE 140 (Cabridge University Press 3rd ed. 2001)
(1988).
50. Statman, supra note 24, at 189.
51. RICHARD NORMAN, ETHICS, KILLING AND WAR 188(1995).
52. William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post September 11th Proposal to Rationalize
the Laws of War, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, 721 (2004). The notion dates back to the Enlightenment. The famous
maxim of Rouseau that soldiers who surrender or lay down their weapons "cease to be enemies or instruments
of the enemy and become ordinary human beings again" is characteristic.
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such as would be the case with a combat soldier being attacked off duty while
sleeping or just having leisure time in a military post, can be brought as an
example. In such incidents, the enemy is targeted not because at the moment
of his death he is contributing to the military machine, but just because of the
potential part he could play in hostilities in the future. Such is the case with the
targeting of a soldier in a non combat post, such as a driver or a cook. If
potentiality is seen as a legitimate ground for killing, then civilian killings
should also be sanctioned, because they can theoretically also take arms and
join hostilities. Yet, the targeting of civilians is prohibited.
As far as his own state is concerned, the soldier should never be viewed
as a proper sacrifice the moment his life could be saved and the same military
objective could-in accordance with the principle of proportionality-be
achieved by other means. The state may not resort to any means to attain its
ends, as it is subject to law and morality. Disrespect for human dignity cannot
serve as the basis for any state action.5 3
Soldiers, should not be seen as means, but as an end by themselves, as
human beings with human rights, first and foremost the right to life. It is true
that a soldier has a duty towards his country to protect it. Yet, this does not
mean that the soldier has a duty to forfeit his life. A soldier is bound to fight,
not to die. The moment death as the culmination of a military operation
becomes a certainty and not just a speculation, and the whole discussion around
the operation is not about whether there would be any casualty troops, but how
heavy these casualties would be, the operation ceases to be an alternative and
should not even be considered from the beginning.
In a war, the notion of risk and the potential of death are embedded in
every military operation. Yet, the moment that this potential ceases to be a
potential and is transformed to a certainty, the whole notion of "risk" is also
annulled. The debate whether a specific risk is permissible or impermissible
in order to sanction the conduct of the operation, has a value as long as the
notion of "risk" itself stands in the foreground. As soon as it is replaced by a
mortal certainty, the whole argument regarding levels of operational dangers is
disqualified. As such, the fact that modem military ethics dictates that the
death of soldiers and not only of civilians should weigh as a factor in a military
commander's decision-making54 should come as no surprise.
53. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4, at 27 (July 29, 1988).
54. See Guiora, supra note 27, at 332; Guiora I, supra note 27, at 145; Assa Kasher & Amos
Yadlin, Fighting Against Terror Morally, 6 BITACHON LEuMI 5 (2003) [hereinafter Kasher].
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IV. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SOLDIERS' LIvES AS A LEGAL DUTY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE
From a legal point of view, the application of human rights and the fact
that they are attributed to every person because of his human nature irrespective
of assumption or performance of any obligations55 places force protection not
only as an important national policy concern, but also as an express legal
obligation56 towards the military commanders and political leaders of a
particular state.57 The human rights system directly addresses the responsibility
of a government vis-A-vis populations over which it exercises power.5 The
protection of human rights necessarily comprises the concept of the restriction
of the exercise of state power.59
The right to life is one of the most basic rights, embodied in all the major
human rights instruments and deemed by some also as ajus cogens right6" and
the most important of all human rights.6 With deep roots in natural law and
stipulated in the most important legal documents like the Magna Carta and the
Bill of Rights, the right to life is embodied nowadays in all the human rights
documents.62 Moreover, the right to life is not derogated in situations of public
emergency, such as a war.63
The fact that Article 15, Section 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights clearly allows for the derogation of the right to life in cases where deaths
result from lawful acts of war should be taken to sanction only the possibility
of death as deeply embedded in the notion of war itself and not to justify, in any
55. A. DELAFIELD SMITH, THE RIGHT TO LIFE 52 (1955).
56. Martin, supra note 48, at 393.
57. Smith v. United Kingdom, 384 Eur. Ct. H.R. 620, 624 (2000), where it is stated that
investigations into military personnel's homosexuality and their pursuant discharge from the Royal Navy on
those grounds, constituted degrading treatment and violated the right to private life. See also Vereinigung
Demokratischer Soldaten Osterrichs and Gubi v. Austria, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56, 87 (1994), where it was held
that the decision of the defence minister to prohibit the distribution of ajournal to military personnel, violated
the freedom of expression and article ten of the European Convention on Human Rights.
58. Meron, supra note 29, at 256-57.
59. The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-6/86, 1986 Inter-Am Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 6, at 5 (May 9); Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, 1989
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, at 31 (Jan. 20, 1989).
60. Mark Janis, The Nature ofJus cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 (1988).
61. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity andLiberty, in THE INTERNATlONAL
BIL OF RIGHTS 114, 114 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 214,217
(S. Aft.).
62. M. Cheriff Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INTL L. 235, 254 (1993).
63. See e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; The European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15, Dec. 10, 1948, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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case, unnecessary troop losses. The fact that the article comes to excuse deaths
stemming only out of lawful acts of war is indicative. As such and in light of
the other human rights instruments awarding a responsibility to the state to
preserve its nationals' lives, it is doubtful whether a command to soldiers to go
into a mission of "no return" would constitute a "lawful act of war."
Even if the view is put forward that in battle the deprivation of the right
to life does not occur by the state itself, but by a third party-because it is an
enemy combatant that forfeits the soldier's life-still the state can be held
accountable. Not only are states obliged to not actively deprive their citizens
of the specific right arbitrarily, but are also held responsible for infringement
of human rights law once they do not prevent the entrance of their citizens in
life risking situations.
The duty to protect the right to life' entails, in the first place, a negative
obligation of respect. The duty of respect encompasses the obligation to pre-
vent situations that might imperil human life and eventually the obligation to
prosecute persons responsible for a loss of life.6"
Thus, in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights clarified that a state can be found imputable of a human rights
violation not because the violation itself could be attributed to the state or one
of its agents, but because the state did not take the necessary steps in order to
prevent the particular violation from taking place.66 In Godinez Cruz v.
Honduras, it was held that an illegal act which violates human rights and which
is initially not directly imputable to a state can lead to international responsi-
bility of the state, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due
diligence to prevent the violation or respond to it as required.67
In Europe, the aforementioned statement was also incorporated in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. For example, in Osman
v. United Kingdom, the Court not only certified the aforementioned statement,
but also proceeded to establish a negligence standard according to which even
the reasonable ability to foresee a potential forfeit of life can constitute a valid
ground for claims of violations of the right to life. As the Court pronounced in
its judgment, sufficient grounds for such allegations required a demonstration
that the state knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and
immediate risk to an individual from the criminal acts of a third party, and that
it had failed to take measures expected to avoid that risk.68 In another occasion,
64. JOHAN DE WAAL, lAIN CuRRIE, & GERHARD ERASMUS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 217
(3d ed. 2000).
65. Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental Values Into the European Convention on Human
Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 268 (1995).
66. Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. at 30-31.
67. Cruz, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., at 32.
68. Osman v. United Kingdom, 101 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 305 (1998).
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the same Court recognized that a potential violation may amount to an actual
violation when the injury is foreseeable and of serious and irreparable nature.69
Of course, it is true that a problem arises in determining when there is
enough "certainty" of the soldiers' deaths in order for the state to be obliged to
abstain from sending its soldiers in the battlefield. The answer lies in the
evidence available each time according to facts on the ground. In other words,
what are the objective chances that a soldier will survive from such a mission
without the requirement of a high level of proof.70
According to the aforementioned, sending soldiers into battles from where
they are bound with almost certainty not to return alive, is a clear violation of
these soldiers' right to life. Any argument that the forfeit of life is legal in war,
and thus a state could not be held accountable for a death that it has incurred
legally, is not feasible. First, killing a soldier is legal only from an enemy's
point of view. Second, even in situations where death is legally imposed by a
third party, a state is prohibited from allowing, much less creating, the circum-
stances leading to the forfeit of the lives of its citizens.
While indeed the state is brought into existence solely to protect its
nationals against harm, an idea dating back at least to ancient Greece,71 this
does not mean that the state only has a duty to protect its nationals from
external dangers, which makes the existence of an army necessary. The state
is equally obliged to protect its citizens from criminal behaviour internally,
even when the criminal behaviour stems from actions of the state itself. Thus,
as much as the state owes civilians a duty to do everything possible to protect
them from enemy attacks, it may not order its combatants to expose themselves
to excessive risks while protecting civilians.73
As such, although it is legitimate for the state to demand the drafting and
the active participation of its citizens in an army and their participation in
hostilities, even by endangering their lives to safeguard the state's territorial
entity, these state expectations cannot extend to the point that soldiers are sent
on expeditions which equal their certain extermination by the enemy.
The recognition that life can indeed be taken in a war, does not mean that
this can occur under all circumstances. In this regard, international
69. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) 439, 468 (1989).
70. John Pak, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance
of Life, 26 CORNELL INTL L. J. 239, 274 (1993).
71. Michael Lacey, Self Defence or Self Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 10 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 293, 310 (2000).
72. See Jeffrey Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order on Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 751, 761-62 (2003); Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of
Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA J. INT'L L. 151, 201 (2002).
73. Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L.
REV. 81, 89 (2006).
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jurisprudence regarding the imposition of the death penalty is indicative. The
latter came not only to define the circumstances under which the death penalty
should apply, but to erase the possibility of the imposition of the particular
sentence in the first place. Although death penalty still constitutes the legal
deprivation of life74 in cases where persons are convicted in countries which
have abolished the death penalty, their extradition or deportation to countries
where it is not only certain but even likely for them to face the particular
sentence, is forbidden.
The landmark case is that of Soering v. United Kingdom." Soering, a
West-German national, murdered his girlfriend's parents in the United States
and fled to the United Kingdom, from where his extradition was requested.
After the United States' request was answered positively by the British govern-
ment, Soering appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. The latter
refused to allow the extradition of Soering to the United States because of the
high probability that while there, the accused would be subjected to inhuman
or degrading treatment by being kept on death row for a prolonged period.76
Thus, the Court pronounced that the United Kingdom could not violate any
human rights of the accused, and was also prohibited from placing the accused
in a framework where violations of his rights were likely to occur.
The decision of the European Court in the case of Soering should not be
seen as an isolated example. Similar trends in international jurisprudence can
be traced in the decisions of the Human Rights Committee. In Kindler v.
Canada,77 as in Ng v. Canada,78 the Committee allowed Canada to extradite
Kindler to the United States without requiring the former to ask for guarantees
that Kindler was not going to be executed in the United States. Yet, in both
cases, the problematic nature of the Canadian practice was hinted. In Ng v.
Canada, the Committee held that Canada had violated Article 7 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, because Canada could have
easily foreseen that if Ng was to be extradited to the United States he could be
sentenced to death in California.79 While in the case of Kindler, although the
request for any guarantees for Kindler's life was not posed as a requirement for
the legality of the extradition, the Committee added that States must be mindful
of the possibilities for protection of life when exercising their discretion in the
74. Neira Alegria et al. Case v. Peru, 1995 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 21, at 17 (Jan. 19,
1995).
75. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 468.
76. Id. 91.
77. H.R. Comm., Communication No. 470/1991, Joseph Kindler v. Canada, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Kindler].
78. H.R. Comm., Communication No. 469/1991, Charles Ng v. Canada, No. 469/199, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Jan. 7, 1994).
79. Id. 16.4.
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application of extradition treaties. 80 This was an important remark for the
extraditing country to note.
The preponderance of the assurances requirement gradually evolved in the
internal jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court, in order to form a veto
requirement in the subsequent decisions of the Human Rights Committee. In
the case of United States v. Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court held that prior
to extradition, the Canadian government must seek assurances in all but
exceptional cases that the death penalty will not be applied.8 In Judge v.
Canada,82 the Human Rights Committee applied its requirement of assurances
also to a case of deportation where no legal framework existed in order to be
moulded according to requirements of respect for the right to life. Such was the
case with the extradition treaty between Canada and the United States, which
was required to be seen under this particular spectre. In Judge v. Canada, the
forbiddance of subjecting a person to a situation or ajurisdiction where his life
was likely to be endangered emerged as an independent rule and not as the
outcome of the interpretation of a legal framework.
In June 2001, the Constitutional Court of South Africa granted a petition
from Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a participant in the Al Qaeda bombing of the
United States Embassy in Tanzania. After being arrested in South Africa,
Mohamed was summarily turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) in what the state called a "deportation," although the Court saw no reason
to view it as anything but a disguised extradition.83 The Court noted that in
handing Mohamed over to the United States without securing an assurance that
he would not be sentenced to death, the immigration authorities failed to give
any value to Mohamed's right to life, his right to have his human dignity
respected and protected, and his right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment.84
In the case where soldiers are sent on a mission with almost certainty that
some or all of them will not return, the aforementioned jurisprudence is more
than relevant. First, even the likelihood of the forfeit of life can render a state
accountable for violation of its obligation to respect and insure the particular
right. Second, the state is not held accountable for the deprivation of soldiers'
lives by enemy combatants, but for their failure to take the necessary steps to
insure that these soldiers would not enter a situation that would certainly forfeit
80. Kindler, supra note 77, 14.6.
81. United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, 42.
82. H.R. Comm., Communication No. 829/1998, Judge v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/
D/829/1998 (Aug. 5, 2003).
83. William Schabas, Symposium: Death Penalty and International Law: International Law.
Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. AND MARY BILL OF RTs J. 417, 441
(2004).
84. Mohamed v. President ofS. Afr. 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) at 17 (S. Aft.).
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their lives. Thus, the state is held accountable for establishing the crucial link
that led to these soldiers' deaths. As such, it is irrelevant whether the soldiers
themselves wanted to join the mission or whether they were well paid or even
well trained for such missions.
Their consent to membership in the mission should be seen as consent to
the risk of death, but not to its certainty. Should that not be the case, in no way
could such consent be deemed lawful, as this would lead to a violation of the
state's international obligations regarding the preservation of the lives of the
people under its jurisdiction. As far as the professional training of soldiers is
concerned, it must be noted that the objective of training is to lessen the
chances of death and should not be seen as granting carte blanche to the state
to place soldiers in situations from which they are not about to exit.
Combatants are expected to assume reasonable risks, as far as their lives are
concerned,85 and constitute legitimate targets. Yet, as all human beings, they
are also entitled not to be arbitrarily deprived of their lives.86
The notion of arbitrariness as a legal potential for the legality of life
deprivation, appears explicitly in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as well as the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.
Yet, as much as the specific term constitutes a basic parameter in the
consideration of the legality of life deprivation, it is also filled with vagueness.
This is not by accident. The drafters of Article 6 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights left intentionally vague the definition of
"arbitrary", so as to insure wide latitude for the protection against deprivation.87
Indeed, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted the right to life broadly,
particularly in circumstances concerning the deprivation of life by a state's
security forces. 8
Yet, no matter how one reads and interprets the notion of arbitrariness in
relation to the right to life, the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of
life finds a ready application within the general principle of proportionality.89
According to the European Court of Human Rights, there must be regard for the
fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the
individual and the community as a whole.9"
Thus, the competing interests of the army or of a state for the achievement
of a certain military result at all costs-even by troop losses-should be
balanced to the right of the individual to care for the perseverance of his life.
85. Benvenisti, supra note 73, at 90.
86. Id. at 83.
87. B. G. RAMCHARAN, The Concept and Dimension of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 19 (B. G. Ramacharan ed., 1985).
88. Stephens, supra note 37, at 6-7.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Powell v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 355, 368 (1990).
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Because the issue at stake is the waging of a balance and not the elimination of
one of the two interests, it is self-evident that a solution forfeiting soldiers' lives
cannot be condoned. On the other hand, a military solution that would achieve
the same military result in another way should be deemed utterly preferable.
As such, the principle of proportionality, a maj or principle in international
humanitarian law, should be invoked twice. The principle should be invoked
not only for the protection of civilians and the diminishment of their casualties,
but also for the protection of combat soldiers' lives, whose protection-albeit
grounded in the principle of military necessity-should be tempered by the
principle of proportionality.9 In fact, it is this particular principle which keeps
the balance between these seemingly opposite interests. Saving the lives of a
few soldiers cannot justify the endorsement of the death of a disproportionate
number of civilians. Concurrently, pity for one or two civilians cannot justify
the death of many more soldiers.
V. THE RIGHT To LIFE OF SOLDIERS V. THE RIGHT To LIFE OF CIVILIANS
It is accepted that soldiers are supposed to take some risks in order to save
the lives of enemy civilians.92 Yet, the question of the extent of these risks must
be framed by the principle of proportionality.93
The effects of any military operation and the hardship it inflicts on the
civilian population must be proportionate to the advantage that is achieved by
resorting to the particular practice,94 namely, the sparing of the lives of the
soldiers. The need for a balance between the right to life of civilians and the
right to life of soldiers is particularly urgent in our era. In the new war against
terrorism the battlefield is carried into civilian population centers. Terrorists
are hiding among civilians with the purpose of using these civilians as a means
91. The Judge Advocate General's School, TJA GSA Practice Note: International and Operational
Law Note, ARMY LAW., Feb. 1999 at 1, 6.
92. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 151 (2d 1992).
93. The principle of proportionality finds expression in article 51 of the First Additional Protocol,
regarding international conflicts. Although in non-international conflicts, international humanitarian law does
not seem to wholly apply, yet article 13 of the Second Additional Protocol refers to the distinction between
combatants and civilians. As such, the standards ofintemational conflicts would be applicable; the targeting
of combatants would be legitimate, while the death of civilians would be subject to the principle of
proportionality. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber) at 33-34 (Jul.
15, 1999) (the Tadic Case where the Appeals Chamber of the ICTYU stated that, "with the exception of
common article 3 ... the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 only apply to armed conflicts between state
parties"); International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Commentary on Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (June 8, 1977) Art. 51 T 4.
94. Major John Parkerson Jr., United States Compliance With Humanitarian Law Respecting
Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 47 (1991).
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of achieving immunity from attacks by the defending state95 and making their
elimination, without heavy civilian casualties, more difficult.
In modem warfare, where combatants purposely hide among the civilian
population-oftentimes with the encouragement of the civilians themselves-
the argument can even be posed that the latter constitutes a legitimate target.
What is included in the category of "targets," according to the Hague Regula-
tions and the laws of war, is broader than just troops in the field. Non-comba-
tants and civilians can be designated as a valid target if they are sufficiently
involved in the war effort. The decision of whether a civilian should be deemed
a valid target depends on context.96
In situations where aerial bombardments occur in areas that basically
constitute a battlefield where it is known that military targets are mainly
situated and civilian presence, if traced, should be deemed as unexpected or
incidental97according to Article 57 of the First Additional Protocol, any civilian
losses should not be deemed as contravening international humanitarian law.
Such would be the case for any civilians remaining in an area after having been
warned by the attacking army that the specific region would be subject to an
aerial bombardment.98
The critical issue that determines the legality of air strikes against military
targets is not the existence of civilian casualties, but their number. The
preference for sparing soldiers' lives and the price it inflicts on the enemy
civilian population is legitimate, once no other operational alternatives exist,
sound and reliable information are at the army's disposal regarding the
particular target99 and the incidental loss of life in the enemy civilian population
is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage.
The problem with the principle of proportionality is that as every principle,
it is quite abstract and thus difficult to apply. 0 In weighing the pros and cons
and possible disagreements regarding the legality ofan operation in cases where
joint military action has to be taken, a military commander may find it difficult
95. See Guiora, supra note 27, at 329; Emmanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What
Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 445,456 (2002); Statman, supra note 24, at 186.
96. Castenaro, supra note 7, at 8.
97. Asa Kasher, the man who wrote the military ethics code of the Israeli Defense Forces says that,
"assuming that we warned the civilians and gave them enough time to leave and that the civilians that
remained chose, themselves, not to leave, then there is no reason to jeopardize the lives of the troops."
Nathaniel Rosen, IDF May Be Morally Justified In Flattening Terror Strongholds, JERUSALEM POST, Jul.
27, 2006 at 1-2.
98. Id
99. Guiora, supra note 27, at 322.
100. See Gardam, supra note 39, at 391; Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Establishedto Review the NA TO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic ofYugloslavia 48 (June
8, 2000), available at htpp://www.un.org/icty/pressrea/nato06l300.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
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to concretize the principle, which can lead even to the annulment of an
operation. ' One additional difficulty is the fact that the number of potential
civilian casualties is never known in advance. In targeted killings this is
exceedingly true.
One additional issue that is raised in the practice of targeted killings in
respect to civilian casualties and is closely linked to the principle of propor-
tionality is whether the final large number of collateral civilian damages should
be seen as an ex ante or ex post facto for the pronouncement of the illegality of
the operation. In other words, the question is whether the legality of an attack
should be judged by the knowledge of its planners and their intentions to act
according to the laws of war or according to the results of the operation, such
as the high number of civilian casualties or the revelation that the person
targeted was in fact innocent.
Jurists have always been loath to "second guess" the military which
operates often in the heated context of the battlefield.'0° Yet, expectations are
higher in cases where the planners of a particular operation have the time and
possibility to calmly take into consideration various parameters before making
a decision-in our case, the order for a targeted killing. The deep split among
thejudges of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the
McCann case is indicative. '03
In the particular case, the Court had to adjudicate on the legality of the
killing of three members of the Irish Republican Army by the British Special
Air Forces in Gibraltar. The British had reason to believe that the particular
persons were planning a terrorist attack. Thus, when British soldiers perceived
a move by one of the terrorists as an attempted detonation of a bomb, fire was
opened by the British forces. This eventually led to the killing of all the
terrorists. The majority of the Court, albeit slim and based on the double vote
of the Court's president, stressed the erroneous assumptions that eventually led
to the opening of fire and the death of the terrorists. 1"4 As such, the Court
emphasized the facts and the objective reality rather than the subjective reality
of the planners of the operation and the soldiers who, when they opened fire,
did not know and could not have known in advance that the particular persons
were not carrying a bomb. With all the information they had, the opposite
hypothesis was more plausible. As such, the majority opted to take a objective
view of the operation, rather than a post event point of view.
101. Francoise Harnpson, States' Military Operations Authorized by the United Nations and
International Humanitarian Law, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 371,
400 (Luigi Condorelli, Anne-Marie La Rosa & Sylvie Scherrer eds. 1996).
102. Martin, supra note 40, at 381.
103. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A.) 97, 97 (1995).
104. Id. at 175-76.
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On the contrary, the minority underlined the importance of judging the
legality of the operation according to the data that the planners of the attack had
in their disposal.'l 5 This tendency is reinforced by positions of states like the
United Kingdom, which ratified the Additional Protocol and rushed to specify
its interpretation of the text, stating that the commander in charge had the
authority to make a decision with the knowledge he had at the time of the
attack. According to this position, we should not benefit from the hindsight of
the judge in applying the inherent standard of excessiveness. Rather, the
ultimate determination is made on a moral basis.'0 6
Since nowadays most battles are being conducted among civilian
populations, graver civilian and troop casualties should be expected to occur in
cases of ground operations. Thus, the option of operations by air is the best
moral and legal alternative. This option protects not only the attacking state's
troops, but also their enemy civilian population.
The case of Israel and the targeted killings it performed in Gaza Strip---the
most densely populated area in the world-is characteristic. In June 2006,
targeted killings by the Israeli Air Force resulted in thirteen civilian casualties,
which spanned over the course of a week.0 7 Once the Israeli Army decided to
enter the Gaza Strip, the number of casualties in one day rose to twenty-three,
and Israeli soldiers were also killed. Although a big part of the aforementioned
Palestinian casualties were combatants, irrespective of their precise number'
it is more than logical that the casualties and suffering among civilian
populations were augmented due to the ground operation. 109
105. Id. at 179-87, (Bernhardt, Vilhjamsson, Golcuklu, Pekkanen, Freeland, Baka & Jambrek,
dissenting).
106. Vincent Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on
the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 801, 885 (2005).
107. Irwin Arief, U.N. Again Urges Israel To Cease Targeted Killings, REUTERS, June 21, 2006,
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KKEE-6QYPW7?OpenDocument&rc
=3&emid=ACOS-635PFR (last visited on Sept. 14, 2007).
108. Avi Yischaharof, How Many Were Killed in the Operations of the Israeli Army? It Depends
on Whom we are Asking in the Gaza Strip (in Hebrew), HAARETZ, June 07, 2006, available at
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=736176&contrasslD=2&subContrasslD=21
&sbSubContrasslD=0 (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
109. See IDF: Basel Was Killed By Friendly Fire, JERUSALEM POST, Jul. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.jpost.com/servletSatellite?cid=l 150885950567&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(last visited on Sept. 14, 2007); CNN, Report: Hamas Orders Palestinian Forces To Fight Israel: Up to 23
Palestinians, I Israeli killed as Gaza Offensive Intensifies, Jul. 6, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/
WORLD/meastI07/06/israel.soldier/index.html (last visited on Sept. 14,2007). See also Amos Harel & Avi
Yischaharof, What is the Purpose? (in Hebrew), HAARETZ, June 30, 2006, available at http://www.
haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=733 143&contrasslD=0&subContrasslD
=0&sbSubContrasslD=O (last visited Sept. 14, 2007) (the article in Haaretz speaking of twelve civilian
casualties already only two days after the Israeli operation in Gaza).
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Force must be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, air strikes in general and targeted
killings in particular, should be endorsed in situations where the elimination of
an individual or a small group would preclude the forfeit of more lives or a
greater damage caused to the enemy population." 0 In such cases, the resort to
targeted killings poses not only as a legal possibility, but also as an ethical
demand. "1
VI. CONCLUSION
International humanitarian law always considered the death of combatants
as a fait accompli. Yet, a closer look to the particular branch of international
law as well as to human rights law leads to the conclusion that this should not
be the case. Soldiers also have a right to life, and the state has an obligation to
respect it and not send them on missions from where their return is unlikely.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, the extent to which consideration of
the lives of the troops should be taken into account is balanced with the enemy
civilian population's right to life. Cases where an operation would result in
heavy civilian casualties should be cancelled, even if the operation would have
likely minimized or eliminated the possibility of troop losses.
The aforementioned conclusions are well applied in modem warfare,
largely held in civilian populations, especially in regard to the dilemma of
modem armies in general whether to resort to air strikes instead of ground
operations-and to the policy of targeted killings in particular. Although it is
true that civilians' lives should continue to be held in reverence, the soldiers'
lives should also constitute a parameter which would render these strikes
lawful. The principle of proportionality should govern the extent to which the
strike is considered lawful.
Albeit difficult to be concretized and subject to the subjective decisions
of military commanders, the aforementioned principle is, bottom line, the
ultimate test for humanity's conscience-the chance for modem man to prove
that despite his engagement in battle, he has not lost his humanity. Like the
Abrahamic discussion with his Creator before the destruction of Sodom and
Gomorra, officials in top political and military echelons are called to ponder
and ultimately decide by themselves how many innocent lives are worth
sacrificing to save their troops.
110. Joshua Raines, Osama, Augustine and Assassination: The Just War Doctrine and Targeted
Killings, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 235 (2002).
111. See Guiora, supra note 27, at 328; Kasher, supra note 54, at 6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International law likes to imagine itself as neutral, dispassionate, and prin-
cipled, operating above the petty squabbles and prejudices of states and peoples.
In this self-understanding, international institutions embody and protect the
"ideals of universalism, humanitarianism, peace, security, and human rights."'
Legal argumentation presents itself as supra-political; whereas politics is passion,
"[t]he very identity of international law seems based on its capacity to set itself
on the side of reason, in opposition to the passionate, the irrational."2 Although
* Guy Fiti Sinclair holds BA and LLB(Hons) degrees from the University of Auckland and is
currently Legal Advisor at Unitec New Zealand. The author is grateful to Professor Antony Anghie for his
comments on an early draft of this essay; thanks also to the ILSA Journal editorial team.
I. Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold
War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 477 (1997).
2. Martti Koskenniemi, Faith, Identity, and the Killing of the Innocent: International Lawyers
and Nuclear Weapons, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 137 (1997).
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the origins of international law are regrettably tainted by association with racist
theories based on cultural differences,3 the discipline has thankfully and
decisively distanced itself from those raw beginnings. Indeed, the concept of
race has all but disappeared from contemporary international law, except where
international law instruments explicitly oppose and seek to eradicate racism.4
In this essay, I challenge the above depiction of international law as having
entirely detached itself from the racist worldview and theories that shaped its
genesis. In considering the history of Western contact and influence in the
Congo, it becomes apparent that international law has repeatedly excused or
obscured the human suffering caused by the actions of Western powers in
relation to the Congo and its peoples. In two key "moments" in that history-at
the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 and again in 1960 when United Nations
(UN) peacekeepers forcibly intervened in the newly-independent state-
international law and international lawyers provided ready justifications for
Western interference in the Congo. In both instances, events central to the
development of international law and institutions resulted in lasting calamity
for the Congo.
After reviewing the colonial and post-colonial history of the Congo, I
argue that the events surrounding the 2005 Armed Activities case, 5 and the
judgment of the International Court of Justice (the Court or ICJ) in that case,
replicate and compound the historical connections between Western interests
3. See Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical
Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REv. 887, 897-900 (2000) [hereinafter Civilization]; and Antony Anghie, Finding
the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 1, 5 (1999) [hereinafter Peripheries].
4. E.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30,1973,1015 U.N.T.S. 243; and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, (especially art 6, on Genocide, and art. 7, on Crimes Against Humanity, including
the "crime of apartheid").
5. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Armed Activities]. For a summary of the case, see Margaret E.
McGuinness, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo: The ICJ Finds Uganda
Acted Unlawfully and Orders Reparations, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-ASIL Insights
(Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/01/insights060109.html (last visited Oct. 17,
2007). The Court's decision has received some early criticism. See Phoebe N. Okowa, Case Concerning
ArmedActivities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 55 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 742 (2006); Ryszard Piotrowicz, The Easter Bunny, the Tooth Fairy, Santa Clause and the
Security Council: A Heart of Darkness at the ICI, in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, 80 AUSTL.
L.J. 162, 164 (2006); Jorg Kammerhofer, The Armed Activities Case andNon-state Actors in Self-Defence
Law, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 89, 89 (2007); Guy Fiti Sinclair, Don't Mention the War (on Terror): Framing
the Issues and Ignoring the Obvious in the ICI's 2005 Armed Activities Decision, 8 MELBOURNE J. INT'L
L. 124, 125 (2007).
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and international law in that country. Conspicuously absent from the Armed
Activities judgment is any consideration of the complex events leading up to the
particular conflict that was the subject of the Court's inquiry. In particular, the
judgment makes no mention of the role of Western countries in creating the
conditions for and sustaining that conflict. Going a step further, I show that
international law and institutions are themselves to a degree culpable in the
most recent series of catastrophes afflicted upon the Congo.
The Congo, itself in a sense invented by the colonial project, continues to
be impacted negatively by Western interests, both directly and via its
neighbours. In conclusion, I argue that the Court's failure to acknowledge the
force of that impact, as well as the role of international law and institutions in
the Congo's disastrous history, has the effect of further extending the
regrettable record of international law in relation to that country.
II. REMEMBERING THE PAST: Two KEY 'MOMENTS' IN THE HISTORY OF THE
CONGO AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Berlin Conference, Imperial Expansion, and the Creation of the
Congo Free State
Imperial involvement in the Congo proper was initiated in an unusually
formal manner at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885,6 convened at a time of
rapid expansion by European colonial powers as well as the transition from
informal to formal empire.7 Amidst general concern that disputes over African
territory might lead to conflict between the European powers, the Conference
sought "to channel the scramble in Africa into pacific channels."8  The
Conference was therefore central to the expansion of colonialism in Africa at
the end of the nineteenth century, and thus to the expansion of international law
to new areas of the globe.9
6. Inhabitants of the Kingdom of the Kongo first made contact with Portuguese explorers in the
fifteenth century; these explorers were followed soon afterwards by missionaries and then slave traders who,
over the following centuries, decimated the local population. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST:
A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 7-11 (1998).
7. MARTIi KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CRvILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, 116-20 (2001). On the Conference generally, see ARTHUR BERRIEDALE
KEITH, THE BELGIAN CONGO AND THE BERLIN ACT (1919); S.E. CROWE, THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN
CONFERENCE 1884-1885 (1942); BISMARCK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN AFRICA CONFERENCE
1884-1885 AND THE ONSET OF PARTITION (Stig Fo-rster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Ronald Robinson eds.,
1988).
8. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 123.
9. See H. L. Wesseling, The Berlin Conference and the Expansion of Europe: A Conclusion, in
BISMARCK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN AFRICA CONFERENCE 1884-1885 AND THE ONSET OF
PARTITION 527, 533-34 (Stig Fo"rster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Ronald Robinson eds., 1988).
2007]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
The creation of an "independent" state in the Congo was, in turn, central
to the Berlin Conference. Prior to the Conference, King Leopold II of Belgium
had sought to gain influence in the Congo basin through the explorer Henry
Stanley, who made his name depicting the Congo and its inhabitants for a
European audience eager to be titillated by his (self-starring) narratives of
heroic white men bringing the light of civilization and God to the savages of
Africa." Under the flag of the King's "International Association of the
Congo," Stanley established trading stations along the Congo and entered into
hundreds of "treaties" with local chiefs, ceding authority to the Association."
Before, during, and after the Conference, the King's representatives arranged
a series of bilateral agreements with European countries recognizing the
Association as a sovereign state.2 The Association, which was signatory to the
General Act of the Conference13 and soon afterwards metamorphosed into the
"Congo Free State,"' 4 was intended to embody the new imperial spirit
expressed at the Conference and in the General Act. As an international
organization similar to the Red Cross, it would administer the territory of the
Congo neutrally, according the benefits of free trade and the blessings of
civilization to all.
15
Much has been written about the horrific atrocities committed in the "Free
State," as King Leopold sought to extract maximum material wealth from his
new colony.' 6 Suffice it to say that the ruthless exploitation of the Congo's
natural resources-principally ivory and rubber-exacted a terrible toll on the
indigenous inhabitants of the Congo basin; it has been estimated that Leopold's
10. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 51.
11. MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD IL THE CONGOFREE
STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH 71-72 (2002); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 63-72.
12. KEITH, supra note 7, at 62. See also HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 84-87; EwANS, supra note
11, at 98-99.
13. KEITH, supra note 7, at 63.
14. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 84-87; EwANS, supra note 11, at 103-08. The precise legal and
political means by which a sovereign state in the Congo emerged is rather obscure: KOSKENNIEMI, supra note
7, at 165. But it seems clear enough that the state was "an international legal fiction," non-existent prior to
the Conference. Jesse S. Reeves, The Origin of the Congo Free State, Considered from the Standpoint of
International Law, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 108 (1909).
15. KEITH, supra note 7, at 58-63. See also Civilization, supra note 3, at 904; and ANTONY
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (2005) [hereinafter
IMPERIALISM]. Undoubtedly driven by King Leopold's desire for a personal colony, the creation of the "Free
State" was also convenient to other European countries with an interest in free trade in Africa. See
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 157; James Thuo Gathii, How American Support for Freedom of Commerce
Legitimized King Leopold's Territorial Ambitions in the Congo, 37 STUDIES IN TRANSNAT'L L. POL'Y 97,
(2005).
16. See, e.g., E.D. MOREL, RED RUBBER: THE STORY OF THE RUBBER SLAVE TRADE FLOURISHING
ON THE CONGO IN THE YEAR OF GRACE 1906 (1970), especially section I; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 6;
and EWANS, supra note 1I, at 11.
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rule reduced the population of the territory by half, or roughly ten million
people. 7 Persistent reports of the atrocities committed in the young "state"
eventually led to an international outcry, and in 1908, the Congo finally came
under the formal rule of Belgium.'
The manner of the Free State's creation has had lasting effects on the
peace and security of the Congo. The arbitrary way in which African
boundaries were agreed between European powers during the colonial period
led to the artificial segregation of familial, cultural, ethnic, tribal, and linguistic
groupings, with the result being that most colonial (and later national) borders
bore almost no relationship to pre-colonial entities. 9 Makau wa Mutua has
argued that the Berlin Conference itself "was the genesis of many present-day
conflicts and virtually insoluble problems in the African Continent,"' and that
the post-colonial state in Africa is "doomed" because of its "normative and
territorial construction on the African colonial state, itself a legal and moral
nullity."'" In a region of arbitrary borders, the Congo's geographical and
historical centrality makes it the "most fictional state in the region."2 More-
over, King Leopold's rule established a pattern of domination, suppression, and
exploitation that continued in the Belgian colony and beyond, into
independence. 23 The model of economic predation established by Leopold
became "deeply ingrained in institutional, political, and even social and
psychological dynamics,"24 resulting in the "violent, unaccountable, uncon-
trolled, inequitable, and neo-patrimonial" exploitation of natural resources, not
only in the Congo itself but in the whole region.25
B. Decolonization, Intervention, and the Cold War
Belgian involvement in the Congo did not cease upon the latter's
independence in July of 1960. Immediately after independence, Belgian forces
17. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 6, at 232-33.
18. Id. at 257-59.
19. Peter Uvin et al., Regional Solutions to Regional Problems: The Elusive Search for Security
in the African Great Lakes, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 67, 69 (2005); Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the
Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1135 (1995).
20. Mutua, supra note 19, at 1142.
21. Id. at 1116.
22. CHRISTIAN P. SCHERRER, GENOCIDE AND CRISIS IN CENTRALAFRICA: CONFLICTROOTS, MASS
VIOLENCE AND REGIONAL WAR 328 (2002).
23. Herbert F. Weiss & Tatiana Carayannis, The Enduring Idea of the Congo, in BORDERS,
NATIONALISM AND THE AFRICAN STATE 135, 136-39 (Ricardo Rend Lardmont ed., 2005). On Belgian rule
in the Congo, see generally OsrrA G. AFOAKU, EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AUTOCRACY AND DISSENT IN AN AMBIVALENT WORLD, ch. 2 (2005).
24. Uvin et al., supra note 19, at 75.
25. Id. at 74.
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conducted what they claimed was a humanitarian intervention for the protection
of Belgian nationals in the Congo.26 Soon afterwards, at the request of the
Prime Minister and President of the new Republic of Congo, a UN peace-
keeping mission was established in the Congo that would continue until 1964
and become one of the most ambitious, expensive, controversial, and violent
peacekeeping operations in UN history, at least until the 1990s.27 During the
same period, the popular Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated,
for which the Belgian government accepted "moral responsibility" in 2002.28
The events in the Congo in the early 1960s, and the steps taken by the
Secretary-General, the Security Council, and peacekeeping troops on the
ground, were extraordinarily complex, and could hardly be summarized here.29
Indeed, one of the long-term effects of the Congo mission was the groundswell
of international opinion it produced in opposition to UN involvement in "messy
internal conflicts involving peace enforcement. 30
Of more lasting impact on the Congo, the severity of the 1960-64 crisis
raised the possibility of Soviet influence in the heart of Africa, ultimately
brought Mobutu Sese Seko to power (in 1965, after the withdrawal of the UN
mission) and "supplied the initial legitimating text" of his regime.31 Fears of
division, anarchy, and ethnic strife helped to justify intervention by UN
peacekeepers; colonial conceptions of the Congolese as irrational and childlike
justified the imposition of the "strong man" Mobutu to prevent the degeneration
of the Congo into chaos or, perhaps worse, communism.32
26. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATTACKS 78 (2002).
27. In all, the mission required 93,000 personnel from thirty-four states and cost over
US$400,000,000. ESREF AKSU, THE UNITED NATIONS, INTRA-STATE PEACEKEEPING AND NORMATIVE
CHANGE 100-01 (2003).
28. Thomas Turner, Crimes of the West in Democratic Congo: Reflections on Belgian Acceptance
of 'Moral Responsibility'for the Death of Lumumba, in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES & THE WEST: HISTORY
AND COMPLICrrY 230, 230 (Adam Jones ed., 2004).
29. On the operation, see generally KING GORDON, THE UNITEDNATIONS IN THE CONGO: A QUEST
FOR PEACE (1962); D.W. BOwET, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY, 153-245 (1964); ARTHUR
LEE BURNS & NINA HEATHCOTE, PEACE-KEEPING BY UN FORCES (1963); ERNEST W. LEFEVER, CRISIS IN THE
CONGO: A UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN ACTION (1965) [hereinafter CRISIS IN THE CONGO]; ERNEST W.
LEFEVER, UNCERTAIN MANDATE: POLITICS OF THE U.N. CONGO OPERATION (1967); TREVOR FINDLAY, THE
USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS, 51-86 (2002); ADRZEJ SITKOwSKI, UN PEACEKEEPING: MYTH
AND REALITY 63-76 (2006).
30. FINDLAY, supra note 29, at 81, 87; see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Constitutional Crisis at
the United Nations: The Price of Peace-Keeping, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 621 (1965); Eric Stein, Mr.
Hammarskjold, the Charter Law and the Future Role of the United Nations Secretary General, 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 9 (1962).
31. Crawford Young, Zarre: The ShatteredIllusion of the Integral State, in THE DECOLONIZATION
READER 414, 423 (James D. Le Sueur ed., 2003).
32. KEVIN C. DUNN, IMAGINING THE CONGO: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF IDENTITY 87-91
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Under Mobutu, whose rule lasted until 1997, the state became "an
incarnate of its colonial predecessor."33 For nearly thirty years during the Cold
War, Mobutu received the unwavering support of the United States (US),
France, and Belgium through direct and indirect intervention, technical,
military, and financial support.34 As during the colonial period, that support
was also motivated by interest in the Congo's vast natural resources.35 It is
difficult to estimate the effect on the Congo of over three decades of Mobutu's
cruel, kleptocratic, and nepotistic autocracy.36 It is even more difficult to guess
what might have replaced him had he been deposed sooner. However, it is
undeniable that Mobutu's rule would not have lasted as long had it not been for
the support of these Western powers.
C. International Law as Apologism
In both of the key "moments" described in this section, international law
and international lawyers played an important part in explaining, justifying, and
apologizing for Western interference in the Congo. In the nineteenth century,
the extension of European empires was supported by positivist theories which
constructed a more explicit rationale for colonialism no less expertly than the
other nascent sciences of the age.37 This rationale was based on the difference
between European and other cultures, conceived as a "gap" between the
civilized and the uncivilized,38 order and disorder that, if left unattended,
"raised the specter of European destruction at the hands of the savage to invoke
(2003); DAVID F. SCHMITZ, THE UNITED STATES AND RIGHT-WING DICTATORSHIPS, 1965-1989, 31-34
(2006).
33. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 14.
34. See generally id, at 61-87; CRAWFORD YOUNG & THOMAS TURNER, THE RISE & DECLINE OF
THE ZAIRIAN STATE, 363-395 (1985); and MICHELA WRONG, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF MR. KURTZ: LIVING ON
THE BRINK OF DISASTER IN MOBUTU'S CONGO (2000).
35. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 63. Each of the U.S., France, and Belgium had its own economic
ambitions in the Congo, in particular in relation to the country's mineral reserves. WRONG, supra note 34,
at 196-97. For the sake of simplicity, I use "the Congo" throughout this essay, including in relation to the
period during Mobutu's rule in which the state was called Zaire (October 1971 to May 1997).
36. Despite having vast natural resources, Afoaku estimated that by the early 1990s, living
conditions in the Congo were "among the most appalling in sub-Saharan Africa." AFOAKU, supra note 23,
at 74. On the political and economic aspects of Mobutu's rule, see generally DAVID J. GOULD,
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: THE CASE OF ZAIRE (1980);
AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 61-123; and Herbert Weiss, Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future
Polity, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY, 157-70
(I. William Zartman ed., 1995). On the disastrous results of Mobutu's "Zairianisation" of the country's
economy, see YOUNG & TURNER, supra note 34, 326-62.
37. Peripheries, supra note 3, at 80.
38. Id. at 5, IMPERIALISM, supra note 15, at 3.
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the necessity of international law."39 The necessity of overcoming this gap both
permitted great violence against "uncivilized" peoples and required rapid
doctrinal development tojustify their subjugation.40 A degree of flexibility was
also necessary. International law thus deemed Congolese chiefs to be suffi-
ciently sovereign for King Leopold's agents to enter into numerous "unequal
treaties," establishing his authority over huge swathes of the Congo basin, even
though strict positivist theories of sovereignty excluded "uncivilized" societies
from the province of international law.4 1
Through the instrumentality of the Berlin Act, international law lent the
appearance of legitimacy to the decisions of the European states present at the
Conference, "allow[ing] private interest to parade as public interest. 42In
paying lip-service to principles of free trade and native rights, the Act created
an illusion of propriety, masking the ugly reality of King Leopold's rule.43 The
establishment of Western sovereignty in the Congo appealed to international
lawyers who saw the need to avoid territorial conflict between European
powers, protect European settlers, and extend Western civilization to the
natives.' These lawyers were generally silent on the growing humanitarian
criticisms of King Leopold's rule of the Congo, except to defend that rule.45 At
least one scholar has linked the long silence of international lawyers to the
unusual circumstances of the Congo Free State's birth: "It was the anomalous
character in international law of the State which has made the Congo question
so difficult of treatment. The Congo State, not being the result of ordinary
conditions, could not be judged by ordinary standards." '46 Whatever the
reasons, there is no doubt that international law and international lawyers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries served as apologists for the prevailing
international system, and in particular for European imperialism in the Congo.
39. Annelise Riles, Aspiration and Control: International LegalRhetoric andthe Essentialization
of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723, 729 (1993).
40. Peripheries, supra note 3, at 7.
41. Id. at 40-41. On the disagreements among European international lawyers regarding the
effectiveness of such treaties, see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 127-41.
42. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 126.
43. Chapter 1 of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the Congo was headed:
"Declaration Relative to the Liberty of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo, its Embouchures and
Neighboring Country, and Disposition Connected Therewith." Article 6 of that chapter was headed:
"Depositions relative to the protection of the natives, of missionaries and of travelers, and also to religious
liberty." On the difference between the rhetoric of the Act and the reality on the ground, see Padideh Ala'i,
Leopold & Morel: A Story of 'Free Trade' and 'Native Rights' in the Congo Free State, 37 STUD.
TRANSNAT'L L. POL'Y 33,36-37 (2005) (citing the General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the
Congo, Feb. 26, 1885), reprinted in 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1909); Gathii, supra note 15, at 105.
44. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 7, at 145, 148.
45. Id. at 159-64.
46. Reeves, supra note 14, at 118.
[Vol. 14:1
Sinclair
The UN peacekeeping mission of the early 1960s was recognized, then as
today, as marking a significant step in the development of that institution. Early
accounts described the UN mission as "the first in which the organization
imposed its will by force in a sovereign independent State" '7 and "the most
complex and protracted operation ever authorized, financed, and administered
by an international organization. ' 8 Even a recent appraisal of the mission
describes it as "probably the most complicated peace-keeping operation
initiated by the United Nations."' 9
In the wake of the UN peacekeeping mission, international lawyers
disagreed about the legal and constitutional basis of the UN action.5" Given that
the mission was initiated at the invitation of the Congo government, the issue
could have remained a merely academic one, but the circumstances of the
intervention and the wide-ranging engagement of the peacekeepers made the
Charter bases of the mission uncertain.5 The ICJ was asked to rule upon
whether certain expenses of the mission constituted "expenses of the Organiza-
tion" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter,52 requiring
47. GEORGE MARTELLI, EXPERIMENT IN WORLD GOVERNMENT: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO 1960-1964, 7 (1966). Martelli describes the UN mission in the Congo
as the "first experiment" in "world government," marking "a turning point in world history." Id. at 7.
48. CRISIS IN THE CONGO, supra note 29, at 17 1.
49. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations,
43 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 498 (2003). Trevor Findlay observes that:
the lessons of the Congo [in 1960-1964] with regard to the use of force are
uncomfortably familiar to those who witnessed the UN operations in Somalia, the
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone [thirty] years on. Indeed, had the
lessons of the Congo been learned and retained the mistakes of the latter missions
might never have occurred.
FINDLAY, supra note 29, at 82. The Congo mission also invites ominous comparisons with the post-war
occupation of Iraq. See Janeen Klinger, Stabilization Operations and Nation-Building: Lessons from United
Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960-1964, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 83, 84-85 (2005).
50. See, e.g., E. M. Miller, Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1961); Finn Seyersted, United Nations Forces Some Legal Problems, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 351
(1961); Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Law in Africa: The Congo Operation as a Case Study, 27 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 632 (1962); Quincy Wright, The United Nations and the Congo Crisis, 2 J. JOHN
BASSETT MOORE SOC'Y INT'L L. 41 (1962); G.I.A.D. Draper, The Legal Limitations upon the Employment
of Weapons by the United Nations Force in the Congo, 12 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 387 (1963); Oscar Schachter,
The Uses ofLaw in International Peace-Keeping, 50 VA. L. REV. 1096 (1964); R. SIMMONDS, LEGAL PROB-
LEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITEDNATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO (1968); ROSALYN HIGGINS,
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY: I AFRICA (1980); Agola
Auma-Osolo, A Retrospective Analysis of the United Nations Activity in the Congo and its Significance for
Contemporary Africa, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1975); Orakhelashvili, supra note 49, at 498-500.
51. John W. Halderman, Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 971,
990 (1962).
52. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 166-67, 175-79
(July 20).
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the Court to determine which provisions of the Charter the mission came
within.
The intense scholarly interest in the legalities (or otherwise) of the UN
mission contrasts starkly with the marked lack of attention by international
lawyers to abuses that occurred under the gaze of that mission, as well as later
developments in the Congo. As noted above, the "Congo crisis" was quickly
understood and manipulated in terms of Cold War dynamics: the United States
viewed the UN action as necessary to stymie communist expansion in central
Africa,53 and after supporting the initial Security Council resolutions the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) soon expressed opposition to the
mission. 4 In this geopolitical climate, the UN did not remain entirely neutral:
it has been described as being, at times, "the willing tool of Western inter-
ference," and complicit in the murder of Lumumba."
The Cold War continued to provide the lens through which the Congo was
viewed, at least until the early 1990s. For so long as Mobutu continued to
support its policies in the Cold War, he received support from the West (and in
particular the U.S.). 6 Despite widespread knowledge of the human rights
abuses under Mobutu's regime,57 there is remarkably little written about them
by international lawyers. By focusing on the formal reasons for the UN
mission, and largely (though not entirely) disregarding the political motivations
that sustained the Mobutu regime that succeeded it, the earnest legal analyses
that were published in the years immediately following the establishment of the
mission appear apologetic in aggregate effect, if not individual intent."
M]I. RECONSIDERING THE PRESENT: AN (EXPANDED) FACTUAL
MATRIX FOR ARMED A CTIVITIES
A. From Mobutu to Kabila
Following the end of the Cold War, Mobutu's usefulness to his Western
patrons waned.59 By the early 1990s, U.S. Assistant Secretaries for African
53. SCHMITZ, supra note 32, at 20.
54. Richard N. Gardner, The Soviet Union and the United Nations, 29 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
845, 846-47 (1964); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Constitutional Crisis at the United Nations: The Price of
Peace-Keeping, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 621, 638-41 (1965).
55. LUDO DE WITrE, THE ASSASSINATION OF LUMUMBA xxii, 51-57 (Ann Wright & Ren6e Fenby)
(translation from DE MOORD OP LUMUMBA).
56. SCHMITZ, supra note 32, at 34-35.
57. Id. at 33; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ZAIRE (1980).
58. A recent study comparing the various arguments and seeking to identify the correct legal bases
for the mission seems to exemplify a kind of after-the-fact apologism. Orakhelashvili, supra note 49, at
498-500. For an early assessment of the geopolitical maneuvering behind the UN operation, see LEFEVER,
UNCERTAIN MANDATE, supra note 29, at 75-148.
59. AFoAKU, supra note 23, at 89-90.
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Affairs were publicly acknowledging that country's "poor human rights
record"6 ° and that U.S. policies during the Cold War era "were strongly
influenced by broader strategic interests, often to the detriment of other con-
siderations." 6' Despite belated attempts to foster partisan politics and
democracy in the 1990s, 62 the relatively sudden loss of Western support made
Mobutu's government more vulnerable to political opposition, unrest, and
rebellion.63
Just as Mobutu was losing the support of his Western friends, another
crisis was brewing in the Great Lakes region. Ethnic divisions that had been
fostered by colonial policy in neighbouring Rwanda reached a climax with the
genocide of Tutsis in April-July 1994.' The genocide ended with the
overthrow of the Hutu government and was followed by an exodus of Hutu
refugees across Rwanda's borders into the Congo and Uganda, creating further
instability in both of those countries. From refugee camps in the Congo, Hutu
militias, including some of the g~nocidaires, launched a series of attacks into
Rwanda and against Congolese Tutsis (Banyamulenge). The Rwandan army
then combined with Banyamulenge and other opposition groups to attack the
Hutu refugee camps and marched onwards to Kinshasa with help from Uganda,
Burundi, and Angola.65
The rebel leader who emerged from this complex set of events, and who
eventually succeeded Mobutu in May 1997, was Laurent-Dsird Kabila. As
time passed, however, Kabila proved unable to gain control of the Congo's
60. Herman J. Cohen, US Policy and the Crisis in Zaire, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 828, 829 (1991).
61. George E. Moose, USPolicy TowardLiberia, Togo, andZaire, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 437,438
(1993).
62. See John F. Clark, The Collapse of the Democratic Experiment in the Republic of Congo: A
Thick Description, in THE FATE OF AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS: ELITES AND INSTITUTIONS 96
(Leonardo A. Villalrn & Peter VonDoepp eds., 2005).
63. AFOAKu, supra note 23, at 91-117; Weiss and Carayannis, supra note 23, at 144-45.
64. Belgium administered the territory of Ruanda-Urundi under a League of Nations mandate, and
later as a trusteeship territory under the United Nations. The Belgian authorities "declared that each and
every person had an 'ethnic identity' that determined his or her place within the colony or the postcolonial
system." See John R. Bowen, The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict, in GENOCIDE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
READER 334, 336 (Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2002); Liisa H. Malkki, Speechless Emissaries: Refugees,
Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization, in GENOCIDE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER 334, 336
(Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2002). For example, a 1933 census of Ruanda-Urundi classified the whole
population as belonging to one of three ethnic groupings-Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa-based on individuals'
physiognomy and wealth. L.R. MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA'S
GENOCIDE 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter PEOPLE BETRAYED]. On the genocide and events leading up to it, see
generally GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995); LINDA MELVERN,
CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2004).
65. DtUNN, supra note 32, at 2-3; Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 145-46; AFOAKU, supra
note 23, at 137.
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border areas, which were so crucial to "his foreign sponsors" security.66
Popular opinion in the Congo gradually hardened against the foreign invaders,
as well as against Banyamulenge who were seen to be holding high positions
in Kabila's government and army.67 These developments required Kabila to
distance himself from his foreign sponsors, leading to overt military conflict
with Uganda as well as Rwanda.6"
The "second Congo War" (1998-2003), the events of which were in
dispute in Armed Activities, involved, at one time or another, the forces of no
fewer than nine African countries in armed conflict on the Congo's territory,
including Uganda, Rwanda, and other neighboring countries, many of which
were or claimed to be under attack by rebel forces based in the Congo.69
Shifting allegiances between the various state and non-state parties involved
made it very difficult if not impossible to identify culpability for each of the
innumerable human rights abuses that took place during this time. Suffice it to
say that these wars-and the ongoing conflicts in the Congo-have been
conducted at the expense of millions of lives.7"
B. Western Culpability in the Second Congo War
The role of Western states in these events was no less complex than the
events themselves. Firstly, the West must accept some responsibility for the
Rwandan genocide, not only because of the ethnic policies introduced during
the colonial period but also because of the support that it (especially France)
gave to the Hutu-favouring dictatorship of Juvrnal Habyarimana.7 l Secondly,
the Angolan and Ugandan opposition groups that maintained bases in the
Congo, and whose attacks provoked the support of those countries for Kabila,
did so with support from the United States via Mobutu, and in some cases
directly from the United States.72
66. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 150.
67. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 150.
68. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 150-51; see also Mwesiga Baregu, Congo in the Great
Lakes Conflict, in SECURITY DYNAMICS IN AFRICA'S GREAT LAKES REGION 59, 61-63 (Gilbert M.
Khadiagala ed., 2006).
69. Okowa, supra note 5, at 743. In 1999, the DRC also initiated actions in the ICJ against Burundi
(withdrawn in 2001) and Rwanda (withdrawn in 2001 and a new application made in 2002). Id.
70. An estimated 3.9 million people died as a result of the Congo wars between 1998 and 2004.
Benjamin Coghlan, Richard J. Brennan, Pascal Ngoy, David Dofara, Brad Otto, Mark Clements & Tony
Stewart, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey, 367 LANCET 44 (2006).
Described as "one of the most devastating humanitarian disasters of our day," the conflict displaced nearly
ten percent of the Congo's population. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 145.
71. PEOPLE BETRAYED, supra note 64, at 24.
72. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 147.
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Thirdly, the Clinton administration in the mid-1 990s provided Kabila with
diplomatic, military, strategic, and economic support, 7 and opposed a Security
Council resolution in 1996 that would have deployed an international force
effectively to defuse a rebellion led by Kabila.74 Following Mobutu's over-
throw, North American companies won multi-million dollar mining contracts,
and provided financial support for Kabila's war efforts.75 In all these ways,
moral if not legal responsibility for the second Congo war must be shared with
countries other than the parties immediately involved.
C. Implicating the International
Most commentaries on the Rwandan genocide have focused on the failure
of the international community, and the UN in particular, to respond quickly
enough to prevent such a massive loss of life.76 Similar accusations of inaction
and passivity can be and have been made against the UN and the international
community in relation to the wars in the Congo.77 Fighting continues in what
has been called the "Third Congo War," involving many more smaller actors
in relatively unstructured, localized, but no less deadly, conflicts. 78 Extreme
violence, including ethnically-targeted attacks and incursions by foreign troops,
have been observed by UN peacekeeping troops, mostly too small in numbers
to intervene effectively.79 Legal scholars and other commentators have warned
that Rwandan troops have long moved in and out of the Congo with impunity,0
that the Security Council has failed to provide sufficient troops to end the
73. Frangois Ngolet, African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire, 47 AFR. TODAY 65, 70
(Winter 2000).
74. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 143; Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 147-48.
75. Ngolet, supra note 73, at 70-71.
76. See Christopher J. Le Mon & Rachel S. Taylor, Security CouncilAction in the Name of Human
Rights: From Rhodesia to the Congo, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 227-28 (2004); PEOPLE
BETRAYED, supra note 64, at 85-87. Developing tensions in 1990-1993 were met with indifference; the
increasing frequency of attacks on Tutsi, particularly in the northwest provinces, was at least partly
attributable to the passivity of UN troops, while information about the seriousness of the situation was
withheld from the Security Council by the UN Secretariat. See PEOPLE BETRAYED, supra note 64, at 88,
111-12; Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke, Rwanda, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR
TO THE 21 ST CENTURY 483,492-95 (David M. Malone ed., 2004). Despite repeated pleas for help from UN
forces on the ground both before and during the genocide itself, the Security Council refused to commit more
forces or to authorize more proactive measures that could have staunched the bloodshed. PRUNIER, supra
note 64, at 277-80.
77. John R. Tatulli,ResolvingAfrica 's Longest Civil War: Updates ofthe Case ConcerningArmed
Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 903, 906 (2003).
78. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 157.
79. Uvin et al., supra note 19, at 81.
80. Kenneth W. Harrow, "Un Train Peut en CacherunAutre: " Narrating the Rwandan Genocide
and Hotel Rwanda, 36 RES. AFR. LITERATURES 223, 225 (2005).
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fighting in the Congo,8 and that the relative absence, impotence, and silence of
the international community is "striking in the face of a conflict which not only
has huge humanitarian consequences but a potential continental impact as
well."82
Apart from these charges of absence and passivity, the actions taken by
international institutions have often exacerbated already dire circumstances in
the Congo. After the Rwandan genocide was effectively completed, the
(French-led) UN Op6ration Turquoise allowed Hutu militias to cross the border
to the Congo, leading to the profound destabilization of eastern Congo and
creating conditions that led to the Congo wars.83 Hutu refugee camps were then
maintained in the Congo by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at
massive cost to international donors." The Rwandan government's requests for
the international community to disarm these Hutu refugees, who were launching
attacks on Rwanda and on Congolese Tutsis, fell on deaf ears, leading directly
to the invasion of the Congo by Rwanda, Uganda, and other neighbouring
countries, and the subsequent overthrow of Mobutu.85
More disturbingly, laments about the inaction of international institutions
have often masked just how involved the international community already has
been in the Congo.86 Michela Wrong tells of a report by a former director of
the Congo's central bank which exposed the complacency of international
financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank in the face of endemic corruption in Mobutu's government.87
Wrong argues that the report "made it impossible for the West to ever pretend
it was not aware of what was going on, bringing it face to face with its own
hypocrisy,"88 and suggests that the Congo's economy (and, by extension, its
security) would have benefited had the IFIs held Mobutu more accountable.89
81. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 248-50 (Malcolm Evans &
Phoebe Okowa eds., 2nd ed. 2004); Adekeye Adebajo, From Congo to Congo: UnitedNations Peacekeeping
in Africa after the Cold War, in AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT ON THE
CONTINENT 195, 2 10 (Ian Taylor & Paul Williams eds., 2004); SCHERRER, supra note 22, at 314-26.
82. Filip Reyntjens, Briefing: The Second Congo War. More than a Remake, 98 AFR. AFF. 241,
249 (1998).
83. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 146; PRUNIER, supra note 64, at 281-311.
84. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 137.
85. Weiss & Carayannis, supra note 23, at 146.
86. Compare to Anne Orford's findings on the involvement of international organizations in
Rwanda prior to the genocide. ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-08, 158-59 (2003).
87. WRONG, supra note 34, at 196-97.
88. Id. at 189.
89. Id. at 199.
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Uganda and Rwanda, too, are clients of various IFI credit programmes.9"
One study reports that despite military spending above limits set by these
institutions, Uganda is rated among their top clients.91 Yet Uganda's positive
economic performance is closely linked to its military involvement in the
Congo: sales of natural resources and products stolen from the Congo "help
make Uganda appear as though it is improving its position as an example of
export-led growth and successful economic reform;"92 those reforms in turn
facilitate Uganda's exports of stolen Congolese goods, and attract further loans
and debt relief.93 Rwanda also continues to receive support from IFI pro-
grammes despite its alleged ongoing interventions in the Congo and claims by
the UN that its military uses income from exports of Congolese mineral
resources to finance those interventions.94 Angola and Zimbabwe, equally,
have reaped economic benefits from their military interventions in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and both the Congolese government
and rebel leaders have used their country's resources to fuel the war.95 It is no
exaggeration to suggest that all of the Great Lakes countries "are war
economies, at least in part.., linked through the sale and transit of resources
from the DRC. 96 According to reports for the Security Council, both the IMF
and the World Bank are aware of the war-profiteering by Uganda and
Rwanda; 97 this has not prevented the World Bank from praising Uganda for its
economic performance.98
The integration of the Congo wars into the global economy raises troubling
questions about whether the international community may be more deeply
implicated in the central African conflicts than it imagines.99 Arms used in the
conflict are sourced from countries in the industrialized North, including
permanent members of the Security Council,00 and multinational mining
90. William Reno, Uganda's Politics of War andDebt Relief, 9 REv. INT'LPOL. EcoN. 415, 426
(2002).
91. Id. at 427-28.
92. Id. at 425.
93. Id. at 425-26, 428.
94. Id. at 432.
95. AFOAKU, supra note 23, at 180.
96. Uvin et al., supra note 19, at 74.
97. See, e.g., United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N.
Doc. S/2001/357 (Apr. 12, 2001). See also Korinna Horta, Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights and the
World Bank, 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 227, 231-33 (2002).
98. Horta, supra note 97, at 233.
99. Charles Cater, The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: Rethinking the Critical
Cases of Africa, in THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF ARMED CONFLICT: BEYOND GREED AND GRiEVANCE 19,
32 (Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman eds., 2003).
100. Id. at 33.
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corporations are directly engaged with various participants in the wars,
including those alleged to have committed mass atrocities.'0 ' Among the
resources fuelling the Congo wars are minerals used in the production of cell
phones and laptop computers,0 2 goods that are iconic of the processes of
globalization. These inter-linkages should lead us to question whether our era
of globalization and democracy, capitalism, and universalized human rights is
really any different from that of King Leopold, in our acceptance of mass
deaths for the sake of Western economic progress." The war in the Congo
may ultimately be found to be, like the Rwandan genocide that led to it, the
"indirect result of the expansion of the European-dominated international
system of the late nineteenth century," which "occurred mostly through
colonization."'"
IV. BLIND-SPOTS AND ASSUMPTIONS INARMEDACTIVITIES
A. The Court's Findings
In Armed Activities, the DRC claimed that Uganda had violated
conventional and customary international law in three areas. First, the DRC
claimed that by occupying DRC territory and actively extending military,
logistic, economic, and financial support to irregular forces there, in relation to
the principle of non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for
sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic matters. Second, the DRC
claimed that by illegally exploiting Congolese natural resources and pillaging
its assets and wealth, in relation to respect for sovereignty over natural
resources, the right to self-determination, and non-interference in domestic
matters. And lastly, the DRC claimed that Uganda violated conventional and
customary international law in relation to fundamental human rights by
committing acts of oppression, including killing, injuring, abducting, or
despoiling DRC nationals.'05 The Court found that Uganda had violated the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, had interfered in the DRCs
internal affairs and had committed a grave violation of the prohibition against
the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.'0 6 The
Court further found that Uganda was an occupying power in part of the DRC °7
and was internationally responsible for violations of international human rights
101. Id. at 32.
102. Reno, supra note 90, at 432.
103. Harrow, supra note 80, at 226.
104. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 9
(2005).
105. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 24.
106. Id. 165.
107. Id. 178.
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law and international humanitarian law"°8 and for its military's looting,
plundering, and exploitation of the DRC's natural resources.0 9 The Court did
not, however, uphold the claim that Uganda had violated the principle of the
DRC's sovereignty over its natural resources."0
B. Silence, Apology, and Utopianism
I have elsewhere examined how the judgment in Armed Activities frames
the legal issues of the case so as to ignore the most obvious resonances with
recent developments in international relations."' Specifically, the judgment
affects to ignore a series of issues that are of particular significance in the US-
led "war on terror"-including such controversial topics as pre-emptive self-
defense, armed attacks by non-state actors, acts of aggression, and "legal black
holes."
The manner in which the Court excludes these issues from the case is
striking enough. But an important element of the factual matrix of the case-
and indeed of all the conflicts that have afflicted central Africa for over a
decade-is also absent from Armed Activities. Remarkably, the judgment
makes no mention at all of the colonial histories of the parties and the other
participants in the Congo wars. Early in the judgment, the Court declares its
awareness of "the complex and tragic situation which has long prevailed in the
Great Lakes region," that there has been "much suffering by the local
population and destabilization of much of the region," and that "the instability
in the DRC has had negative security implications for Uganda and some other
neighbouring States.""' 2 At most, these observations would seem to suggest
that the Congo wars have a regional dimension. Certainly, the rulers and elites
of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and other central African countries have a huge
burden of responsibility for the economic disasters, corruption, and conflict that
have afflicted the region, including their avarice and brutality in the Congo
wars. Far from balancing these observations with due notice of wider
international responsibilities, however, the judgment indicates absolutely no
awareness by the Court that states outside the region might be culpable or
otherwise involved in the conflict in any way." 3 The account given by the
108. Id. 1219-20.
109. Id. 1246.
110. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 1 224.
111. Sinclair, supra note 5, at 124.
112. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 1 26.
113. It is possible, as Judge Simma writes, to "agree with everything the Court is saying in its
Judgment" while expressing concern about "certain issues on which the Court decided to say nothing." Id.
Judge Simma's separate opinion, 1 1.
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judgment is thus incomplete, lacking important details that, if included, would
have told a more nuanced and truthful story.
The gaps in the judgment's account are not remedied elsewhere in the
Court's decision.'14 In his separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans offers a passing
acknowledgement of the "hapless post-decolonization history" of the parties
and their "chronic instability."'' 5 Though conceding that both parties had "been
in the grip of merciless dictatorships" and that governments in post-Cold War
Africa have "sometimes come to power through external intervention,"116 Judge
Kooijmans does not specify that Western intervention, whether direct or
indirect, has been virtually constant in the region, and that Western support had
sustained those dictatorships. Even Judge ad hoc Kateka, who was appointed
to the Court by Uganda, refers to colonialism only once directly in his dissent-
ing opinion, in connection with the exploitation of ethnicity "by the colonialists
during colonial times.""' 7 He notes that as an "additional factor" the "terrible
history of unscrupulous dictators-all of whom had support from abroad,""' 8
but does not go further to identify the Western sources of such support.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the judgment, separate opinions, and
dissenting opinion all fail to make mention of the role of international law and
international institutions as described in this essay. No reference is made to the
nineteenth century doctrines and theories that justified King Leopold's
annexation of the Congo and concealed the pernicious effects of his regime; nor
any to the role of international institutions in facilitating the rise and prolonging
the rule of Mobutu; nor even to the international system and institutions that
contributed towards the conditions for the ongoing wars in the Congo.
These blind-spots in the judgment lend it a sense of apologism and,
paradoxically, utopianism. On the one hand, the judgment's silences have the
effect of concealing and excusing both Western interference in the Congo and
the culpability of international law in enabling that interference. On the other
hand, they have the unfortunate effect of divorcing the judgment from reality.
Thus, for example, the Court suggests that Uganda should have reported to the
Security Council any armed attack upon it by or from within the DRC;" 9 an
early academic response has ridiculed the Court's reasoning as "a complete
114. In the sense that the Court's decision includes both thejudgment and the separate and dissenting
opinions, see Hugh Thirlway, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinions: The Declarations and Separate and
Dissenting Opinions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONs 390, 396 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
115. Armed Activities, Kooijmans separate opinion, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 5, 8.
116. Id. 5,7.
117. Id. Kateka dissenting opinion, 9.
118. Id.
119. Armed Activities, Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 145.
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denial of reality because the Security Council almost certainly will do nothing,
or else will do too little too late."'
120
C. In Defence of the ICJ.: "Reification" in International Law
The criticisms made thus far may seem a little unfair to the ICJ. After all,
surely the members of that Court cannot be accused of racism: apart from
having been elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, 2 ' the
current composition of the Court includes members from developing countries
such as Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Morocco, Jordan, Mexico, and Venezuela.'22
It is also apparent from the record of proceedings in Armed Activities that the
judgment quite faithfully reflects the issues as raised by the parties to the case.
A careful review of those proceedings reveals that the submissions of neither
party dwelt particularly upon the history of colonialism in central Africa. On
one occasion, counsel for Uganda objected to the DRCs claim of "illegal
exploitation" of its natural resources and of violation of the "principle of
permanent sovereignty" of its people over its resources, stating that the charge
sought "to resurrect the ghosts of colonialism in Africa." '23  On another
occasion, in responding to allegations of human rights violations by Ugandan
troops, Uganda's representative referred to "long-standing ethnic conflicts in
eastern Congo... dat[ing] back to the colonial era when the Belgian rulers of
Congo fostered enmity" between two different ethnic groups. 124 On neither
occasion, however, did the DRC or Uganda seek to rely upon the fact of
colonialism, or any aspect of the colonial experience of any country, to support
their claims or refute the others. Moreover, even with respect to these few
references in the proceedings to the colonial past, the Court's remit was to
focus only on the particular legal issues placed before it; 25 any narrowing of
120. Piotrowicz, supra note 5, at 162. In his dissenting opinion, Judge ad hoc Kateka states: "It is
not enough for the Court to refer Uganda to the Security Council. It bears mentioning that many tragic
situations have occurred on the African continent due to inaction by the Council." Armed Activities, Kateka
dissenting opinion, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 38.
121. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 4, Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
122. International Court of Justice: The Court: Current Members, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=2&p3=1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
123. Public sitting held on Wednesday, April 20, 2005, at 10 a.m., CR 2005/9 (translation) 2,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 16/4315.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007); see also Public
sitting held on Wednesday, April 27, 2005, at 3 p.m., CR 2005/15 (translation) 30-31, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 16/4339.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
124. Public sitting held on Wednesday, April 20, 2005, at 3 p.m., CR 2005/10, 56, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/l 16/4317.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
125. Though obviously worried that the judgment may not be "seen as logical and fair in its
historical, political and social dimensions," Judge Kooijmans describes the Court's task as "compel[ling] it
to come to a clear and unequivocal determination of the legal consequences of acts committed during that
'complex episode."' Armed Activities, Kooijmans separate opinion, 2005 I.C.J. 116, 4, 3.
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those issues is simply a normal part of the judicial settlement process. 126 In its
contentious jurisdiction the Court is only able to recognize and address disputes
between the particular parties to a case, and should disregard broader historical
concerns. 1
27
Thus stated, the Court's narrow focus on the specific dispute and facts
before it appears reasonable and normal: that is simply the nature of inter-
national law and the dispute settlement process in the ICJ. I would argue,
however, that the nature of that law and process are far less settled than we
might be led to believe. James Boyle has shown how international law theorists
consistently "use" reification "to establish that the thing they want us to
recognize about international law is already there woven into every strand."'28
We have seen how positivist doctrines in the nineteenth century, though
apparently fixed, remained flexible enough to meet the needs of Western
imperial interests at different stages. And again in 1960, when sovereignty was
granted to the independent Congo, this sovereignty was of a "different form and
character" to that possessed by European states,129 and was immediately vitiated
by successive military interventions by Belgium and the UN. Antony Anghie
has noted that the sovereignty conferred upon decolonized Third World states
effected a clean break from the past, requiring those states to "relinquish their
own history and the claims that could arise from it."'13
In its own quiet way, the background work of international law doctrines
prevents the Court, and even the parties themselves, from considering the
possibility of assigning any kind of legal accountability for armed activities on
the Congo's territory to colonial powers, contemporary Western states,
international financial institutions, or multinational corporations. These
doctrines act as an invisible shield of unexamined assumptions, protecting
Western states and non-state actors alike against the possibility of legal action
for their role in the Congo's wars. What we "know" about how an international
court functions and the kinds of issues it can consider thus prevents us from
considering the possibility that the Court could use a wider lens in its
examination of the root causes of the dispute at hand.
126. See Sir Robert Y. Jennings, The Proper Work and Purposes of the International Court of
Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 33, 33-35 (A.S.
Muller, D. Raic & J.M. Thurinszky eds., 1997).
127. Id. at 36.
128. James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of
Language, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 327, 349 (1985).
129. Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 520 (2002).
130. Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home: " Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 445, 497 (1993).
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However, other possibilities are available to the Court. Judge Christopher
G. Weeramantry, for example, is widely recognized to have explored alternative
paradigms of international jurisprudence.13' Judge Weeramantry exemplified
in his judicial and extra-judicial writings an approach to international law that
combined due deference towards positive law with a "much wider type of
inquiry... extraordinarily broad ranging in its geographical and historical
sweep."' 13 2 In his dissenting opinion in the ICJ Advisory Opinion, Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 133 Judge Weeramantry "range[d] far
afield from traditional jurisprudential authority to draw on a range of macro-
historical and multi-cultural sources as well as philosophical considerations."' 34
The Court in its judgment--or any of its members in a separate or dissenting
opinion-could have adopted a similar approach, providing what Judge
Kooijmans referred to as "a 'thick description' of a complex episode."' That
they did not do so, in my view, has resulted in a decision from which it is not
sufficiently clear that the Court "is fully aware of the wider context and the
complexity of the issues involved," and which may therefore not be seen "as
logical and fair in its historical, political and social dimensions.' 36
V. CONCLUSION
There is a curiously repetitive pattern to the story of Western contact with
the Congo. At crucial points the Congo has been regarded as both anomaly and,
in retrospect, as avant-garde: at the Berlin Conference when a new sovereign
entity was created as a kind of internationally-administered territory, pre-
figuring the mandate system later developed under the League of Nations; 1
37
and again in a later era of brave new institutions, decolonization, and Cold War
131. Richard Falk, The Coming Global Civilization: Neo-Liberal or Humanist?, in LEGAL VISIONS
OFTHE21STCENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUROF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 15, 16 (Antony Anghie
& Garry Sturgess eds., 1998); Peter Kooijmans, Two Remarkable Men Have Left the International Court of
Justice, 13 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 343,344 (2000). For Judge Weeramantry's own understanding ofthe function
of the Court, see Christopher G. Weeramantry, The Function of the International Court of Justice in the
Development of International Law, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 309, 311 (1997).
132. Antony Anghie, C. G. Weeramantry at the ICJ, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 829, 834 (2001).
133. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8).
134. Saul Mendlovitz & Merav Datan, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons: A Narrative of Affirmative Appreciation and Judge Weeramantry's Grotian Quest, in
LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21 ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 653,
668 (Antony Anghie & Garry Sturgess eds., 1998).
135. Armed Activities, Judge Kooijmans separate opinion, 2005 1.C.J. 116, 13. Judge Kooijmans
concluded that "[t]he task of a judicial body does not allow it to conclude with a 'thick description' of a
complex episode but compels it to come to a clear and unequivocal determination of the legal consequences
of acts committed during that 'complex episode."' Id.
136. Id. at4.
137. QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3 1, n.20 (1930).
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politics, when the Congo became a testing ground for a new kind of inter-
national "humanitarian" intervention that would become increasingly familiar,
and depressingly predictable, as time passed.'38 The patterns of governance and
exploitation that were established between these two episodes have indelibly
shaped the modem Congolese State, and have contributed their own part to the
creation of conditions that make the Congo particularly susceptible to violent
upheavals. Just as imperialist interference in the Congo preceded the Berlin
Conference, so too has it continued long after independence. The nature of that
interference has shifted with global political sea-changes, but has been no less
disastrous to the Congo's peace and security.
Knowledge of the recurring patterns in the Congo's history lends texture
and depth to our reading of the Armed Activities decision. Indeed, in recalling
and re-telling the history of conflict in the Congo, "past" and "present" quickly
become artificial categories, transcended by the continuity of imperialist
involvement in the Congo and its neighbours.'39 The act of remembering
imperialist and international culpability in the Congo wars suggests more
troubling connections with the Court's reluctance to engage with the issues that
have become controversial in the "war on terror." Firstly, it evokes the
possibility that the emerging doctrines of the "war on terror" may articulate a
new form of imperialism, linking present to past in disturbing ways. 4 '
Secondly, it suggests that a more profound and enduring terror may be sited in
the long history of the Congo's relationship with the West than in more recent
events involving international terrorist networks. And thirdly, the Court's
reluctance to engage with the principles of international human rights and
humanitarian law may betray an inchoate apprehension on the part of the Court
that, in some sense, the whole of the Congo has become a legal "black hole" or
"anomalous zone," '' beyond the reach of international law.
In the Congo, stories matter. As Kevin Dunn has demonstrated, images of
the Congo as the "heart of darkness"-invoking slavery, cannibalism, and
savagery, as well as division, anarchy, and ethnic strife-have been remarkably
resilient and flexible, providing easily adaptable justifications for each form of
138. With perfect circularity, UN peacekeepers are once again stationed in the Congo though, as in
Rwanda over a decade ago, they are largely powerless to prevent the ongoing violence. Adebajo, supra note
81, at 195.
139. In a similar vein, Kenneth Harrow has asked whether our narratives of the Rwandan genocide,
conceiving of it as unique and exceptional though explicable by a certain history, contain a self-serving
teleology that enables us to ignore the possibility that the genocide was neither unique nor exceptional.
Harrow, supra note 80, at 223-24.
140. IMPERIALISM, supra note 15, at 279, 294; Antony Anghie, The War on Terror and Iraq in
Historical Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 45, 47 (2005).
141. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 65 (2004).
Reyntjens states that by 1996-97, the state in the Congo "had virtually disappeared, thus leaving a 'black
hole."' Reyntjens, supra note 82, at 241.
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imperialism and foreign interference in the Congo. 14 2  This essay has
interrogated the narrative offered by the Court, looking past the account offered
in the judgment. The Court does not intend, of course, to tell a racist story; this
essay has also tried to suggest how the assumptions and cosmology of
international law prevent the Court from venturing beyond its immediate frame
of reference. But the judgment bears responsibility, too: the Court's expertise
and narrative power create reality as much as they reflect and conceal it. As
such, it must be questioned whether the judgment persuades, "on a self-
sufficient basis and throughout a heterogeneous world community, that the
Court'sjudicial authority has been correctly exercised."" More critically, the
judgment's silences allow us all-the Court and international law included-to
avoid taking responsibility:
There is only one account ... that needs to be heard .... It is the
account that refuses to leave the reader out of it: the account where
the past is not distanced from our lives, and where the consequences
are not over for us or for them; the account that refuses the comfort-
able position of distance and of mere observation. The account that
implicates us is all that matters now....
142. DuNN, supra note 32, at 8-9. See also Patrick Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: The
Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent, 12 CRITlcAL INQUIRY 166 (1985).
143. MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 207 (1996).
144. Kenneth W. Harrow, 'Ancient Tribal Warfare:' Foundational Fantasies of Ethnicity and
History, 36 RES. AFR. LITERATURES 34, 40 (2005).
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I. INTRODUCTION
As we have witnessed since the beginning of the 1990s, international law,
in particular international criminal justice, can have a significant impact on the
peace process and the reconciliation of societies in post-conflict periods.
* LL.M. (McGill University), Mag.iur. (University of Innsbruck, Austria). The author would like
to thank Professor Payam Akhavan for his advice and encouragement. Thanks also to Elisabeth Roy Trudel,
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However, debates over peace versus justice, justice versus reconciliation, and
truth versus justice have shaped attempts in the last decades to determine the
controversial place of international criminal justice. This article attempts a
different approach which follows none of the aforementioned concepts and
focuses on the impact that international criminal justice has on ongoing
conflicts. More precisely, the Darfur conflict will serve as a case study to
examine the question whether and how the International Criminal Court (ICC)
can, in addition to offering post bellum justice, also play a more active role to
halt or, at least, to restrain mass atrocities. These opportunities are a new
phenomenon in the field of international law.
The current war in Darfur, unfolding since 2003, has provoked one of the
worst ongoing humanitarian disasters. The international community has been
exceptionally slow to react to the growing crisis; the only stringent collective
measure was the referral of the situation to the ICC by the Security Council on
March 31,2005-a novelty in international law and international relations. For
the first time, the ICC was activated by the Security Council and without the
consent of the respective state. Sudan is a signatory to, but has not ratified the
Rome Statute and consistently rejects ICC jurisdiction over its nationals and
over crimes committed on its territory. As we will see in the first part, it is
probably even more remarkable that the ICC was activated while the conflict
was still going on and far from being resolved. Until now, international
criminal justice mechanisms have usually delivered post bellum justice, and
influencing the conflict itself was never a major issue. However, the ICC is a
permanent institution that is ready to act, thus being able to shift the delivery
of post-conflict justice towards in-conflict justice. As a result of the Security
Council referral, the ICC has the chance to demonstrate that it can have a
significant impact on ongoing conflicts.
The Darfur conflict is characterized by massive violations of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law, which have mainly been
committed by the Sudanese army and a government-sponsored militia, as we
will see in the second part. It is important to understand the roots of the current
conflict as well as the complex issues regarding the different warring parties in
order to examine the potential impact of international criminal justice on the
key players of the conflict.
The victims of the conflict urgently need the support of every international
player that has the potential to end their suffering and help to achieve long-
lasting peace. The ICC is one of these players. The third part examines the role
of the ICC in the conflict, beginning with the activation of the Court and
admissibility issues. The ICC is an active player that can exercise significant
pressure on key players of the conflict, above all on the Sudanese government
and its Darfur policy. Although the ICC should not be dominated by political
issues, this does not mean it cannot have important direct and indirect political
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effects. Potential risks of the ICC involvement, such as endangering the
conclusion of a peace agreement, thus prolonging the conflict, or the
deployment of a peacekeeping mission, also have to be taken into account by
the ICC. It will also be argued that, so far, the activity of the ICC, in particular
the indictments of a member of the Sudanese government and a militia leader,
has had modest, but positive effects on the conflict. In addition to this
evaluation, further steps will be proposed in order to maximize the positive
impact of the ICC activity on the situation in Darfur in the long run.
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ARMED CONFLICTS
A. Tribunals ad hoc providing ex post facto justice
International criminal justice has evolved rapidly since the beginning of
the 1990s. Nearly fifty years after the International Military Tribunals set up
in Nuremberg and Tokyo, which prosecuted crimes committed during World
War II, the international community created judicial bodies to deal with war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created by a Chapter VII
Security Council resolution in 1993 to face the international crimes committed
during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' The Security Council followed the
same approach a year later to deal with the genocide in Rwanda by installing
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).2 These two ad hoc
tribunals target specific situations, which are both limited in time and space.
Both tribunals, in particular the ICTY, have produced an important amount of
case law, thus advancing international criminal law significantly. They were,
however, ineffective or else came too late to influence the conflict whilst the
atrocities were being committed. The ICTR was established several months
after the genocidal outbreak in Rwanda. The ICTY was established during the
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina but did not have the desired impact of
diminishing mass atrocities in the conflict itself. In fact, both tribunals can be
considered a substitute to a more effective involvement of the international
community, such as more stringent diplomatic pressures or military interven-
tion. The tribunals presented themselves as a financially and politically inex-
pensive way of responding to demands of the international community to act.3
1. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
2. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
3. STEVEN D. ROPER & LILtAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (2006). See also Thomas W. Smith,
Moral Hazard and Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Court and the Limits of Legalism, 39
INT'L POL. 175, 184 (2002), (discussing the preference of States for tribunals to the detriment of a
peacekeeping or military intervention because of costs).
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The tendency towards implementing international criminal justice
manifested itself in another major step in 1998 when the Rome Statute was
adopted. It established the ICC, which became functional in 2002. Recent
developments in the field of international criminal justice also include the
establishment of so-called hybrid or internationalized tribunals, which are made
up of national and international judges. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) was created in 2002' to deal with the crimes committed during the
brutal civil war; the trial of its most notorious suspect, former Liberian
president Charles Taylor, started in June 2007. In Kosovo, East Timor and
Cambodia, international judges support local courts in delivering international
criminal justice. These and other special mechanisms, such as the Iraq High
Tribunal trying Saddam Hussein and others, have been necessary due to the
facts that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed before July
1, 2002, and because several states in war zones, including Iraq, have not
ratified the Rome Statute.
B. Limited effectiveness of ad hoc tribunals
It is difficult to judge the success of the adhoc tribunals, as no generalized
standards exist to measure success or effectiveness.5 Since both the ICTY and
the ICTR were established by the Security Council using its Chapter VII
powers, however, one of the goals of the tribunals must therefore be to restore
international peace and security. The ICTY has been criticized for not fulfilling
these expectations, particularly due to its inability to arrest senior officials
while the conflict was still going on.6 Only eight arrests were made by the end
of 1996. Moreover, most of those who were indicted until 2000 were lower-
rank officials.7
More general critics of prosecutions argue that criminal trials are selective,
politicized, and prevent social and ethnic reconciliation. More specifically, the
ad hoc tribunals have been criticized for not meeting their goals:
4. On the basis of Security Council Resolution 1315, the Secretary General negotiated an
agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to establish the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
5. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 3, at 83.
6. Hideaki Shinoda, Peace-Building by the Rule of Law: An Examination of Intervention in the
Form of International Tribunals, 7:1 INT'L J. PEACE STUDIES (2002), available at
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol7_l/Shinoda.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
7. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 3, at 86.
8. Dominic McGoldrick, Legal and Political Significance of a Permanent ICC, in THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 453, 457 (Peter Rowe & Eric
Donnelly eds., 2004).
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Criminal tribunals in places such as Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia were supposed to bring justice to oppressed peoples.
Instead, they have squandered billions of dollars, failed to advance
human rights, and ignored the wishes of the victims they claim to
respect. It's time to abandon the false hope of international justice.9
The well-known "peace versus justice" debate has been a central issue for
international criminal justice and its critics since the beginning of the 1990s.
The basic argument made by advocates of international criminal justice is that
justice is a necessary element to achieve peace and that justice can only be
accomplished through trials. If domestic judicial systems are unable or unwill-
ing to indict perpetrators, the international community must react. Opponents
of prosecutions argue that indictments complicate peace negotiations and
prolong conflicts and ongoing violence, as amnesties are sometimes a necessary
prerequisite to achieve a peace deal. Moreover, traditional criminal prosecu-
tions are criticized for not acknowledging the particular realities of the different
armed conflicts and not allowing other, allegedly more effective, mechanisms
of holding individuals accountable.
The issue of reconciliation has also shaped the debate over the effective-
ness of international criminal tribunals, reconciliation of war-tom societies
being a necessary precondition for long-term peace. The need to reconcile
Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims was widely recognized when the ICTY was
established.'0 The goal of national reconciliation was even specifically
mentioned in Security Council Resolution 955 and is therefore an integral part
of the ICTRs mandate. Again, the success of the tribunals' contribution to the
reconciliation of Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda as well as the different groups in
Bosnia is difficult to evaluate. It has been argued that the ICTR has exercised
a moderating influence and that revenge killings in the region would have been
far greater without the ICTR."' Promoters of international criminal justice also
argue that trials help to bring about truth, which is necessary for reconciliation.
Others deny that the ICTR has had any significant impact on reducing the
9. Helena Cobban, Think Again: International Courts, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 22
[hereinafter Cobban, Think].
10. See Payam Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement
and Beyond, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 259, 264 (1996) [hereinafter Akhavan, Crossroads].
11. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 7,23 (2001) [hereinafter Akhavan, Impunity]. See generally MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998),
for a more in-depth analysis of trials and truth commission as well as the issues of vengeance and reparations.
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horrors12 or claim that the fragile peace in the Balkans is chiefly a product of
international troops, and not of the ICTY. 3
The effectiveness of international criminal tribunals has been compared
to other mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs),
which were installed in many countries over the last decades with varied
success. They have been combined with amnesties in different forms; blanket
amnesties have been less and less accepted by legal scholars as well as the
international community, while conditional amnesties are still tolerated to a
certain extent. While the most prominent example is South African's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, the most interesting recent one is the TRC in
Sierra Leone that was installed to complement the SCSL. Helena Cobban, a
scholar and veteranjournalist, concludes that the TRC in South Africa, granting
conditional amnesties, and the absence of any individual accountability in
Mozambique have delivered much better results than, for instance, international
prosecutions in Rwanda. 4 However, it seems difficult to establish a general
rule by linking situations that are hardly comparable. The effects of individual
accountability mechanisms cannot be the same for a post-genocidal society like
Rwanda, where the genocidal outburst lasted a few months, and in South Africa
where a decades-long policy of apartheid was followed by a negotiated regime
change. Furthermore, an isolated assessment of accountability mechanisms in
post-conflict societies can hardly be comprehensive since there are many other
factors that must be considered. In addition to the particularities of every situa-
tion of armed conflict, the broader context, such as the politics of neighboring
countries and the international community as well as the socio-economic
circumstances, must not be overlooked. In general, trials, TRCs and amnesties
are more likely to have a better outcome when supported by political reforms
and a strong institutional system. 5
Another important rationale of international criminal justice is deterrence.
In the history of states, holding criminals individually accountable has been an
efficient and valuable instrument of national jurisdictions to deter future crimes.
Ideally, the same logic would also apply to international criminal tribunals.
Since international criminal justice is in its nascent stage, its credibility is still
emerging. With the establishment of the ICTY, the Security Council wanted
12. Adam Roberts, Implementing the Laws of Wars in Late 20th-Century Conflicts: Part If, 29
SECURrrY DIALOGUE 265, 274 (1998).
13. Cobban, Think, supra note 9, at 22.
14. HELENA COBBAN, AMNESTY AFrER ATROCIY?: HEALING NATIONS AFrER GENOCIDE AND WAR
CRIMES 194 (2007).
15. The paradigm that "trials work best when they are needed least" can be extended to other
mechanisms; weak democratic structures will always lower the positive effects of trials, TRCs and amnesty
programs. See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors, Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies
of International Justice, 28 INT'L SECuRrrY 5, 20 (2004).
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to send a message to other perpetrators of international crimes that the
international community would no longer tolerate impunity. 6 However, in the
context of large-scale crimes, specific deterrence cannot easily be ascertained. 7
The Srebrenica massacre of an estimated 8,000 Bosniaks at a moment when the
ICTY was already fully operational is a gloomy illustration of the tribunal's
insignificant impact on the ongoing atrocities in Bosnia. Moreover, although
the immediate effect of international criminal justice mechanisms on human
rights violators in other countries is difficult to measure, it also seems evident
that neither the ICTY nor the ICTR have influenced the behavior of political
and military leaders in conflicts in Sierra Leone, Chechnya, East Timor or
Darfur; 8 there is scant evidence for direct deterrent effects of international
prosecutions on future criminals. However, the potential long-term influence
of international trials to discourage future offenders is substantial. John
Prendergast of the International Crisis Group, for instance, argued in the
context of a "peace versus justice" debate regarding the SCSL that "[t]he
precedent of removing an indictment against Taylor would be disastrous for
years to come in encouraging impunity and making a mockery of attempts at
establishing accountability for crimes against humanity throughout the world." 9
According to Payam Akhavan, former legal advisor to the Prosecutor of the
ICTY and ICTR:
[T]he ICTY will help internalize the expectation that individuals,
irrespective oftheir official position, may be held liable for violations
of international humanitarian law.... Over time, this will contribute
significantly to deterrence through the transformation of the political
culture of the former Yugoslavia and the international community as
a whole.2"
It has been argued that the international community should only insist on
holding individuals accountable "if the benefits of accountability over the long
16. Akhavan, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 264.
17. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTs. Q. 737, 748, 750 (1998)
[hereinafter Akhavan, Hague] (emphasizing the contribution of the ICTY to general deterrence, by
transforming the political culture of the international community, over its contribution to specific deterrence).
See also David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, andthe Limits ofInternationalJustice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 473,476,485-86 (1999) (discussing the problems of both specific and general deterrence in the context
of international criminal justice). For a very critical view that prosecutions do not deter future atrocities, see
Cobban Think, supra note 9.
18. See Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 15, at 20. See also, Akhavan, Hague, supra note 17, at
748-49 (focusing on the tribunals' effect on altering the calculations of combatants in conflicts world-wide).
19. Somini Sengupta, Besieged Liberian, N.Y. TIMES, July, 11 2003, at A7.
20. Akhavan, Hague, supra note 17, at 748.
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term are likely to outweigh the costs on the short term of prolonging an ongoing
conflict."21 This decision will, in practice, turn out to be very complicated,
since the "long-term benefits" of deterrence are very difficult to predict and will
often be too abstract for victims suffering in a conflict that could have ended
more quickly without insisting on prosecutions.
Regarding the urgent need to respond to mass atrocities in Bosnia, it must
be concluded that the ICTY was established as a rather illusionary substitute to
a military intervention since "it seemed that the tribunal was more an
instrument for appeasing a troubled conscience that yearned for absolution from
responsibility."22  Even though it furthered international criminal law
significantly by creating an important amount of case law, it had, unfortunately,
only minimal effects on the conflict itself. While its positive impact on
reconciling Balkan's war-torn societies is also controversial, the ICTY has, at
least, stigmatized several war criminals, and thus helped to remove them from
the political scene.23 As for the conflict in Rwanda, the ICTR can be considered
as another rather poor attempt of the international community to set things right
months after the genocidal outburst. One must conclude that the ICTR, due to
its institutional limits, can only provide ex post facto justice, while hoping that
it will have, somehow, a deterrent effect on future genocidaires.
The hybrid tribunals have been trying to bring international justice closer
to the people and increase its immediate effects on respective societies. Even
though these efforts have a considerable potential to positively influence legal
systems in need of international support, thus increasing both the level of
deterrence and the possibility of reconciliation, it is unrealistic to expect that
this type of criminal justice will ever have the potential to influence an ongoing
conflict itself. In addition to the fact that both purely international and hybrid
tribunals are very costly and are therefore unlikely to be installed on a regular
basis, their establishment will always remain time-consuming and dependent
on the political will of various players, including the respective governments
and members of the Security Council. Therefore, expectations that hybrid
tribunals will have an immediate impact on future ongoing conflicts do not
seem realistic.
21. NICK GRONO & CAROLINE FLINTOFT, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE TO UNDERSTAND
ACCOUNTABILITY, BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE (2001), available at http://www.peace-
justice-conference.info/download/Grono-Flintoft/20expert 0 /o20paper.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
22. Akhavan, Hague, supra note 17, at 744; see also Smith, supra note 3, at 185.
23. See Akhavan, Impunity, supra note 1I, at 9.
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C. The imminent capacity of the permanent court to influence ongoing
conflicts
The ICC is special for a number of reasons. First, it is not a tribunal
installed by a Security Council resolution but a treaty-based legal institution.
It is the outcome of an international treaty, which was negotiated and concluded
between states; therefore, its democratic legitimacy cannot seriously be
challenged.24 As a supranational authority, the ICC can also assume jurisdic-
tion over nationals of non-States Parties. 5
Second, the ICC has no proper enforcement mechanisms and must
therefore rely on the cooperation of the States Parties to the Rome Statute.
Contrary to the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC is not a UN body or sub-organ; it
only concluded a relationship agreement with the UN. As a result, its jurisdic-
tion will usually not be enforced by the Security Council. Moreover, the ICC
does not have direct jurisdiction over the international crimes committed. Since
its jurisdiction is marked by the principle of complementarity, the Court serves
as an "international jurisdictional safety net" 26 which only starts to work when
national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to deal with the crimes
committed.27 Regarding its global effectiveness, the ICC will have to undergo
a difficult test whether it can create deterrence without the direct ability of
enforcement, as "deterrence depends on the predictable ability to enforce the
law coercively, which often falls short in countries where abuses take place. 28
However, if the ICC activity is triggered through a Security Council referral,
which also obliges the respective state to cooperate with the ICC, the Court
might resume a similar function as the ICTY and the ICTR as a Chapter VII
enforcement organ.
Third, the ICC is also special for its permanent character. Security
Council resolutions or agreements with the governments involved, as it was the
case for the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, are not necessary to trigger ICC
jurisdiction. Specific situations will not have to be dealt with by the establish-
ment of ad hoc tribunals, which have shown to have many political and legal
difficulties,29 are very costly, and, most importantly, in order to have a realistic
impact on an ongoing conflict, take important time to become functional. The
24. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 135
(2006) (arguing that unanimity has never been the basis for democratic legitimacy).
25. Madeline H. Morris, The Politics of War Crimes Trials, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY To
INTERNATIONALACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FORJUSTICE INA WORLD OF STATES 187,189-90 (Ramesh
Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004).
26. M. CherifBassiouni, The 1CC-Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 421,422 (2006).
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
28. Snyder&Vinjamuri, supra note 15, at 11-12.
29. See McGoldrick, supra note 8, at 454.
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ICC has, therefore, the potential to shift the delivery of post-conflict justice
towards in-conflict justice. It has a novel capacity to react immediately3" and
influence armed conflicts by stigmatizing those who are most responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, while the conflict is still
going on. This approach will mostly target political and military leaders, which
is likely to produce considerable effects on the character of the respective
conflict.
The ICC also adds to the capacity of deterrence of international criminal
justice. The ICC will be far more effective, in a global sense, than ad hoc
tribunals can be in providing a deterrent effect. The ICTY and the ICTR have
shown that the international community cares about international crimes and
wants to end impunity. However, it is unlikely that costly ad hoc tribunals
would be established through Security Council resolutions for every situation
where mass atrocities are being committed. Now, thanks to its permanent
character, an international criminal court exercises a permanent threat for
perpetrators. Because the ICC functions as a court of last resort and exercises
a direct influence on national systems to act, it is realistic to believe that its
mere presence will augment the number of national prosecutions in the future,3'
and thus increase the long-term potential for global deterrence.
Moreover, specific deterrence will probably be at least as important as
deterring perpetrators of future armed conflicts, which has been an important
goal of international criminal justice so far. Now, international criminal justice,
thanks to the Court's permanent character and its capacity to react faster, can
have a deterrent effect on those fighting in the middle of a conflict situation
over which the ICC has assumed jurisdiction. Political and military leaders will
be more careful in their decisions once the Prosecutor's role has switched from
a theoretical threat to a concrete prosecutorial organ.
Besides these unique aspects, the Court already faces similar criticism as
the ad hoc tribunals and finds itself in the middle of a discussion over justice
versus peace, individual accountability mechanisms versus amnesties or
pardons, trials versus TRCs. Targeting political and military leaders of warring
parties unavoidably influences peace negotiations; situations might be
30. See Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 423 (discussing the difficulties for the International Criminal
Court to conduct investigations and prosecutions without delay, on the possibility for the Office of the
Prosecutor to start investigations on its own initiative, pursuant to the Rome Statute, supra, note 27, art.
15(1), is an important asset for the International Criminal Court in order to act politically independent from
the Security Council and states' parties).
31. Peter Barcroft & David Donat Cattin, Parliamentarians for Global Action, A Deterrent
International Criminal Court-The Ultimate Objective (Dec. 6, 2004) (Parliament ofNew Zealand), available
at http://www.pgaction.org/uploadedfiles/deterrent%20paper%/h2Ofor /2ONZpane %20l.pdf(last visited
Jan. 4, 2008). However, the International Criminal Court will have difficulty in building a true threat for
perpetrators worldwide due to its lack of coercive enforcement mechanisms.
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destabilized because of international indictments; these are issues the ICC is
even more susceptible to due to its potential ability to interfere in any ongoing
conflict. A controversial case is northern Uganda, the first situation that was
referred to the ICC. The government of Uganda activated the ICC through an
article 14 referral in December 2003, thus trying to raise awareness on the
international scene about the long-lasting armed conflict between the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) 2 and government troops, a conflict which has caused
the death of about 100,000 people in the region and the displacement of up to
two million.33 At the beginning, northern Uganda seemed to be an easy first
case for the ICC; there was no doubt about the LRA leaders' responsibility for
the mass atrocities committed among the civilian population of northern
Uganda. However, the ICC has been criticized since its activation for being the
main obstacle to the peace process. We will see later that, although the nature
of the conflict in northern Uganda and the way of activating the ICC are
radically different from Darfur, many issues regarding the ICC involvement are
comparable in the two situations.
IlI. THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR
A. Origins of the conflict
When it comes to identifying those individuals who are most responsible
for mass crimes committed in Darfur and evaluating the potential impact of the
ICC on them, it is necessary to understand the complexity of the war and the
different warring parties, as well as the origins of the conflict.
The current armed conflict between the government of Sudan (GoS) and
rebel groups in Darfur started in 2003. The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
(SLA/M) 34 and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) turned against the
GoS, which had continued the British colonial administration's policy of
neglecting the region.35 This deliberate underdevelopment of Darfur had
32. See TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD'S
RESISTANCE ARMY 25 (2006) (for the history of the LRA).
33. Press Release, U.N. SCOR, Security Council Presidential Statement Demands Release of
Women, Children by Lord's Resistance Army, Expeditious Conclusion of Peace Process, 5566th mtg., U.N.
Doc SC/8869 (Nov. 16,2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8869.doc.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007). Moreover, tens of thousands of children, representing up to eighty-five percent of the
armed forces of the LRA, were abducted and forced to fight for the LRA. See Press Release, International
Criminal Court, Background Information on the Situation in Uganda (Jan. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/press/pressreleasesUganda_200401_EN.doc (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
34. The SLA is the military arm of the political faction SLM. Res Publica, The Darfur Resistance:
Who They Are, What They Want, and What They Need to Create a New Sudan 14 (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.darfurgenocide.org/ResPublicaDarfurTripReport.pdf (last visited January 5, 2008) (discussing
the relationship between the SLA/M and the JEM).
35. Darfur had been an independent sultanate for centuries, before it was annexed to the Anglo-
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already led to tensions before and was particularly criticized during the
devastating, but foreseeable famine of 1984, which cost the life of around
100,000 people.36 Darfur of the late 1990s has been described as an
"increasingly marginalized, violent and frustrated place".
37
In addition to this policy of marginalization, the ever-present cleavage
between farmers and herdsmen, which had largely become equivalent to a
distinction of Africans versus Arabs in the mid-twentieth century, was
increasingly exploited.38 The draughts of the 1970s and 1980s multiplied the
incidents between sedentary agriculturalists and cattle-raising nomads, which
did not, however, necessarily correspond to the Arab-African dichotomy. 39 The
Arab-Islamist GoS added a new dimension to the difference between nomadic
and sedentary lifestyles in Darfur by emphasizing the ideological and racist
definition of "Arab" and zuruq (black) more and more.40 In the late 1980s,
nearly all Arab groups, influenced by this new pro-Arab ideology propagated
by Libya and Khartoum, united themselves to fight the Fur.4' In this time, the
term Janjaweed also came up for the first time, referring to Arab militiamen on
horseback. They are not a popular representation of the Arab tribes in Darfur,42
but can be considered as armed bandits that were tolerated to some extent by
the government because of their Arabic correlation.43
Another aggravating factor was the introduction of automatic weapons in
the 1980s, which gradually buried traditional forms of dispute settlement over
land ownership and access to water wells." The fact that these disputes are
Egyptian Condominium in 1916. See JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
LONG WAR 12 (2005).
36. GtRARD PRUNIER, DARFUR: THE AMBIGUOUS GENOCIDE 56 (2005) [hereinafter PRUNIER,
AMBIGUOUS].
37. Id. at 81.
38. See Robert 0. Collins, Disaster in Darfur: Historical Overview, in GENOCIDE IN DARFUR:
INVESTIGATING THE ATROcTES IN THE SUDAN 3 (2006) (explaining that these cattle and camel nomads claim
Arab origins and speak Arab, but are ethnically the result ofintertribal marriage with their African neighbors
since their arrival in the 16th and 17th century); see also PRtNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 5
(emphasizing that the ambivalence is not grounded on biological or cultural reasons, but largely on a different
way of life).
39. JMr6me Tubiana, Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? 101 POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 11, 113
(2006).
40. Collins, supra note 38, at 9 (discussing the genealogical constructs of Sudanese "Arabs" and
the "African" identity, the latter being adopted by the SLM/A similar to that of the SPLA, thus reproducing
a polarized discourse); see also RUTH IYOB & GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA, SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
PEACE 31 (2006).
41. Tubiana, supra note 39, at 113. Darfur literally means "land of the Fur."
42. See PRUNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 97 (comparing the Janjaweed to the Rwandan
Interahamwe, who were not a natural expression of the Hutu in Rwanda either).
43. Id.
44. Collins, supra note 38, at 6. The easy availability of weapons was largely due to the war in
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another major source of the conflict has been viciously exploited by the
government who has been presenting the whole conflict as a low-level inter-
ethnic dispute over land. According to Alex de Waal, a social anthropologist
and one of the most renowned experts of Darfur, the dichotomy between
Africans and Arabs is "historically bogus, but disturbingly powerful".45 In sum,
the facts that members of the two groups have intermarried in the past and that
they are all Muslim and mostly speak Arabic" are strong indicators for a largely
political construction of the Arab-African distinction.
B. Escalation in 2003
In February 2003, the constant, low-level violence suddenly erupted. 7
About three hundred members of the SLA seized the town of Golu, killed two
hundred government soldiers and proclaimed their political demands, the most
important of which were that Khartoum address the uneven development and
socio-economic marginalization of Darfur as well as the separation of religion
and politics.4" The GoS decided to fight the insurrection, hoping that it would
be able to solve the conflict before it could affect the fragile peace process with
the South.49 However, the victories of the SLA in Western Darfur rapidly
showed that the Sudanese army was incompetent and insufficiently prepared.
Moreover, the GoS could not fully rely on its army, largely made up of
Darfurians, to fight its "own" people.
Khartoum responded by rearming the already existing Janjaweedmilitias°
and by recruiting mercenaries from Libya, Chad, and other countries.5'
Although not a new practice, since the GoS increasingly armed Arab tribes and
their militias and disarmed non-Arab tribes with the purpose of intensifying the
southern Sudan and the use of Darfur as a basis for Chadian rebels who, supported by Libya, launched their
attacks from Darfur. See U.N. SCOR, Report of the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur to the
Secretary-General, delivered to the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 at 24,
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Sept. 18, 2004), [hereinafter UNCOI].
45. Alex de Waal, Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External
Engagement, in THE HORN OF AFRICA (Social Science Research Council, 2004), available at
http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/homofafrica/dewaal/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
46. Ren6 Lemarchand, Unsimplifying Dafur, 1 GENOCIDE STUDIES & PREVENTION 1, 5 (2006).
47. See Gerard Prunier, Darfur's Sudan Problem, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Sept. 15, 2006,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-africa-democracy/darfur-conflict_3909.jsp (last visitied January
5, 2008) (speaking about "undeclared sporadic war").
48. Collins, supra note 38, at 9 (the SLA's manifesto largely resembles the SPLA's vision of a
united, but decentralized Sudan); see also FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 82 (claiming that senior SPLA
members coauthored the political declaration of the SLA).
49. PRUNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 97.
50. See id. (discussing an overview of the origins of the Janjaweed).
51. UNCOI, supra note 44, at 26.
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ethnic divide throughout the 1990s,52 this major sponsorship was decisive in
setting off wide-spread atrocities in Darfur. Janjaweed fighters were partly
incorporated into the Sudanese army through an associated group called the
Popular Defense Force (PDF) 3 They received weapons, official army
uniforms, and were paid and trained by the central government. They have
been described as an "ad hoc unit of Sudan's army."54 Usman Tar, an expert
on African peace studies, explains why the Janjaweed were ready to take up
arms against the insurgents and the civilians in Darfur:
Janjaweed militias have seemingly cashed in on their strategic
positions as agents ofthe Sudanese government, perhaps with the tacit
approval of the latter, to vent their racial/ethnic anger and hatred on
rival African communities with whom they have clashed for decades
over economic resources and ethnic/racial differences.5
It is interesting to note that Khartoum's decision to recruit Arab militias
was not a novelty in its fight in peripheral regions in Sudan. As early as in
1985, Baggara militias, known as Murahaliin, were recruited to fight against
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and to terrorize civilians
suspected of supporting the SPLA;56 in the 1990s, the GoS armed Arab tribes
to sponsor a brutal ethnic-cleansing campaign in the Nuba Mountains.57
Since the increased level of violence in Darfur, government troops and
Janjaweedmilitias have been fighting the local insurgencies, above all the SLA,
which had grown to a force of approximately 11,000 men in 2005 compared to
a few hundred in 2001.58 The JEM, albeit much smaller, could rely on the
military and political experience of its leaders, some of them having been part
of the central government. 9 Although several ceasefire agreements were
52. ARMIN MEKKI MEDANI, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SUDAN
1989-2000204(2001). For more details on the attacks of Arab militias on hundreds of Masalit villages in
1997 and 1998, see also id at 206.
53. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 102 (the PDF emerged in the 1980s, its members being
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood); see also Pablo Castillo, Rethinking Deterrence: The International
Criminal Court in Sudan, 13 UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS 167, 172 (2007).
54. Usman Tar, Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards? Civil Militia andState Violence in the
Darfur Region, Western Sudan, in CIVIL MILITIA, AFRICA'S INTRACTABLE SECURITY MENACE? 145 (David
J. Francis ed., 2005).
55. Id.
56. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 24; see also Belachew Gebrewold, Civil Militia and
Militarisation of Society in the Horn of Africa, in CIVIL MILITIA, AFRICA'S INTRACTABLE SECURITY
MENACE? 201 (David J. Francis ed., 2005).
57. LUCIAN NIEMEYER, AFRICA: THE HOLOCAUSTS OF RWANDA AND SUDAN 435 (2006).
58. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 85.
59. See id. at 89, for more information on the two main pillars of the JEM; one being its link to the
Islamist movement, the other its tribal component due to its close relation to the Kobe branch of the Zaghawa.
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negotiated and concluded, the fighting has never stopped. The main issue of the
conflict became the targeting of the civilian population of Darfur by the
Sudanese army and the Janjaweed. The presence of rebels in Darfurian villages
has been irrelevant for the attackers; a general fear that civilians from the Fur,
Zaghawa and Masalit tribes might join the rebels or give them foodstuff and
shelter has resulted in the destruction of hundreds of villages. Numerous
atrocities, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, have been
reported: persecution, murder, rape, intentional attacks on civilians and civilian
property, pillaging, and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC6 ° have
led to at least 200,000 deaths and two million displaced persons.6 Because of
these brutal attacks on civilians, the rebels have enjoyed growing support
among the population and had no difficulty in finding new recruits who want
to resist Khartoum.62
60. See generally International Criminal Court, Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the UN. Security Council Pursuant to UN. SCR
1593 (2005), delivered to the UN. Security Council, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPReportUNSC4-DarfurEnglish.pdf(last visitied January 16, 2008); see also
Martin Mennecke, What's in a Name? Reflections on Using, Not Using, and Overusing the "G-Word, " 2
GENOCIDE STUDIES & PREVENTION 57, 60 (2007). The debate whether genocide is being committed has
become a key question for Western governments and in the Western media to measure the degree of violence
and possibly justify a humanitarian intervention. This debate, however, does not serve the interests of the
hundreds of thousands of victims for whom it makes little difference whether they are being targeting with
genocidal intent or "only" persecuted; it is worth noting that the outcome of crimes against humanity can be
worse than genocide. The rather specific question of the offenders' intent should be solved by a judicial
institution. It has been argued that the "use of the 'G-word' in the Darfur crisis has neither helped galvanize
broad international support for action to stop the killings nor forced the Sudanese government to halt its
campaign of ethnic cleansing." Gareth Evans, the President ofthe International Crisis Group, has argued that
using the term genocide in the Darfur case can be "unproductive, non-productive, and even
counterproductive." DON CHEADLE & JOHN PRENDERGAST, NOT ON OUR WATCH, THE MISSION TO END
GENOCIDE IN DARFUR AND BEYOND 2 (2007). On the genocide debate, see generally William A. Schabas,
Darfur and the 'Odious Scourge': The Commission of Inquiry's Findings on Genocide, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 871 (2005); Scott Strauss, Darfur and the Genocide Debate 84 FOREIGN AFF. 123 (2005); Jerry Fowler,
A New Chapter oflrony: The Legal Definition of Genocide and the Implications ofPowell's Determination,
in GENOCIDE IN DARFUR, INVESTIGATING THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN 127 (2006). See William F.S. Miles,
Labeling "Genocide" in Sudan: A Constructionist Analysis of Darfur I GENOCIDE STUDIES & PREVENTION
251 (2006), for social impact of applying the term genocide.
61. Q&A: Sudan's Darfur Conflict, BBC NEWS, Oct. 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
3496731 .stm (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); Q & A: Crisis in Darfur, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 4, 2004,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05/darfur8536.htm (last visited Sept. 18,2007); EntrenchingImpunity,
Government Responsibilityfor International Crimes in Darfur, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2005), available
at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/darfurl 205webwcover.pdf(last visited Sept. 18,2007) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Impunity]. The estimated numbers vary a lot. Other sources estimate that up to
400,000 have died. See, e.g., SAVE DARFUR, THE GENOCIDE IN DARFUR-BREFNG PAPER (2007), available
at http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/background (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
62. Res Publica, supra note 34, at 12.
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Although the GoS hesitates to admit any link with the Janjaweed and
usually labels them "armed bandits,"63 many sources show that the GoS has
been arming, training and funding the militias, as well as coordinating the
attacks on civilians.' Victims describe a typical pattern in which most of the
attacks on their villages have been carried out by the Sudanese army, which
first launches aerial attacks, followed by the militias, who attack the villages on
horseback and camels.65 Recent documents show that the violence, including
indiscriminate and disproportionate air strikes by the GoS, continues without
interruption.66
Because, unfortunately, Arab tribes are often blamed as a whole for the
atrocities committed among Africans, it is important to note that the largest and
most influential Arab tribes in the region, including the Baggara, the Rizeigat, and
the Habbanyia, are not involved in the conflict; they seem to emphasize good
neighborly relations over racial divides, which are, moreover, seldom absolute.67
In addition, it seems that members of the SLA/M do not consider the Arab tribes
as their enemies. 6 Experts have even argued that, "[f]or the people involved, this
is a political, not an ethnic or racial conflict." 9 It must be noted that, while most
Arab tribes have remained neutral, a few originally non-Arab, but arabized groups
joined the side of the government and the Janjaweed, largely because of strategic
reasons.7" Clashes over land between different Arab tribes, in particular in South
Darfur since late 2006, underline the limits of a model of an African/Arab
dichotomy as sole explanation for conflicts in Darfur.7
63. UNCOI, supra note 44, at 37.
64. Id. at 34; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Impunity, supra note 61.
65. See International Criminal Court, Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, Prosecutor's Application
under Article 58(7) 48-49, Feb. 27, 2007, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-
56_English.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
66. See International Criminal Court, Fifth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), delivered to the UN. Security Council,
June 7,2007, available at http'//www.icc-cpi.int/library/organslotp/OTPReportIUNSC5-Darfur-English.pdf
(last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
67. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 124.
68. Res Publica, supra note 34, at 17.
69. Khalid Medani, The Darfur Crisis andthe Challenge ofDemocracy in Sudan, reprinted in THE
CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION, PAPERS PRESENTED TO McGILL UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR DEVELOPING-
AREA STUDIES 19 (Monica Trevifto Gonzalez, 2007).
70. Tubiana, supra note 39, at 112.
71. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 125, DARFUR: REVITALISING THE PEACE
PROCESS 13 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfin?id-4769 (last visited
Dec. 28, 2007) [hereinafter ICG, PEACE PROCESS].
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C. The response of the international community72
The initial reaction of the international community to the rising conflict in
Darfur was very slow. The situation in Darfur deteriorated at the same time as
the negotiations between the North and the South came to an important point,
with all eyes of the international community fixed on the peace talks in
Naivasha, Kenya. International negotiators were willing to leave the nascent
crisis in Darfur aside or, at least, to postpone open criticism and more active
involvement, in order to avoid endangering the promising peace process for the
South: "Khartoum effectively held the carrot of peace in front of the noses of
the international community while it wielded the stick in Darfur."73 Gdrard
Prunier, a historian and eminent Darfur specialist, argues that the whole year
of 2003 and the first half of 2004 were lost time for Darfur, because the GoS
knew that "as long as it showed 'good faith' in Naivasha it could do what it
wanted in Darfur.' 74 Western governments and leaders-in particular President
Bush who tried to boost his election campaign by showing his own Christian
electorate that he was acting in behalf of the persecuted Christians in southern
Sudan-were praising themselves for solving the civil war, while Darfur had
to wait for attention. In fact, both the North-South conflict and the Darfur
conflict must be considered in the broader context of a center-periphery
dichotomy in Sudan, with important inequalities between Khartoum and the rest
of the country.7
The situation had already horribly deteriorated in Darfur, when Western
politicians finally started to openly condemn the GoS and its Darfur policy.
Particularly the United States intensified its discourse: the Congress declared
in July 2004 that the first genocide of the 21st century was happening in
Darfur.76 However, the Bush administration, the U.N., and the European Union
72. The Security Council resolutions concerning the ICC will be discussed in more detail below.
73. John Prendergast, Resolving the Three Headed War From Hell in Southern Sudan, Northern
Uganda, andDarfur, 3 WOODROW WILSON INT'L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS AFR. PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER
SERIES 1 (2005).
74. PRUNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 122; see also FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 128.
75. See Gerard Prunier, Nord/Sud La Paix Reste Incertaine, 14 ENJEUX INTERNATIONAUX 28, 29
(2006). Others emphasize the relationship between the elites and their population over a struggle of the
periphery against the center. See Roland Marchal, Le Conflit de Toutes les Ambivalences, 14 ENJEUX
INTERNATIONAUX 34, 37 (2006).
76. President Bush waited three more months before declaring that genocide was happening in
Darfur. See Press Release, The White House, President's Statement on Violence in Darfur, Sudan (Sept. 9,
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040909-1 0.html (last visited Dec.
28, 2007). The United States has, however, played a very ambiguous role. Although Khartoum's policy in
Darfur has been heavily criticized, the United States has benefited from increasing Sudanese support to fight
international terrorism. This has been suggested as the main reason why the new anti-Al Qaeda ally has not
been seriously challenged. See Res Publica, supra note 34, at 28; Greg Miller & Josh Meyer, US. Relies on
Sudan Despite Condemning It, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 11, 2007, at 1 (discussing the intelligence
collaboration of the CIA with Sudanese authorities to spy on the Iraqi insurgency and al Qaeda).
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showed themselves more reserved; Jan Egeland, the personal representative of
the U.N. Secretary General, for instance, denounced the atrocities as "ethnic
cleansing." Overall, the international community could not exercise any
coherent pressure on the GoS due to the lack of a unified position. Proposals
for economic sanctions through a Security Council resolution were unrealistic
from the beginning; China would veto any measures that might endanger its
heavy investments in the Sudanese oil industry. Furthermore, both Russia and
China concluded lucrative contracts to sell military equipment to the GoS, thus
representing the most important supplier countries for Sudan.7"
The first measure deserving mention was the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004, stipulating an arms embargo for the warring
parties in Darfur. The embargo excluded, however, the Sudanese army. The
resolution decided that
All states shall take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or
supply, to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including
the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur
and West Darfur, by their nationals or from their territories or using
their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types
79
This embargo was a first step of the international community to face the
conflict in Darfur, but it overlooked the fact that many Janjaweed fighters were
incorporated in the army or in quasi-military forces, such as the PDF. In
addition to this deficit, a first assessment of the effects of Resolution 1556
shows that the arms embargo has been constantly violated.8"
On March 29, 2005, Security Council Resolution 1591 condemned the
continued violations of the 8 April 2004 N'djamena Ceasefire
Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Protocols, including air
strikes by the Government of Sudan in December 2004 and January
2005 and rebel attacks on Darfur villages in January 2005, and the
77. Sudan: Envoy Warns ofEthnic Cleansing as Security Council Calls for Ceasefire, U.N. NEWS
CENTRE, Apr. 2,2004, http://www.un.orglapps/news/story.asp?NewslD= 10307&Cr=sudan&Crl= (last visited
Jan. 4, 2008).
78. According to Amnesty International, these weapons, including helicopters and airplanes, were
used to attack civilians in Darfur. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SUDAN: ARMS CONTINUING TO FUEL
SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN DARFUR 8, 12-14 (May 8, 2007), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR540192007ENGLISH/$File/AFR5401907.pdf (last visited Jan. 4,
2008).
79. S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. SCOR, 5015th mtg. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 556 (Jul. 30,2004) (emphasis
added).
80. The Chairman of the Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts concerning the Sudan
prepared in accordance with S.C. Res. 1665, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1665 (Mar. 29, 2006).
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failure of the Government of Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militiamen
and apprehend and bring to justice Janajaweed leaders and their
associates who have carried out human rights and international
humanitarian law violations and other atrocities .... "
Contrary to the United Nations and Western governments, the African
Union (AU) has been directly involved in the conflict since an early stage. This
involvement is praiseworthy, but unfortunately has not proved very effective.
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the 7,000 strong personnel
mission in Sudan deployed in Darfur since 2004, was only able to provide very
limited protection to civilians and did not have significant effects on the
conflict itself.
In sum, although the GoS would have the primary responsibility to protect
its citizens against atrocities, the international community has failed to react
and take measures to take the place of the GoS, which is, in fact, the driving
force behind the ethnic cleansing. "The sad reality is that Darfur simply does
not matter enough, and Sudan matters too much, for the international com-
munity to do more to stop the atrocities."82
D. Recent developments
Since the large-scale massacres orchestrated in 2003 and 2004, the nature
of the conflict seems to have shifted towards a chaotic situation, with numerous
rebel groups split up into small fractions83 which are fighting without common
goals due to different political, tribal and individual interests.8 4 The Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA), concluded in Abuja in May 2006, could not end the
conflict. Weak on the subject of power sharing, 5 the DPA was only signed by
a faction of the SLA led by Minni Minawi; the SLA branch led by Abdel Wahid
Mohamed Nur as well as the JEM refused. These two groups subsequently
formed the National Redemption Front (NRF). To add to the confusion and the
level of violence, the different rebel groups have also been fighting each other;
81. S.C. Res. 1591, U.N. SCOR, 5153rd mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005).
82. Nick Grono, Briefing-Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect 105 AFR.
AFF. 621, 628 (2006).
83. For more information on the splintered groups, see Cdrard Prunier, Darfour, la Chronique d'un
Genocide Ambigu, LE MONDE DIPLOMAT1QUE, Mar. 2007, at 16.
84. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, DARFUR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO A TRAGEDY'S FORGOTTEN
ACTORS 6, (April 2007), available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/RSFSudanENG.pdf(last visited Jan. 4,
2008).
85. Since the DPA was not supposed to affect the 2005 power sharing agreement between the North
and the South, the DPA gave the Darfurian insurgents only twelve of 450 seats in the national assembly. See
ICG, PEACE PROCESS, supra note 71, at 26-7.
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as early as in October 2005, for instance, several members of the JEM were
killed in an attack of a dissident JEM faction.86
On the one hand, since the Abuj a Peace Agreement, Minni Minawi and its
"SLA-MM" have been fighting against the NRF on the side of the GoS, whose
tactic of dividing the rebel groups seems to be successful.87 Civilians who are
suspected of cooperation with the NRF are now not only suffering under
Janjaweed and army attacks, which are still ongoing in Darfur and which
recently started in Eastern Chad,88 but also under attacks by the SLA-MM.
Rebel groups have added to the crisis by diverting international aid for their
own purposes.89 On the other hand, some Janjaweed fighters appear to have
changed sides and now fight the regular army together with rebel groups,
probably fearing that Khartoum will scapegoat them for the atrocities
committed among civilians and send them to The Hague.9"
IV. THE ROLE OF THE ICC IN THE CONFLICT
A. Expectations after the Security Council referral to the ICC
With Resolution 1564, the Security Council established a Commission of
Inquiry in September 2004 to examine the violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur.9 The commission delivered
a report to the Secretary-General in January 2005, recommending a Security
Council referral to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Surprisingly, because
of the generally negative attitude of the United States and China towards the
ICC,92 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
followed this recommendation on March 31, 2005. Resolution 1593 triggered
ICC jurisdiction for crimes committed in Darfur since July 1, 2002, states that
"the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the
Prosecutor . .. [and] urges all States and concerned regional and other
86. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 84, at 6 n. 1.
87. Suliman Baldo, La Paix, Arme de Guerre, 14 ENJEUX INTERNATIONAUX 21, 22 (2006).
88. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 78, at 2.
89. Andrew S. Natsios, Moving Beyond the Sense of Alarm, in GENOCIDE IN DARFUR,
INVESTIGATING THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN 25, 31 (Samuel Totten & Eric Markusen eds., 2006).
90. Alex Perry, Defections in Darfur?, TIME ONLINE, Mar. 21, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1601495,00.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
91. S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. SCOR, 5040th mtg. 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004).
92. See Zachary D. Kaufman, Justice in Jeopardy: Accountability for the Darfur Atrocities, 16
CRIM. L.F. 343, 345 (2006); see generally Matthew Happold, Darfur, The Security Council, and the
International Criminal Court 55 I.C.L.Q. 226 (2006) (for more information on the political discussion
concerning the Security Council referral, in particular in the United States).
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international organizations to cooperate fully."93 In other words, the Security
Council explicitly obliged the GoS to cooperate with the ICC, but failed to
establish such an obligation for those states which are not parties to the Rome
Statute.
The activation of the ICC through the Security Council can be regarded as
the first and, besides the more recent efforts to deploy a joint U.N.-AU
peacekeeping mission, only major reaction of the international community to
the Darfur crisis. The activity of the ICC has been given much weight in the
case of Darfur, in particular due to the lack of any other concerted measures of
the international community, the dimensions of the conflict and its increasing
mediatization. However, the expectations following the Security Council
referral were mixed; the referral has been criticized for focusing too much on
the future punishment of perpetrators rather than the immediate prevention of
mass atrocities. The possibility of deterring violence in Darfur thanks to the
ICC has been dismissed as a "specious hope."94 A more optimistic view of the
referral to the OTP suggests that the ICC represents a significant threat for key
players of the conflict, being able to pressure the GoS to cut support for the
Janjaweed. Members of the SLA expressed their hope that the ICC would
quickly indict those who they consider responsible for the atrocities committed
in Darfur, in other words senior figures of the Khartoum regime, including
President Omar el-Bashir and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha. It has been
argued that making public the names of the fifty-one individuals, which are on
the list of the Commission of Inquiry, would already stigmatize and de-
legitimize the GoS.95
B. Admissibility under Article 17 of the Rome Statute
As a result of the Security Council referral, the ICC has jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Darfur, although Sudan has not ratified the Rome Statute.
However, specific cases must also be admissible according to the principle of
complementarity, which means that Sudan must either be unable or unwilling
to carry out the investigation and/or prosecution.96 The Sudanese judicial
system can be considered functional from a general point of view. Even though
crimes have been committed on a large scale, it should, nonetheless, not be
93. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 5158th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
94. Eric Reeves, Darfur: Genocide Before Our Eyes, in DARFUR: GENOCIDE BEFORE OUR EYES
26,30 (Joyce Apsel ed., 2005).
95. See Res Publica, supra note 34, at 30.
96. Rome Statute, supra note27, art. 17. The principle of complementarity also applies in the case
of a Security Council referral; see Giuliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1137, 1142 (Antonio Cassese, Paola
Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
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unable to carry out investigations and prosecutions in the sense of the Rome
Statute. However, the numerous crimes committed in Darfur have been dealt
with by the national court system very insufficiently. The little efforts of the
GoS to tackle the crimes in Darfur, such as through its National Commission
of Inquiry, established in May 2004, and the Special Court for Darfur,
established in June 2005, have had very limited effects. Until recently, only a
few low-level officers had been indicted, and only for crimes less grave than
those that have been committed on a large scale.97 Human rights organizations,
such as Amnesty International, have dismissed the establishment of the Special
Court as a tactic by the GoS to avoid ICC prosecutions.98 The timing of the
establishment of the Special Court, shortly after the OTP announced the
opening of investigations into the situation in Darfur, certainly gives rise to
allegations that it was only set up to try to thwart ICC jurisdiction. However,
since the end of 2006, the Sudanese Ministry of Justice has been committed to
showing more concrete actions; it arrested, for instance, Ali Kushayb, an
important militia leader who is also denounced by the OTP as one of the
persons who is most responsible for the crimes that have been committed.99
However, it is obvious that the judicial system has been unwilling to truly
investigate most of the militia leaders and those members of the GoS who bear
individual responsibility for the atrocities committed in Darfur. Even if
investigations are carried out, it is, furthermore, unlikely that they will fulfill
the requirements of article 17(2)(c) of the Rome Statute that such investigations
be conducted independently and impartially, as well as with the "intent to bring
the person concerned to justice."'00 Generally speaking, it should not be
difficult for the OTP to prove the admissibility of cases concerning the situation
in Darfur; in this case, an activity of the ICC perfectly corresponds to the
purpose of the Rome Statute due to the direct involvement of the GoS and its
97. For instance, for stealing property, see Report of the High-Level Mission on the Situation of
Human Rights in Darfur Pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision S-4/101, Human Rights Council, 4th
Sess., Agenda Item 2, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80 (Mar. 9, 2007).
98. Sudan: Judiciary Challenges ICC over Darfur Cases, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, June 24,2005,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2005/0624collaborate.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); see also
Dawn Yamane Hewett, Sudan's Courts and Complementarity in the Face of Darfur, 31 YALE J. INT'L L.
276, 279 (2006).
99. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, PROSECUTOR'S APPLICATION, supra note 65, at 89.
Regarding the admissibility of the case against Ali Kushayb, the OTP affirmed that its own investigations
and those made by the Sudanese did not relate to the same conduct; see International Criminal Court, Fifth
Report of the Prosecutor, supra note 66, at 8. However, Ali Kushayb was released for lack of evidence in
September 2007. See International Criminal Court, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), delivered to the U.N. Security
Council, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otpOTP-RP-20071205-UNSC-
ENG.pdf (last visited Jan 5, 2008).
100. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(2)(c).
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influence on the judicial system. In its application to the Pre-Trial Chamber to
issue summonses to appear against Ahmad Harun, a government official, and
Ali Kushayb, a militia leader, the OTP concluded that the case was admissible,
since the "Sudanese authorities have not investigated or prosecuted the case
which is the subject of the Application."''
C. Effects of the ICC activity on the Darfur conflict
A prelude to future trials before the ICC occurred in April 2006. Security
Council Resolution 1672 named four individuals allegedly responsible for
crimes committed in Darfur and imposed on them travel sanctions, as stipulated
in Security Council Resolution 1591.102 The four individuals were Major
General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, a commander of the Sudanese army, the
well-known leader of the Jalul Tribe Musa Hilal, the SLA-commander Adam
Yacub Shant, and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri, a commander of the National
Movement for Reform and Development. Choosing individuals from the
different warring parties, the Security Council wanted to appear as impartial as
possible, which was a noteworthy step. However, the Security Council did not
target one of the roots of the problems by stigmatizing political leaders, in
particular members of the GoS. Although some feared that the sanctions would
have negative effects on the peace talks, others, such as the United States,
which supported this measure, even argued that it would strengthen the political
and diplomatic process.1"3 In any case, since the adoption of Resolution 1672,
Khartoum's attitude towards Darfur has not changed significantly. Now, the
ICC has the potential to target the key players. The following chapter will
analyze the possible effects of the ICC activity on those players who shape the
ongoing conflict in Darfur.
1. Weaken the government of Sudan
The GoS seems to be a perfect target for the ICC. Since the political
leaders exercise effective control over the army, the violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law committed by the regular Sudanese
army are directly attributable to government officials. " As individual criminal
101. Fact Sheet, International Criminal Court, The Situation in Darfur, the Sudan (Feb. 27,2007),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Iibrary/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-Fact-Sheet-Darfur-20070227-en.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4,2008). The warrants of arrest were issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber two months later, on April
27, 2007.
102. S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. SCOR, 5423rd mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006).
103. MOGHALU, supra note 24, at 154.
104. This assumption can, however, not be made without the remark that it is one thing to know
pretty well what has been going on, but another one to establish responsibility of superiors and prove beyond
reasonable doubt effective control of superiors over their subordinates.
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responsibility according to article 25 of the Rome Statute is difficult to establish
for senior government officials," 5 the focus will here be on the responsibility
of superiors according to article 28. The President of Sudan, for instance,
exercises de jure authority over the army; according to the 1998 Sudanese
constitution, which was in force until July 2005, the President is "responsible
for the command of the armed forces and other organized forces."' 6 He
remains Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces according to the 2005
Interim National Constitution. '07 Due to the extremely hierarchical political and
military organization in Sudan, defacto control of senior government officials
over the army can also be assumed. '08 Regarding the mental element, according
to article 28(b)(i) of the Rome Statute, a non-military superior is criminally
responsible for crimes committed by subordinates if he "either knew, or
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes." Although the
threshold is higher than for military commanders, it would be enough to prove
that members of the GoS knew about or were willfully blind regarding the
atrocities committed by the Sudanese troops in Darfur. °9
Members of the GoS can also be considered responsible for crimes
committed by the Janjaweed, which is consistent with the concept of control
established by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic: "[i]n order to attribute the
acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that the
State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing
the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its
military activity."" 0 When attacks are carried outjointly by the Sudanese army
and the militia, the latter are even under the effective control of the GoS, thus
acting as defacto agents of the GoS."'
105. However, contribution to the commission of crimes according to article 25(3)(d) might be
conceivable.
106. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN (1998) art. 42 (Sudan).
107. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN (Draft 2005) pt. 3, ch. I, § 58(f) (Sudan), available at
http://www.sudan.net/govemment/constitution/draftconst/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
108. The ICTY held in the Delalic case that de jure or defacto possession of powers or control over
subordinates was sufficient to qualify a civilian as a superior; see Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic & Hazim Delic,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 370 (Nov. 16, 1998).
109. For a more profound analysis of the "willfully blind" standard for non-military superiors of the
Rome Statute, see Kai Ambos, Superior Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 823, 870 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds.,
2002). The ICC civilian standard is higher than the standard of the ad hoc tribunals. See Greg R. Vetter,
Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 89, 123 (2000).
110. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 1T-94-l -A, Judgment, 131 (July, 15 1999).
111. See UNCOI, supra note 44, at 38.
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Moreover, the GoS is an obstacle to peace due to its political
considerations; peace in Western Sudan might further the creation of a common
political front in Darfur, which would threaten the central government's
reelection in 2009.112 An insecure situation in the West is therefore important
for the political survival of Bashir's National Congress Party. Weakening, if
not overthrowing, the regime in Khartoum seems, at the moment, to be a
prerequisite to lasting peace in Darfur.
Traditionally, regime change has been a necessary precondition to start
prosecutions or other accountability mechanisms. '13 This was the case with the
TRC in South Africa, the ICTR in Rwanda and the hybrid tribunal in Cambodia
to try the Khmer Rouge." 4 The situation in Sudan is radically different. At the
moment, nothing indicates a possible regime change or overthrow of the
Islamist government," 5 which is in power since the 1989 coup. Its position can
even be considered to have been strengthened by the international community's
negotiation strategy to achieve peace for the South, while providing methods
of accountability for government officials seemed to be a less important
concern. l' Despite this political unwillingness of the international community
to exercise a genuine pressure on the GoS for its involvement in the Darfur
conflict, the ICC now has the potential to stigmatize the top leaders. The
effects should not be underestimated, since "stigmatization eventually
contributes to the loss of power and influence on the part of leaders, especially
those who can no longer act as representatives on the international stage."' 7
Ultimately, successful prosecutions could bring about regime change in
Khartoum.
There is evidence that Khartoum and its politics are susceptible to inter-
national actions. In the case of Darfur, the reactions to offers of humanitarian
aid, to the Security Council intervention and to the ICC activity show that the
GoS is far from being indifferent to possible negative consequences of an
112. ICG, PEACE PROCESS, supra note 71, at 15.
113. Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A
Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 191 (2006).
114. Although established while the conflict was still going on in Bosnia, the ICTY also delivered
mainly ex post facto justice. Id. at 196-97.
115. One must be careful in labeling the current regime as "Islamist," in particular since the removal
of the leader of the Sudanese Islamist movement, Hassan al Turabi, from official powers in 1999/2000.
Despite this transformation, it is clear that the Sudanese state remains devoted to an Islamist
neofundamentalism. See Alex de Waal & A.H. Abdel Salam, Islamism, State Power andJihad in Sudan, in
ISLAMISM AND ITS ENEMIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 71, 113 (Alex de Waal ed., 2004). Therefore, the term
"Islamist" seems appropriate, although the Islamist model of the current government is radically different
from the model of political Islam conceived by Turabi. For more information on the important influence of
Turabi on Sudanese politics in the 1980s and 1990s, see id. at 75.
116. Lipscomb, supra note 113, at 192.
117. Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 10, at 272-73.
2007]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
international condemnation of the regime. Its discourse was rather marked by
important efforts to avoid such a condemnation." 8 Precedents to the reactions
in the Darfur case underline the effectiveness of international pressure on the
present government. In 1996, a Chapter VII resolution by the Security Council
imposed travel sanctions on members of the GoS and the armed forces and
obliged all countries to "[s]ignificantly reduce the number and the level of the
staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control
the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain; ' " in order to
pressure the GoS to surrender the three men suspected of attempting to
assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. 20 Although the suspects were
never extradited, these diplomatic sanctions had an immediate impact on the
policy of the GoS, concerning, in particular, its support for terrorists.
Numerous foreign extremists, including Osama bin Laden and dozens of
Egyptian Islamists, were asked to leave the country shortly after Resolution
1054 had been adopted.'' According to Tim Niblock, a specialist of the
politics of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the regime's tendency for ideological
expansionism has also been curtailed as a result of the sanctions.' One can
therefore conclude that actions by the international community, even in the
form of light diplomatic sanctions, could be helpful in the case of Darfur.'23
If international sanctions can influence Khartoum's politics, threats to
indict senior members of the government should do so as well. Khartoum has
shown in the past that its policies are not immune to international actions. Even
though the ICCs potential is therefore extremely valuable, the inability to
apprehend the indicted persons might be the most important obstacle for the
ICC to have any direct effects on both the political and the militia leaders, since
the ICC cannot count on the cooperation of the present regime. Nevertheless,
there is evidence that the indictment of Ahmad Harun, who remains the current
Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, has already had effects. Although
118. Castillo, supra note 53, at 175.
119. S.C. Res. 1054, U.N. SCOR, 3660th mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1054 (Apr. 26, 1996). It is
interesting to note that, probably due to their lightness, the sanctions did not strengthen the regime in
Khartoum, thus standing in sharp contrast to the situations in Iraq and Libya. See TIM NIBLOCK, PARIAH
STATES & SANCTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN 213 (2001).
120. For more information on these sanctions, see NIBLOCK, supra note 119, at 204.
121. Id. at 212.
122. Id. at 217.
123. See DIDAR FAWZY-ROSSANO, LE SOUDAN EN QUESTION 262 (2002), arguing that the
international sanctions did not only provoke the expulsion ofslamist leaders, such as Osama bin Laden, but
also stopped Sudan's project of an international Islamism. For a different, and probably more accurate, view
of the failure of Hassan al Turabi's political Islam in Sudan, see de Waal & Abdel, supra note 115, at 106,
who argue that divisions between Turabi and Bashir were insinuated throughout the 1990s. In short, de Waal
and Abdel describe the split of 1999/2000 between Turabi and Bashir as "entirely self-inflicted" and the
dispute as "simply over power." Id. at 108.
[Vol. 14:1
Kastner
Harun enjoys a peaceful life in Sudan, it seems possible that he will be
sacrificed by the GoS; "he knows that he may have little time," as an Arab
tribal leader expressed it recently. 24
Furthermore, even without any cooperation of the GoS and without the
option that a multinational force, mandated to arrest indictees, be installed in
Darfur, more subtle effects than mere incapacitation are conceivable. The
activity of the ICC can have an important influence on diminishing support for
the GoS among the Sudanese population. As newspaper articles and editorials
show, critical voices towards the National Congress Party are becoming louder.
A March 18, 2007 editorial in the daily newspaper The Citizen condemned the
support for the Janjaweed and called the GoS "a racist regime that is in many
respects worse than the apartheid regime in South Africa, which at least had the
dignity not to employ rape as a tactic of suppression."' 125 This is an important
development, since the GoS had initially felt powerful enough to suspend
independent newspapers, such as the Arabic-languageAl-Ayam and the English-
language Khartoum Monitor, or to close Al-Jazeera in Sudan after it had
reported the atrocities in Darfur as the first broadcast channel in the world.'
26
By showing the criminal face of the GoS, the ICC can, therefore, significantly
contribute to weakening the regime in Khartoum in the long run and influence
the elections scheduled for 2009.127
Despite this potential pressure that can be exercised by the ICC,
weakening the GoS seems to be a difficult task. In addition to the long-lasting
negotiation strategy of the U.N. to give more emphasis to the peace process in
southern Sudan and the indecisiveness of the international community to tackle
the problem, the strong position of the GoS is due to three mainly internal
factors. Oil revenues secure a permanent income that serves to build up the
army, which is today one of the strongest in the region; there is no viable
internal opposition to the regime; and the central government is protected by the
124. Maggie Farley, War Crimes Suspect Has Free Rein in Darfur, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 5,
2007, at 1.
125. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 84, at 8.
126. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 115. Unfortunately, arrests of Sudanese editors and
column writers increased in spring 2007, and in May 2007, all media coverage related to the Darfurian rebel
movements was temporarily banned by the GoS. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORTNO. 130,
A STRATEGY FOR COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN II n.39 (July 26, 2007), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfn?id=4961&l1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
127. "General elections at all levels of government shall be held no later than the end of the fourth
year of the Interim Period," in other words at the latest in 2009. THE DRAFT CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SUDAN, supra note 107, pt. 14, ch. II, § 216. According to experts of the Sudanese political system, the NCP
takes the upcoming elections seriously and already gets ready for an election campaign. The GoS also seems
to acknowledge that a hardline policy will only win the voices of some ofKhartoum's hardliners but not the
elections. Interview with Annette Weber, Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
(July 3, 2007).
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geographical vastness of the country.12 A military intervention into Darfur, a
territory as large as France, by an international coalition would require
enormous resources.
Security Council Resolution 1593 obliges Sudan to cooperate with the
ICC, but the GoS does not have to fear any stringent consequences of its non-
compliance. It has too many allies in the world that are powerful enough to
prevent the Security Council from taking more decisive actions, and threats of
economic sanctions or a Chapter VII military intervention are, at least under the
current circumstances, not realistic. China and Russia will block any invasive
measures in the Security Council due to economic considerations, while the
Arab League and other traditionally anti-US and anti-Israel organizations and
states support Sudan out of ideological reasons. 2 9 Furthermore, the GoS is
aware that the United States does not have the political and material resources
to launch another major war as long as the engagement in Iraq persists and that
Europeans, not as unified as they could be regarding their foreign policy, are
"not ready to die for Darfur."'3
From a realistic point of view, the ICC cannot be expected to have a major
immediate impact on the position of the GoS in the current circumstances, but
it is more thanjust a symbolic act that can bring Khartoum in need to explain.13'
Members of the government have clearly become more nervous since the
Security Council referral. They fear that some of them might be held
individually accountable for the atrocities committed in Darfur; the possibility
that someone will be surrendered to the ICC is a reality.'32 In sum, the ICC
involvement has the potential to be an important factor in causing change in
GoS policy toward Darfur.
2. Pressure the Sudanese government to cut support for the Janjaweed
If the GoS cannot be targeted directly through the ICC involvement, it can,
however, be incited to change its policy in Darfur. Thanks to the ICC and the
preliminary work of the Commission of Inquiry, crimes committed by the
Sudanese army and the Janjaweed against the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa
have been revealed, documented and made known to the international society.
Khartoum's method of arming and supporting the militias, allowing them to
128. Collins, supra note 38, at 22.
129. In addition to China, Malaysia and India have also heavily invested in the Sudanese oil sector;
see, e.g., Jean-Paul Marthoz, Le Soudan, Pays de Tous les Enjeux, 14 ENJEUX INTERNATIONAUX 13, 14
(2006).
130. [LIes Europ6ens ne sont pas prets A mourir pour le Darfur. Id. at 15.
131. Jochen Stahnke, Erste Kriegsverbrecher benannt, DIE ZErr ONLINE (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/09/ICC-Darfur (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
132. Interview of Annette Weber, supra note 127.
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murder, rape, and pillage with guaranteed impunity, has been particularly
criticized. The GoS knows that its Darfur policy is now closely followed by
foreign governments and international NGOs and that it must show some good
will in order to maintain or regain a certain credibility. To save the situation,
or at least to appear in a better light, the GoS is likely to cut its support for the
Janjaweed.
There is evidence that the GoS is susceptible to pressure produced by the
ICC. In the case of northern Uganda, the activity of the OTP increased the
pressure on the GoS to end support for the LRA, which had become an
important ally in its fight against the SPLA in southern Sudan. The conflict
went on largely unnoticed in the world, but the referral to the OTP mobilized
the international community to a certain extent and isolated the LRA. The
International Crisis Group noted in a report in April 2005 that the "ICC has
already had a positive impact on the peace process by sobering the LRA and
influencing Khartoum to reduce support." '133 If the GoS had to change its policy
in the case of the LRA, it puts into question its motivation to continue to
support militias within its own boundaries.
Leaders of the Janjaweed seem to fear now that they will be used as
scapegoats and will be blamed by the GoS as the ones responsible for the
atrocities committed since 2003. At the present time, it does not seem realistic
that Khartoum seriously considers cooperating with the ICC; but should the
government give in to the international pressure and take one step into this
direction, it is conceivable that militia leaders will be "sacrificed" by the GoS.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that some militia groups do not
remain loyal to the government and have already started to fight side by side
with the rebels against the Sudanese army.'34
Even though it is encouraging that the activity of the ICC seems to have
its first true effect on the conflict in Darfur, the issue is, however, extremely
complex. Several other factors are at least as important as the ICC threat.
Generally, there is no clear frontline in Darfur; the rebel groups have split, with
some of them developing into armed bandits whose fighting patterns and
attacks on civilians are similar to those of the Janjaweed.135 Many commenta-
tors also doubt that the GoS can still exercise any control over the militia
leaders and believe that the situation has become unmanageable for Khartoum,
133. INTERNATIONAL CRisIs GROUP, AFRICA BRIEFING NO. 23, SHOCK THERAPY FOR NORTHERN
UGANDA'S PEACE PROCESS 5 (Apr. 11, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=
3366&1=1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
134. PERRY, supra note 90.
135. China Claims Success on Darfur, POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.pinr.comlreport.php?ac-viewreport&report-id=643&languageid= I (last visited Jan. 4,2008).
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thus making it impossible to disarm theJanjaweed. '36 Moreover, the decreasing
loyalty of some militia leaders is not really surprising and is not necessarily
linked to the fact that militia leaders are afraid of facing trials in The Hague.
According to Alex de Waal, the economic relationships between Arabs and
non-Arabs have been so close in Western Sudan that, "given enough time they
are likely to make common cause against the government."' 37 Presumptions
that the ICC is the cause for certain actions of the warring parties should,
therefore, be made with awareness of the multifaceted dynamics of the conflict.
3. Bring rebel leaders back to the negotiating table
Even though it is unquestionable that most crimes in Darfur have been
committed by the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed, the conflict is not only
black-and-white. Rebels have reportedly also targeted the civilian population
and looted civilian property,"' as well as attacked and raped aid workers,'39
thus committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Civilians reportedly
call Minni Minawi's troops "Janjaweed 2."4 The international community has
barely acknowledged this fact. However, one SLA-commander is among the
four individuals against whom travel sanctions were imposed by Security
Council Resolution 1672. There are also speculations that some of the SLA and
JEM leaders are on the sealed list of the Commission of Inquiry. 4'
The leaders of the SLA and the JEM mostly have a different background
than the people they represent. Having lived in cities far away from their
traditional homeland, leaders like Minni Minawi and Abdelwahed Mohamed
Nur were educated in Arabic or English 4 2 or, such as in the case of SLA's most
prominent Masalit commander Khamis Abakir, have lived abroad for many
years. 43  Moreover, JEM's leaders are politically and diplomatically
experienced, since several of them, like Dr Khalil Ibrahim, had been part of the
National Islamic Front government or had been educated in Europe. 1" They
136. See, e.g., FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 122. "Forcible disarmament of the Janjaweed
is almost certainly impossible." Id. at 127.
137. Lydia Polgreen, Militia Talks Could Reshape Conflict in Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007,
at 11.
138. In early 2005, hundreds of rebels had already shown "abusive behavior." FLINT & DE WAAL,
supra note 35, at 88.
139. Sudan 'Backs UN.-Led Darfur Force,' BBC NEWS, June 18, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6760781.stm. (last visited Dec. 28, 2007)
140. ICG, PEACE PROCESS, supra note 71, at 8 n.45.
141. According to Flint and de Waal, seven of the fifty-one individuals named are rebel leaders; see
FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 132.
142. Tubiana, supra note 39, at 114.
143. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 66.
144. Id. at 91.
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can be considered susceptible to international pressure to negotiate as well as
to pressure from the ICC. Indicting rebel leaders could therefore create a
similar situation as in the case of the LRA, where the activity of the ICC, along
with military pressure, has arguably isolated the LRA and pressured Joseph
Kony and other LRA leaders to come back to the negotiating table. 45 It has
been argued that "[t]he threat of apprehension and prosecution presents the
LRA with clear negative consequences if the peace process fails."'146 Even
though it is clear that the ICC does not want to become a bargaining chip in any
peace negotiations but wants to remain as independent as possible in pursuing
its vocation, its involvement can facilitate the conclusion of a peace deal. In the
case of northern Uganda, prominent NGOs, such as the International Crisis
Group, have pressured the international community to "continue to provide
strong support for prosecution and only consider asking the court to suspend its
activity when and if the LRA leaders begin to implement a fair settlement."' 47
This approach should also guide the attitude of international peace
negotiators towards the rebel leaders in Darfur, despite the factual differences
between the two conflicts. The ICC threat can be a useful incentive in the case
of the Darfurian rebel movements in order to initiate negotiations once again.
Moreover, members of the rebel groups seem to acknowledge the fact that some
of their leaders are likely to be on the list of the Commission of Inquiry and risk
to be indicted by the ICC. SLA members have even expressed their approval
that their leaders accept responsibility for an eventual guilt. 48 Generally, this
is not perceived as an obstacle to peace. The SLA is certain that the crimes
committed by government troops and the Janjaweed are much graver than those
rebel leaders could be responsible for. Under the condition that Janjaweed
leaders are brought to justice in The Hague, SLA members have also expressed
145. Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State
Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 A.J.I.L. 403, 404 (2005). Clearly, the situation in Darfur
is radically different from the LRA case. While the conflict in northern Uganda basically opposes an armed
movement, that has completely lost its popular base and has been terrorizing civilians over the last twenty
years, and the Ugandan army, the Darfurian rebel movements fight for relatively clear defined political goals
against the central government and have been trying to protect the civilian population against attacks from
the Sudanese army and the militias. ICC jurisdiction was also triggered in a different way; in the case of
northern Uganda, the ICC can rely on the cooperation of the Ugandan government, which referred the
situation to the OTP on December 16, 2003. In the case of Darfur, the Security Council triggered ICC
jurisdiction, while the GoS has refused any cooperation. Despite these differences, the effects of the ICC
indictments on LRA leaders are helpful to address the issue in Darfur.
146. INTERNATIONAL Cmisis GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 124, NORTHERN UGANDA: SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE 15 (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=
4791 (last visited Jan. 5, 2008) [hereinafter ICG, UGANDA]
147. Id.
148. Res Publica, supra note 34, at 31.
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their will to reconcile with the Janjaweed.149 As Abakir expresses it, "[o]ur
problem is not with the Arabs. It is with the government."' 50 Overall, some
rebel factions can, at least for the time being, be considered as a supporting
force for the ICC that is also susceptible to its pressure, since the rebels know
that they are not immune from indictments.
4. Pressure the international community to act
The activity of the ICC also has the potential to make the international
community exercise more coherent pressure on the key players of the conflict
to stop violence and negotiate an agreement. The ICC is a powerful actor for
two reasons. First, since the entry into force of the Rome Statute and the start
of the ICCs practical functioning, the Court has experienced significant
attention by the world media. This interest increased with the first referrals and
the OTPs announcement of its first investigations. When arrest warrants were
issued against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb in February 2007, the world
public was well-informed thanks to the broad coverage of the events. The ICC
is, therefore, a well-known institution whose next steps will be closely
observed. Second, courts in general have a naturally increased authority to
shape public opinion as long as their independence and impartiality are assured.
An international court is, moreover, responsible to the international society as
a whole,' 5 ' which is, in the case of the ICC, represented by the Assembly of
States Parties. The Rome Statute provides different mechanisms to guarantee
the independence of the Court vis-6-vis national governments as well as the
Security Council.'52 For these reasons, findings of the ICC are likely to have
more authoritative power than statements made by national governments or
NGOs. It is a meaningful step if some Western governments or the Inter-
national Crisis Group declare that the GoS is responsible for genocide in
Darfur; it is another one if individuals are singled out by an independent
international prosecutor who is ready to put them on trial in The Hague.
Thanks to this position, the ICC can play an important supportive role in
raising awareness about the responsibility of some individuals for atrocity
crimes and urging the international community to act. Charges by the ICC
cannot easily be dismissed as politicized actions out of ideological reasons
149. Id.
150. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 70.
151. Here, the ICC's backing by 104 States and its goal to reach universal ratification are emphasized
over the fact that several States, including three permanent members of the Security Council, have been
rejecting ICC jurisdiction so far. The ICC is responsible to a large international society and clearly represents
internationalized interests.
152. For instance, independence ofthe judges and of the OTP, as stipulated in articles 40 and 42 of
the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 27.
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towards certain governments. Stigmatizing those who are mainly responsible
for the atrocities in Darfur, in particular the top of the GoS, through the ICC
would make it more difficult and arguably inevitable for the international
community not to take more stringent measures against the regime. This
indirect impact on an ongoing conflict like in Darfur could be extremely
valuable. An ICC activity is not exclusive to the detriment of more rigorous
diplomatic pressure or even a military intervention; 153 such measures could be
enacted as a consequence of the work of the ICC.
D. Concrete dangers of the ICC activity in the Darfur case
Many international criminal lawyers and human rights groups have been
arguing that international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide, must and can be prevented.
However, a strategy that many such groups favor for achieving this
goal-the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities according to
universal standards-risks causing more atrocities than it would
prevent, because it pays insufficient attention to political realities.154
The following chapter will address those facets of the ICC involvement
that may prolong the conflict and aggravate the humanitarian situation of the
victims.
1. Fewer prospects of a peace agreement-
the ICC prolonging the conflict
"The pursuit of criminals is one thing. Making peace is another."'' 55
One of the major problems in Darfur is that the conflict has had disastrous
consequences on the humanitarian situation. In addition to the fact that around
2.5 million Darfurians live in refugee camps in Western Sudan and Eastern
Chad, around six million people depend on food aid. Although the conflict has
fortunately lost its characteristic of mass atrocities committed in 2003 and 2004
by the Janjaweed and the Sudanese Army, the effects of the lasting conflict on
the civilian population are not less invasive.
153. The debate whether or not a military intervention would be helpful has split in particular French
NGOs trying to find solutions to end the conflict; while organizations like Urgence Darfour fight vigorously
for a military option, spokespersons of Midecins Sans Fronti~res, for instance, affirm that a military
intervention would aggravate the conflict. See Agnes Gruda, Le Darfour n est pas le Rwanda, LA PRESSE,
Apr. 13, 2007.
154. Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 15, at 5.
155. Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18:2 HUM. RTs. Q. 249, 258 (1996).
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It is obvious that an inclusive peace agreement is urgently needed to
increase the probability of stopping violence; the mere fact that the level of
violence has decreased does not save Darfurians from starving to death.
Security cannot be reestablished in the region without disarmament of both the
militias and the different rebel groups, which would ideally be accompanied by
the retreat of the Sudanese army and the deployment of a multi-national force.
An agreement between the warring parties is an essential prerequisite for peace
and also for some form of power sharing 6 la Naivasha, although the GoS
would have difficulties to justify another "defeat;" promising any form of
political influence to the rebels in addition to the North-South accord would be
rejected by Khartoum's hardliners. One major problem is that it does not seem
realistic to assume that any of those who are or will be indicted by the ICC
could play an important role in peace negotiations or be part of a new
government. As a result, it has been argued that indicting leaders "would only
increase the incentive to ramp up the attacks and force a final resolution by
eliminating the enemy."' 56 Furthermore, by portraying the ICC as an obstacle
to peace, Khartoum is trying to make the ICC a bargaining chip in future peace
negotiations. 57
It has often been argued that amnesty deals are a necessary element in
peace negotiations. Governments have used this tool in order to raise the
probability of stopping an ongoing conflict or to secure the transition from a
dictatorial regime to a democratic rule of law. The argument is that the
prospect of prosecution only creates a "nothing-to-lose" attitude among the
leaders of belligerent groups, with the result that conflicts last longer than they
would have to. Spokespersons of peace initiatives in northern Uganda, for
instance, have broadly condemned the "interference" of the ICC. They fear that
peace will be even more difficult to reach: "[o]bviously, nobody can convince
the leaders of a rebel movement to come to the negotiating table and at the same
time tell them that they will appear in courts to be prosecuted."'' 8 Furthermore,
the LRA is well-known for committing revenge massacres among the civilian
population for alleged cooperation with the Ugandan government.'59 As a
result, many commentators and peace organizations condemned the referral to
the ICC and argued that an unconditional amnesty for Joseph Kony and other
156. Trying Times in Darfur and the Establishment of International Criminal Law, POWER AND
INTEREST NEWS REPORT, Mar, 4, 2005, available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=viewreport&
reportid=275&languageid=I (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
157. Nick Grono & David Mozersky, Sudan and the ICC: A Question of Accountability,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cftn?id=4640&1=1
(last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
158. Adam Branch, International Justice, Local Injustice, DISSENT MAGAZINE (Summer 2004),
available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=336 (last visited January 16, 2008).
159. ALLEN, supra note 32, at 103.
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LRA commanders would be an indispensable requirement for peace
negotiations and therefore the only possibility for bringing peace to northern
Uganda. 6° Even the government of Uganda itself, having referred the situation
to the ICC to raise international awareness about the conflict on the inter-
national scene, has been trying to convince the OTP to suspend the indictments
in order to enable a peace deal and traditional forms of reconciliation.' 6 '
Achieving peace in northern Uganda and in Darfur will not be possible
through the same means. The frontlines in northern Uganda where relatively
promising peace negotiations were made in 2006 are clear; the LRA versus
President Museveni's government. Negotiations are marked by clear bargain-
ing chips, such as amnesty for members of the LRA. Compared to this long-
lasting duel, the situation in Darfur is chaotic. The Abuja peace agreement
must be considered to have failed; a completely new process, which brings
together the GoS, the numerous rebel groups, as well as militia leaders, will be
necessary. Clearly, there is still a long way to go. For these reasons, ICC
indictments will not affect peace negotiations in the same way as in northern
Uganda. However, the basic assumption remains valid; negotiating peace with
individuals who are facing trials is a problematical matter. Possible prosecu-
tions are likely to represent an obstacle to a peace deal. In the case of Darfur,
if the OTP continues a consistent policy, precisely those individuals that will
be needed to settle the conflict can be expected to be targeted by the OTP:
government officials as well as leaders of rebel groups and the Janjaweed.
2. Endanger the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force
The humanitarian situation in Darfur has been deteriorating drastically
since the outbreak of protracted violence in 2003; humanitarian relief is badly
needed. Numerous NGOs operating in the area had to pull out or limit their
activities due to security concerns. 62 Although a U.N. mission would not solve
160. See, e.g., Branch, supra note 158. Di Giovanni comes to the conclusion that, "[t]hrough
prosecution or eventual reparations, the Court could threaten any transitional justice process in Uganda by
playing into the government's political strategies." Adrian Di Giovanni, The Prospect ofICC Reparations
in the Case Concerning Northern Uganda: On a Collision Course with Incoherence?, 2 J. INT'L LAW &
INT'L REL. 25, 62 (2006).
161. UGANDA: Locals Want Rebel Leader Forgiven, IRIN, Dec. 7, 2006, http://www.irinnews.
org/report.aspx?reportid=59805 (last visited Jan. 8, 2008); see also Peace or Justice?, GUARDIAN WEEKLY,
Jan. 10, 2007, available at http'//www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,, 1987173,00.html (last visited
Jan. 8, 2008).
162. A cause de l'inscuritg, des zones inaccessibles, des personnes sans assistance, MfDECINS
SANS FROwItRES, Oct. 25, 2006, http://www.msf.fr/site/actu.nsf/actus/darfouritvjs251006 (last visited Jan.
8, 2008). Oxfam announced in June 2007 that it would withdraw permanently from Gereida due to security
concerns. See Sudan 'Backs UN Led Darfur Force, ' supra note 139.
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the problem immediately,'63 it would certainly improve security significantly
through its presence in buffer zones and internally displaced persons camps.
Although the international community did not react as quickly as it should have,
there is now a broad international consensus that the 7,000 troops of the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which cannot cope with the situation,16
should be supplemented by a stronger U.N. mission. As a result, the Security
Council decided in August 2006 that the United Nations Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) shall be strengthened by up to 20,000 troops and its mandate be
extended from southern Sudan to Darfur. 165 The GoS, however, blocked the
deployment of a U.N. mission or even a combined U.N.-AU mission. In June
2007, Khartoum started to show more willingness to admit a hybrid U.N.-AU
peacekeeping force for Darfur, which was authorized by the Security Council
on July 31, 2007.166 While this is an important step, diplomats remain skeptic
due to the frequent policy of the GoS not to keep its promises. Moreover,
experts affirm that a deployment would not take place before 2008.167
One should thus question why the GoS has been so reluctant to admit a
U.N. force into Darfur, considering the fact that there is already a U.N. mission
in southern Sudan. One issue is Khartoum's fear that a U.N. mission in Darfur
would cooperate with the ICC, for instance by arresting members of its armed
forces and transferring them to The Hague. 68 Strongly opposing the ICC, the
GoS objects, therefore, to any means which might potentially support the OTP's
activity. Although there is no empirical evidence that a U.N. mission would
really arrest persons wanted by the ICC, the OTP already showed that it takes
advantage from a U.N. mission on the ground. To pursue investigations in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the OTP affirmed that it relied heavily
on the cooperation of the U.N. mission in the DRC (MONUC), in particular due
to the security situation. Logistical assistance, such as flight transportation, has
also been essential. "And while we are striving to become as autonomous as
possible in the circumstances, in some areas we will simply not be able to
163. According to M~decins Sans Fronti&es, one ofthe major NGOs operating in Darfur, a military
intervention would face many difficulties, because any foreign troops would have to fight against the
Sudanese army; due to the current position of the GoS, the situation would be hardly different for a U.N.
mission. See De Mauvaises Reponses t de Bonnes Questions, MEDECINS SANS FRONTlItRES, Mar. 23, 2007,
http://www.msf.fr/sitelactu.nsf/actus/darfouritwgab230307 (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
164. For more information, see CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, ANNUAL REVIEW OF
GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 37 (2006). For the role of the African Union in Darfur, see Jeremy I. Levitt,
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council: The Case
ofDarfur, Sudan, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE, THEORY AND REALITY-A NEED FOR
CHANGE? 213, 240 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005).
165. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. SCOR, 5519th mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
166. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. SCOR, 5727th mtg. i, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
167. Sudan 'Backs U.N.-Led Darfur Force, 'supra note 139.
168. Le Soudan rejette la ldgitimit de la CPIsur le Darfour, LE MONDE, Feb. 27, 2007.
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operate without such support." 169 Moreover, attempts have been made by the
Ugandan government in mid-2006 to carry out a joint operation between the
Congolese and MONUC in order to execute the arrest warrants against the
leaders of the LRA, 171 which is now believed to be based in the northeast of the
DRC.17' Even if such cooperation is unlikely at the moment, the possibility that
MONUC or UNMIS will play a considerable role in apprehending Joseph Kony
and his allies still exists.
The missions in Bosnia and Liberia are good examples to show that
peacekeeping forces can be important players to deliver war criminals to
international tribunals. With Resolution 1638, adopted unanimously, the
Security Council took an important step to reform U.N. practice by expanding
the mandate of the U.N. mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to "apprehend and detain
former President Charles Taylor in the event of a return to Liberia and to
transfer him or facilitate his transfer to Sierra Leone for prosecution before the
Special Court for Sierra Leone." '172 Charles Taylor was subsequently arrested
by Nigerian officials, when he tried to flee Nigeria in March 2006; after Taylor
had been repatriated to Liberia, U.N. peacekeepers transferred him to
Freetown.173  With this new policy, the Security Council underlined the
importance of fighting impunity, extending the means to do so by Resolution
1638.
After the establishment of the tribunals for ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda as
well as the support for other bodies, such as the SCSL, the Security Council,
therefore, made further efforts to sponsor international criminal justice, in the
case of Resolution 1638 on the level of enforcement. The non-coercive nature
of the peacekeeping force is not an obstacle, in particular if the host government
approves the extension of the mission's mandate; Resolution 163 8 did not shift
UNMIL towards a peace-enforcement mission.'74 However, if the Liberian
government had not given its consent, the task, which arguably amounts to a
duty, 175 to apprehend Taylor could hardly have been reconciled with the
mandate of a peacekeeping force.
169. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Informal Meeting of
Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Oct. 24, 2005), available at www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051024 English.pdf (last visted Jan. 8, 2008).
170. See ICG, UGANDA, supra note 146, at 7.
171. Id. at 8.
172. S.C. Res. 1638, U.N. SCOR, 5304th mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1638 (Nov. 11, 2005). The
mission in Somalia, UNOSOM IL was given a similar mandate. For more information, see Micaela Frulli,
A Turning Point in International Efforts to Apprehend War Criminals, The UN. Mandates Taylor's Arrest
in Liberia, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 351, 352 (2006).
173. Frulli, supra note 172, at 351.
174. Id. at 359.
175. In the wording of Security Council Resolution 1638, the mandate "shall include." See S.C. Res.
1638, U.N. SCOR, 5304th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1638 (2005).
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The NATO-led force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not receive
an explicit authorization by the Security Council to apprehend war crimes
suspects, but it is mandated to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accord, including the clause that the parties must cooperate with the ICTY.
One can therefore conclude that, by arresting indictees, the international force
only enforces compliance with the Peace Accord.' The North Atlantic
Council, using non-mandatory language, specified that "IFOR should detain any
persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal who come into contact
with IFOR in its execution of assigned tasks, in order to assure the transfer of
these persons to the International Criminal Tribunal,"' 77 thus expressly
mandating the multinational force to execute arrest warrants issued by the
ICTY. Indeed, several indictees were subsequently arrested and transferred to
The Hague by SFOR.
In sum, the fact that peacekeeping forces in Liberia and Bosnia played a
substantial role in arresting war criminals is an important development towards
the enforcement of international criminal law. In the case of Darfur, it has been
argued that the GoS had been opposed to a peacekeeping force in Darfur long
before the referral to the ICC, since it is "determined to wipe out the rebel
groups in Darfur, at almost any cost.' 178 It is also evident that, similar to
UNMIS, the mandate of a peacekeeping mission would be limited to a clearly
defined region and would not include the arrest of government officials.
79
However, as the case of Liberia has shown, mandates can be extended once a
force is on the ground; a general tendency towards implementing international
law, including international criminal law, seems to be emerging. Even if
executing ICC arrest warrants would not be one of the primary tasks of a
peacekeeping force in Darfur, international forces, as evidenced in the cases of
Liberia and Bosnia, are increasingly sought to cooperate with international
criminal tribunals.
Moreover, in the case of Darfur, the OTP has already shown that peace-
keeping troops on the ground are considered an important source of information
for its investigations. In its reports to the Security Council, Luis Moreno-
176. For a further discussion on this controversial point and the question whether the multinational
force is obliged to execute arrest warrants, see Paula Gaeta, Is NA TOA uthorizedor Obligedto Arrest Persons
Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia?, 9 E.J.I.L. 174 (1998). On the
difficult relationship between the ICTY and IFOR, see GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF
VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 251 (2000).
177. Gaeta, supra note 176, at 3. To facilitate the arrest of indictees by the peacekeeping force, the
ICTY amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 1996 by adopting Rule 59, allowing the ICTY to
transmit a warrant of arrest to an "appropriate authority or international body." See Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, 1994 ICTY 59.
178. See GRONO & MOZERSKY, supra note 157.
179. See id.
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Ocampo revealed that contacts with AMIS had been made and underlined the
importance of expeditious assistance of the AU to the work of the OTP. 8 ° A
possible cooperation of a U.N. mission with the ICC is also on the table.
Prominent NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis
Group, have openly pressured the Security Council to explicitly mandate a U.N.
peacekeeping mission to support the work of the ICC in Darfur: "The mission
should also be specifically empowered to provide appropriate assistance to the
International Criminal Court's investigations in Darfur including the arrest of
individuals indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes."'
181
Whether or not Khartoum's fear that a U.N. mission in Darfur might start
to arrest members of the Sudanese army and the militias is justified, there is a
realistic possibility that a U.N. mission would at least facilitate the work of the
OTP on the ground, as it has been the case in the DRC. Due to this scenario,
the ICC has not been a supporting factor in persuading the GoS to approve a
U.N. mission for Darfur.
E. Evaluation and suggested further proceedings
The two important dangers of the ICC activity in the Darfur conflict must
be considered seriously, although they should not fuel doubts neither on the
involvement itself nor the ICC as an institution. However, the potentially
negative impact of indictments and arrest warrants must not be ignored but
rather clearly addressed. Being an obstacle to a peace agreement or the
deployment of a peacekeeping mission are serious challenges.
The example of Darfur underlines the validity of the premise that peace
and justice do not have to contradict each other and are not mutually exclusive
concepts. Since the ICC entered the scene when a reliable peace process was
still out of sight, its potential to pressure key players to change their policy and
attitude are much more important than the risk that peace negotiations are, in
the end, prolonged because the question of individual accountability must be
addressed. In other words, the ICC is a player that can help to bring about
peace through profounder means than what the "peace versus justice" debate
can offer.
180. International Criminal Court, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the UN. Security Council Pursuant to UN. SCR 1593, delivered to the Security Council, Dec. 13,
2005, available athttp://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LMOUNSC_ReportBEn.pdf (last visited Jan.
8, 2008).
181. Letter from Gareth Evans & Kenneth Roth to Members of the U.N. Security Council Regarding
Darfur (Jan. 31,2006), in Security Council Must Take Action to Protect Civilians in Darfur, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH & INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/31/
sudan12577.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2008)
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For these reasons, the above-mentioned prospects of the ICC involvement
in the Darfur conflict, in particular the potential to make the GoS change its
policy in Darfur, clearly outweigh the dangers that come with international
indictments. Even if indicting government officials is always a delicate matter,
since their cooperation is essential to deal with the humanitarian situation and
the resolution of the conflict, government officials should not be shielded
against prosecutions. Since the negative impact for the victims of the conflict
is potentially more serious when the actors still in power are targeted, evidence
must be carefully collected. The more risky a case is from a political point of
view, the stronger is has to be. If there are "reasonable grounds to believe"'82
that the top of the Sudanese government is responsible for crimes committed
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, which means in concreto that, besides
individual criminal responsibility, superior responsibility can be established by
the Prosecutor according to article 28(b) of the Rome Statute, then the OTP and
the Pre-Trial-Chamber should not restrain themselves from taking similar steps,
as in the case of Harun and Kushayb. The prospect of weakening the GoS
outweighs the risk that the subsequent lack of cooperation of the GoS with
international players will aggravate the situation of Darfurians.
In any case, it is important that the ICC remains impartial and, equally
important, that it also appears impartial in the eyes of the warring parties.
Otherwise, the ICC will be considered as an instrument of one party, which was
only activated to abet the party's victory, if not in the battlefield, then in the
courtroom. The danger of becoming a political instrument exists; in the case
of northern Uganda, the ICC has been harshly criticized and branded as a tool
of President Museveni to exercise political pressure. The activation of the ICC
by the Ugandan government itself, which has a strong interest in putting as
much pressure as possible on its military opponents, stands in sharp contrast to
the situation in Darfur. Nonetheless, the ICC also risks being criticized as a
political instrument regarding its involvement in the Darfur conflict. It has been
argued that, through the Darfur referral, the Security Council "took the risk to
confuse the juridical order with political tactic."' 83 The question is how the
ICC can show its willingness and capability to act independently and
impartially in Darfur and emphasize that it is not a mere instrument of Western
governments to exercise pressure on the generally unloved Islamist GoS.
One possibility to face this challenge is the "initial proportion" strategy,"'
a pragmatic approach that takes into account the political effects of indictments.
According to this strategy, the prosecutor should start by selecting a similar
182. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 58(1)(a).
183. Marchal, supra note 75, at 36.
184. A strategy proposed by Aleksandar Fati6 in the context of the ICTY. See ALEKSANDAR FATI(t,
RECONCILIATION VIA THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL? 84 (2000).
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amount of individuals of the various warring parties in order to avoid appearing
partial. Once a settlement of the conflict is reached and another outbreak of
violence is unlikely, the prosecutor will be able to do his work more freely at
lower political risks. Applied to the Darfur conflict, the OTP should not only
target the Haruns and Kushaybs, but also rebel leaders. Thanks to the large
prosecutorial discretion and due to the substantial violations of international
humanitarian law by various rebel groups, the question of sufficient gravity is
not an obstacle. If the OTP pursues a consistent procedure, at least one or two
leaders of rebel groups should be targeted next. This would also facilitate a
rectification of the perception of the conflict which is largely still reduced to an
oversimplifying black-and-white offenders-victims scheme in the world
opinion. The OTP would have to maintain this equilibrium as long as necessary
in order not to appear as an instrument of one side. Subsequently, the OTP
could return to a policy that is marked by article 17(1)(d) considerations and the
preamble of the Rome Statute; in other words it could then set up a clear list of
those who are allegedly most responsible for the worst crimes committed in
Darfur, regardless of their affiliation with a certain group.
It is important to mention that the ICC, besides the problem of enforce-
ment, is limited in its possible impact on ending the Darfur conflict due to
another factor: time. The question of time is decisive because the ICC could
have even more immediate effects on an ongoing conflict if it could react faster.
Clearly, political considerations must not be disregarded; rushing into indict-
ments is not advisable. The question of the right timing in order to exercise a
genuine threat while minimizing potential political risks will always be crucial.
It would not make sense to release the decision of numerous indictments of
central political figures when an important peace agreement is about to be
concluded; or to scare Darfurian rebel leaders with indictments when long-
awaited negotiations to unite the splintered rebel groups, which would be a first
fundamental step to refuel the peace process, come to a critical point. The
ICC's commitment to bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice
does not hold the OTP back from postponing the publication of indictments a
few weeks or months in order to show itself politically sensitive and in line with
the requirement of acting in accordance with the "interests of the victims," as
stipulated in article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The work of the ICC can have effects on ongoing conflicts like the one in
Darfur. As a result of its permanent character, the ICC is able to react more
quickly than ad hoc tribunals vis-hi-vis an unfolding conflict and therefore
represents a constant threat to potential perpetrators worldwide. The Court also
commits international criminal justice to a new task, namely to deal with
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ongoing mass atrocities. The main challenge of the ad hoc tribunals has been
to deliver post-conflict justice; one of the main challenges of the ICC will be
to have beneficial effects on ongoing conflicts.
Dealing with the Darfur conflict is and will remain a difficult and complex
issue for the ICC. Although the Court could have reacted more quickly after its
activation through the Security Council referral in order to have a more
immediate impact on the conflict, it must also proceed with awareness of
possible damaging consequences. By issuing arrest warrants against Ahmad
Harun, a member of the GoS, and Ali Kushayb, a militia leader, the ICC began
to genuinely influence the conflict in Darfur. Although the GoS continues to
reject ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory and will probably
not change its non-cooperative policy towards the ICC in the near future, the
indictments have had political effects; Sudanese officials have clearly become
more nervous. The impact of the ICC could, however, be more substantial.
Even though it is unlikely that those most responsible for the crimes committed
in Darfur can be incapacitated by ICC indictments in the near future, the ICC
can stigmatize political and military leaders. As a result, the ICC activity is
likely to influence the upcoming elections in 2009, thus forcing Khartoum to
change its Darfur policy.
Despite these desirable possible effects, the ICC must proceed carefully
until it can benefit from unconditional support of the international community,
and particularly as long as the position of the GoS is strong enough to block or
substantially delay the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. At the moment,
the international community, including the ICC, should mainly be concerned
about the successful deployment of thejoint U.N.-AU mission. The Court must
not be blind on the political eye and endanger a peacekeeping mission, which
would clearly not be in the interests of the victims in Darfur. Under the current
circumstances, meetings of OTP staff with representatives of the U.N. and the
AU 185 send the unhelpful signal to the GoS that the OTP will effectively try to
cooperate as much as possible with a peacekeeping mission. However, once
basic security can be guaranteed, the ICC will be able to act more freely.
Although the deployment of a peacekeeping mission is of utmost
importance, it will not bring about a political solution for Darfur. In the course
of renegotiating the Darfur Peace Agreement, holding individuals criminally
responsible in The Hague will also become an issue. It is important that the
185. The ICC Deputy Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, met with the U.N. Deputy Secretary General,
Asha-Rose Migiro, and with Ambassador Pascal Gayama, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Congo
to the U.N. and President of the Security Council for the month of August in 2007, to discuss the cooperation
of the U.N. and other organizations with the Court as well as the need to enforce the Court's decisions. See
Press Release, International Criminal Court, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC to meet U.N. Deputy Secretary
General and President of U.N. Security Council (Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/265.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
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OTP avoids becoming a bargaining chip for various players during these peace
negotiations. Following the concept of the initial proportion strategy, the OTP
should target individuals of all sides of the conflict. As a consequence,
addressing the question of cooperating with the Court would become inevitable
for the GoS and the militia leaders as well as for the rebel leaders. This would
significantly strengthen the credibility and the political weight of the ICC.
Under the current circumstances, a successful scenario, including the
enforcement of arrest warrants and the surrender of Sudanese indictees to The
Hague, is only conceivable if and when the advocates of international criminal
justice will be able to exercise enough political pressure on the GoS to make
cooperation with the ICC unavoidable. Since China began to pressure the GoS
towards more international cooperation, tougher measures, such as political or
economic sanctions, have become a realistic threat for Khartoum in case of non-
compliance with its international obligations.
It seems that the ICC will have to break a circle. If the ICC does not
receive the necessary support from the international community, it will not be
powerful enough to effectively target high political leaders; but if the Court
does not make a meaningful step, some important political players, such as
permanent members of the Security Council or the AU, will not seriously take
into consideration the possible contribution of the ICC to bring peace to the
region. Therefore, more individuals will have to be targeted, including rebel
leaders and higher government officials in Khartoum. Sooner or later, the GoS
will have to "sacrifice" at least the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs,
Ahmad Harun. Unfortunately, trying those most responsible for the inter-
national crimes committed in Darfur will not be possible in the short run but
only after a regime change in Khartoum. I"6
More generally, international support for the ICC is crucial, above all by
the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to increase the
effectiveness of the Court. The Security Council has the power to determine
that the refusal of a national government to cooperate with the ICC represents
a threat to international peace and security, thus ensuring the enforcement of
ICC requests for cooperation and arrest warrants. With this political support,
the ICC will become a significant player when the international community
faces situations of mass atrocities, therefore successfully developing into "an
instrument for maintaining international peace and security by the pursuit of
justice." '187
186. In this context, it is interesting to note that Sudan already has experience with trials of former
political figures. The leaders of the 1969 coup, including Colonel Jaafar al-Nineiri, were successfully
prosecuted during the 1985-86 transitional period for overthrowing a democratically elected government.
See Yoanes Ajawin, Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice, in THE PHOENIX STATE: CIVIL
SOCIETY AND THE FUTURE OF SUDAN 113, 121 (A.H. Abdel Salam & Alex de Waal eds., 2001).
187. McGoldrick, supra note 8, at 471.
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However, there is an important caveat: the ICC should not be used as a fig
leaf by the international community. In the case of Darfur, the Security Council
seemed to consider the ICC referral as a "halfway measure from the
humanitarian military intervention."' 88 If more stringent measures, such as
political or economic sanctions or, as a last resort, a military intervention, are
urgently needed to halt mass atrocities, the ICC activity cannot be used as an
excuse by the international community not to take action.
The Darfur conflict has shown that the international community, including
the ICC, must urgently increase its efforts to be able to deal with mass atrocities
without delay. The analysis of the ICC involvement in the situation of Darfur
should also be helpful to determine a generally valid, constructive approach of
international criminal justice regarding future armed conflicts and in bello
justice.
188. Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur and the International Criminal
Court, 13 TJL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 55 (2006).
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I. INTRODUCTION
While traveling through Pakistan, British resident Binyam Mohamed
(Mohamed) was arrested and handed over to U.S. government agents for four
months of abusive first-round interrogation while denied access to a legal
representation.' Abou Elkassim Britel (Britel), an Italian citizen, endured two
months of initial interrogation in Pakistan, while denied access to the Italian
consulate.2 Ahmed Agiza (Agiza), an Egyptian citizen seeking asylum in
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A.,
Florida Atlantic University, 2003. I would wholeheartedly like to thank the ILSA Journal for their support
and painstaking time, with special gratitude toward Brooke Guenot, Valerie Piermatti, Allison Sinclair, David
Ehrlich and Jennifer Keesler. I am most grateful to Professor Charlene Smith for providing the spark that
ignited this article and to my husband, Anthony, for his ever-present belief in me.
1. Complaint at 1, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., Civ. No. C-07-2798 RS (N.D. Cal. filed
May 7, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/299191g120070530.html (last visited Aug.
1,2007).
2. Id. at 2.
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Sweden was secretly apprehended and turned over to U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) agents.3 Unbeknownst to them, the period of December
2001-April 2002 would mark the onset of a horrific fate: each stripped,
shackled, and flown blindfolded to secret detention facilities across the globe,
against their will, where they were physically and psychologically tortured4
devoid of judicial safeguards.' None would know their seizures and secret
detentions were part of a larger clandestine CIA secret rendition program,6 in
which suspected terrorists are methodically plucked from neighboring nations,
and placed against their will to "black sites" across the globe to countries where
it is more likely than not 7 that the transfer will lead to their torture They
would each instantly become "ghost detainees"9 and after prolonged detentions
without charge, none have been released."1
In May 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit on
behalf of these three plaintiffs"l in the United States District Court for the
3. Id.
4. Id at 1.
5. Complaint at 1, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., Civ. No. C-07-2798 RS (N.D. Cal. filed
May 7, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/299l9lgl20070530.html (last visited Aug.
1,2007).
6. Authorities in Sweden and Italy opened investigations into the CIA's role in seizing suspects
from their respective countries and flying them to other countries such as Egypt where they were interrogated.
See Scott Shane, Stephen Grey & Margot Williams, C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter
Flights, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at Al.
7. ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, Torture by Proxy: Int"l andDomestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary
Renditions" (Oct. 29,2004), available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/Torture By Proxy.pdf (last visited Aug.
1, 2007) [hereinafter Torture by Proxy] (committee report concluding the extraordinary rendition program
violates both international and domestic law and recommends that it is immediately brought to an end).
8. AMNESTY INT'L, BELOW THE RADAR: SECRET FLIGHTS TO TORTURE AND "DISAPPEARANCE"
(2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR510512006ENGLISHI$File/AMR5105106.pdf
[hereinafter Below the Radar] (according to Amnesty, "the rendition network's aim is to use whatever means
necessary to gather intelligence, and to keep detainees away from any judicial oversight.").
9. WORLD ORG. FOR HUM. RTS. USA, Torture, Arbitrary Detention, and Other Major Human
Rights Abuses by the United States: US. Non-Compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in the Context of the "War on Terror" (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/wofhr.pdf (last visited July 31,2007) (report submitted
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in preparation for NGO hearings before the Committee in
March 2006).
10. As of July 2007, Mohamed remains incarcerated in Guantanamo, Cuba; Agiza is serving a
twenty-five year sentence in Egypt for being a member of a banned Islamic organization, following a six-hour
military trial; Britel is serving a nine-year sentence in Casablanca, Morocco after signing a forced confession
for involvement in bombings that took place there. See generally Complaint, supra note 1.
11. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-3.
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Northern District of California, Ninth Circuit. 2 However, the named defendant
is not the CIA, nor any of the plaintiffs U.S. citizens. 3 A Boeing Subsidiary,
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen) 4 headquartered in San Jose, California, 5
finds itself front stage on the torture debate that started brewing when rumors
of the CIAs secret rendition flights were first given intense media spotlight. 6
The brief two-month period following the initial complaint, a probable result
of broad international coverage, produced two additional plaintiffs who joined
the suit against Jeppesen in August 2007.'" Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah
(Bashmilah), a Yemeni citizen, and Bisher al-Rawi (al-Rawi), a British resident
whom was living in England since 1984 to escape Saddam Hussein's regime,
endured experiences similar to those ofMohamed, Agiza, and Britel.' 8 Hooded,
drugged, and flown to countries in which both were systematically tortured,
Bashmilah and al-Rawi were forcibly disappeared; what separates these two
men from the others are their recent releases.' 9 Freed from secret confines of
the covert rendition program, their voices speak to the details of U.S.
government policies which have quietly evaded mainstream discussion.
Though controversy embeds itself within the emotive and pragmatic
implications of countering terrorism, this article embraces the global implica-
tions of a U.S.-led rendition to torture program. The discussion begins by
outlining the legal framework from which five international citizens-none of
which maintain American citizenship--likely have standing to bring their
claims in U.S. courts. Next, the claims for relief sought against Jeppesen are
referenced, while focusing upon their potential for dismissal, under a likely
intervention by the United States, citing state-secrets privilege. The
international rendition network, its operation and background, and Jeppesen's
12. See id.
13. Anthony J. Sebok, A Bid to Litigate the Legality of U.S.-Sponsored Torture in Federal Court:
Will It Succeed?, FindLaw.com, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20070605.html (June 5, 2007) (last
visited Aug. 1, 2007).
14. Jeppesen operates under the trade name of Jeppesen International Trip Planning. It is also a
subsidiary of Jeppesen Sanderson based in Englewood, Colorado. Jeppesen Sanderson is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Boeing Company headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
15. Jane Mayer, The C.LA. 's Travel Agent, NEW YORKER, at 34, (Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030ta-talk mayer (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
16. Chandra Lekha Sriram, Op-Ed., Exporting Torture: US Rendition and European Outrage,
JURIST, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/12/exporting-torture-us-rendition-and.php (Dec. 13,2005) (last
visited Aug. 1, 2007).
17. First Amended Complaint at 1, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., Civ. No. 5:07-cv-02798
(JW) (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 1,2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefreettorturel3I1641g120070801 .htm
(last visited Aug. 4, 2007).
18. Id. at3.
19. Id. at 3, 4.
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role in facilitating the illegal activities are enumerated for further under-
standing. Finally, the suit's implications, legally and sociologically, and its
likelihood of success, are woven together to determine/analyze what the future
may bring for multinational corporations complicit in violation of international
law as well as whether the rendition program may be impacted at all.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Five non-U.S. citizens are able to file suit within the federal court system,
based solely on jurisdiction granted by the U.S. government."
A. Jurisdiction through the Alien Tort Statute (A TS)21
Alien's action for tort: the district courts "have cognizance ... of all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."22 Adopted through the Judiciary Act of 1789,23
as a means for providing recourse to non-citizens whom suffered at the hands
of pirates on the high seas,24 new life has breathed upon this once ancient
statute. The ATS allows aliens to bring suit in U.S. courts for violations of
the law of nations or treaties of the United States by granting jurisdiction.26 It
does not, in and of itself, create a cause of action.2 7  The Supreme Court
carefully reviewed history when placing the ATS into a modern-day context in
2004 and viewed the statute to be practical in nature.28 "The ATS recognizes
20. Jurisdiction is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (federal question). Id. § 1332
(diversity jurisdiction). Id § 1350 (Alien Tort Statute). See First Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 6.
21. The ATS will also be referenced as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) at times during this
article to preserve quoted material. See Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern Foundations for
Aiding andAbetting Liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARIz. L. REv. 805, 805 n.5 (2005) (noting the
Supreme Court's reference to the statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain as the Alien Tort Statute-rather than
the ATCA.).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
23. Id.
24. Jenny B. Davis, OldLaw Bares Its Teeth: Alien Tort Claims Act Bites International Firms, 89
A.B.A. J. 20,20 (2003); see also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of1 789:
A Badge of Honor, 83 A.J.I.L. 461, 488 n. 120 (noting that piracy was not included in the enumeration of
potential torts in the 1781 resolution and not excluded by the language of the statute).
25. Id
26. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
27. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) ("The jurisdictional grant is best read as
having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.").
28. Id
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as federal common law those international norms that have definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations. ' 29
B. Filartiga v. Peha-Irald°
The modem-day usage of the ATS, giving birth to its revitalization, was
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision in Filartiga,
after near two-hundred years of dormancy.3 In Filartiga, a Paraguayan
national whose son was tortured to death by a Paraguayan police officer (Pefia-
Irala) filed suit in a United States court under the ATS, though the citizens were
from Paraguay and the events exclusively occurred there.32 While in the United
States seeking asylum, the plaintiff-mother learned of Pefia-Irala's presence in
the country on a VISA and commenced a wrongful death suit.33 The Court held
that torture which leads to the death of a person is a direct violation of the law
of nations34 and expanded the application of the Alien Tort Statute to include
torts, in violation of international law, committed around the world.3 5
Interpretation should not be strictly limited to laws of 1789 but rather
international law as it exists today.36 The Filartiga Court37 viewed the ATS as
a basis for providing a civil remedy to the victims of the enemies of mankind,3"
when it held, that deliberate torture committed under color of law violates
29. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
30. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
31. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort
Statute, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607,610 (noting Filartiga paved the way for a new conceptualization of the
ATS.).
32. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
33. Id. at 878-79.
34. Id. at 876, 880 n.4 ("Richard Lillich, the Howard W. Smith Professor of Law at the University
of Virginia School of Law, concludes, after a lengthy review of the authorities, that officially perpetrated
torture is 'a violation of international law formerly called the law of nations."').
35. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-90.
36. Id. at 881.
37. Torture by Proxy, supra note 7 ("The Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where
courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international
law" (quoting Filartiga)).
38. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 ("In the modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations have
combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their
individual and collective interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted,
is the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like
the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding today,
giving effect to ajurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but important step in the
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.").
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universally accepted norms of international human rights law and is therefore
a violation of United States law.39
C. Kadic v. Karadzic°
Filartiga, coupled with a Second Circuit ruling in Kadic in 1995, extended
the ATS to include non-state actors.4 In Kadic, the plaintiffs were Croat and
Muslim citizens ofBosnia-Herzegovina who brought charges of atrocities such
as torture, rape, and summary execution, inter alia, against Karadzic, on behalf
of themselves and representative victims.42 Karadzic, who was in lawful
control of Bosnian-Serb forces carrying out these war crimes, could face
liability as acting under the color of state law43 or, in the alternative, as an
individual due to the magnitude of the offenses. 44 The court laid down the
principle that private parties could be liable, "for certain violations of
customary international law,' 45 such as genocide, war crimes, summary
execution, and torture.46
D. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
47
The landmark United States Supreme Court case of Sosa, which originated
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was initiated by a
Mexican citizen who was forcibly abducted by several Mexican nationals
operating as bounty hunters, at the bequest of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). Dr. Alvarez-Machain was tried and
acquitted for the murder of a DEA agent, then later filed suit against one of the
hired abductors (Sosa) for violation of the law of nations as spelled out in the
ATS for his false arrest. Alvarez-Machain also brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the court summarily dismissed since
the alleged harm took place outside of the United States, in Mexico.48
39. Id. at 878.
40. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
41. Alan Frederick Enslen, Commentary: Filartiga 's Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly
Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act with its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REV. 695,
734 (1997).
42. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
43. Id. at 237.
44. Id. at 239.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 242-46.
47. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
48. Id. at 712 ("We therefore hold that the FTCA's foreign country exception bars all claims based
on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred."); see
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The Supreme Court held, in an opinion written by Justice Souter, that
although the plaintiff was not entitled to a remedy on either the ATS claim or
the FTCA claim, this did not preclude future human rights victims from the
ability to bring suit under the ATS in U.S. courts.49 The Sosa opinion has been
a source of contention as both human rights advocates (potential future
plaintiffs) and multinational corporations (likely future defendants) euphemisti-
cally view it as a victory: on one hand, the Supreme Court left a narrow
window of recovery open for violations against international law, while at the
same time, cautioned against an expansive view of the ATS.5" At present, there
have been little more than twenty cases brought under the modem-day
interpretation of the ATS against multinational corporations for complicity in
egregious human rights violations.51
ii. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL NORMS
Generally, there are four ways in which international law may become
binding on the United States: court interpretation of statutes, legislative
reference to international law, use of international law principles to fill gaps in
common law, and through direct incorporation52 of treaties.53 In Sosa, "the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that 'the domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations,' a pronouncement in accord with a long lineage
of precedents. 54  Customary international law, also called, "the law of
nations,"55 are practices followed by state entities out of a sense of legal
obligation and are of a "general and consistent practice" such as the prohibition
on slavery and genocide.56 Furthermore, Congress has affirmatively sided with
court decisions which hold the statute refers to current norms of international
also Beth Henderson, Note & Comment, From Justice to Torture: The Dramatic Evolution of US.-
Sponsored Renditions, 20 TEMP. INT'L&COMP. L.J. 189, 210 (2006) (noting that under the FTCA one who
had been rendered by the U.S. government in order to be tortured in a foreign country would not be able to
sue under this statute.).
49. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 at 724-25.
50. Id.
51. Daphne Eviatar, A Big Win for Human Rights, THE NATION, May 9, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050509/eviatar (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
52. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
53. AMNESTY INT'L, U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/Detainees/US-Obligations -Under-International-Law/page.do?id=I 031030&
nl =3&n2=82 I&n3=837 (last visited Aug. 2, 2007).
54. David M. Lieberman, Sorting the Revolutionary from the Terrorist: the Delicate Application
of the "Political Offense" Exception in US. Extradition Cases, 59 STAN. L. REV. 181, 205 (2006).
55. Id.
56. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 53.
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law.57 Given precedent and public policy leanings, the Plaintiffs charge
Jeppesen's with violating customary international law and treaties ratified by
the United States legislature, due to their involvement in the CIAs extraordinary
rendition program."
IV. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
The claims for relief are based on both forced disappearance and for
"torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."59 These are both,
"specific, universal, and obligatory norm of customary international law,"
which is recognized under the ATS.60 The complaint alleges that:
[Jeppesen had] actual or constructive knowledge that its involvement
would result in the secret apprehension and detention of Plaintiffs...
in the alternative, Jeppesen . . . participated in or committed a
wrongful act in furtherance of conspiracy which resulted in injury to
plaintiffs... [the] plaintiffs were subjected to torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment by agents of the U.S., Morocco, and
Egypt. Customary International law prohibits.., against removing
any person, regardless of status, to a country where there is a
substantial likelihood that he will be tortured... [it] is a 'specific,
universal, and obligatory' norm of customary international law
cognizable under the Alien Tort Statute.6 1
V. CIA RENDITIONS
In the Post-9/1 1 world, the United States government expanded its global
counter-terrorism role, utilizing state agencies such as the CIA. Covert
operations conducted by the CIA operate within a sphere of vagueness in U.S.
law,62 making it an attractive vehicle for the government to carry out state
objectives in a less than public fashion. Covert action is activity meant "to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is
57. Beth Stephens, International Law Weekend Proceedings: Human Rights Accountability:
Congress, Federalism, and International Law, 6 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 277, 281 n.16 ("noting that the
ATCA permits suits based on 'norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
international law"').
58. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5-6.
59. Complaint, supra note 1, at 42.
60. Id. at 41.
61. Id.
62. Jennifer D. Kibbe, The Rise of Shadow Warriors, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 102, 102-04 (2004),
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040301 faessay83209/ ennifer-d-kibbe/the-rise-of-the-shadow-
warriors.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
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intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly."63 The CIA operates clandestine prisons at different
points around the globe, which were unknown to many to even exist.' One of
the means through which these covert activities are carried out are through
extraordinary renditions.65 The phrase was first used by the United States
Marshall Service to, "[bring] certain fugitives within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States by kidnapping them abroad."66 However, this practice has
morphed from one in which the U.S. government used formal proceedings to
try the covertly abducted to a program where the suspects are transferred to
countries where it is likely-if not a near-certain probability-they will be
tortured.67 It is considered a "hybrid human rights violation" with "elements of
arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, forcible transfer, torture, denial of
access to consular officials, and denial of impartial tribunals."68 The rendered
victims are taken to "black sites"-secret detention facilities-in countries in
which the State Department acknowledges the clear and ongoing use of torture.
A committee report, submitted by a nongovernmental agency (NGO) to the
United Nations sheds light on this abusive practice:
[T]he CIA continues operating these secret detention facilities abroad
and refuses access to these prisons to international monitors such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). These 'ghost
detainees' are being held abroad in secret sites to avoid judicial
review of the legality of their detention and conditions of their
confinement, and to avoid media attention. This denial of an impartial
judicial determination of their status and treatment constitutes a
violation of the Article 9 right to promptly challenge lawfulness of
detention before a court and the Article14 right to a fair trial by a
competent, independent and impartial court of law or tribunal.
Sources within the CIA indicate that approximately 100 'ghost
detainees' are currently being held in these secret facilities despite the
fact that over 70% of these detainees have little to no intelligence
value to interrogators. Eight detainees held at Guantanamo Bay
revealed in December 2005 that they were held in a secret detention
63. Id.
64. Jackie Northam, Morning Edition: U.S. Acknowledges Existence of Secret CIA Prisons, NPR
radio broadcast, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5780585 (September 7,
2006) (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
65. See infra, note 68.
66. Henderson, supra note 48, at 210 (remarking "(tioday, rendition to justice stands juxtaposed
to a newer form of rendition developed with the advent of the U.S. war on terrorism: rendition to torture.").
67. Id at 189.
68. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 127 (2006).
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facility near Kabul, Afghanistan at different times between 2002 and
2004 before being sent to Guantanamo. There, the detainees reported
being chained to walls, deprived of food and clean drinking water,
and kept in total darkness with loud music and other sounds blared
over a stereo system for weeks at a time. U.S. interrogators slapped
and punched the detainees during interrogations and shackled them
in such a manner that made sleep impossible.69
All five plaintiffs were rendered to countries in which they endured similar
torture abuses, and were beyond the reach of international safeguards.
The executive branch has strong incentives to withhold information from
the public, albeit some of them legitimate.7" However, valid concerns arise
where an individual is not afforded even the barest of due process and is left,
"in the hands of despotic governments."'" It is common for states to deny their
involvement in order to escape scrutiny.72 The detentions are shrouded in
secrecy and scant information-characteristic of the program itself-is made
available on held individuals; even a person's name will likely be concealed by
the government.73 It was not until September, 2006, that President Bush
publicly acknowledged the existence of the secret-run CIA prisons across the
globe.74 Prior to this, information slipped out through government leaks75 or a
minority of victims that were held captive and released." There is consensus
among experts that more than one hundred of these cases are thought to exist
since September 11 th.77
69. WORLD ORG. FOR HuM. RTS. USA, supra note 9 (citing Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspect
in Secret Prisons, WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 2, 2005), at AO1 and Human Rights Watch, U.S. Operated
Secret 'Dark Prison' in Kabul (Dec. 19, 2005)).
70. Jared Perkins, Note & Comment, The State Secrets Privilege and the Abdication of Oversight,
21 BYU J. PuB. L. 235, 264 (2007).
71. Henderson, supra note 48, at 217.
72. Id.
73. Jonathan Hafetz, Symposium: Secret Evidence and the Courts in the Age of National Security:
Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy Detentions at Guantanamo, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 127, 127 (2006).
74. Northam, supra note 64 (President Bush remarked, "It has been necessary to move these
individuals to an environment where they can be held in secret, questioned by experts and, when appropriate,
prosecuted for terrorist acts.").
75. Hafetz, supra note 73, at 127.
76. Michael V. Sage, Note, The Exploitation ofLegal Loopholes in the Name ofNational Security:
A Case Study on Extraordinary Rendition, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 121, 124 (2006).
77. Id. (citing Douglas Jehl, Senate May Open Inquiry into C.I.A. 's Handling of Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 15).
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The recent Executive Order,7" signed into law by President Bush on July
21 st, 2007 outlines new rules for the CIAs interrogation methods, yet does little
to quell the controversy.79 Unmistakably, there is no assertion the rendition
program will cease; the Order speaks to modification rather than cessation.
While the directive facially tones down some of the harsh interrogation
methods which were previously authorized, the techniques which have been
approved are classified, and beyond scrutiny."0 Forbidden techniques include
exposing detainees to extremes of hot and cold and "waterboarding" to induce
a feeling of drowning." However, the NEW YORK TIMES reports that the new,
"rules would still allow some techniques more severe than those used in
interrogations by military personnel in places like ...Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba."82 Moreover, the order continues to prohibit the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) from visiting detainees.83
Conceptually and in practice, a "rendition to torture'' 4 program is fraught
with complexities, as attitudes of world leaders clash within the fuzzy nexus
where legality, morality, and necessity combine to shape state policies to
combat terrorism.85 Swiss Senator Dick Marty authored a report by the Council
of Europe 6 on the ClAs secret rendition program, and condemned it to be
directly at odds with the European Convention on Human Rights87 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.8 The report is also critical of the
precarious methods in which both people and corporations are linked to
terrorism, placed on special lists without charge, and with no way to remove
one's self.89 In defense, Dan Fried, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs stated, "[w]e are attempting to keep our people safe; we are
attempting to fight dangerous terrorist groups who are active and who mean
what they say about destroying us. We are trying to do so in a way consistent
78. Exec. Order No. 13440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40, 707 (July 20, 2007).
79. Mark Mazetti, Rules Lay Out C.I.A. 's Tactics in Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at
Al.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Henderson, supra note 48, at 189.
85. Paul Reynolds, Rendition and the Rights of the Individual, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5055872.stm (last visited July 31, 2007).
86. First Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
87. Reynolds, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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with our values and our international legal obligations."9 State entities such
as Britain and the United States maintain it is necessary in order to effectively
combat the terrorism threat.9 However, Marty points out that the "Old World"
used existing legal institutions to deal effectively with threats in the past yet the
United States opted, "to develop new legal concepts."92
While many across the globe eagerly await an overdue torture on trial,
some countries prove not so patient: the sovereign nations of both Italy and
Germany have issued public arrest warrants for CIA agents in their alleged
involvement in illegally abducting and rendering citizens from within their
respective borders.
Meanwhile, the ACLU alleges Jeppesen provided the logistical support,
travel, and operations for the CIA in these illegal renditions.93 They are
charged with knowledge, or in the alternative, constructive knowledge that
facilitating the transport of these abductees was likely to lead to their torture
and may face liability for complicity as, "aiding and abetting" the torture. 94
While Jeppesen will likely claim in its answer to the complaint that it had
no knowledge of the role the CIA played in the forced disappearances, in using
its planes or planning expertise, it may not make for a convincing argument if
the claim survives an inevitable motion to dismiss95 and proceeds through
discovery to trial. On record are published flight logs which document
Jeppesen's involvement in actual flights and planning,96 which were uncovered
by a journalist when investigating the disappearance of Italian citizen Britel. 97
At a minimum, the records demonstrate circumstantial proof, particularly when
corroborated with known disappearances.
Crucial evidence could easily be swept up into the surreptitious vortex of
"state secrets." Legally, this presents a challenge beyond the obvious question
of accountability: the Ninth Circuit will undoubtedly be forced to consider
whether significant portions of information will be protected by the
90. Reynolds, supra note 85.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
94. Id. at 39-42.
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
96. Diane Solomon, Breaking Jeppesen: Behind the Story: How Investigative Journalists Used
Flight Records to Uncover the Company's Link to the CIA, METROACTIVE, http//www.metroactive.com/
metro/06.13.07/j eppesen-0724.html (Jun. 13-19,2007) (last visited Aug. 1,2007) (discussing Italian reporter
Claudio Gatti who uncovered and decoded flight logs correlating to secret rendition flights). See also Mayer,
supra note 15 (quoting managing director Bob Overby, "[w]e do all of the extraordinary rendition
flights-you know, the torture flights." Another executive was quoted saying, "[w]e do the spook flights.").
97. Solomon, supra note 96.
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government's state secrets privilege.9" Only a government can assert this in a
direct effort to protect its national security.99 Though the torture and the
transport of the plaintiffs is illegal and violates customary international law,'
much of the supporting documentation would likely have to be obtained from
the government itself: the CIA.
A. EI-Masri v. Tenet (El-Masri 1)101
In December of 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia dismissed the suit of EI-Masri I, based on the CIAs invocation of state
secrets privilege. 0 2 El-Masri, whose identify was mistaken for another, was
abducted while vacationing in Macedonia, 10 3 and consequently detained,
drugged, and tortured for five months1" by CIA operatives after having been
flown via Air CIA105 to one of the nefarious black sites located in
Afghanistan.0 6 Represented by the ACLU, El-Masri brought claims in the U.S.
under the Alien Tort Statute for violating international legal norms'0 7 which
98. Erin M. Stilp, Comment, The Military and State-Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding
Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 831, 831 (2006) (noting "[t]he privilege permits the government to refuse
discovery requests where 'there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged."' United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
99. Id. (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10).
100. Torture by Proxy, supra note 7, at 31.
101. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).
102. Id. at 541.
103. El Masri's citizenship is German. Id. at 532.
104. See ACLU, STATEMENT: KHALED EL-MASRI, available at
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraordinaryrendition/22201 res20051206.html#statement (last visited July 31,
2007) [hereinafter STATEMENT].
105. See Michael Hirsh, Mark Hosenball & John Barry, Aboard Air CIA, available at
http://www.msnbc.com/id/6999272/sitelnewsweek (Feb. 28, 2005) (last visited July 31, 2007).
106. STATEMENT, supra note 104.
107. See generally DIGEST OF JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM, General Comment No. 20, (Oct. 3, 1992)
("The right to freedom from torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is, under both the
universal and regional systems, absolute and non-derogable under all circumstances. In its General Comment
No. 20 on article 7 of the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee underlined the non-derogable nature of
this provision: The text of article 7 allows of no limitation. The Committee also reaffirms that, even in
situations of public emergency such as those referred to in article 4 of the Covenant, no derogation from the
provision of article 7 is allowed and its provisions must remain in force. The Committee likewise observes
that no justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 for any
reasons, including those based on an order from a superior officer or public authority."). Id 3.
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prohibit, "prolonged, arbitrary detention."' 8  He also brought claims for
violation of international norms such as the prohibition against cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment.'0 9
The United States took several approaches in defense of its extraordinary
rendition program. First, it filed a formal claim of state secrets privilege."0
Then, a motion to intervene was filed to preserve state secrets."' The District
Court granted the government's motion to dismiss and the presiding Judge
remarked that, "any admission or denial of [EI-Masri's] allegations by
defendants in this case would reveal the means and methods employed pursuant
to this clandestine program and such a revelation would present a grave risk of
injury to national security.""' 2 The court reasoned that, although El-Masri's
claims may be true, his "private interests must give way to the national security
interest in preserving state secrets.""' 3 Furthermore, while examining Fourth
Circuit precedent, the court reasoned that trying the plaintiff's claim would be
akin to exposing the very methods used by the government, whose interests
were [deemed] paramount." 4 According to this logic, this made a dismissal
appropriate where El-Masri's abduction and torture claims could not be proved
without examining the CIAs methods, which are protected." 5 He is currently
petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari'16 after losing the appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit." 7
B. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
The El-Masri case differs from the complaint filed against Jeppesen," 8 as
the U.S. government, though inextricably linked, is not a named defendant' "'
-seemingly reminiscent of President Nixon as the "unindicted co-conspirator"
108. Amanda Frost, Essay, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1931, 1942 (2007).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1943.
111. Id.
112. Frost, supra note 108, at 1943 (quoting EI-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 536).
113. Id. at 1944 (quoting EI-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 539).
114. EI-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
115. Id. at 539.
116. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, El-Masri, 479 F.3d 296 (No. 06-0000), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/elmasri_cert20070530.pdf (last visited July 31, 2007).
117. EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007). See also Adam Liptak, German
Loses Appeal on Abuse Suit Against CIA, INT'L HERALD TRM (Mar. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/03/news/webO3O3.terror.php (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
118. First Amended Complaint supra note 17.
119. SeeEl-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530.
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during Watergate. 120 The ACLU appears to be shifting its legal strategy on
behalf of Mohamed, Britel, Agiza, Bashmilah, and al-Rawi by not taking direct
aim at the state, rather circuitously through the corporation 2' which was
instrumental in the rendition program. 22
Flight logs housed by aviation authorities provide evidentiary support of
Jeppesen's connection with the renditions. 123 Each flight log contains codes
specifying the airport's departure, arrival, and originator.124 "The originator
files the flight plan and supports the flight."' 25 Research obtained through flight
records made available by the commissions of the European Parliament and
Council of Europe, as well as civil aviation authorities, documented Jeppesen's
undeniable involvement. 26 Although Jeppesen has had $7.7 million in defense
contracting since 2000, it is unclear how much of that went toward the rendition
flight planning, as the CIA does not foreclose its contracts. 127 The raw data
obtained through the flight lists provides more clarity when individual cases are
brought to light and the rendition can be matched with the flight record.' 28
Amnesty International released a comprehensive report 29 explaining, "that
the CIA has avoided detection by taking advantage of the terms of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the so-called 'Chicago Convention'
under which private, non-commercial flights may fly over countries and make
120. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 (1974).
121. First Amended Complaint, supra note 17.
122. Note that the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) is not alleged to have been violated. For
a potential explanation, see e.g., Eric Engle, Commentary, The Torture Victim's Protection Act, The Alien
Tort Claims Act, and Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. REv. 501, 504 n.16 (2003)
("Whether a corporation can be liable under the TVPA is contentious. The TVPA uses only the term
'individual' which argues against a finding that corporations maybe liable for torture, but the overall purpose
of the statute is to remedy torturous wrongdoings, irrespective of which individual is torturing." (quoting
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-44)).
123. Solomon, supra note 96.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Rick Anderson, Flog is My Co-Pilot: Boeing is Alleged to be Travel Agent for Torture,
SEATTLE WEEKLY (Dec. 2,2006), available at http://www.seattleweekly.com/2006-11-29/news/flog-is-my-
co-pilot.php (last visited July 31, 2007) (based on a review of Pentagon records).
128. Below the Radar, supra note 8, at 28.
129. Id. at 27.
The flight information comes from several sources: FAA flight records; European flight records; actual
flight logs; aircraft movements recorded by airport authorities; airport records acquired in police and
parliamentary investigations; photographs of aircraft in selected airports; and some press reports. Flight logs
contain all movements carried out by the plane, including all stopovers between origin and destination
airports. Id.
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technical stops without notifying the country.""13 Both tacit and explicit rules
are established for flights which require national governmental approval in the
189 contracting states which are part of the Convention.' 3' The most recent
adoption was in 2000.132 "[S]pecific agreement or authorization to fly over the
territory of another state or to use its airports" is required of state aircrafts.'33
However, private flights are not required to seek prior approval and that is why
it is held that private contractors are utilized.'34 Crucially, Jeppesen's role, in
addition to providing logistical support and the means to effectuate the
renditions was to provide the illusion of civilian transit. Its decoy ensured the
CIA could sidestep international law and avoid public scrutiny by arriving
unmarked,' unannounced, and arguably increased the odds that, more likely
than not, the secret abduction and transfer of rendition victims would be
successful. The Ninth Circuit will be called upon to potentially decide whether
this is actionable under the Alien Tort Statute, or in the alternative, whether to
allow the case to proceed.
VI. COMPLICITY LIABILITY
Both "the common law and modem jurisprudence . . . support the
application of aiding and abetting, and complicit liability, under the ATS.' 36
In 2005, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Cabello maintained that, "by
[its] terms, the ATCA... [is] not limited to claims of direct liability."'3 Citing
Ninth' and Fifth139 Circuit cases, the Cabello court noted that these two
districts, "held that the ATCA reaches conspiracies and accomplice liability." 4 °
Although, there has been only one final circuit decision 4' post-Sosa against a
corporation under the ATS and one settlement, 142 the international business
community is closely watching twelve pending federal appeals that could have
130. Chris Buell, CIA Used Private Air Carriers to Hide Rendition: Amnesty International Report,
JURIST, http ://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/04/cia-used-private-air-carriers-to-hide.php (Apr. 4,2006)
(last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
131. Below the Radar, supra note 8, at 22.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id
135. Flights implicated in the extraordinary renditions bore no markings related to the CIA. Id.
136. See Diskin, supra note 21, at 836 for a detailed discussion of the ATS's underpinnings.
137. Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005).
138. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1996).
139. Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988).
140. Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1157.
141. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242 (11 th Cir. 2005).
142. Eviatar, supra note 51.
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a significant impact on future liabilities.143 Of particular relevance in the Ninth
Circuit is the recent Ninth Circuit Appellate decision of Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
which has recently survived in its ability to go forward under the ATS.
44
Critics argue that imposing civil liability on multinational corporations, under
the Alien Tort Statute, does little for underlying human rights violations.'45
However, if it is possible to hold companies liable for egregious violations,
such as their complicity with torture, then it presumably could alter their actions
internationally. If the case against Jeppesen is seen to strike at the chord of
complicity, then its aim is surely to shatter the rendition's tune.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the aiding and abetting standard has been waged to put multi-
national corporations on the defensive in their complicity, and sometimes overt
participation, with egregious foreign governments' human rights abuses, it
remains to be decided what, if any, nepotism may be shown towards the home
team: the United States government. Although there is a strong likelihood that
the Jeppesen case may be dismissed, under a government invocation of the
state-secrets privilege, perhaps it should not. A corporation's direct involve-
ment, in violation of both international and domestic law, should not go
unscathed. Had it not been for the covert activities of companies such as
Jeppesen, making it possible for the renditions to continue, perhaps Mohamed,
Agiza, Britel, Bashmilah, and al-Rawi might not have paid the ultimate price.
143. NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, YAHOO! LATEST CORPORATE TARGET FOR ALIEN
TORT STATUTE CLAIMS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, available at http://www.uschamber.com/NR/
rdonlyres/eqisp7upvvjc2276ehj5nwtbzr4ecfv3be5wqv4ceqgqgo3i6dqaipm3tct6wg4rpwexvr72fljaey5oi
uf7qywra/070515casealert.pdf (May 15, 2007) (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
144. 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing dismissal by lower court for non-justiciable political
question and affirming the ATCA does not require an exhaustion of local remedies before pursing an ATCA
claim).
145. Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Note & Comment, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on
Multinational Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism Note and Comment, 18
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1009, 1056-57 (2003) (commentating that enforceable guidelines are needed for
multinational corporations in foreign nations) (citing Demian Betz, Holding Multinational Corporations
Responsible for Human Rights Abuses Committed by Security Forces in Conflict-Ridden Nations: An
Argument Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Regulating Corporate Behavior
Abroad, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 163, 203 (2001-2002)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Space offers the potential for practically limitless wealth, some already
being exploited, some we may only harness in the distant future, and
undoubtedly some we cannot begin to guess."' On October 4, 1957, the first
satellite, Sputnik, was launched to outer space.2 On July 21, 1962, Neil
Armstrong, an American astronaut, landed on the moon, this being the first time
anyone had ever set foot in outer space.' Ever since, humanity's curiosity for
* JD Candidate 2009, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; B.S. in Finance
and B.A. in Economics, University of Florida, 2006. The author would like to thank her family and friends
specially Mirta Gallego, her grandmother, her parents, and Romel Mederos for their continued and
unconditional love and support.
I. Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59 (1999).
2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Solar System Exploration,
http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/missions/profile.cfm?MCode=Sputnik (last modified Jan. 28, 2004) (last visited
Sept. 27, 2007).
3. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Neil A. Armstrong Biographical Data,
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/arrnstrong-na.html (last modified Dec. 2003) (last visited Sept. 27,
2007).
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the mysteries of outer space has increased exponentially. New technologies are
constantly being developed to explore the potentials of outer space as well as
the hidden mysteries of the earth. The international community, through the
United Nations' (UN) Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
promulgated five treaties and principles aimed to regulate governmental and
commercial activities in space.4 The Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (also known as the Outer Space Treaty or
OST) was opened for signature on January 27, 1967, entered into force on
October 10, 1967 and as of January 1,2007, ninety-eight countries have ratified
it and twenty-seven have signed it.5 The second Treaty was The Agreement on
the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (also known as the Rescue Agreement) which was
entered into force on December 3, 1968 and as of January 1,2007, it has eighty-
nine ratifications and twenty-four signatures.6 Thirdly, the UN General
Assembly adopted The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (known as the Liability Convention) which was
entered into force on September 1, 1972, and as of January 1, 2007, it has
eighty-four ratifications and twenty-four signatures.7 On September 15, 1976,
the General Assembly entered into force the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space (also known as the Registration Conven-
tion) and as of January 1, 2007, it has forty-seven ratifications and four signa-
tures.' The last Treaty adopted by the General assembly was The Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(known as the Moon Agreement) which was entered into force on July 11, 1984
and as of January 1,2007, it has thirteen ratifications and four signatures.9 Ever
4. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2410, 610 U.N.T.S.
215 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T 7570, 7 I.L.M. 151 [hereinafter
Rescue Agreement]; Convention of International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29,
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,28 U.S.T. 695,1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
Convention]; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec.
18, 1979, 1353 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. See United Nations Treaties and
Principles on Space Law, available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2007).
5. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4.
6. See Rescue Agreement, supra note 4.
7. See Liability Convention, supra note 4.
8. See Registration Convention, supra note 4.
9. See Moon Agreement, supra note 4.
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since 1984, the United Nations has not adopted any other Treaties pertaining
the exploration and use of Outer Space.
The international instruments that are most relevant when analyzing remote
sensing activities are:
1) The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, known as the "Outer Space Treaty";
2) The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects, known as the "Liability Convention"; and
3) The United Nations General Assembly resolution adopting the
Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer
Space, known as Resolution 41/65.10
This Note is divided in five parts; the three main topics will be the Outer
Space Treaty, remote sensing, and civil and military use of remotely sensed
data. Part H focuses on the Outer Space Treaty: its history, the Principles con-
trolling it, and an overview of some of its Articles, focusing on Article IV. Part
IH addresses the OST Article IV provision specifying that information obtained
from out of space can only be used for "peaceful purposes""; it also looks at
the different theories regarding "peaceful purposes" and whether the military
use of information collected via remote sensing is in violation of the OST.
Part HI is a brief overview of remote sensing. Part mH. A discusses all the
different definitions of remote sensing. Part HI. B addresses remote sensing
generally, including use, benefits, and laws controlling the distribution and use
of remotely sensed data.
Part IV discusses the similarities between the civil and military use of
remotely sensed data. Part IV. A addresses the growth in commercialization of
remote sensing. Part V. B discusses the inequality of access to information
among Less Developed Countries, Developing and Developed Countries. Part
IV. C focuses on the state's responsibility to maintain national security while
facing the dilemma of maintaining its citizens' rights.
II. OUTER SPACE TREATY: PEACEFUL PURPOSES
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
10. Captain Michael R. Hoversten, US. National Security and Government Regulation of
Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer Space, 50 A.F. L. REv. 253, 260 (2001). See also Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 4; Liability Convention, supra note 4; Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth
from Outer Space, G.A. Res. 41/65, U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/65, Dec. 3, 1986.
11. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4.
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Bodies, most commonly known as the "Outer Space Treaty," provides the
foundation for international legal order in outer space. 2 The OST establishes
the international framework for the exploration and commercialization of
space. 3 It took effect on October 1967 and as of January 2006, ninety-eight
countries have ratified and twenty-seven have signed the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967." The Treaty is composed of seventeen articles. 5 The first three
articles establish the groundwork for the principles concerning the use and
exploration of space. 6 There are nine principles controlling the exploration and
use of outer space:
1) The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for
the benefit and in the interests of all mankind;
2) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use
by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law;
3) Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means;
4) The activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space
shall be carried on in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international cooperation and understanding;
5) States bear international responsibility for national activities in
outer space, whether carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national
activities are carried on in conformity with the principles set
forth in the present Declaration. The activities of non-
governmental entities in outer space shall require authorization
and continuing supervision by the State concerned. When
activities are carried on in outer space by an international
organization, responsibility for compliance with the principles
12. N. JASENTULIYANA, A Survey of Space Law as Developed by the United Nations, in
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 349, 359 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1995). See also Major
Christopher M. Petras, "Space Force Alpha: "Military Use of International Space Station and the Concept
of "Peaceful Purposes, " 53 A.F. L. REV. 135, 149 (2002).
13. Youseff Sneifer,;15443;15443 The Implications of National Security Safeguards on the
Commercialization of Remote Sensing Imagery, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 539, 548 (Spring 1996).
14. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4.
15. See United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, Text of Treaties and Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, (2002), available at
http://www.unoosa.orgloosa/en/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html (follow "PDF-E" hyperlink in "Title of Instrument"
table) (last visited Aug. 1, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Treaties and Principles on Outer Space].
16. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 12, at 359. See also Petras, supra note 12, at 150.
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set forth in this Declaration shall be bome by the international
organization and by the States participating in it;
6) In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be guided
by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall
conduct all their activities in outer space with due regard for the
corresponding interests of other States. If a State has reason to
believe that an outer space activity or experiment planned by it
or its nationals would cause potentially harmful interference
with activities of other States in the peaceful exploration and use
of outer space, it shall undertake appropriate international
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or
experiment. A State which has reason to believe that an outer
space activity or experiment planned by another State would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space may request
consultation concerning the activity or experiment;
7) The State on whose registry an object launched into outer space
is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object,
and any personnel thereon, while in outer space. Ownership of
objects launched into outer space, and of their component parts,
is not affected by their passage through outer space or by their
return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found
beyond the limits of the State of registry shall be returned to that
State, which shall furnish identifying data upon request prior to
return;
8) Each State which launches or procures the launching of an
object into outer space, and each State from whose territory or
facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for
damage to a foreign State or to its natural or juridical persons by
such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space, or
in outer space; and
9) States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer
space, and shall render to them all possible assistance in the
event ofaccident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory
of a foreign State or on the high seas. Astronauts who make
such a landing shall be safely and promptly returned to the State
of registry of their space vehicle. "
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty refers to the common interest principle
as well as the freedom principle, Article II addresses the nonappropriation
principle, and Article I1 refers to the application of international law and the
UN Charter to outer space. I" Article IV "contain[s] the first principles of
17. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4.
18. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 12, at 359. See also Petras, supra note 12, at 150.
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international law explicitly relating to military activities in space."' 9 Article IV
provides in part that:
State Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons ofmass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies,
or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of
military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type
of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies
shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.
The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be
prohibited.20
The first paragraph prioritizes the denuclearization of outer space; it
prohibits the positioning of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction2 around the earth and "on celestial bodies."22 It is implicit from
this paragraph that other weapons are allowed in space.23 Scholars are also
prone to believe that the drafters intentionally left the Moon out of the wording
of the Treaty implying that such weapons of mass destruction can be used on
the Moon.24 However, there is no clear evidence of whether nuclear weapons
19. I.A. VLASIC, Space Law and the Military Applications of Space Technology, in PERSPECTIVES
ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 385, 396 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1995). See also Petras, supra note 12, at
157.
20. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4.
21. "Weapons of mass destruction" is generally accepted to include nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons. See W.T. Mallison, Jr., The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 326 (1967). See also Robert L.
Bridge, InternationalLaw and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. REV. 649,656 (1980); Major
Douglas S. Anderson Judge Advocate, United States Air Force, A Military Look into Space: The Ultimate
High Ground, 1995 ARMY LAw. 19, 24 (Nov. 1995).
22. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4, 1.
23. NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, The Law in Outer Space, in SPACE: ITS IMPACT ON MAN AND
SOCIETY 69, 75, (Lillian Levy, 1965). See also CENTRE FOR RESEARCH OF AIR & SPACE LAW, SPACE
ACTIvrrIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAw 270, 292 (Nicolas M. Matte ed., 1984); Petras, supra note
12, at 157-58.
24. NANDASIRI. JASENTULIYANA, The Moon Treaty, in MAINTAINING OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL
USES 121, 126 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed. 1984). See also Petras, supra note 12, at 158.
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or weapons of mass destruction are banned from the Moon as well as from the
rest of outer space.25
The second paragraph of the Treaty is also a common source for debate
and interpretation due to its vagueness with respect to what the drafters meant
by "peaceful purposes" and to which areas of space they intended it to apply.
The second paragraph of Article IV provides for two different issues: what
areas of space did the drafters intend "peaceful purposes" apply to and what did
the drafters mean by "peaceful purposes?"
There are two major schools of thought with respect to the extent to which
"peaceful purposes" should apply; there is a strictly construed view that the
term allows certain military activity in some regions of outer space and there
is a more broad interpretation that suggests that the drafters intended for
"peaceful purposes" to apply to all of outer space.26 The first theory proposes
that by specifying "the moon and other celestial bodies"'2 shall be used
"exclusively for peaceful purposes", 28 the drafters intentionally omitted "outer
space" 29 to allow the states to use certain areas of space for military purposes.3"
Followers of the second theory look at other clauses of the Outer Space Treaty,
mainly the Preamble and Articles IX and XI, as well as other documents such
as the UN General Assembly resolutions and the UN Charter to conclude that
"all 'outer space' must be used for peaceful purposes."31 This view focuses on
the language of the nine principles controlling the use and exploration of outer
space:
1) [B]enefit and interest of all mankind [Principle 1];
2) [I]n accordance to international laws [Principle 2);
3) [M]aintaining international peace and security [Principle 4];
4) [P]romoting international cooperation [Principle 4]; and
5) IWlith due regard for the corresponding interests of other States
[Principle 6]. 32
25. Petras, supra note 12, at 158.
26. Id. at 160.
27. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. G.S. RAJU, Military Use of Outer Space: Toward Better Legal Controls, in MAINTAINING
OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL USES 90, 91 (N. Jasentuliyana ed. 1984). See also CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE
MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 24-25 (1982); Petras, supra note 12, at 160.
31. Robert L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. REV.
649, 658 (1980). See also Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A
New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and Peaceful Purposes, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 237, 302 (1994); Petras,
supra note 12, at 160.
32. See United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, supra note 15, at 4.
Licor2007]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
This theory would support the conclusion that current international law requires
all of outer space to be used for "peaceful purposes" based on the constant
technological developments and its wide availability. 3
The framers' intended meaning of "peaceful purposes" has also been
troubling scholars for several years; they have created numerous definitions
ranging from the idea that all uses of the satellites for military purposes is
nonpeaceful, hence in violation of the Treaty.34 A different view sees "peaceful
purposes" as prohibiting only the aggressive use of the satellites rather than
completely banning their military use.35 The idea that "peaceful purposes"
prohibits the military use of space is founded on the history of the Treaty
itself.36 The provision referring to "peaceful purposes" in the Outer Space
Treaty was adapted from the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which stated in part that,
"Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited,
inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of
military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well
as the testing of any type of weapons." "
Since the main purpose of the Antarctic Treaty was the demilitarization of
the Antarctic, it is commonly referred to by followers of the view that "peaceful
purposes" can be equated with non-military.3" However, such a strictly
construed interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty has not being followed by
the states ever since the treaty's adoption.39 Furthermore, by the time the
Treaty was signed in 1967, the two primary drafters of the Treaty, United States
(US) and the former Soviet Union, were already using outer space for military
purposes.4" After the launching of Sputnik in 1957, states realized that
reconnaissance satellites would start to become widely available and therefore,
a general consensus has since emerged within the UN that peaceful is more a
synonym of non-aggressive rather than of nonmilitary.41
Further, the UN Charter recognizes some military actions as being non-
aggressive; such actions are those pursuant to a UN Security Council
33. Morgan, supra note 31, at 241.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Petras, supra note 12, at 168.
37. See Petras, supra note 12, at 168 (quoting Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402
U.N.T.S. 72, 1959 U.S.T. LEXIS 420).
38. Petras, supra note 12, at 169-70.
39. Id.
40. Anderson, supra note 21, at 25.
41. Walter D. Reed & Robert W. Norris, Military Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON L. REV. 665,
678 (1980). See also Morgan, supra note 31, at 303. See also Petras, supra note 12, at 171.
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Resolution or if the action is done in self defense.42 It is usually argued that if
such actions are not in violation of the UN Charter, they are therefore in
compliance with the "peaceful purpose" provision of the Outer Space Treaty. 3
II. REMOTE SENSING
Remote Sensing technology emerged around the late 1950s and early
1960s. Its original purpose was for meteorology and military reconnaissance;
it is mainly used to take measurements of objects from a distance.' Since
1972, when the US launched the first remote sensing satellite, other countries
have also developed their own remote sensing systems.45
A. Definitions of Remote Sensing
Before 1986, when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 41/65,
there were several definitions for remote sensing. Overall, their content is very
similar with slight variations:
a) The United States House of Representative's Committee on
Science and Astronautics defined remote sensing as "the
acquisition of information about specific objects or phenomena
in which the information gathering device is not in intimate
contact with the subject under investigation." This is a broad
definition which could even include X-ray medical examina-
tions or radar-directed shipping movements;
b) The United Nations Committee on Permanent Uses in Outer
Space at its 1973 second session stated that "remote-sensing of
the earth from outer space is defined as a methodology to assist
in characterizing the nature and/or condition of features or
phenomena on, above or below the earth's surface by means of
observation and measurements from space platform . . . at
present, such methods depend upon the emission and reflection
of electromagnetic radiations." This is a much more functional
42. Anderson, supra note 21, at 27.
43. Id. at 27-28.
44. Jean-Louis Magdelnat, The Major Issues in the "Agreed" Principles on Remote Sensing, 9
J. SPACE L. 111 (1981). See also Jefferson Hane Weaver, Lessons in Multilateral Negotiations: Creating
a Remote Sensing Regime, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 29, 31 (1993).
45. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Scientific and Technical Sub-
Committee on the Work of Its Twenty-Fifth Session, 13, 56, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/409 (1988). See also
David A. Greenburg, ThirdParty Access to Data Obtained via Remote Sensing: International Legal Theory
versus Economic and Political Reality, 15 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 361, 362 (1983); J. Richard West,
Copyright Protection For Data Obtained By Remote Sensing: How The Data Enhancement Industry Will
Ensure Access For Developing Countries, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 403, 404 (1990).
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definition which is aimed at describing a specific space
operation;
c) At the Agricultural University of Wageningen in the Nether-
lands, S. Hempenius stated in 1978 that remote-sensing "con-
sists of collecting data concerning objects, materials and
situations on the earth by means of sensors mounted into fast-
moving crafts on land, at sea, in the air and in space, and
processing such data for quantification, qualification and
mapping purposes." This is a functional definition that also
embraces the functions of monitoring and of data-processing;
d) At UNISPACE 1982, it was stated that remote-sensing 'refers
to the detection and analysis of resources on earth by sensors
carried by aircraft and spacecraft.' This is a concise definition
which seems to place its value upon the use of 'sensors'.46
Finally, the 1986 UN General Assembly Resolution 41/65, which is the
only Resolution that provides guidance with respect to the use and meaning of
remote sensing, defined remote sensing by satellite as "the sensing of the
Earth's surface from space by making use of the properties of electromagnetic
waves emitted, reflected or diffracted by the sensed objects, for the purpose of
improving natural resources management, land use and the protection of the
environment. 4 7 Regardless of these definitions, it is easier to think of remote
sensing as observations occurring without physical contact with the target under
surveillance and from a location considered to belong to outer space.48 Remote
sensing can also be defined as "[including] the monitoring, processing, storing,
value-adding and disseminating of data as being integral parts of the whole
remote sensing process. 4 9
B. Remote Sensing in General
Remote sensing is done by using satellites orbiting the earth to obtain a
"large scale picture and repetitive view of the surface of the earth, thereby
making it possible to monitor changes in the earth environment without
interruption through all the seasons and in almost any conditions all year
round."5 Scientists divide remote sensing in two categories: passive remote
46. Patrick A. Salin, Proprietary Aspects of Commercial Remote-Sensing Imagery, 13 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 349, 352. (1992).
47. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res. 41/65, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/41/65, Annex I(a), Dec. 3, 1986.
48. Salin, supra note 46.
49. Id
50. Detlev Vagts & Ivan A. Vlasic, Charles C. Okolie 's International Law of Satellite Remote
Sensing and Outer Space, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 221, 221 (1992) (book review).
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sensing and active remote sensing." Passive remote sensing is done by reading
electromagnetic radiation emitted by an object. On the other hand, active
remote sensing is done by "first transmitting electromagnetic radiation down to
the object and then reading the reflected energy., 52 Quality of the images is
determined by how good the resolution of the area remotely sensed is. 3 The
resolution capabilities of the sensors are generally measured in meters and it
defines the smallest object that could be detected by satellite sensors. 4
Currently, some remote sensing satellites can detect images of a couple of
feet.55 Resolution is also dependent on the altitude of the orbit; lower altitudes
provides for a narrower span of vision but a better resolution.56 Military and
reconnaissance satellites need a narrow vision. However, this diminishes the
value of the images for commercial use." Remote sensing images are currently
available in multispectral color readings; these images are able to differentiate
specific colors, and shots from different angles provide three dimensional
viewing."
Remote sensing offers an extensive variety of possible uses including air
and water pollution surveys, ocean fishing surveys, and land use planning. 9
Data acquired from the satellites have helped in the location of subsurface
supplies of water, examination of land features to locate mineral resources and
in enhancing civil engineering and coastal zone management.6° Besides being
used for environmental purposes, remote sensing can also serve military
purposes such as the reconnaissance and verification of compliance with arms
control treaties. 6' Remote sensing technology was at first only used by the
military and intelligence forces of the major world powers. 62 It was not until
1972, when the Americans launched the U.S. Earth Resources Technology
51. Weaver, supra note 44, at 32.
52. Id.
53. "Resolution" has different meanings according to the technology used. Sneifer, supra note 13,
at 548.
54. Cynthia M. Hayward, Remote Sensing: Terrestrial Laws for CelestialActivities, 8 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 157, 162 (1990).
55. T. A. Heppenheimer, Operational Remote Sensing Satellites,
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/SPACEFLIGHT/remote-sensing/SP36.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2007).
56. Sneifer, supra note 13, at 543.
57. Id. at 544.
58. Susan M. Jackson, Cultural Lag and the International Law of Remote Sensing, 23 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 853, 858 (1998).
59. Weaver, supra note 44, at 33.
60. Id.
61. Hoversten, supra note 10, at 258.
62. Id at 253.
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Satellite (ERTS) that the remotely sensed imagery became commercialized.63
After the launch of ERTS, a chain of events occurred where many countries
started to launch their own satellites and the availability of remotely sensed
imagery became even more widely accessible commercially.'
Around 1973, the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS) started working on the formulation of rules to
govern the conduct of remote sensing, but it was not until many years after that
the committee approved fifteen principles in an attempt to control the use of
remote sensing activities.65 Principle III of the UN General Assembly
Resolution 41/65 provides that:
Remote sensing activities shall be conducted in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, and the relevant instruments of the International
Telecommunication Union. 66
This principle clearly states that remote sensing activities shall comply
with the requirements of the aforementioned treaties and laws. 67 Since remote
sensing activities refers to the interpretation and dissemination of the remotely
sensed data, two questions arise: whether the distribution of imagery from
space remote sensing activities has to comply also with the "peaceful purposes"
provision of the Outer Space Treaty and whether the use of such imagery for
military purposes is also a violation of the nonmilitary provision of the Treaty.
An attempt to answer these questions would be unfruitful since there is no clear
definition of what the drafters meant by "peaceful purposes." Remote sensing
images used for news gathering, which can be characterized as being peaceful
in nature, could trigger a non-peaceful event if the images shown are analyzed
by the wrong people. Further, the commercialization of remote sensing images
has made it almost impossible to control who uses what and where. Even if the
states where able to control the primary dissemination of the images, for
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Jackson, supra note 58, at 870.
66. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res. 41/65, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/41/65, Annex 1(a), Dec. 3, 1986.
67. The term "remote sensing activities" means the operation of remote sensing space systems,
primary data collection and storage stations, and activities in processing, interpreting and disseminating the
processed data. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing ofthe Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res. 41/65, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/41/65, Annex l(a), Dec. 3, 1986.
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example, prohibiting the distribution for military purposes, there is no feasible
way to control to whom they are sold after their primary purchase.68
In 1992, U.S. Congress passed Section 5621 of the Land Remote Sensing
Policy Act which authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to issue licenses for
private space-based remote sensing systems.69 The Act defines land remote
sensing as "the collection of data which can be processed into imagery of
surface features of the earth from [a] ... satellite. ,70 Private companies
began to sell high resolution images of the earth and its resources taken with
remote sensing technology.7' In March 1994, the Clinton Administration
pronounced a policy allowing extended sales of images obtained from remote
sensing systems.72 The purpose of this policy is to allow US companies more
liberty to sell remote sensing images in the international market.73 Under the
policy, companies have to request a license from the Secretary of Commerce to
operate remote sensing systems and make them available in domestic and
foreign market.74 The commercialization of such data can be of significant help
to many countries' military strategies, considering that in order to obtain the
same information, such countries would have had to spend considerable amount
of money and resources required to produce and operate the space-based remote
sensing systems.75
IV. CIVIL AND MILITARY USE OF REMOTELY SENSED DATA
Currently, the potential commercialization of remote sensing is limitless.
Today, almost all advances in remote sensing technology have civil and military
applications since at its beginnings remote sensing was primarily used as
reconnaissance satellites for the military.76 Remote sensing technology is still
generally used for agricultural and environmental studies, terrain mapping, and
a new market for remote sensed imagery is being developed in the real estate
market where companies are offering photographs of homes, neighborhoods
68. Jackson, supra note 58, at 878.
69. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5621 (1992) available at
http://geo.arc.nasa.gov/sge/landsat/15USCch82.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
70. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5602 (1992) available at
http://geo.arc.nasa.gov/sge/landsat/l 5USCch82.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
71. Hoversten, supra note 10, at 254.
72. "The fundamental goal of [the] policy is to support and to enhance US industrial
competitiveness in the field of remote sensing ... while at the same time protecting US national security and
foreign policy interests." Sneifer, supra note 13, at 558.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Hoversten, supra note 10, at 254.
76. Id. at 253.
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and traffic patterns taken from space." Currently, individuals can even use
their home computers to view high resolution imagery of certain places. In
addition, it can be argued that any photograph of the earth taken from space can
be used for both civilian and military purposes. Further, communication
satellites used to transport communication for civilian purposes can also be
used to transport military communications in times of wars.78 And since it has
been established that states cannot prohibit the placement of remote sensing
satellites in space that will take images of their territory, all remotely sensed
images are up for grabs, whether it is by the military, an individual, or a private
corporation.79
A. Commercialization of Remote Sensing
The commercialization of remote sensing imagery has created a great
division of views. Some think that dissemination of remotely sensed data will
benefit everyone by reducing the tension caused by the search for information;
others disagree and affirm that distribution of that data will not be obtained
asymmetrically by less developed, developing, and developed countries.8" The
first view sustains the idea that commercial dissemination will hinder the states'
capabilities to secrete their military potential and any nuclear, biological, or
chemical production factories they might have, therefore, discouraging such
countries from having these facilities.81 In contrast, supporters of the second
theory fear that the advances in technology plus the commercial distribution of
remotely sensed high resolution images will nourish international competition
and cause nations to attempt to destroy each other's military defenses.82
Further, commercial dissemination of remote sensing imagery can increase
the opportunities available for terrorist groups to come across valuable
information that could be used against a country, especially in these days that
the use of the internet is a common occurrence and digital images can be down-
loaded from the convenience of your own home. 3 Significantly, commerciali-
zation of remotely sensed data has demonstrated that nations will never be safe
and they will always face a threat either from their own citizens or from other
nations.
77. Jackson, supra note 58, at 856-57.
78. Anderson, supra note 21, at 27.
79. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides that outer space is "not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art 2.
80. Jackson, supra note 58, at 876.
81. Id. at 877.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 878.
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B. Commercialization and Less-Developed Countries
Even though remotely sensed data has been commercialized and it is at the
disposal of whoever wants to buy it, less developed countries (LDCs) feel at a
constant disadvantage compared to developing and developed countries and
private foreign companies." LDCs also face a great disparity in accessing the
information. Even though most of the data is commercially available, there is
some data that cannot be accessed in the market and these countries do not have
the necessary resources to implement a remote sensing system of their own.85
Further, there are also debates "in the international forum about the legality of
one nation's right to collect and disseminate remotely sensed data concerning
another nation."86 Nations do not have the right to prohibit remote sensing
systems to take images of their territory. 7 Even though this seems to even out
the playing field, it is a disadvantage to LDCs because their natural resources,
military bases, and defenses are out in the open for everyone to see.
Conversely, LDCs do not have access to the most precious secrets of other
nations, neither do they have the resources to buy the data from their own
territories to prevent it from being disseminated.
These inequalities raise a concern when analyzing the main principles of
the Outer Space Treaty; "Outer Space shall be the province of all mankind."88
If the drafters really meant for the space resources to be enjoyed by every
nation equally, would the UN be failing its mission of promoting peace and
equality among nations? Principle VIII and IV of the General Assembly
Resolution 41/65 state respectively:
Principle VIII
The United Nations and the relevant agencies within the United
Nations system shall promote international co-operation, including
technical assistance and co-ordination in the area of remote sensing.
Principle IV
Remote sensing activities shall be conducted in accordance with the
principles contained in article I ofthe Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which, in particular
provides that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of
84. Hayward, supra note 54, at 164.
85. Such resources can include among others, technology, training of staff, technicians, and
financial resources as well. Id
86. Jackson, supra note 58, at 855.
87. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2.
88. Id. art l.
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their degree ofeconomic or scientific development, and stipulates the
principle of freedom of exploration and use of outer space on the
basis of equality. These activities shall be conducted on the basis of
respect for the principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all
States and peoples over their own wealth and natural resources, with
due regard to the rights and interests, in accordance with international
law, of other States and entities under their jurisdiction. Such
activities shall not be conducted in a manner detrimental to the
legitimate rights and interests of the sensed State. "
Notwithstanding the countries' agreement to follow the Principles
stipulated in this Resolution, there is still a lot of work remaining for the UN as
a peacekeeper organization.
C. States'Responsibility With Respect to Civilian Use of Remotely Sensed
Data
"The quest for international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space
must not jeopardize national defense responsibilities."9
In spite of all the interpretations and efforts to demilitarize outer space,
military use and exploration of space has been occurring since the beginning-
even before the Outer Space Treaty took effect in 1967-and it does not seem
to be heading towards an end. 91 Rather than figuring out how to completely ban
military use of space and the data obtained from remote sensing, states should
also direct their attention to civilian use of remotely sensed data. Since remote
sensing data became commercially available, individuals have been able to
acquire any sort of images and data obtained from remote sensing systems.
Commercialization of remote sensing poses more of a threat to the countries
than militarization of space. States are in a constant fight to provide their
citizens with the tranquility that their rights will not be violated. However,
individuals might not be able to assimilate the responsibility that comes with
access to endless amount of information. The use of remotely sensed data by
the wrong people can be a problem of national security. Do the countries have
a higher duty to protect its citizens rights or its citizens well being?
Freedom of information and expression are not only recognized in the US,
they are universal rights recognized internationally.92 The UN Charter
89. G.A. Res. 41/65, supra note 10, Annex 1(a).
90. Anderson, supra note 21, at 29.
91. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Symposium, Issues in Space Law: International Space Law in
Transformation: Some Observations, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 69, 71 (2005).
92. Article 19 states that everyone "has the right to freedom or opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and to impart information and
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expressly proclaims that one of the purposes of the U.N is to promote and
encourage human rights.93 However, the UN also promotes international peace.
Nevertheless, there is often a conflict between maintaining peace and
individuals' rights.94 How can the states limit the dissemination of remotely
sensed images of their military bases and operations? Generally, countries
cannot prohibit the dissemination of remotely sensed imageries of their
territories.95 However, they could implement restrictions that would only be
binding on their own companies; such restrictions can include limits on the sale
of remotely sensed data.96 Assuming states are successful in taking these
actions, there is no guarantee that they will be successful that secondary
dissemination will not occur. After a national company sells the information,
the remotely sensed data is back in the market and there is no piece of law that
restricts the dissemination of remotely sensed imagery.
V. CONCLUSION
The advances in technology have exceeded everyone's expectations and
the laws controlling the use and exploration of outer space are therefore falling
behind. Scholars have not been able to determine what the drafters of the Outer
Space Treaty meant by "peaceful purposes," neither have they been able to find
whether military use of remotely sensed data is in violation of the Treaty.
However, regardless of all the scholarly analysis of these issues, it all boils
down to the stake that countries and organizations have in the peaceful use of
outer space; the higher this stake is, the more they will help preclude aggressive
military use of space.97 States will always face the dilemma of maintaining the
freedom of speech and expression of their citizens. On the other hand, they also
have to protect their national security and maintain the country's welfare.
States' first and foremost duty should be to protect its citizens by any
means necessary. Technology is a double edge sword. On one side, it provides
incredible benefits for the country and its individuals, and on the other it
exposes the countries' greatest weaknesses making them vulnerable to their
enemies. As of right now, the laws controlling the commercialization and use
of remotely sensed data do not match the advances in technology, leaving very
important areas uncovered and facilitating the circumvention of these laws. For
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doe A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/bludhr.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
93. U.N. Charter, art. 1, 3.
94. Id. 11.
95. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2.
96. Sneifer, supra note 13, at 571.
97. Reynolds, supra note 91, at 71.
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example, there is no specific law regulating the sale of remotely sensed imagery
and even if nations are successful in regulating their own companies they have
no means to control secondary dissemination of remotely sensed data.
It seems that with the commercialization of remote sensing we are
achieving the main purpose of these Treaties and Resolutions; in other words,
that outer space should be equally accessible for all mankind.98 However, one
can not help to wonder: are nations encouraging commercialization because
they believe in the core principles of the Treaties or because it is in their best
interest to be able to obtain military and civilian information on their enemies
and biggest competitors? Regardless of the individual reasons of the states, we
as citizens have to be aware that those with the economic resources to obtain
remotely sensed imagery will not always have the best of intentions, and it is
the author's opinion that it will be violating the "peaceful purposes" provision
of the Outer Space Treaty.
98. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art 1.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Adaria, on one side, and the Republic of Bobbia, the
Kingdom of Cazalia, the Commonwealth of Dingoth, the State of Ephraim and
the Kingdom of Finbar, jointly on the other, have submitted by Special
Agreement their differences concerning the Rotian Union, and transmitted a
copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court pursuant to article 40(1) of the
Statute. Therefore, both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ
pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT
The Republic of Adaria respectfully asks this Court:
A) Whether or not Respondents have violated international legal
obligations owed to Adaria by denying Adaria membership in
the Rotian Union;
B) Whether or not Respondents have standing to make any claim
concerning Adarian actions with respect to the Rotian Union
representative office, its property, or its personnel;
C) Whether or not Adaria violated international law concerning the
immunity of diplomatic missions by seizing the premises,
property, or personnel ofthe Rotian Union representative office;
and
D) Whether or not the National Industry Act constitutes an illegal
expropriation of Adarmoire and the other privatized concerns
under international law.
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Republic of Adaria is a developing State with a parliamentary
democratic form of government. Traditionally dependant on agricultural
production, over the last years it had experienced a growth of the manufacturer
industry led by state-owned enterprises.
Adarian population consists of 40 million ethnic Adarians and 2 million
ethnic Sophians. Although sharing religious, idiomatic and cultural differences,
the Sophian minority has always been a primary concern for Adarian
authorities. In light of this, the Parliament had enacted the 1975 Sophians
Protection Act (SPA) aimed at protecting its craft production and farm-based
economy by providing for governmental subsidies and benefits to small
businesses, as well as discounts in basic public services.
On December 2, 1995, the Republic of Adaria applied for entering into the
Rotian Union, an international organization created and integrated by
Respondents. In accordance with the Union's rules governing accession of new
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members into the Organization, the Commission performed a four-years
investigation and research of Adarian economy. At the end of this endeavour,
on December 6, 1999, a recommendation was submitted to the Council
containing a series of three conditions upon which fulfilment Adaria was
suitable for election as a member. As it was the Commission's view that Adaria
would successfully accomplish the requirements, said organ urged the Council
to celebrate an Accession Agreement with Adaria.
After ratifying the aforementioned recommendation, the Council entrusted
the Commission with the celebration of the Agreement, which was finally
concluded between Adaria and that organ on 1 October 2001. This instrument
reproduced the three conditions previously established by the Commission.
Specifically, Adaria had to: "a) reduce its public debt owed to non-member
States, b) privatize State-owned monopolies, and eliminate government support
payment to small, privately-owned businesses."
Additionally, it stipulated the creation of a Delegation of the Rotian Union
in Adarian territory aimed at facilitating the accession process. The deadline
for accomplishment of the three conditions was set for November 1, 2005.
After informing of the Agreement to the Adarian citizenship, the
government began to undertake drastic changes in its economy in order to
comply with the three requirements formulated by the Rotian Union.
Specifically, it increased ad valorem taxes in every sector in order to reduce its
foreign debt, and privatized a great number of public companies, which were
all immediately acquired by corporations established in the Respondent's
States.
With the view to integrate the recently purchased companies into its global
network, the new owners took the measure of laying off some 20,000
employees. Additionally, they reduced a great number of supply contracts
established with Sophian handicraft manufacturers and eliminated the price
discounts to which they were beneficiaries under the SPA. The resultant
increase of prices in basic utilities such as water and power left a great portion
of the Sophian population in poor life conditions.
In order to comply with the third demand established by the Accession
Agreement, Adarian government had to eliminate all subsidies to Sophian
manufacturers, which, as informed by the Department of Social Studies of the
Adarian National University, contributed to the impossibility to operate farm
activities originated by the price increase in supplies.
With the idea of palliating this crisis, Prime Minister Mesmim announced
the creation of a public works programme in the northeast region of Adaria.
However, in spite of the publicly recognized good-willingness of this measure,
it resulted on a failure as no significant portion of the Sophian population was
willing to participate.
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Over 2004 and 2005, Adarian government continued to take measures in
order to accomplish the objectives laid down in the Accession Agreement.
Disregarding inner voices that opposed the idea of entering the Rotian Union,
the government of Prime Minister Mesmin insisted on his endeavour, with the
confidence that upon completion, Adaria would effectively become a member.
Finally, as expected, on November 10, 2005, the Commission Delegation
established in Ilsa informed the Council that Adaria had fully complied with all
the requirements, and urged on its accession as a member of the Rotian Union.
However, on 20 November 2005, the Council adopted decision N' 05/376
thereby declining Adarian accession to the Rotian Union on the unforeseen
basis that the conditions in which the Sophian population had entered after
implementation of the economic measures required for said accession were
"inconsistent with membership in the Union."
Social discontent and political reaction immediately followed Adarian
denial of membership. At a press conference held in November 6, 2005, Prime
Minister Mesmin informally protested against the Council's decision and called
on the Rotian Union to fulfil the promise it had undergone.
A few days later, on 15 November 2005, an investigation on the represen-
tatives of the Rotian Union Delegation began. It had come to the authorities
attention that during the period in which the aforementioned delegation was
established in Ilsa, it had made financial contributions to parliamentary
candidates in violation of Section 17-1031 of the Adarian Criminal Code. Such
norms specifically forbid such donations by foreign business or corporate
entities.
The following day, agents of the Justice Ministry delivered a duly issued
subpoena to the Delegation Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Uriah Heep, ordering
to handle all electronic or paper bank records concerning transactions within
Adarian territory. Following his public denial, he was arrested and taken into
custody on the charges of violating Adarian Criminal Code Section 17-1031
and impeding due exercise of justice.
Seizure of the bank records withheld by Mr. Heep ultimately took place
the following day when, following an order form the local magistrate, Justice
Ministry officials entered into the Delegation's office.
As it was suspected, the recovered documents demonstrated that
representatives of the Rotian Union had indeed violated Adarian Criminal Code
by illegally financing political candidates.
Finally, on December 19, the Adarian Parliament approved the National
Industry Act (NIA), forbidding the exportation of proceeds obtained by all
companies privatized after ratification of the Adarian Accession Agreement,
and repatriating of any of their assets. Such measure was conceived as a way
to mitigate the devastating effects that the economic process ending in the
denial of Adarian membership into the Rotian Union had produced.
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Following contestation in national courts, Adarian Supreme Tribunal
confirmed the economic measure inasmuch as it considered that no expropria-
tion can occur when property and assets remain in the territory and within the
patrimony of the companies.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
The Republic of Adaria submits before this High court that the Republic
of Bobbia, the Kingdom of Cazalia, the Commonwealth of Dingoth, the State
of Ephraim and the Kingdom of Finbar have violated international legal
obligations by denying Adarian membership into the Rotian Union. Secondly,
Adaria claims that the Respondents do not have standing to make any claim
concerning Adarian action with respect to the Rotian Union Representative
Office, its property or its personnel. Additionally, it is submitted that Adaria
did not violate international law concerning the immunity of diplomatic
missions by seizing the premises, property or personnel of the Rotian Union
Representative Office. Finally, Adaria claims that the National Industry Act
does not constitute an illegal expropriation of Adarmoire and the other
privatized concerns under international law.
In respect of the denial of membership to the Rotian Union, Adaria
submits that the Respondents have violated international legal obligations owed
to Adaria, given that such denial because it violated the terms of the Adarian
Accession Agreement, as well as the procedure for admission established in
Adaria's favor. Futhermore, Respondents are liable for the acts of the Rotian
Union that affected Adaria, because generally Member States are liable for the
acts of the International Organizations of which they form part and in particular
because the Respondents led Adaria to rely on their liability and because the
illegal conduct of the Rotian Union belongs to the field of the Member's
delegated competences.
In connection with the Respondents standing to bring international claims
in respect of the Rotian Union Representative Office, its property or personnel,
it is maintained, firstly, that local remedies available in Adaria have not been
exhausted. Furthermore, the obligations concerning privileges and immunities
would be owed to the Rotian Union, being it the only entity entitled to bring an
international claim. Further, it is submitted that member States cannot bring an
international claim for a breach of such obligations, neither on behalf of the
organization, nor in their own right. Lastly, it is maintained that Respondents
cannot bring the aforementioned claim as they have delegated foreign policy
matters in the organization.
As regards international law obligations concerning the immunities of the
Rotian Union representative office, its property or personnel, Adaria submits
that no breach attributable to it has occurred. On the first place, diplomatic
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privileges and immunities are not applicable to the Rotian Union representation.
Furthermore, it is argued that no conventional or customary law imposes Adaria
the obligation to provide privileges and immunities to the Rotian Union office
and that if any such rule were held to exist it would only bind the Members of
the Organization. Finally, it is submitted that, in case Adaria's is held to be
bound by such rules, no breach of the concerned obligations would have
occurred because Adaria's actions fall within accepted exceptions to them.
Finally, with respect to National Industry Act, Adaria claims, firstly, that
Respondents have not exhausted local remedies with regard to all the privatized
concerns and thus, they can only exercise diplomatic protection in Adarmoire's
case. Secondly, it is submitted that the National Industry Act does not amount
to an expropriation, given that only forcible takings of property are considered
as such in international law and that all other measures that affect property
rights, without constituting an actual taking of property, are legal. Alterna-
tively, it is claimed that the National Industry Act does not produce the required
effect on the privatized concerns' property rights as to be deemed an indirect
expropriation. Lastly, Adaria submits that the National Industry Act is a valid
regulatory measure that complies with the requirements of non-discrimination,
public purpose and temporary duration and that consequently, it does not
require payment of compensation
V. PLEADINGS
A. Respondent States Have Violated International Legal Obligations Owed
To Adaria By Denying Adaria Membership In The Rotian Union.
Under international law, treaties must be performed in good faith.' The
Rotian Union's [hereinafter R.U.] denial of Adarian membership is inconsistent
with the Adarian Accession Agreement [hereinafter A.A.A.] and it engages
Respondents' international responsibility.
1. Denial Of Membership Under The Circumstances Of This Case Is
Inconsistent With The Obligations Undertaken Under The AAA.
a. Denial of membership violates the terms of the Adarian Accession
Agreement to the Rotian Union Treaty.
An organization cannot make consent for admission dependent on
conditions other than those expressly specified in the pertinent treaty.2 The
I. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art.26 [hereinafter
V.C.L.T.]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations, May 1986, 25 ILM 543, art.26 [hereinafter 1986 V.C.L.T.].
2. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948 1.C.J. 57, 65
(Dec. 12)
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A.A.A. established that Adaria was eligible for admission to the R.U. after
accomplishing three specific conditions.3 Having Adaria met them, the R.U.
rejected its application on grounds not expressly contemplated in the treaty.'
Hence, the denial is inconsistent with international law.
The reference that Adaria would only be "eligible" does not affect such
conclusion. In ascertaining what "eligible" comprises, due regard must be paid
to the rules set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,5 for not
only do they reflect customary rules on the issue,6 that extend to International
Organizations' instruments,7 but also all parties to this case have ratified it.'
In this vein, even if the ordinary meaning of the term "eligible" may imply
a certain power of the Council to decide on Adaria's application, such margin
of appreciation must be interpreted in good faith and has to be placed in
context, including the common intention of the treaty as a whole, its object and
its spirit.9 Even if the ordinary meaning of "eligible" is broader than that
provided by the context, the latter should prevail.'°
The purpose of the A.A.A. was "to facilitate the successful integration of
Adaria into the RU."'" Then, any impediment had to be construed restrictively,
as this type of treaties do not create obligations only for the State applying for
membership but also for the organization concerned. 2
Furthermore, the context reveals that the only conditions for admission are
those established in § 1. Thus, the Council's discretion must be circumscribed
to assessing the fulfillment of those requisites, but not to the inclusion of other
considerations, especially when such developments were envisioned by the
Parliament prior to the conclusion of the A.A.A. 13 and the Treaty was
nonetheless concluded.
3. Compromis, Annex I, art. 1.
4. Compromis, # 28.
5. V.C.L.T., supra note 1.
6. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3), para. 41; M.SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 937 (2003).
7. Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Adv. Op., 1996 I.C.J. 66
(July 8), para 19.
8. Compromis #40.
9. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, art. 31; South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South
Africa), Preliminary Objections, 1962 ICJ 319, (Dec. 21), 336; H.Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48 (1949), 80.-
10. Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros-Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, (Sept.25), para. 142, South
West Africa (Preliminary Objections), supra note 9, 336
11. Compromis, Annex If.
12. Cfr. P.SANDS & P.KLEIN, BowETT's LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 539 (2001).
13. Compromis #15 & #16.
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Finally, resort to relevant rules of international law 14 confirms the
aforementioned conclusion, for according to the ut magis rule, where conditions
are enumerated they must be deemed exhaustive. 5
Consequently, the denial of membership grounded on the Sophians'
situation exceeds the power of the Council to decide on Adaria's application,
entailing a violation of the A.A.A.
b. The refusal to admit Adaria was effected in violation of the procedure
established in its favor.
The Treaty Establishing the Rotian Union [hereinafter T.R.U] confers the
right tojoin the Union to every State, subject to a detailed admission procedure.
The A.A.A. established that Adaria would be eligible for admission, "pursuant
to Article 11, Section 6.''16 Thus, the R.U. incorporated into the A.A.A. the
process provided for in the aforementioned clause, namely, the decision of the
Council after obtaining the opinion of the Parliament. 7
Furthermore, the admission procedure contemplated in the T.R.U. con-
stitutes a stipulation established in Adaria's favor. Indeed, under the V.C.L.T
a treaty may provide a right to a third State if the parties to it intend to accord
such right and the third party assents thereto. 8 Such assent is presumed, 9 inas-
much as existence of a substantive right,2° or enjoyment of beneficial conse-
quences" is asserted. In this connection, the possibility of becoming a party to
a treaty by virtue of its own provisions is generally accepted as a right for third
states.22
Hence, resolution N0 05/376 rejecting Adaria's application without the
Parliament's prior opinion23 is contrary to the admission procedure as this Court
14. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, Art. 31.3.(c).
15. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, supra note 2, 62-63;
G.G.Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court ofJustice: International Organizations
and Tribunals, 29 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 1 (1952), 25.
16. Compromis, Annex II, para. 1.
17. Compromis, Annex I, art. 11 para. 11.
18. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, art.36; S.S.Wimbledon (U.K, France, Italy, Japan v. Germany), 1923
P.C.I.J., (ser. A) N' 1 (June 28), 22; E.Jim~nez de Arfchaga, Treaty stipulations in favor ofthirdstates, 50
AM.J.INT'L.L. 338 (1956), 355-357.
19. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, art.32.1.
20. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) N' 46 (June 7), 147-148
21. Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties (Treaties and Third States), 1960 Yb.I.L.C. IL 76.
22. Ibid. p.82.
23. Compromis #28.
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has found on a similar situation.24 Therefore, the Council's omission constitutes
a breach of an obligation under the A.A.A and of the T.R.U.'s stipulation in
Adaria's favor.
2. Respondents are liable for the acts of the Rotian
Union vis-A-vis third parties.
Even if denial of membership was issued by the R.U., Bobbia, Cazalia,
Dingoth, Ephraim and Finbar, are still liable, since member states retain respon-
sibility for the conduct of that organization. In the alternative, their responsi-
bility arises from the fact that they (i) made Adaria rely on their liability and (ii)
delegated their foreign affairs on the organization, thereby circumventing their
own obligations.
a. Respondent States are liable for the acts of the Rotian Union.
Unless specifically limited or excluded, member States of an international
organization are responsible for the acts of the latter vis-6-vis third states.25 This
rule is derived from legal reasoning based upon general principles of law,26 as
this Court has often done.27
Responsibility of States for acts of international organizations is based on
the same premises governing state responsibility.2" Hence, relevant principles,
such as the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts29 should be
considered. In this vein, States are responsible for bringing to life an inter-
24. Competence-oftheGeneral Assembly for the Admission ofa Stateto the United Nations, 1950
I.C.J. 4 (March 3), 9.
25. M.HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES
148 (1995); see I.Brownlie, The responsibility of States for the acts of international organizations in
M.RAGAzZI(ED.), INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 355-
362(2005); and S.Yee, The responsibility of States Members of an international organization for its conduct
as a result of membership or their normal conduct associated with membership in M.RAGAZZI(ED.),
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 435-454 (2005).
26. I.Brownlie, in M.RAGAZZI(ED.),supra note 25,357; and S.Yee, inM.RAGAZZI(ED.),supra note
25,443-446.
27. North Sea Continental Shelf(F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), 46 para.
83-84; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38
(June 14), paras. 46-48; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 7, para. 74.
28. Report of the ILC on the Work of its 54th Sess., UN DOC. A/CN.4/529, para. 200; I.Brownlie,
in M.RAGAZZI (ED.), supra note 25, 360.
29. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May24),
29; Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros-Project supra note 10, 54; Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83, Jan. 28th, 2002, [hereinafter Res. 56/83], art. 1.
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national organization, and for all the resultant responsibility thereof,3" since it
would be unacceptable for them to shelter their acts behind the legal personality
of the organization,"' as was expressed during the debate of this issue at the
General Assembly.32
State practice confirms the existence of the aforementioned rule. Indeed,
States-when creating international organizations-have included clauses
limiting their liability in more than twenty constituent instruments.33 The
consistency and continuity of this practice is shown by the fact that after the
default of the International Tin Council other six instruments establishing
organizations were accordingly adopted.34
Further, member States of international organizations have supplied the
funds to reach a settlement with creditors35 thereby tacitly admitting their
liability or full liability for all its debts when they decided to wind up the
organization.36
Additionally, in the frame of the European Community, treaties with non-
member States result in mixed agreements to apportion clearly the
responsibility, in the absence of which, States are all jointly liable.37
Furthermore, judicial decisions have confirmed the existence of this rule
when affirming that "[i]n the absence of any provision expressly or impliedly
30. S.Yee, in M.RAGAZZI(ED.),supra note 25,444; W.E.Holder, Can International Organizations
be Controlled? Accountability and Responsibility, 97 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L.PROC. 231 (2003), 234-235.
31. M.HIRSCH, supra note 25, 136; I.SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw 121 (1987).
32. Summary record of the Ilth meeting of the Sixth Committee, Oct. 24th 2005, U.N.G.A.
A/C.6/60/SR. 11, para. 53.
33. C.F.AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATiONS 427(2005); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, Dec. 10th
1982, Article 174 (4); Agreement of the I.B.R.D, at http:\\web.worldbank.org, art. 2(6); Agreement
Establishing the Interamerican Investment Corporation, available at http:\\www.iic.int, art. 2(6); Convention
establishing the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation available at http:\\www.iaigc.org, art. 7(4).
34. H.G.SCHERMERS & N.M.BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw §1589 (2003);
International Cocoa Agreement, at http:\\www.icco.org, art. 23; International Coffee Agreement, at
http:\\www.ico.org, art. 26.
35. M.HIRSCH, supra note 25, 126-127; Current Developments: Public International Law, 39
INT'L&COMP.L.Q. 923, 945 (1990).
36. l.Seidl-Hohenveldem, Piercing the Corporate Veil of International Organizations: The
International Tin Council Case in the English Court of Appeals, 32 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW 43
(1989), 51-52.
37. P.J.Kuijper & E.Paasivirta, Further Exploring International Responsibility: the European
Community andthe lLC's Project on Responsibility ofInternational Organizations, I INT'L ORGANIZATIONS
LAW REVIEW 111 (2004), 122-123; Case 316/91, Parliament v. Council, E.C.J., 1994 E.C.R. 1-625, para. 29.
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excluding the liability of the four States, this liability subsists ... This rule
flows from general principles of law and from good faith".38
The Treaty establishing the Rotian Union does not contain any provision
denying liability of member states. Consequently, Respondents are liable for
the conduct of the organization.
b. Respondent States are liable for the acts of the Rotian Union because
they led Adaria to rely on their liability.
Members of an international organization are responsible vis-ii-vis third
States for the acts of the organization if they have led the injured party to rely
on their responsibility. 9 In determining so, the surrounding circumstances
should be examined globally.4"
In the instant case, the final decision on membership applications rests
with the Council.41 The fact that each member state is represented there by its
Head of Government,42 coupled with the requirement of unanimous vote for
admissions,43 reflects the intention of respondents to keep a high degree of
control over the decision, being that a strong presumption of liability,44 as it
casts doubt on the sufficient independence of the organ concerned.45 Other
relevant factors are the small size of the organization,46 and the fact that the
Parliament warned about their impact on the Sophians' situation47 making it
apparent that respondents would not deny liability for any related circumstance.
Moreover, under the T.R.U., respondents ensured the fulfillment of
obligations arising from the Treaty or resulting instruments, 48 a situation
38. Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization, 80 INT'L LAw.REP. 596
(1989), 613.
39. Report of the I.L.C., 58th Sess., U.N.G.A. A/61/10 [hereinafter I.L.C. Report 58rd, 286-291;
Fourth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, Addendum, U.N.G.A. A/CN.4/564/Add.2,
para. 92; I.Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 36, 47; Westland Helicopters Ltd., supra note 38, para. 56;
Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd. Appellants v. Department of Trade and Industry, 3 All ER 307, 331.
40. I.L.C. Report 58rd, supra note 39, 290; C.F.AMERASINGHE, supra note 33, 435; I.Seidl-
Hohenveldem, supra note 36, 47.
41. Compromis, Annex I, art. 11.6.
42. Ibid., art. 5.2.
43. Ibid.,art. 11.6.
44. Maclaine Watson & Co., supra note 39, 331.
45. First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, March 26th 2003, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/532, para. 19.
46. Summary record of the 12th meeting of the 6th Committee, Nov. 23th 2005, U.N.G.A.
A/C.6/60/SR. 12 para. 52.
47. Compromis #16.
48. Compromis Annex I, art. 10(a).
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
specially contemplated by the European Court of Justice in a similar case,4 9
specially when no clause excluding members' liabilities was included."
For these reasons, Adaria relied that Respondents would comply with the
obligations under the A.A.A. and bear any responsibility arising thereof.
Consequently, Respondents must be held liable for the organization's rejection
of Adaria's application for membership.
c. Respondent States are liable for the acts of the Rotian Union because
they delegated their foreign affairs to the organization.
Member states are liable for the conduct of the international organizations
in the fields of delegated competences," since States cannot evade their
responsibility for what would be their ordinary competence by delegating it to
an organization. 2
In the case at bar, Respondents have delegated many of their competences
to the R.U.,53 among them, the conduction of their foreign policy,54 including
the capacity to conclude international treaties.5 Indeed, it could be argued that
the R.U. acts both in law and in fact as the agent of the Respondent States.56
Adaria's process of admission to the R.U. is within the competences that those
States delegated to the organization. Thus, Respondent States are liable for any
wrongful act emerging from such process. Otherwise they would circumvent
all their international responsibilities by merely deferring issues to another legal
person.
49. Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, E.C.J., 1987, E.C.R. 03719 (Sept. 30), recital
11.
50. C.F.AMERASINGHE, supra note 33, 436.
51. I.L.C. Report 58rd, supra note 39, 283-286; Fourth Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, Addendum, U.N.G.A. A/CN.4/564/Add.1, para. 64-74.
52. P.J.Kuijper & E.Paasivirta, supra note 37, 130-13 1; Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, (2000)
30 E.H.R.R. 261, 287 para. 67; Matthews v. United Kingdom, (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 361, 396 para. 32;
Bosphorus v. Ireland, (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 1, para. 154.
53. Compromis #6, #7 & #9; Annex I, art. 2 & 8.2.
54. Compromis#1 & #12.
55. Compromis Annex 1, art. 11.
56. Institut de Droit Intemationale, Les consequences juridiques pour les Etats membres de
I Tnex&ution par des organisations internationales de leurs obligations envers des tiers, Article 5, at
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1995_lis_02_fr.pdf
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B. Respondents Do Not Have Standing To Make Any Claim Concerning
Applicant's Actions With Respect To The Rotian Union Representative
Office, Its Property, Or Its Personnel.
1. Respondents cannot espouse the Rotian Union claim because local
remedies in Adaria have not been exhausted.
International organizations are generally recognized the capacity to
institute legal proceedings in national courts.57 Therefore, compliance with the
rule of exhaustion of local remedies when claiming for damages inflicted to its
delegation or agents, as it is analogically required for the exercise of diplomatic
protection," is required from international organizations.59
The R.U. has not exhausted local remedies available in Adaria and,
therefore, both the Union and the Respondents are precluded from resorting to
this Court with regard to this issue.
2. Respondents do not have standing because obligations concerning the
Rotian Union privileges and immunities, if any, were owed to the
organization and its Members cannot espouse the claim.
a. The alleged obligations would have been owed to the Rotian Union and
thus only the organization would be entitled to invoke Adaria's
responsibility,
As a corollary of the attribution of international personality an inter-
national organization is capable of possessing rights and obligations of its
own,6" including the capacity to invoke the responsibility of States for inter-
nationally wrongful acts.6 Furthermore, it is generally established that only the
entity to which an obligation is owed possesses that capacity.62 Therefore, the
57. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UnitedNations, I U.N.T.S. 15,13 February
1946, Section 1; ILO Constitution, Article 39, 15 U.N.T.S. 35; Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 Article 211; Fourth Report on Relations Between States and International
Organizations, Y.B. INT'L L.COMM'N., Vo.11, 153, Article 5, A/CN.4/424, P.SANDS & P.KLEIN, supra note
12, 485.
58. Mavrommantis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, 12.
59. C.Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of Responsibility, 76 RCADI 319, 351
(1950); A.REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 127 (1995).
60. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174 179 [hereinafter: Reparations]; R.HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 46 (1995).
61. Reparations, supra note 60, 179; M.Hardy, Claims by International Organizations in respect
of Injuries to their Agents, 37 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 516 (1961), 521-522; M.Rama Montaldo, International
Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, 44 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 111 (1970),
130; D.Akande, International Institutions, in M.EVANS(ED.), INTERNATIONAL LAw 274 (2003).
62. Report of the ILC on the Work of its 53rd Sess., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, UN
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capacity to invoke a breach of an obligation owed to it must be understood as
exclusive in respect of the international organization concerned.
This assertion is endorsed by international practice, as international
organizations generally present international claims themselves,63 as this Court
has recognized when stating that, in bringing a claim for damages suffered by
its agent, an international organization does so by invoking the breach of an
obligation towards itself.'4
In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding Uriah Heep's reception
into Adarian territory, the presentation of credentials before governmental
authorities,65 and, most relevantly, the terms of the AAA 66 dictate that, if any
obligations regarding privileges and immunities were held to bind Adaria, they
would only be owed to the R.U. and not to its members. As one authority has
expressed in the most conclusive terms:
"In practice, all Organizations invoke or waive (as the case may be)
privileges and immunities on behalf of their officials, and they, or the host
State, could hardly accept a transfer of these functions to the State of which the
officials are nationals. This is especially evident if the privileges and
immunities are based upon a headquarters or host agreement to which only the
Organization, not it several Member States, are parties."67
Moreover, as in the case at bar Uriah Heep is not a national of any of the
member States,6" less reason for a transfer of the kind may exist.
Therefore, only the R.U. would be capable of invoking Adaria's inter-
national responsibility and the Respondent States lack standing in this regard.
b. Respondents cannot espouse a claim on behalf of the
Rotian Union or any of its organs.
Member States of the R.U. are precluded from representing the latter in
order to bring an international claim. The organization is, at least in this area,
an international subject with enough capacity to act on the international plane
by itself.
GAOR56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN DOC. A/56/10, [hereinafter UN DOC. A/56/10], Article 42, paragraphs
1,2 & 3.
63. G.A. Res.365 (IV), 1 December 1949; UNESCO-France Arbitration Award, 14 January 2003,
107 R.G.D.I.P. 221 (2003).
64. Reparations, supra note 60, 182.
65. Compromis #18
66. Compromis, Annex I, #3
67. F.Seyersted, International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations. Do Their
Capacities Depend Upon Their Constitutions? 4 INDIAN J.INT'L.L. 6 (1964).
68. Clarifications #3
240 [Vol. 14:1
Distinguished Brief
There is no rule of international law enabling States to espouse a claim on
behalf of an international organization and no special provision on the issue has
been included on the codification of international responsibility of international
organizations.69
Lack of practice in this connection confirms the aforementioned conclu-
sion. States can only act on the international plane on behalf of an international
organization, either when the latter is devoid of international legal personality,
70
or in the specific case foreseen by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, 7' which is unrelated to the present circumstances.
The fact that the Statute of this Court72 does not permit international
organizations to become parties to contentious proceedings does not imply that
its member States should be entitled to represent it, even if this resulted in the
R.U. being incapable of enforcing its rights as this Court has already recognized
that "in the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the
last resort be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than
the exception."73
Furthermore, that path would result in the unacceptable consequence of the
member States disregarding the international personality of the organization.74
Certainly, this would collide against elemental principles of international law,
such as good faith,75 and the legitimate interests of Adaria76 in having
contracted with the Union.
69. Report of the ILC, 55th Sess., A/CN.4/532; Report of the ILC, 55th Sess., A/CN.4/541; Report
of the ILC, 57th Sess., A/CN.4/553, Report of the ILC, 58th Sess., A/CN.4/564; Report of the ILC, 58th
Sess., A/CN.4/564/Add. 1.
70. Treaty of the European Union, Title 1, Article 1, Oct. 11, 1997, Offic. J. of the E.C. C325/5
(Dec. 24 2002); Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970 between the
European Economic Community and Turkey, Official Journal L 293, 29/12/1972, p. 4.; A.S.MULLER,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES 78 (1995); M.Gavouneli, M. International Law
Aspects of the European Union, 8 TUL.J.INT'L & COMP.L. 147 (2000), 149.
71. 1986 V.C.L.T., supra note 1, Article 66(2)(d).
72. I.C.J. Statute, June 26, 1945, 1060 U.S.T.S. 993, Article 34
73. South West Africa, supra note 9, para. 86.
74. M.SHAw, supra note 6, 243.
75. Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France, Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (December 20),
267; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N.Doc. A/8082 (1970).
76. J.Klabbers, Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law, in M.
KOSKENNIEMI(ED.), INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 237 (1998); C.Tomuschat, The
International Responsibility of the European Union, in E.CANNIzARO(ED.), THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN
ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 182 (2002).
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c. Additionally, Respondents do not have standing in their own right with
respect to Adaria's action in connection with the Rotian Union Legation
because they are not injured States.
Furthermore, Respondent States do not have standing to bring a claim in
their own right in connection with Adaria's action because they do not satisfy
the requirements set out by the international law of state responsibility in that
regard." Indeed, the Respondents cannot be considered as injured states"8 for
the purposes of invoking Adaria's responsibility and the rule for invoking
responsibility as a State other than the injured one is neither part of customary
international law nor applicable to this case.
d Respondents are not injured States as the alleged obligations were not
owed to them individually.
Under international law, a State can be considered injured if the breached
obligation was due to it on a bilateral basis.79 Clearly, such condition is
inexistent in the case at bar. No bilateral treaty exists between Adaria and
Respondents regarding the R.U. Legation, neither on privileges and immunities
whatsoever."0 Furthermore, no bilateral relation can emerge from the AAA as
it expressly indicates that the Legation would represent the interests of the
Commission and not of the five member States.
e. Respondents are not injured States because they were not specially
affected by the breach of an obligation owed to a group of States or the
international community as a whole nor was there a breach of an integral
obligation.
International responsibility can also be invoked by a State specially
affected by the breach of an obligation owed to a group of States.8 ' As all
member states of the R.U. are claiming together and on the same facts and
law, 2 no one is "affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes it from the
generality of other States to which the obligation is owed." 3 Certainly, neither
Uriah Heep's nationality nor an eventual detriment of the diplomatic relations
77. Res 56/83, supra note 29.
78. Res.56/83, supra note 29, Part Hm, Chap. 1.
79. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62 Article 42, paragraph 6.
80. Clarifications # 12.
81. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62, Article 42.
82. Compromis #38.
83. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62, Article 42, paragraph 13.
84. Clarifications #3.
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of any of the member States with Adaria"5 provide a basis for such
differentiation.
Furthermore, in the case at bar no reciprocal obligations exist, so far as
member States do not owe Adaria any privilege or immunity under the AAA
thus precluding the possibility of invoking Adaria's responsibility on that basis.
f Neither can Respondents invoke Adarian responsibility as States other
than the injured State.
Finally, Respondents cannot invoke Adaria's responsibility by extensively
applying the provisions of Article 48 of Draft Articles on State Responsibility.86
Indeed, this provision is envisaged as a measure of progressive development
which does not amount to international customary law up to this date87 and the
privileges and immunities supposedly granted to the R.U. cannot be said to have
been instituted for the protection of a collective interest as it is the case with
environmental preservation, security of a region or freedom of navigation.88
g. In the alternative, Respondents are incapable of invoking Adaria's
responsibility by having delegated diplomatic and foreign policy matters in
the organization.
Respondent States are precluded from invoking Adaria's responsibility
because they have delegated diplomatic and foreign policy matters in the
Commission.89 The delegated powers go beyond the scope of those accorded
under article 4(1)(g) of the TRU as they have been expanded by way of practice
to cover the member States' own diplomatic and foreign relations.9"
This Court has previously held,9' and it has been endorsed by commenta-
tors,92 that the established practice of international organizations constitute
rules to which they must conform in the development of their international
activities. When said practice specifies functions or purposes of the organiza-
tions, they must be understood as duties they are called to exercise. 93 In the
85. Clarifications #6.
86. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62, Article 42.
87. Ibid., Article 48, para. 12.
88. Ibid., Article 48, paragraph 5.
89. Compromis # 12
90. Compromis #12
91. Legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 22, Adv.Op., (June 21), para. 22.
92. P.SANDS & P.KLEIN, supra note 12, 456; C.F.AMERASINGHE, supra note 33, 55.
93. Reparations, supra note 60, 180.
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instant case, such practice bars Respondent States from bringing a claim on
grounds that no longer pertain to the scope of their capacities.
3. In the alternative, the Rotian Union and its Member States would be
precluded from bringing a claim due to the Rotian Union Legation illegal
activities in Adaria.
According to international law, a State cannot make a claim on behalf of
an injured national if he suffered injury as a result of engaging in improper
activities.94
Illegal conduct was proved to be carried out by Uriah Heep in the exercise
of his functions.95 Said conduct, bordering undue intervention 96 in Adarian
affairs, precludes both the R.U. and its Members from invoking Adarian
responsibility as it analogously contravenes the aforementioned rule.97
C. Applicant Did Not Violate International Law Concerning The Immunity
Of Diplomatic Missions By Seizing The Premises, Property, Or Personnel Of
The Rotian Union Representative Office.
The distinction between the privileges and immunities recognized to
diplomatic missions of States and those accorded International Organizations
is well established.9s The RU Representative Office cannot be assimilated to an
embassy or diplomatic mission and therefore the privileges and immunities
pertaining to them are not applicable. Furthermore, customary international law
does not require Adaria to vest the RU with privileges and immunities and, in
any event, Adaria's action would not be inconsistent with such rule under the
current circumstances.
94. P.MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1997);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 I.C.J. 14, Judgement,
27 June 1986, (Schwebel, dissenting opinion) 272; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 53, (Anzilotti dissenting opinion), 95.
95. Compromis #32
96. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, (Dec. 15), 35.
97. R.Higgins, Les consequences juridiques pour les Etats membres de l inexicution par des
organisations internationales de leurs obligations envers des tiers, 66-1 YEARBOOK OF THE INSTITUT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, Part IV, 2 (1995).
98. J.Kunz, Privileges and immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM.J.INT'L L. 828, 854
(1947); J.Lalive, L "immunite dejurisdiction des etats et des organisations internationales, 84 R.C.A.D.1205,
293 (1953); A.REiNISCH, supra note 59, 20&21.
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1. The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities accorded to Embassies and
Diplomats are not applicable to the RU Representative Office.
The RU Representative Office is not and cannot be assimilated to an
embassy or diplomatic mission of a foreign State. Indeed, analogies between
diplomatic or consular law and institutional immunities are not accepted.99
Consequently, diplomatic or consular law is not applicable to International
Organizations, whose system of privileges and immunities has received separate
treatment' 00 as it arises from different sources and has distinct characteristics. 01
Recognition as a diplomatic mission cannot be derived from the absence
of payment of property taxes by the R.U.'l 2 since Adarian law also exempts not-
for-profit organizations 3 and the Adarian Taxation Ministry has so qualified
the R.U. Legation."°
Pursuant to the AAA, 0 5 Mr. Heep was a representative of the R.U., an
International Organization. Thus, the whole body of law pertaining to diplo-
matic and consular immunity is per se inapplicable to them.
2. Additionally, neither treaty nor customary law require Adaria to grant
privileges and immunities to an international organization.
As regards privileges and immunities of international organizations, the
test is functional,"0 6 and they must emerge from relevant treaties 7 as no
99. P.SANDS & P.KLEIN(EDS.), supra note 12, 486 (2001); I.KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW, 153 (2002); G.H.Glenn et al., Immunities of International
Organizations, 22 VA.J.INT'L L. 247, 266 (1982); Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, 13 UNCIO
Doc- 933, IV/242(2), 704 (1945).
100. UN Doc. A/CN.4/304 (1977), A/CN.4/SER.A/1977.Add.! (Part I); UN Doc. A/CN.4/311
(1978), UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (Part 1); UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.383, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1985 Add. I (Part /Add.l); UN Doc. A/CN.4/432 (1990), UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add. 1 (Part 1); UN Doc. A/CN.4/439 (1991); UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991; GA Res.
47/33, 47 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49), 287-8, para. 7; UN Doc. A/47/49 (Vol. 1) (1993).
101. Explanatory Report by the sub-committee of the European Committee on Legal Co-operation,
in Resolution (69) 23 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1969).
102. Clarifications #5
103. Clarifications #4
104. Clarifications #5
105. Compromis, Annex II, §3
106. E.Fedder, The Functional Basis of International Privileges and Immunities: A New Concept
in International Law and Organization, 9 AM. U. L. REv. 60, (1960) p.6 0 .
107. P.MALANCZUK(ED.),supra note 94,127 (1997); International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc.,
(1998), 80 I.L.R. 30, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia BHD v. International Tin Council, High Court of Malaysia
(1987), 80 I.L.R. 24; Explanatory Report, supra note 101, 14.
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customary rule emerges from existent practice,' due to its inconsistency and
lack of opinio iuris.l09
Privileges and immunities accorded to International Organizations were
always developed on a conventional basis,"o leaving no place for custom,"' as
evinced by the discontinuance of the work of the ILC on the topic, explaining
that the existence of multilateral conventions and host agreements turned any
codification on the subject unnecessary.' 12
Additionally, as confirmed by international reports," 3 general conven-
tions,'' 4 domestic" 5 and international" 6 case law; state declarations,"' and
scholars;"' functional necessity is the prevailing standard, implying by
108. Preliminary Report on the Second Part of the Topic of Relations between States and
International Organizations, A/CN.4/304, 2 Yearbook of the ILC 139, 154 (1977)
109. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 94, 186; North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), supra note 27 para. 77.
110. D.B.MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 7(1971)
111. F.MORGERSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3 (1986)
112. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th Session. Doc.
A/C.N.4/446, 297; Remarks by the Representative of Israel, Official Records of the General Assembly, 32nd
Session, Sixth Committee, 36th Meeting, para. 44; Remarks by the Representative of Spain, Official Records
of the General Assembly, 32nd Session, Sixth Committee, 39th Meeting, para. 16.
113. Resolution (69) 29 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1969) &
Explanatory Report, supra note 101
114. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 57; Agreement
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States, 2 LTITP 377 (1949); General
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (and additional Protocols), 250 UTS
12&32 (1949); General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity,
L.B.SOHN (ED.), BASIC DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 117(1971)
115. Cristiani v. Italian Latin-American Institute, Italian Court of Cassation, 87 ILR 20, 24-25;
Eckhardt v. European Organization for the Safety ofAir Navigation (Eurocontrol) No. 2, 94 ILR 331, 337-
338 (1987); Spaans v. Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 438 NJ 1691 (1985)
116. Reparations, supra note 60; Case C-2/88, IMM Zwartveld, E.C.J., (1990) E.C.R. 1-3365, para.
19.
117. Remarks by the Representative of Brazil, Official Records of the General Assembly, 32nd
Session, Sixth Committee, 30th Meeting, para. 40; Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom,
Foreign Office (1965). Para. 18; Reply to the Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom by
the Federal Republic of Germany, German Federal Foreign Office, June 25th (1965), para. 2; Reply to the
Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom by Norway, Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Aug. 10th (1965), para. 3 in Resolution (69) supra note 113.
118. G.WEISSBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1961); Dinh, Les
Privileges etlmmunites des Organismes Internationaux D 'Apres lesJurisprudences Nationales Depuis 1945,
3 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 262 (1957); 316; V.L.Maginnis, Limiting Diplomatic
Immunity: Lessons Learned from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 989, 996 (2003); J.Groff, A Proposal for Diplomatic Accountability Using
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: The Decline of an Absolute Sovereign Right, 14
TEMP.INT L & COMP.L.J. 209, 216 (2000)
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definition, that consistent and uniform practice cannot be found for privileges
and immunities as it will reflect the particular needs and goals of each organiza-
tion.
Accordingly, while the constitutions of some organizations contain
immunity provisions of a very general nature," 9 others have very detailed
provisions12' and yet others have no provisions at all.' 2' Furthermore, States do
not consider themselves bound to recognize International Organizations any
minimum core of privileges and immunities for it is not necessary or
desirable. 2
2
In the absence of a customary rule, Respondents can only support their
claim on conventional basis. However, the A.A.A. merely devolves upon
general International Law to govern the matter, 23 and no international
customary rule has yet crystallized in this regard. Thus, Adaria did not violate
international law by its action in connection with the R.U. Legation.
3. In the alternative, customary international law would not apply to the
circumstances of this case.
a. If a customary obligation to vest International Organizations with
privileges and Immunities existed, it would only extend to
members of the RU.
Under international law, enjoyment of privileges and immunities in the
territory of non-member states remains dependent on agreement 24 --the sole
exception being the United Nations-and thus, if a customary rule existed, it
would solely bind members of the organization.'25
119. ILO Constitution, Oct. 9 15. U.N.T.S. 35 (1946) Art. 40; UNESCO Constitution, Art. XII; Nov.
16, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 (1945); WHO Constitution, July 22, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 (1946) Arts. 67&68; ICAO
Constitution, Dec. 7, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1944) Art. 60.
120. IBRD Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 2 U.N.T.S 134 (1944), Art. VII; IMF Articles of
Agreement, Dec. 27, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (1945) Art IX; IFC Articles of Agreement, May 25, 264 U.N.T.S 117
(1955), Art. VI; MIGA Convention, Oct. 11, 1985 I.L.M 24 (1985), Arts. 43-50; EBRD Constitution, May
29, 1646 U.N.T.S 97 (1990), Arts. 46-55.
121. NATO Constitution; April 4,34 U.N.T.S. 243. (1949).
122. Explanatory Report, supra note 101, 14, 15&16.
123. AAA, supra note 105, §3
124. International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc., supra note 107; Iran-US Claims Tribunal v. AS,
94 ILR 321, 329 (1985)
125. P.DUPUY, A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 844 (1998) Communaute
economique des Etats de l'Afrique de I'Ouest and others v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International,
Paris Court of Appeal, 13th Jan. 1993, 120 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 353,357 (1993).
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Thus, as a non-member of the RU, Adaria owes no obligation to grant
privileges or immunities to the RU Representative Office under customary
international law.
b. If a customary obligation to vest International Organizations with
privileges and Immunities existed, it would only cover official acts.
Privileges and Immunities of international organizations are granted solely
to ensure the achievement of the entity's purposes, protecting it against undue
state intervention.
126
In this vein, privileges and immunities cease to be applicable when the
representative's conduct exceeds the scope of activities strictly necessary for
the administrative and technical operation of the Organization.'27 Tortious
acts, 128 bribery, 12 espionage,"' and fraudulent acts,' 3' are not official acts
attracting immunity, which must be interpreted restrictively having regard to the
limited character of the privileges and immunities normally accorded to them.132
The illegal financial contributions to political candidates performed by
Uriah Heep33 clearly exceeds his functions of facilitating Adarian integration
into the R.U., according to the A.A.A. Is4 Hence, privileges and immunities
need not be accorded to him or to the Organization in connection with those
acts.
4. Eventually, Adaria's conduct falls within a lawful exception to the
general rule of customary international law.
a. Privileges and Immunities do not apply as Adaria's national
security was at stake.
Organizations and their representatives must respect the laws of the state
in whose territory they conduct activities, without interfering with its internal
126. C.JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES, 17 (1961)
127. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 NYS (2d) 31 (1946).
128. L v. The Crown, New Zealand Supreme Court, Sept. 12th, 1977, 68 ILR 175 (1985); United
States v. Coplon et aL, US District Court EDNY, May 10th, 1949.
129. Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim and others, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Feb. 1st, 1996,
1 LLOYD'S REPORTS 589, 596 (1996)
130. United States v. Melekh, 32 ILR 308 (1961)
131. Peoplev. Coumatos, 35 ILR 222 (1962)
132. Explanatory Report, supra note 10 1, 42.
133. Compromis #32.
134. Compromis, Annex, Section 3
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affairs.'35 Furthermore, every state retains the right to adopt necessary
precautions and measures in the interest of its security, 36particularly in cases
of flagrant and serious misconduct, for there would be no further cause for
protecting the international administration, since the acts involved are alien to
its nature. 13
7
The RU Office's illegal interference into the domestic politics of Adaria
compromised its national security, of which the political and electoral process
is a decisive factor. Thus, Adaria acted in accordance with international
standards, which entitles it to derogate privileges and immunities of the
Organization and its personnel where the national security of the State is at
stake.
D. The National Industry Act Does Not Constitute An Illegal Expropriation
OfAdarnoire And The Other Privatized Concerns Under International Law.
1. Respondents have not complied with the requirements for the exercise of
diplomatic protection with regard to the adardrink, adarenergy and adarfleet.
Local remedies must be exhausted before a State can bring a claim on
behalf of its nationals by virtue of diplomatic protection. 38 In the case at bar,
only Bobboman Inc. has exhausted Adarian local remedies. 39
There is no basis to believe that action by the other privatized concerns
would be futile. 4 ° Indeed, in order to find that the exhaustion of local remedies
is not required on such basis "the test is not whether a successful outcome is
likely or possible but whether the municipal system of the respondent State is
reasonably capable of providing effective relief'."' Clearly, Adaria is
reasonably capable of providing effective relief and the decision in Adarmoire
should not be considered as precluding that possibility since that decision is not
necessarily applicable to all other cases. Adarfleet, Adardrink and Adarenergy
135. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 U.N.T.S. 45 (April 18, 1965) Art. 41.1.
136. Explanatory Report, supra note 101, 21; ILC Summary Record of the 2232nd Meeting,
Relations between States and International Organizations (Second part of the topic), A/CN.A/438,
A/CN.4.439, A/CN.4/L.456, sect. F, A/CN.4/L.466, Draft Art. 17 (1991); European Launcher Development
Organisation (ELDO) Protocol, Feb. 29, 1964 U.K.T.S. 30 (1964) Art. 22 ; United States ex rel. Casanova
v. Fitzpatrick, 34 ILR 154, 159-160 (1963); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, 1 American Law Institute 524, §470, reporters' note 3 [hereinafter: Third Restatement].
137. A.PLANTEY, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE - LAW AND MANAGEMENT, 106 (1981).
138. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra note 58, 12; Nottebhom (Liech. v. Guat.), 19595
I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6), at 20; Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 21), at 27.
139. Compromis, #36; Clarifications, #9.
140. Clarifications #9.
141. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, Vol. 11, Part Two, 79.
2007]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
could very well argue the case different, or the fact of the cases be different, so
that a different outcome is achieved.
Consequently, respondents are precluded from espousing the claims of the
privatized concerns other than Adarmoire.
2. The National Industry Act does not constitute an illegal expropriation of
the privatized concerns.
a. Under international law only forcible takings ofproperty constitute an
expropriation and are thus illegal.
Under international law, direct expropriation is the forcible taking and
appropriation by the State of individuals' property by means of administrative
or legislative action.112
In the present case it is not possible to argue that an expropriation has
occurred because the foreign investors have retained property over the stocks
ofAdarmoire, Adardrink, Adarenergy and Adarfleet, which are still in existence
and whose value depends on the free market. '
b. General International Law does not deem as illegal measures other than
a forcible taking regardless of their effect on property rights.
There is no rule of customary law concerning other State measures that
produce an interference with the use of property or enjoyment of its benefits
when there is no formal transfer of property. 1"
The lack of uniformity in State practice regarding this subject is evidenced
in the disparity found in domestic legislation, in which States have subordinated
the right to private property to social interests. '45 Additionally, the fact that Free
142. A.MOURi, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBtNAL 65 (1994); I.BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003),
508-509; LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic
[hereinafter LG&E], ICSID Case N' ARB/02/01, 3 October 2006, para. 187; Amoco International Finance
Corporation v. Iran, 15 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 189 (1987), para. 108, 114; S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (2003) para. 280; Trcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A.
v. United Mexican States [hereinafter Tecmed], ICSID, Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003, 43 I.L.M.
133, para. 113; Seismograph Service Corp v. Iranian National Oil Co. (1989), 22 IRAN-U.S. CL.TRIB.REP.
3, para. 267.
143. Compromis, #36.
144. OECD Working Paper on International Investment, No. 2004/4, "Indirect expropriation "and
the "right to regulate" in International Investment Law, 3, (Sept. 2004), at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf;
145. S.FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1981); BRAZ. CONSTITUTION, art. 5,
XXII; COSTARICACONSTITUTION, art. 45; PANAMA CONSTITUTION, art. 48; MEXICO CONSTITUTION, art. 27;
JAPAN CONSTITUTION art. 29(2).
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Trade Agreements 4 and Bilateral Investment Treaties 147 contemplate explicitly
these measures evinces that indirect expropriation does not form part of
customary international law. Furthermore, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had
the power to rule on "other measures affecting property rights" and grant com-
pensation solely because it was specially foreseen in its constitutive treaty. 48
Furthermore, the assertion that the National Industry Act [hereinafter
N.I.A] is "tantamount to expropiation,"'' 49 does not result in broadening the
ordinary meaning of expropriation, 50 because the ordinary meaning of the term
"tantamount" is that of being almost equivalent.
Therefore, there is no consolidated rule on indirect expropriation and the
N.I.A. is thus consistent with current international law.
c. In the alternative, the N.I.A. is consistent with General International Law
concerning indirect expropriations.
i. The N.I.A. does not produce the effects on property rights required to
deem it an indirect expropriation.
Even if indirect expropriation existed under international law, the
deprivation suffered in Adarmoire, Adarfleet, Adardrink and Adarenergy's
property rights is not enough to affirm that an expropriation has occurred.
Indeed, indirect expropriation occurs when the State in question effectively
neutralizes the benefits of the investment, by supervising the activities of the
company, taking the proceeds of its sales, interfering with its management or
appointing a manager or director.' The need of a significant degree of
deprivation, the fact that the property rights are rendered useless and the unjust
enrichment of the State, have all been deemed essential in determining the
existence of indirect expropriation.5 2
146. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.17, 1992, Ch.l 1, art. 1110, 32 ILM 605 (1993);
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Mar. 3, 2004, art. 11.7(1); US-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
June 6,2003, art. 10.9(1); Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Dec.5, 1996, art. G-1 0(1)(a), 36 1.L.M. 1067.
147. 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 6(1); United States-Turkey Bilateral
Investment Treaty, Dec. 3, 1985, art. III; United States-Poland Business and Economic Relations Treaty, Mar.
21, 1990, art. VII, at http://www.ustr.gov/.
148. Claims Settlement Declaration, January 19, 1981, Art. fl, 1 IRAN-U.S. CL.TRIB.REP. 9.
149. Compromis, #16.
150. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award (June 26,2000), para 96, www.naftaclaims.com;
S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, supra note 142, 1440.
151. Tecmed, supra note 142, para. 113; LG&E, supra note 142, para. 188; Pope & Talbot Inc. v.
Canada, supra note 150, para 100; OECD Working Paper on International Investment, supra note 144, 8.
152. E.Jimenez de Ar~chaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned
Property (1978), 11 N.Y.U.J.INT'L L.& POL. 179, 182; Sea-Land Service Inc v. Iran, 6 IRAN-
U.S.CL.TRIB.REc. 149, 161 (1984); Sporrong and Ldnnroth v. Sweeden, 5 E.H.R.R. 35 (1983) para. 63;
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In the case at bar, even if respondents argue that the value of the privatized
concerns in Adaria is affected, the Act does not prevent said companies from
directing their activities and enjoying its benefits within Adaria's territory.
Specifically, the denial of permission to transfer funds abroad does not
constitute taking of property under international law.'53 Accordingly, arbitral
tribunals have denied compensation for restrictions on international transfer of
funds 5 4 and restrictions on bank account transfers.' Additionally, it has been
found that conditions imposed upon the re-export of property were lawful and
not expropriation when the owner retained the right to sell the property." 6
It is clear that Adaria's Act does not amount to an indirect expropriation
because the companies' assets are in existence and at their disposal and
Adaria's Government has not interfered with the companies management.5 7
d In the further alternative, the N.A. constitutes
a valid regulatory measure.
It is a well accepted principle of customary law that all States have the
right to adopt regulatory measures, known as "an ordinary expression of the
exercise of the State's police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights "'58
as long as they are not discriminatory."' Both necessary elements for the
existence of customary law, State practice and opiniojuris,161 can be found.
Regarding State practice, domestic courts of Holand, the U.S.A., Sweden,
Great Britain and Germany have recognized the right of States to pass
Starret Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 IRAN-US CL. TiUB. REc. 122, 144-145 (1983); Tippets v. TAMS-AFFA
Consulting Engineers of Iran, 6 IRAN-U.S. CL.TRtB.REP. 219, 223 (1984); Tecmed, supra note 142, para.
115.
153. G.C.Christie, What constitutes a taking of property under international law?, 38
BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 307, (1962), 318; B.WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107
(1959).
154. Dallal v. Iran, 3 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 10; Hood Corporation v. Iran, 7 IRAN-U.S.CL.
TRIB.REP. 36.
155. Sea-Land Service Inc v. Iran, supra note 152.
156. Seismograph Service Corp v. Iranian National Oil Co., supra note 142, para. 301.
157. Compromis, #36.
158. Tecmed, supra note 142, para. 115.
159. I.BROWNLIE, supra note _142, 509; H.Burns Weston, "Constructive Takings" under
International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation", 16 VA.J. INT'L L. 104,
121 (1975-1976); G.C.Christie, supra note 153 331-332; Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g);
Oscar Chinn affaire, P.C.IJ, 1934, Ser A/B, Case No. 63; LG&E, supra note 142, para. 195.
160. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 27, 45; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua, supra note 94, 97; H.Thirlway, The Sources on International Law, in M.EvANS(ED.),
INTERNATIONAL LAw 117, 125 (2003).
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regulatory measures and, when the decisions were against the Government
measures, it was only based on their discriminatory nature. 6 '
Evidence of existence of opinio juris can be drawn from instruments
approved by international organizations that affirm the power of States to pass
this kind of measures unless they withhold a clear intention of taking the
property by applying them 62 and the right of States to regulate foreign
investment and the activities oftransnational corporation within its territory "in
conformity with its national objectives and priorities."' 63 Furthermore, the
existence of this rule of customary international law is confirmed by the work
of prominent scholars. 164
i. The N.I.A. pursues a legitimate purpose.
Even if a measure carries some negative effects on property rights, it can
be validly adopted in order to protect public interests, such as health, morals,
safety or welfare. 65 In this vein, the N.I.A. is aimed to protect Adaria against
capital flight 66 and to minimize the damage caused by the closure of companies
and layoffs,'67 as well as at diminishing the impact on the Sophians. 6 The
N.I.A. was aimed at addressing the situation of a pauperized minority and can
therefore be considered to fulfill the requirement of pursuing a legitimate
purpose.
161. Weiss v. Simon (1919-1942 Supp.) Ann. Dig. 109 (No. 57) (Supreme Court, Sweden 1941);
Novello and Co., Ltd. v. Hinrichsen Edition, Ltd., (1951) 1 Ch. 595; Latvian Shipping Company v. Montan
Export Ltd., District Court of The Hague, (1950) I.L.R. 32; Kozicki v. Baltycka Spolka Rybna, Supreme
Court, Sweden, (1951) 1.L.R. 37; Molnar v. Wilsons A/B, Supreme Court, Sweden, (1954) I.L.R. 30;
Expropriation of Eastern Zone Company (Germany) Case, Supreme Court, Germany, (1955) I.L.R. 14.
162. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 2 1.L.M. 241 (1963), art. 3, cmt. 3.(a);
OECD Working Paper on International Investment, supra note 144, 8.
163. U.N.G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 Dec. 1974, 14 I.L.M. 251, Article 2.1l(a),(b).
164. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 15 Apr.
1961, Article 10.5, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 554; Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g).
165. G.C.Christie, supra note 153, 338; Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property,
Article 3, 7 ILM 124 (1968); Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, supra note 164, Article 10.5, 554; Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency Article I I(a)(ii), (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1605, 1611-1612; Oscar Chinn affaire, supra note 159.
166. Compromis, #35.
167. Compromis, #20.
168. Compromis, #21.
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ii. The N.I.A. is not discriminatory.
It is generally acknowledged that regulatory measures are not unreasonable
when they are not discriminatory.'69 Discrimination implies "unreasonable
distinction."''
70
In the present case, the N.I.A. affects only those companies which are
owned by R.U. nationals. However, the measure cannot be said to have been
aimed at those individuals in a discriminatory manner but rather it identified the
companies that were deemed essential for its economic development. 7 The
nationality of the shareholders was not taken into consideration when
distinguishing the concerns that would be targeted by the measure and thus the
N.I.A. cannot be considered as discriminatory.
iii. The N.I.A. is a temporary measure.
A temporary regulation of property rights cannot be seen as expropriation
but only as a mere delaying of an opportunity. 172 Only if the effect on the
property rights extended for a long period of time, the deprivation could be
considered as not merely ephemeral. 73
In the case at bar, Adaria's regulation was passed as a protection against
capital flight and with the intention of reducing the damages caused by the
denial of membership in the R.U. 174 thus being temporarily by definition.
Additionally, the freezing of the assets is a measure that can be reversed at any
time, given that the assets exist and the companies have retained ownership
over them.'75
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Therefore, it may please the Court to adjudge and declare:
A) That Respondents have violated international legal obligations
owed to Adaria by denying Adaria membership in the Rotian
Union;
169. Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g); North American Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 146; Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, supra note 165, Article 3.
170. Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (f);
171. Compromis,#1
172. A.F.LoWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 480 (2003); S.D.Myers Inc. v. Canada,
supra note 142, 1440.
173. OECD Working Paper on International Investment, supra note 144, 14; Third Restatement,
supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g).
174. Compromis, #35.
175. Compromis, #36.
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B) That Respondents do not have standing to make any claim
concerning Adaria's actions with respect to the Rotian Union
representative office, its property, or its personnel;
C) That Adaria did not violate international law concerning the
immunity of diplomatic missions by seizing the premises,
property, or personnel ofthe Rotian Union representative office;
D) The National Industry Act does not constitute an illegal
expropriation of Adarmoire and the other privatized concerns
under international law.
In respectful submission before the International Court of Justice, The Republic
of Adaria
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Adaria, the Republic of Bobbia, the Kingdom of Cazalia,
the Commonwealth of Dingoth, the State of Ephraim, and the Kingdom of
Finbar submit the present dispute to this Court by Special Agreement, dated
September 1,2006, pursuant to article 40(1) of the Court's Statute. The parties
have agreed to the contents of the Compromis submitted as part of the Special
Agreement. All states parties to this dispute have accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with article 36(2) of the Court's Statute.
All parties shall accept the judgment of this Court as final and binding and shall
execute it in good faith in its entirety.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A) Whether the Rotian Union Councils decision to postpone
Adaria's admission breached any international legal obligations
owed to Adaria by Respondents;
B) Whether Respondents have standing to bring a claim against
Adaria in this Court for its actions against the Rotian Union
Legation, its property and its personnel;
C) Whether Adaria violated international law governing the
immunity of international organizations by invading the
premises and seizing the property and personnel of the Rotian
Union Legation;
D) Whether the National Industry Act constitutes an illegal
expropriation under international law.
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Republic of Bobbia, the Kingdom of Cazalia, the Commonwealth of
Dingoth, and the State of Ephraim (Respondents) are five contiguous and
economically developed States in the region of Rotia. In 1964, Respondents
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formed the Rotian Union (RU) in order to foster greater economic cooperation
and promote closer political unity within Rotia. The Treaty establishing the
Rotian Union (TRU) provided for four RU organs:
1) The Parliament, directly elected by the citizens of the Member
States;
2) The Council, composed of one representative from the
government of each Member State;
3) The Commission, consisting of a President and four ministers;
and
4) The High Court. (Compromis 4, 5, Annex I).
Respondents intended the RU to constitute a new legal order in
international law. Thus, they endowed it with a great deal of autonomy and
authority to enact legislation and further the objectives of the Union. Over the
next twenty-five years, the RU established common policies for its Member
States, supplanting domestic laws in numerous economic related spheres. The
High Court also actively brought offending states to task for not enacting
common legislation. Eventually, the RU began to act not only as a harmonizer
of economic relations between the Member States but also as a representative
of the Member States in dealing with non-Members. (Compromis 6, 8).
In 1991, Respondents signed the Convention Amending the Rotian Union
Treaty (CARUT) which further empowered the RU to coordinate non-trade
relations between Respondents and non-Member States. The CARUT also
replaced the national currencies of Respondents with a single Rotian currency,
the Roto. Since the CARUT entered into force, the role of the RU in
coordinating foreign policies of Respondents has grown considerably. For
example, in 1995, the RU negotiated mutual judgment recognition treaties with
the United States and India. In 1997, the RU became a party to the World
Trade Organization in its own right. Finally, in 2004, the President of the
Commission successfully negotiated for the safe release of nationals of Member
States held hostage by a paramilitary organization. (Compromis 9, 11, 12).
In 1995, the Republic of Adaria (Applicant) applied for RU membership.
Adaria is a neighboring country whose population comprises an Adarian
majority and a Sophian minority with its own unique cultural and religious
heritage. After reviewing Adaria's application, the Commission recommended
that Adaria would be suitable for membership if it:
1) Reduced its public debt owed to non-RU states;
2) Privatized state-owned monopolies; and
3) Eliminated government support payments to small, privately
owned businesses.
[Vol. 14:1
Distinguished Brief
These conditions were incorporated into the Adarian Accession Agreement
(AAA) which was ratified by the Council in 2000. The AAA provided that
Adaria would be "eligible for admission" if it met those conditions.
(Compromis 7 14, 15, Annex 1I).
The treaty further provided for the establishment of an RU Legation in
Adaria, the rights, privileges, and immunities of which would be governed by
international law. On February 1, 2002, in accordance with the AAA, the RU
opened a Permanent Legation in Adaria led by an experienced diplomat Uriah
Heep. At that time, the Adarian Prime Minister warmly welcomed Mr. Heep
and his staff "as the Representatives of the Rotian Union in Adaria."
(Compromis 18, Annex II).
Initially, the AAA received much popular support from Adaria and its
people. However, as the Adarian government took steps to meet its obligations,
support waned considerably. Among these steps were an increase in taxes to
pay off national debts and the privatization of state-owned industries through
public auctions. These industries were subsequently purchased by companies
based within the RU. In each case, the parent company integrated its Adarian
facilities into its existing infrastructure resulting in inevitable layoffs. The
newly privatized power and utility companies also modernized pricing so as to
charge all consumers the same rates. (Compromis 21)
At the same time, the Adarian government began to phase out support
payments to small businesses. The loss of these payments forced many
Sophians out ofbusiness. In 2003, the government announced a massive public
works program which was to provide employment for the Sophians.
Unfortunately, and as the Adarian government was well aware, this form of
employment was not suitable for the Sophians as their religion prohibited heavy
labor and road-building. (Compromis 77 22, 23; Clarification 1)
Nevertheless, Adaria continued implementing measures on its own accord
resulting in the increasing dissatisfaction of the Adarians. In November 2005,
the Commission President reported to the Council that Adaria had met the
obligations enumerated in the AAA. However, while Adaria had literally
satisfied these conditions, in the process it had failed to take care of its own
Sophian citizens. Concerned that a country which left its own citizens without
adequate water, electricity, or jobs would not live up to RU standards, the
Council voted to postpone Adaria's admission until it could demonstrate its
willingness and ability to adequately care for its people. (Compromis 7 24-28)
This announcement was not well received and within days a wave of retaliation
swept through Adaria. On December 16, Ambassador Uriah Heep was arrested
for allegedly making illegal political donations. Armed Adarian agents entered
Legation premises without the RUs consent and forcibly took Ambassador
Heep into custody. The RU immediately protested this action as a violation of
the Legation's diplomatic status. On December 17, more armed agents stormed
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the Legation offices seizing bank records and computer diskettes, again without
the RUs consent. The Adarian Attorney General has yet to present formal
charges against any RU personnel. (Compromis 29, 31-32, 34)
On December 17, the Adarian Parliament also passed the National Industry
Act (NIA) which prohibits the RU owners of formerly state-owned enterprises
from transferring any profits earned in Adaria outside of the country. One of
these RU companies brought a lawsuit in Adarian civil court alleging that its
property had been expropriated. However, the lawsuit was rejected by the court
which perfunctorily concluded that no expropriation had occurred. On appeal,
the Adarian Supreme Court upheld the ruling. (Compromis, 29-32, 35-36)
On April 20,2006, Adaria filed an application with this Court alleging that
the Respondents violated international law by denying Adaria admission to the
RU. In order to promote judicial efficiency, Respondents have decided to act
through common counsel in this case. On September 1, 2006, both parties
submitted a Compromis which contains a stipulation of agreed facts. The Court
has decided to hear this case. (Compromis 37-38)
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A) The Court is not competent to decide this dispute because the
issue of whether the Rotian Union (RU) should have admitted
Adaria to membership is not capable of resolution by legal
principles. Even if the Court were to find that Adaria's claim is
justiciable, it should find that Respondents have not breached
any legal obligations owed to Adaria. Neither the AAA nor
customary international law obligates Respondents or the RU to
admit Adaria to membership. Rather, the AAA grants the RU
Council the discretion to determine whether Adaria should be
admitted. The Council properly considered the situation of the
Sophians when it decided not to admit Adaria. Moreover,
Respondents are not responsible for any violation of the AAA
which the RU might have committed. First, the RU assumed
obligations under the AAA in its own right. Second,
Respondents neither assisted nor directed the RU in its decision
not to admit Adaria. Finally, Respondents have not consented
to be responsible for the RUs actions;
B) Respondents have standing to assert a claim against Adaria for
its violation of the RU Legation's right to functional immunity.
Under this Court's precedent, Respondents have a direct legal
interest in the enforcement of legal obligations owed to
international organizations which they have created. As the
RUs right to functional immunity derives from the mutual
respect other states owe to Respondents, the Respondents have
also suffered moral injury as a result of Adaria's breach of the
RU Legation's immunity. Moreover, Respondents have
[Vol. 14:1
Distinguished Brief
standing to assert the RUs claim for the breach of its functional
immunity. As Respondents have not explicitly granted the RU
the power to assert claims against states, they retain the power
to assert claims on its behalf. The purpose of this Court would
also be served by a policy allowing Member States to bring
claims on behalf of their international organizations;
C) Adaria violated the functional immunity of the RU Legation by
storming its premises and seizing its property and personnel.
Both the AAA and customary international law required Adaria
to afford the RU Legation functional immunity. Functional
immunity requires, at a minimum, respect for the inviolability
of an international organization's premises, property, and
personnel. The RU Legation did not waive this immunity. The
Legation's financial contributions to Adarian politicians fell
within its duty to facilitate Adaria's integration into the RU.
These contributions were also consistent with Adarian law as
the RU Legation is a diplomatic mission of an international
organization. Adaria's unannounced invasion of the RU
Legation office and its arrest of Ambassador Heep constitute a
blatant violation of this functional immunity;
D) The National Industry Act (NIA) illegally expropriation
property owned by corporations from Respondent States. In
completelyprohibiting RU-based corporations fromutilizing the
profits from their recently-acquired Adarian industries, the NIA
unreasonably interferes with Respondents' nationals' right to
use and enjoy their property. This expropriation is illegal
because it is a discriminatory measure of political retaliation
against the RU and because the NIA fails to provide any
compensation.
V. PLEADINGS
A. Respondents Have Not Breached Any Legal Obligations Owed to Adaria.
1. The Court is not competent to resolve this dispute because it involves a
non-justiciable political question.
This Court may only decide upon "legal disputes" between states.' A legal
dispute is one that does not turn upon political considerations, but rather is
"capable of being settled by the application of principles and rules of
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 2, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993
[hereinafter I.C.J. Statute] (emphasis added). See also Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J.
15, 33-34 (Dec. 15); Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Gr. v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11
(Aug. 30).
2007]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
international law."2 The question of whether the RUs denial of Adaria's
application for membership was proper is not capable of resolution by legal
principles. Thus, the Court is not empowered to resolve this dispute.
International organizations admit states to membership on the basis of
political, rather than legal, criteria.3 Because states create international
organizations to serve certain functions,4 the decision to admit another state into
an organization turns upon a political evaluation of whether that state's
admission would advance the purposes of the organization.5 Such decisions
cannot be reviewed by courts. For example, the Treaty of the European Union
(TEU) provides that the conditions for admission to European Union (EU)
membership must be decided upon in each particular case.6 The TEU does not
provide the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with the jurisdiction to hear
disputes over membership admissions decisions.7 Likewise, the ECJ has treated
questions regarding admission to EU membership as nonjusticiable.8 While this
Court's decision in the first Admission case may suggest that questions
regarding admission to UN membership are justiciable, its analysis is limited
to the particular facts of that case which involved the interpretation of Article
4 of the UN Charter.9
Unlike the UN, but similar to the EU, the RU is free to determine its own
criteria for the admission of new members.' As opposed to the UN which has
the goal of universal membership," the RU is a regional organization designed
2. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v.Hond.) 1988 .C.J.69,91 (Dec. 20). See also
PAUL REUTER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 236 (1958).
3. See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 71 (May 28) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez); C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES
OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 107 (2d ed 2005); HENRY G. SCHERMERS
& NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW § 99 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter SCHERMERS];
IAN BROWLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (6th ed. 2003); JAN KLABBERS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 108 (2002); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLMCAL ORGANS OF THE UNITEDNATIONS 12 (1963); SIR HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 149 (1958).
4. See, e.g., Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the ffff, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 179 (April 11).
5. See Conditions ofAdmission, 1948 I.C.J. at 85 (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Basdevant,
Winiarski, McNair & Read); SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 99; REUTER, supra note 2, at 224.
6. Treaty on European Union art. 49, adopted as part ofTreaty of Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.
C 224/1 [hereinafter TEU].
7. Id. art. 35.
8. Lothar Mattheus v. Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkfihlkost eG, Case 93/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2203.
9. See Conditions ofAdmission, 1948 I.C.J. at 61.
10. Compare U.N. Charter art. 4 with TEU, supra note 6, art. 49 and Compromis, Annex I
art. 11 (2)-(4).
11. See Conditions ofAdmission, 1948 I.C.J. at 71 (separate opinion ofJudge Alvarez); BENEDErO
CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 26 (2nd ed. 2000); GEORG
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to foster greater economic and political unity within Rotia. 12 Furthermore,
unlike the UN Charter which specifies criteria which are sufficient for
admission, 3 the TRU vests the Commission with the power to establish
admission criteria and the Council with the power to determine whether such
criteria have been satisfied. 4 As with EU membership decisions, there are no
legal standards by which this Court can judge the RUs denial of Adaria's
application. Thus, this dispute does not belong before the Court.
2. Even if Applicant's claim is justiciable, the RU did not violate any legal
obligations when it exercised its discretion not to admit
Adaria to RU membership.
a. The RU did not breach the AAA by finding Adaria
ineligible for RU membership.
In order for the RU to breach an international obligation to admit Adaria
to RU membership, such an obligation would have to exist either under the
AAA or as a rule of customary international law. 5 In Yeda.; Tarim v. Council,
the European Court of First Instance (CFI) held that the Ankara Agreement,
which was designed to promote balanced economic relations between the
European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, did not create an
obligation for the EEC to financially support Turkey in any particular way. 6
Rather, as the Agreement was "not sufficiently precise and unconditional and
[was] of necessity subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of
subsequent measures,"' 7 the CFI found that the treaty granted the EEC a
substantial amount of discretion in its implementation. 8 Indeed, the EEC has
on multiple occasions entered into financial agreements with Turkey designed
to more closely align Turkey's economic policies with those of the EEC, but to
date the EEC has made no formal commitment to admit Turkey to the EU.' 9
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS VOL.
1II 133 (1976).
12. Compromis, Annex I.
13. See U.N. Charter art. 4; Conditions of Admission, 1948 I.C.J. at 65; OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1271-73 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM].
14. See Compromis, Annex I art. 11, para. 6.
15. See MOSHE HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARDTHIRD
PARTIES 102-3 (1995); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 47 (1994).
16. Yeda§ Tarim v. Council & Comm'n, Case T-367/03, Mar. 30, 2006, at 342.
17. Id.
18. Id. at % 55-6.
19. See Financial Protocol Annexed to the Agreement Establishing the Association Between the
European Economic Community and Turkey, Nov. 23, 1973, 1972 O.J. (L 293) 4; Council Decision
concerning the conclusion of a Financial Protocol between the European Economic Community an Turkey,
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Just as the Ankara Agreement created no precise obligation for the EEC
to financially support Turkey, the AAA does not obligate the RU to admit
Adaria to membership, but rather grants the Council final discretion to
determine whether Adaria should be admitted. The terms of the AAA must be
interpreted "in accordance with [their] ordinary meaning."20 The AAA only
guarantees that "Adaria shall be eligible for admission" upon its completion of
the three conditions specified therein.2' Likewise, the TRU provides that after
"the applicant state has timely satisfied all the conditions for accession
described in the Accession Agreement, the Council shall consider the
application, which it may approve by unanimous vote after obtaining the
opinion of Parliament."22 Thus, Adaria's fulfillment of the accession conditions
was necessary, but not sufficient for becoming an RU member. The Council
retained final discretion to determine whether Adaria should be admitted.
The Council properly exercised this discretion when it denied Adaria's
application because of concerns over the living conditions of the Sophians.
International organizations generally consider a membership applicant's ability
to help advance the unique purposes and goals of the organization when
deciding whether to admit it.23 The RU was formed, in part, "to ensure the
development of [its Member States'] prosperity, in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including in particular respect
for human rights and the rights of women and minorities."24 When evaluating
Adaria's application, the Council properly considered Adaria's treatment of its
Sophian minority. Adaria's failure to ensure that its Sophian citizens had
adequate water, electricity, and economic opportunities25 rightly caused the
Council to question whether Adaria should be an RU member.26 Thus, its
denial of Adaria's application for membership was consistent with its
obligations under the AAA.
Mar. 5, 1979, 1979 O.J. (L 67) 14.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations art. 31, March 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 129/15 (1986), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) (emphasis added) [hereinafter VCLTSIO]. AccordVienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (March 3);
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 194-95 (July 20).
21. Compromis, Annex 1 1 (emphasis added).
22. Compromis, Annex I art. 11(6) (emphasis added).
23. See Statute of the Council of Europe art. 4, May 5, 1949,87 U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter Council
of Europe Statute]; SCHERMERS, supra note 3, §§ 95, 97, 99.
24. Compromis, Annex I (emphasis added).
25. See Compromis % 21, 23, 26, 28; Clarifications IM 1-2.
26. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, Dee. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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b. The RU did not violate any rule of customary international law in its
treatment ofAdaria's application for RU membership.
No customary rule of international law requires the RU to admit Adaria.
Admission to membership in an international organization is not governed by
customary international law. Rather, as Professor Amerasinghe has observed,
"matters concerning membership depend primarily on the provisions of the
constitutions of international organizations and on the practice of each
organization. '2 7 Furthermore, Adaria bears the burden of demonstrating to the
Court the existence of a custom regarding admission.28 Adaria cannot meet that
burden for two reasons. First, there is no widespread or consistent practice of
states2 9 regarding admission to membership in international organizations as the
procedures for accession to membership vary with each organization.3" Second,
states share no opiniojuris" regarding the legal obligation to admit states which
satisfy conditions in accession agreements. For example, the UN does not
require accession agreements.32 Indeed, Security Council members have vetoed
for political reasons the admission of applicants who have otherwise satisfied
the Article 4 conditions.33 Likewise, the EU and the Council of Europe admit
new members only if all Member States politically agree upon the admission.34
27. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 105. See also KLABBERS, supra note 3, at 105; KONRAD G.
BUHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 19(2001); Ebere Sieke,
Admission to Membership in International Organizations: the Case ofNamibia, 51 BRIT. Y. B. INT'LL. 190,
192 (1980); Felice Morgenstern, Legality in International Organizations, 48 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 241,244
(1976).
28. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (Nov. 30).
29. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20).
30. Compare TEU, supra note 6, art. 49 with North Atlantic Treaty art. 10, Apr. 4, 1949, 34
U.N.T.S. 243 andConstitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization art. II, Oct. 16,1945, 12 U.S.T. 980
and Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. IV, Oct. 23, 1956, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. See also
Sieke, supra note 27, at 189.
31. See North Sea Continental Shelf 1969 I.C.J. at 42.
32. U.N. Charter art. 4.
33. See U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1836th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIPV. 1836 (Aug. 11,1975); U.N. SCOR,
30th Sess., 1846th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1846 (Sept. 30, 1975). See also SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 96;
KLABBERS, supra note 3, at 110; MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 46
(2001); FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 144,146 (2d ed.
1993); Stephen Jacobs & Marc Poirier, The Right to Veto Untied Nations Membership Applications: The
United States Veto of the Viet-Nams, 17 HARv. INT'L L. J. 581 (1976).
34. See TEU, supra note 6, art. 49; Council of Europe Statute, supra note 23, art. 4; Eur. Parl. Ass.
Res. 1055 (Feb. 2, 1995); Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1089 (May 29, 1996); Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1102 (Nov. 7, 1996).
See also MAURICE FITZGERALD, PROTECTIONISM TO LIBERALISATION: IRELAND ANDTHE EEC 224-27(2001);
Richard Davis, The 'Problem of de Gaulle': British Reactions to General de Gaulle's Veto of the UK
Application to Join the Common Market, 32 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 453 (1997); Evelyne Gelin, L 'Adhesion de
la Russie au Conseil de l'Europe a la Lumiere de la Crise Tchetchene, 99 REV. GEN. PUB. INT'L L. 623, 638
(1995).
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Even in cases where accession agreements govern admission to the
organization, Professor Amerasinghe has concluded that:
[I]t would not be appropriate to speak of a legal obligation to admit
an applicant that fulfills the necessary conditions, since the applicant
cannot be said to fulfill the conditions until the members have decided
that it does, and some of the conditions are subjective, depending on
the judgment of the organization.35
In other words, there is no automatic right in international law to be admitted
to an international organization, even when a state satisfies the conditions of an
accession agreement.36 Thus, the RU was not obliged to admit Adaria to
membership as a matter of custom.
3. Respondents are not responsible for any internationally wrongful acts the
RU may have committed.
a. Respondents are not directly responsible for the RUs actions because the
R U assumes obligations independently from Respondents by virtue of its
separate international legal personality.
Under international law, international organizations possess separate legal
personality37 and are independently responsible for their own acts.38 In the
Reparations case, this Court found that international organizations "exercis[e]
and enjo[y] functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the
possession of a large measure of international legal personality and the capacity
to operate on the international plane., 39 Considering whether non-Member
States must recognize this personality, the Court held that the Member States
of the UN "had the power in conformity with international law, to bring into
being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely
35. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 107.
36. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 11, at 30-31.
37. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 18-19; Esa Paasivirta, The European Union: From an
Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 41 (1997); James E. Hickey, Jr.,
The Source of International Legal Personality in the 21 st Century, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 1,5 (1997);
Finn Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 34 NORDISK
TiDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L RET. 1, 45 (1964).
38. See Gerhard Hafner, Can International Organizations Be Controlled? Accountability and
Responsibility, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 236 (2003); Christian Tomuschat, The International
Responsibility of the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
179 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2002); Finn Seyersted, The Legal Nature of International Organizations, 51
NORDISK TIDSSKRJFr FOR INT'L RET. 203, 205 (1982).
39. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 179 (April 11).
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personality recognized by them alone."'4 Similarly, the EU and the EC have
objective legal personality which other states must recognize."t
Like the UN and the EU, the RU possesses objective international legal
personality. This personality is evidenced by the fact that the RU has entered
into treaties with states, negotiated with other states concerning the protection
of RU nationals, and become a member of another international organization,
the World Trade Organization.42 Adaria has also implicitly recognized the RUs
independent legal personality by entering into a treaty with it.43
One of the major incidents of an organization's possession of legal
personality is the ability to assume international obligations in its own right by
entering into treaties.' When an international organization enters into such a
treaty, the organization itself, not its Member States, assumes the treaty
obligations.45 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between states
and International Organizations (VCLTSIO), to which both Adaria and
Respondents are parties,46 provides that such a treaty "does not create either
rights or obligations for a third state or a third organization without the consent
of that state or organization." '47 Obligations for a third state to such a treaty can
only arise "if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of
establishing the obligation and the third state expressly accepts that obligation
in writing."'48 While the drafters of the VCLTSIO considered including an
Article 36bis which would have made treaty commitments of international
organizations automatically binding upon Member States, they expressly
rejected this approach as inconsistent with international law.49
40. Id. at 185.
41. See Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R.
105, 129; Comm'n v. Council, Case 22/70, 1970 E.C.R. 263,267; TREVOR C. HARTLEY, EUROPEAN UNION
LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 217 (2004); Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Legal Personality, 11 luS GENTIIJM
35,36(2005); Maria Gavouneli, International Law Aspects ofthe European Union, 8TUL. JANTL&COMP.
L. 147, 148 (2000).
42. Compromis IM 9, 12.
43. Id. at 15.
44. See Report of International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Second Session, U.N.
Doc. A/45/1 0, pp. 84-89 (July 20, 1990); Rosalyn Higgins, Report on the Legal Consequences for Member
States of the Non-fullfillment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties, 1
Y.B. INST. INT'L L. 252 (1995).
45. See SCHARF, supra note 33, at 44 (2001); Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 179; Finn Seyersted,
United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 351, 450 (1961).
46. Compromis 40.
47. VCLTSIO, supra note 20, art. 34.
48. VCLTSIO, supra note 20, art. 35 (emphasis added).
49. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session,
[1982] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A1I982/Add.1; Giorgio Gaja, A "New" Vienna
Convention on Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations: A Critical Commentary, 58 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 253,263-64 (1987); Tomuschat, supra note
38, at 179.
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As the AAA was a treaty between Adaria and the RU,5" it created rights
and obligations only for Adaria and the RU, and not for Respondents. Neither
the RU nor Respondents intended the AAA to create any obligation for Respon-
dents since, under the TRU, the RU Council, not Respondents, is responsible
for the accession process." Likewise, no provision in the treaty identifies any
obligations owed to Adaria by Respondents. Because the RU assumed
obligations under the AAA in its own right, Respondents cannot be responsible
for any violations which the RU may have committed.
b. Respondents are not concurrently responsible for the RUs violations of
its legal obligations because they have not consented to be held responsible.
As this Court's President, Rosalyn Higgins, has observed "there is no
general rule of international law whereby states members are, due solely to their
membership, liable concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an
international organization of which they are members."52 The constituent
treaties of many international organizations clarify that Member States are not
responsible for the organization's legal liabilities by expressly disclaiming such
responsibility.53 Moreover, in the International Tin Council case, the British
House of Lords found that the Member States of the International Tin Council
(ITC) could not be held liable for the ITCs failure to pay financial obligations
which it owed to third parties.54 The ITC was created by thirty-two states to
buy and sell tin on the world market for the purpose of keeping the prices
stable.5 When the ITC went bankrupt in 1985, several creditors attempted to
recover their debts by suing the Member States. 6 In the Court of Appeals
decision, Lord Kerr could not "find any basis for concluding that.., there is
any rule of international law, binding on the member states of the ITC, whereby
they can be held liable, let alone jointly and severally .... for the debts...
resulting from contracts concluded by the ITC in its own name."57 Writing for
the majority in the House of Lords, Lord Templeman likewise reasoned that
there was "no support" for the proposition that "a contract by the ITC involves
a concurrent, direct, or guarantee liability on the members joint and
50. Compromis, Annex U.
51. Compromis, Annex I art. 11.
52. See SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 1585; Higgins, supra note 44, at 251.
53. See MacLaine Watson & Co. Ltd. v. Int'l Tin Council, [1989] 1 Ch. 72, 253 (Annex to
Judgement of Kerr L.J.). See also Higgins, supra note 44, at 252; C.F. Amerasinghe, Liability to Third
Parties of Member States of International Organizations: Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 260 (1991).
54. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., et al. v. Australia, 29 I.L.M. 670, 674 (U.c
House of Lords 1989).
55. Id. at 680.
56. Id. at 690.
57. MacLaine Watson & Co., [1989] 1 Ch. 72, at 253.
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severally."58 Just as the ITC Member States were not responsible by virtue of
their ITC membership, Respondents, as RU member states, are not responsible
for any violations of legal obligations which the RU may have committed.
The International Law Commission (ILC), a group of distinguished
publicists charged with the codification of customary international law,59 has
likewise found that Member States of international organizations are not
concurrently responsible for the actions of their organization simply by virtue
of their membership. As the law of state responsibility does not address the
issue of the responsibility of Member States for the actions of international
organizations," the TLC codified the emerging rules in this area in its Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (Draft Articles).6'
These articles identify only four ways in which a Member State may be
responsible for an internationally wrongful act of the organization. 2 First, a
state may be responsible if it knowingly "aids or assists an international
organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act."63 Second,
a state may be responsible if it "directs and controls an international
organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act."' Third, a
state may be responsible if it "coerces an international organization" to commit
such an act. 5 Finally, a Member State is responsible for the acts of the organi-
zation if "[i]t has accepted responsibility for that act or it has led the injured
party to rely on its responsibility."66 As Respondents have not consented to be
responsible for the acts of the RU and have neither aided, directed, or coerced
the RU in its actions, they are not responsible for any internationally wrongful
acts the RU might have committed.
Respondents have never coerced the RU to act in any way. Similarly,
Respondents neither directed nor assisted the RU in its consideration of
Adaria's application for RU membership. In exercising its discretion regarding
whether to admit Adaria to membership, the Council acted in its own right as
58. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group, 29 I.L.M. at 674.
59. See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 46 (Sept. 25); Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 158 (July 20); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 292 (2001); R.Y. Jennings, Recent Developments in the International Law
Commission: Its Relation to the Sources of International Law, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 385, 386 (1964).
60. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 57,
International Law Commission, U.N. GA 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
61. Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, Commentary, locatedin Report
of International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, at pp. 246-92
(Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Draft Articles of Responsibility of International Organizations].
62. ld. at 261-262.
63. Id. at 261.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 262.
66. Id.
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an organ of the RU.67 While Respondents may have had representatives on the
Council, these representatives acted solely in their capacity as Council members
and not as instruments of Respondents. The ILCs Commentary to the Draft
Articles explains that if the state is a member of the organization "the influence
that may amount to aid or assistance [can]not simply consist in participation in
the decision-making processes of the organization according to the pertinent
rules of the organization."6 Likewise, the Commentary draws a distinction
"between participation by a member State in the decision-making process of the
organization according to its pertinent rules, and direction or control which
would trigger" responsibility.69 Because Respondents' only participation, if
any, in the Council's decision not to admit Adaria was due to the RU rules of
procedure,7" Respondents cannot be considered to have directed or assisted the
RU. Respondents also never consented to be held liable for the RUs actions.
Thus, Respondents are not responsible for any internationally wrongful acts the
RU is alleged to have committed.
B. Respondents Have Standing to Assert A Claim Against Adaria's For Its
Violation of the R U Legation's Immunity.
1. Respondents have a direct legal interest in Adaria's violation of the RU
legation's immunity.
a. Respondents as R U Member States have a direct interest in the
enforcement of legal obligations owed to the RU.
In the jurisdictional phase of the South West Africa case, this Court
recognized that Member States of international organizations have a legal
interest in the enforcement of obligations owed to the organization by other
states.7 The case involved a claim brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against
South Africa for violations of the Mandate Agreement for South West Africa,
which had been negotiated between the League of Nations (League) and South
Africa.72 South Africa objected on the grounds that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked
standing because South Africa's alleged mismanagement of the territory
affected no material interests of the two states.7" The Court held that the
67. See Finn Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations,
34 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L RET. 1, 41-43 (1964).
68. Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 61, at 279, 281.
69. Id.
70. Compromis 27-28, Annex I art. 11 (6), Annex lI.
71. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.), Jurisdiction Phase, 1962 I.C.J. 319,
342-44 (Dec. 21).
72. Id. at 321.
73. Id. at 342-43.
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applicants had standing by virtue of their membership in the League.74 In
particular, the Court reasoned that League members "have a legal right or
interest in the observance by the Mandatory of its obligations both toward the
inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations and
its Members."75 In his separate opinion, Judge Jessup clarified that "this case
establishes... that a state may have a legal interest in the observance, in the
territories of another state, of general welfare treaty provisions and that it may
assert such interest without alleging any impact upon its own nationals or its
direct so-called tangible or material interests."76
Just as Ethiopia and Liberia had an interest in South Africa's performance
of the legal obligations owed to the League, Respondents, as members of the
RU, have a legal interest in Adaria's respect for the immunity guaranteed the
RU Legation under the AAA. Like Ethiopia and Liberia who were concerned
that South Africa was not administering South West Africa consistent with its
Mandate obligations, Respondents have protested Adaria's failure to afford the
RU Legation immunity under international law.77 Moreover, as Judge
Skubiszewski stated in the East Timor case, "to have jus standi before the
Court, it is enough to show direct concern in the outcome of the case."78
Because the RU represents the political and economic unity of Respondents,
Adaria's failure to respect the RU Legation's immunity directly concerns
Respondents.
b. Respondents have also suffered moral injury as a result of Adaria's
violation of the R U Legation's immunity.
In his separate opinion in the South West Africa case, Judge Jessup
observed that "[i]nternational law has long recognized that states may have
legal interests in matters which do not affect their financial, economic, or other
'material', or, say 'physical' or 'tangible' interests."79 One of these tradition-
ally recognized legal interests is the moral injury a state suffers when another
state fails to give it due respect as a co-equal sovereign."° One of the primary
ways in which a state suffers moral injury is through "wrongs to diplomatic
74. Id. at 343.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 428 (separate opinion of Judge Jessup).
77. Compromis 33.
78. East Timor (Port. v. Aust.) 1995 I.C.J. 90, 225 (June 30) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Skubiszewski).
79. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Aft.), Jurisdiction Phase, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 425
(Dec. 21) (separate opinion of Judge Jessup).
80. See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSrBILrrY PART 1199-200
(1983); Jodi Wexler, The Rainbow Warrior Affair: State andAgent Responsibilityfor Authorized Violations
of International Law, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 389, 403.
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missions and the like."'" Numerous international tribunals, including this
Court, have recognized moral injury as a basis for awarding compensation to
an injured state. 2
Adaria's failure to accord the RU Legation immunity violates its obliga-
tion to respect the co-equal sovereign status of Respondents. In the Reparations
case, this Court suggested that because international organizations are created
by states, the respect that other states must afford these organizations derives
from the respect they owe to the Member States which created the organiza-
tion. 3 States accord an organization immunity with respect its functions
because the organization performs these functions to serve the interests of its
Member States.84 Thus, just as an injury to a state's citizen involves the
violation of "an obligation towards the national state in respect of its
nationals,'" an injury to an international organization constitutes a moral injury
to the Member States. Here, Respondents suffered moral injury because Adaria
failed show proper respect to the Legation of an international organization
which they created.
2. Respondents can also assert claims before this
Court on behalf of the RU.
Because Respondents have not expressly delegated the right to assert
claims to the RU, they, as Member States which created the RU, retain the right
to assert claims on its behalf. Under principles of the institutional law of
international organizations, "international organizations are competent to act
only as far as powers have been attributed to them by member states."8 6 As
Respondents have not expressly given the RU the power to bring claims against
states," they have retained for themselves the right to assert claims regarding
the violations of the RUs rights before this Court.
Respondent's retention of the right to assert the RUs claims is consistent
with this Court's Statute. Article 34(1) of the Statute clarifies that "[o]nly
States may be parties in cases before the Court." 8 However, Article 34(2)
81. BROWNLIE, supra note 80, at 236.
82. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 14); Borchgrave
(Beig. v. Sp.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C), No. 85, at 37; Rainbow Warrior (Fr. v. N.Z.) 82 I.L.R. 500 (Fr.-N.Z.
Arbitration Tribunal 1990).
83. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 185 (April 11).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 181.
86. SCHERMERS, supra note 3, § 209. See also AMERASINGHE, supra note 3,135,138; KLABBERS,
supra note 3, at 63; RACHEL FRID, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
47 (1995); Pierre Pescatore, Relations Extirieures Des Communates, 103 RECUEIL DES COuRS 219 (1961).
87. Compromis, Annex I.
88. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 23, art. 34(1).
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contemplates that international organizations may have legal interests involved
in the disputes by explicitly allowing the Court to "request of public inter-
national organizations information relevant to cases before it." 9 Early judges
of the Court, including Judge Jessup, also recognized that international organi-
zations would have claims against states that should be presented to the Court.90
The ability of Member States to bring claims on behalf of their organizations
solves this problem.
The notion that Member States may bring claims on behalf of international
organizations is also consistent with this Court's approach to standing in the
East Timor case.9' One of the issues raised in the case was whether Portugal
had standing to assert claims against Australia on behalf of the people of East
Timor.92 While the Court did not directly decide the question of Portugal's
standing because it was able to dispose of the case on other grounds,93 several
judges suggested that states could have standing to assert the claims of other
international legal persons.94 According to these judges, the only problem with
Portugal's standing was that the East Timorese people had not consented to
have Portugal assert their claim.95 Here, the RU has consented to have
Respondents assert its claim against Adaria. Thus, Respondents have standing
to bring the RUs claim before the Court.
C. Adaria Violated International Law Governing The Immunity of
International Organizations By Seizing The Premises, Property, And
Personnel Of The R U Legation.
1. Adaria is obligated to accord the RU Legation functional
immunity under international law.
a. The RU Legation has functional immunity under both the AAA and
customary international law.
Under the AAA, Adaria agreed to accord the RU Legation "privileges and
immunities" as provided for "by international law." 96 Adaria further recognized
that it was obligated to afford the RU Legation such immunity when it accepted
the diplomatic credentials of Ambassador Heep and the other RU diplomatic
89. Id. art. 34(2).
90. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 25 (1948).
91. East Timor (Port. v. Aust.) 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
92. Id. at 99.
93. Id. at 105.
94. SeeId. at 135 (separate opinion ofJudge Vereshchetin); Id. at255 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Subiszewski).
95. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 135 (separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin).
96. Compromis, Annex H 3.
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personnel.97 As international law generally requires respect for the premises,
property and personnel of international organizations,98 the AAA should be read
to incorporate such immunities.
Independently of the AAA, Adaria is obliged to afford the RU Legation
functional immunity as a matter of custom. In the Reparations case, this Court
found that international law grants international organizations immunity for the
purpose of ensuring their ability to perform the functions entrusted to them by
states.99 In the UNPrivileges andImmunities case, the Court also acknowledg-
ed that states may not establish an organization and fail to provide it with the
basic immunities that ensure its independence from its host state.' Likewise,
in Branno v. Ministry of War, the Italian Court of Cassation held that, even
absent conventional provisions, there exists a custom that protects the func-
tional immunity of international organizations.'' The court reaffirmed this
principle in FoodandAgriculture Organization v. Colagrossi, expressly stating
that "customary international law govern[s] the immunity of international
organizations."'' 2 Similarly, the Swiss Labor Court in Z.M. v. Permanent
Delegation of the League ofArab States to the UN held that "customary inter-
national law recognize[s] that international organizations, whether universal or
regional, enjoy absolute jurisdictional immunity."'0 3 The court explained that
"[t]his privilege arises from . . . the purposes and functions assigned to"
international organizations as "[t]hey can only carry out their tasks if they are
beyond the censure of' national courts.'04 The RU Legation thus had a right to
functional immunity under customary international law.
97. Compromis 18.
98. See infra Section III. A. 2. See generally AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 315; MALCOM N.
SHAW, UINTERNATIONAL LAW 1206 (4th ed., 2003); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 683.
99. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174,184 (April 11). See also Rosalyn Higgins, The Abuse ofPrivileges and Immunities: Recent United
Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 641,645 (1985).
100. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177, 192 (Dec. 15).
101. Branno v. Ministry of War, 22 I.L.R. 756, 757 (It. Cass. 1954). See also Waite and Kennedy
v. Germany, 116 I.L.R. 121, 134 (1999).
102. Food and Agriculture Organization v. Colagrossi, 101 I.L.R. 386,387 (It. Cass. 1992). See also
Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615-617 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 116
I.L.R. 121, 134 (Ger. 1999).
103. Z.M. v. Permanent Delegation of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, 116 I.L.R.
643, 647 (Switz. 1993).
104. Id.
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b. The RUs right to functional immunity required Adaria to respect the
inviolability of the Legation's premises, property and personnel.
The protection of premises, property, and personnel is universally recog-
nized as necessary for an international organization's independent exercise of
its functions and responsibilities.'° 5 For example, the American Restatement
of the Law of Foreign Relations provides that "an international organization
enjoys immunity from any exercise ofjurisdiction by a member state that would
interfere with official use by the organization of its premises, archives,
documents, or communications."' °6 This same immunity extends to officials as
well.10 7 Likewise, nearly all constituent treaties of international financial
organizations' 8 as well as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations (UN Convention) 109and the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (Specialized Agencies Convention)" 0
specifically provide for the protection of premises, property, and personnel.
The UN Convention and the Specialized Agencies Convention are so widely
ratified that they are considered to embody customary international law
regarding functional immunity."'
The UN Convention, the Specialized Agencies Convention, as well as
other treaties provide that the property and assets of the organizations shall be
immune from all forms ofjudicial process." 2 These conventions also require
that "the archives of [the organization] and, in general, all documents belonging
to it or held by it shall be inviolable wherever located.""' 3 This protection
105. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 346.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 469 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
107. Id.
108. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 39
[hereinafter IMF Articles]; Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
May 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1077 (1990) [hereinafter EBRD Articles]; Agreement Establishing the Inter-
American Development Bank, Apr. 8, 1959, 389 U.N.T.S. 69 [hereinafter IADB Agreement]; Agreement
Establishing the African Development Bank, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 14/AFDB (1964) [hereinafter ADB
Agreement]; Asian Development Bank Articles of Agreement, Dec. 4, 1965, 571 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter
Asian Agreement].
109. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S.
15 [hereinafter UN Convention].
110. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, 33
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Specialized Agencies Convention].
111. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 346.
112. See UN Convention, supra note 109, art. 2 §3; Specialized Agencies Convention, supra note
110, §5; IMF Articles, supra note 108, art. IX(4); EBRD Articles, supra note 108, art. 47; IADB Agreement,
supra note 108, art. XI(3); ADB Agreement, supra note 108, art. 52(2); Asian Agreement, supra note 108,
art. 50(3).
113. UN Convention, supra note 109, art. 2 §4. See also Specialized Agencies Convention, supra
note, 110, art. VI §5; IMF Articles art. IX(5); EBRD Agreement, supra note 108, art. 48; IADB Agreement,
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ensures the confidentiality of the organization's operations.14 The UN
Convention also provides that the premises of the UN shall be inviolable." 5
While there are no equivalent express provisions in other conventions or consti-
tuent treaties, protection of premises can be inferred from their various provi-
sions regarding the protection of property." 6 Specifically, these treaties'
prohibitions on searches and confiscations of property demonstrate that the
premises of the organizations are outside the reach of states." 7 Finally, these
conventions provide that the officials of international organizations shall be
immune from legal process. 118 This protection of personnel allows officials of
such organizations to fulfill their duties without fear of repercussions from the
host state.
c. The RU Legation did not waive its immunity as its actions were bothlawful and within its functions.
In FAO v INDPAI, the Italian Court of Cassation concluded that the test
for determining whether an act was within the functional immunity of an
organization is whether the purpose of the activity is directly connected with the
institutional aims normally pursued by the organization." 9 As agreed to by
Adaria in the AAA, the RU Legation was to aid in the diplomatic and economic
aspects of Adarian integration in to the RU. 2' In assisting states in the
accession process, international organizations often provide financial support
to pro-integration forces. For example, the EU through its Phare program has
consistently provided financial aid to less economically developed European
countries which seek admission to the EU.'2 ' Like the Phare program, the RU
Legation's contributions to pro-RU Adarian politicians served its purpose of
facilitating Adaria's integration into the RU.
supra note 108, art. XI(5); ADB Agreement, art. 53(2); Asian Agreement, supra note art. 52.
114. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 331.
115. UN Convention, supra note 109, art. H §3.
116. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 330.
117. See IMF Articles, supra note 108, art. IX(4); EBRD Agreement, supra note 108, art. 47; IADB
Agreement, supra note 108, art. XI(3); ADB Agreement, supra note 108, art. 52(2); Asian Agreement, supra
note 108, art. 50(3).
118. See UN Convention, supra note 109, § 18(a); Specialized Agencies Convention, supra note I 10,
§ 19(a); IMF Articles, supra note 108, art. IX(8)(i); EBRD, supra note 108, art. 51; IADB Agreement, supra
note 108, art. XI(8)(a); ADB Agreement, supra note 108, art. 56(l); Asian Agreement, supra note 108, art.
55(i).
119. FAOv. INPDAI, 87 I.L.R. 1, 6-7 (It. Cass.1982).
120. Compromis, Annex H 13.
121. See Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central
European and Mediterranean States, 1 LOY. INT'L L. REV. 15, 22 (2003).
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Moreover, the Legation's political contributions did not violate Adaria's
domestic laws. Section 17-1031 of the Adarian Civil Code only prohibits
political contributions from a "foreign business or corporate entity.' 22 The RU
Legation is neither a business nor corporate entity, but rather, as recognized by
Adaria's own prime minister, it is "the representative of the Rotian Union in
Adaria." 123 As the RU Legation was properly fulfilling its functions at all times
while in Adaria, it was entitled to functional immunity.
2. Adaria violated the RU Legation's functional immunity by
seizing its premises, property and personnel.
International law accords the property and archives of international
organizations very broad protection. 24 In Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v.
Int'l Tin Council the British House of Lords held that the ITC had the same
immunity for its archives as did diplomatic missions. 125  The Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that the documents of such
missions "shall be inviolable at any time wherever they may be."'26 The House
of Lords in Shearson also clarified that "archives" include all documents
belonging to or held by the organization. Adaria's seizure of the RU Legation's
bank records as well as other files clearly violated this immunity. 27
The personnel and premises of an international organization also enjoy
broad protection. under international law. For example, in 767 Third Avenue
Association v. Permanent Mission of Zaire, the United States Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a landlord could not forcibly enter the premises of
the Zaire Mission to evict its tenants for failure to pay rent even though the
landlord owned the building. 2 Here, Adaria not only stormed the RU Legation
without warning and without seeking its consent, but it also arrested
Ambassador Heep and imprisoned him for two days without filing any official
charges. 129 This blatant disrespect for the RUs premises and its personnel
should not be tolerated by the Court.
122. Compromis 30.
123. Compromis 18.
124. AMERASINGHE, supra note 3, at 328.
125. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Int'l Tin Council (No. 2), 77 I.L.R. 107, 131 (U.K.H.L.
1987).
126. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 24, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
127. Shearson Lehman Brothers, 77 I.L.R. at 131.
128. 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire to the United
Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1993).
129. Compromis I 31, 33.
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D. Adaria's National Industry Act Illegally Expropriated Assets Owned by
Respondents' Nationals.
1. The NIA constitutes an expropriation of assets owned by the
Respondents' citizens.
Expropriation is not limited to a state's direct taking of assets but also
encompasses any "unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment or
disposal of property so as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not
be able to use, enjoy or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of
time after the inception of such interference."' 30 Thus, in Starret Housing
Corp. v. Iran, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal found that expropriation includes
any interference with property rights which renders those rights useless to the
owner." ' Indeed, any "covert or incidental interference" with the use of
property which deprives the owner of "the economic benefits of his property,
even if not to the obvious benefit of the State," is expropriation.' 32 To
determine whether a governmental action is expropriation, tribunals generally
consider:
I) The degree of interference with the property right;
2) The purpose and context of the governmental measures; and
3) The interference of the measure with reasonable and
investment-backed expectations.133
Interference with property ownership which substantially impairs the
owner's use or enjoyment of the property has consistently been found to be
expropriation. 34 In Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, the tribunal held that
Jamaica's decision to charge the applicant increased royalties was an
expropriation. 35 The tribunal reasoned that, even though the applicant still had
legal title to its property and was still able to operate its business, the govern-
mental action had effectively deprived the applicant of the right to control and
use its property.' 36 Similarly, in CME (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, the
130. Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens,
art. 10(5), reprinted in Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests ofAliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 548 (1961). See also BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 508; SHAW,
supra note 98, at 740.
131. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983).
132. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 616 I.L.R. 617, 639 (2000).
133. Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, OECD Doc.
No. 2004/4, 10 (2004) [hereinafter OECD Doc.].
134. Id. at l1.
135. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 56 I.L.R. 258, 259 (1980).
136. Id.
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tribunal found that the Czech National Media Council's restrictions on the use
of an exclusive license granted to the applicant's media company constituted
an expropriation because the restrictions destroyed the applicant's operations,
leaving the company "with assets, but without business."' 13 7
The NIA similarly deprives Respondents' nationals from using and
enjoying their investments in Adaria. Like the exorbitant increase in royalties
in Revere Copper which prevented applicant from deriving financial benefit
from his business in Jamacia, the NIAs absolute ban on capital transfers
prevents companies based in the RU from utilizing the profits of their Adarian
enterprises. Moreover, just as the license restrictions in CME technically left
the applicants with ownership of their assets but without a use for them, the
NIA prevents the RU corporations from enjoying the integration benefits of
their ownership of the formerly Adarian-run enterprises. Thus, Adaria has, for
all effective purposes, taken the property of Respondents' nationals.
While governments occasionally pass regulations which affect foreign
interests without amounting to expropriation, 3 ' the cases in which tribunals
have upheld such action involved laws which granted property owners much
greater freedom to manage their assets than does the NIA. For instance, in
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal upheld regulation which introduced
export quotas that resulted merely in a reduction of profits.'39 In contrast, the
NIA totally deprives RU corporations of the use of their profits made in Adaria.
In Starrett Housing, the detention of applicant's personnel which the Tribunal
upheld did not amount to a taking of property because it did not completely
deprive the asset owners of the right and ability to utilize and profit from their
assets. The NIA, on the other hand, leaves no such residual right to the RU-
based corporations, but rather absolutely prohibits the export of profits.
2. The NIA's expropriation of Respondents' nationals' assets is illegal
because it is discriminatory and does not provide for compensation.
As the UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(Resources Resolution)14 has been widely acknowledged by arbitral tribunals' 4
and publicists 42 as reflecting customary international law, it provides the
137. CME (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (Partial Award) (Sept. 13, 2001) available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001 PartialAward.pdf.
138. See OECD Doc., supra note 133, at 4; BROWNLIE,supra note 3, at 208.
139. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award of June 26,2000, NAFTA/UNC1TRAL Tribunal,
reprinted in 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 455, 479 (2000).
140. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR,
17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/$217 (1962) [hereinafter Resources Resolution].
141. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389, 489 (1977); Kuwait v. Aminoil,
66 I.L.R. 519, 601 (1982).
142. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 510; SHAW, supra note 98, at 744; REBECCA WALLACE,
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appropriate standard by which to judge whether expropriation is legitimate. 143
According to the Resolution, expropriation can be justified only if it is:
1) For a public purpose;
2) Provided for by law;
3) Non-discriminatory; and
4) Accompanied by adequate compensation. 44
All four conditions must be met. As the NIA does not satisfy these conditions,
it is illegal.
Discriminatory expropriation is illegal. 145 In Amoco International Finance
Corp. v. Iran, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal held that customary international
law prohibits discriminatory expropriation when there is not an objective and
reasonablejustification for the distinctions made. 46 The American Restatement
of the Law of Foreign Relations provides that an governmental act is
discriminatory if it is applied only to alien enterprises. 147 Expropriation is also
discriminatory if it is engaged in for extraneous political reasons. Thus, in
British Petroleum Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. v. Libya, the arbitrator
found Libya's nationalization law to be discriminatory because it was an act of
political retaliation against Britain.
41
Just as the nationalization in the British Petroleum case was targeted at a
specific company, the NIA effectively applies only to business concerns owned
by RU-based corporations. While the NIA refers to "recently privatized
business concerns,"'149 all such business concerns were privatized and purchased
by companies based within the RU.'5°  Furthermore, like the politically
retaliatory law in the British Petroleum case which was designed to expel the
British from Libya, the NIA was meant to punish the RU for its decision to
postpone Adaria's admission. The Adarian Parliament passed the NIA shortly
after its unsuccessful bid for RU membership and within days of Ambassador
Heep's arrest. The effect of the NIA has also been to encourage RU-based
corporations to leave Adaria. In this aspect alone, the NIA is illegal.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (4th ed., 2002).
143. OECD Doc. supra note 133, at 3; RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 712.
144. Resources Resolution, supra note 140.
145. OECD Doc., supra note 133, at 4; OPPENHEIM, supra note 13, at 920; SHAW, supra note 98,
at 751.
146. Amoco Int'l Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 139 (1987).
147. RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 712.
148. British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 297, 329 (1974). See also
Libyan-Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 62 I.L.R. 141, 194 (1977).
149. Compromis 35.
150. Compromis 20.
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Expropriation without "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation is
also illegal.15" ' The requirement to compensate is universally accepted and is
provided for in the Resources Resolution' as well as in the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.'53 National laws have also consistently
found compensation to be decisive in determining whether governmental
takings are illegal.5 4 In Libyan-American Oil Co. v. Libya, the arbitrator found
that the Libyan government had an obligation to compensate the applicant for
concession rights which it had nationalized.' Similarly, the arbitral tribunal
in Benvenuti v. Congo ordered the Congolese government to compensate the
applicants for nationalizing business concerns in which they had an interest.'56
Adaria has not provided any compensation to RU companies. In this regard, the
NIA is patently illegal.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request this
Honorable Court to find, adjudge, and declare as follows:
1) That the denial of Adaria's application to join the RU did not a
breach any international legal obligations owed to Adaria by
Respondents;
2) That Respondents may properly bring a claim for Adaria's
actions against the RU Legation, its property, and Ambassador
Heep;
3) That Adaria violated international law concerning the immunity
of diplomatic missions by seizing the premises, property, and
personnel of the RU Legation.
4) That the National Industry Act constitutes an illegal expropria-
tion of Respondents' nationals' property.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents for Respondents
151. See Amoco Int'l Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189,223 (1987); Am. Int'l
Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96, 105 (1983); OECD Doc., supra note 133, at 3; OPPENHEIM,
supra note 13, at 920; SHAW, supra note 98, at 743.
152. Resources Resolution, supra note 140.
153. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States art. 2(2), G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974); Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262;
American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; U.S. CONST. amend V.
154. WALLACE,supra note 142, at 191.
155. Libyan-Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 62 I.L.R. 141, 201 (1977).
156. Benvenuti v. Congo, 67 I.L.R. 345, 374 (1980). See also Sociedad Minera el Teniente SA v.
Norddeustsche Affinerie AG, 73 I.L.R. 230, 244-245 (1973).
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